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Summary 
The current vast sociocultural shift from Modernism to Post-
Modernism forms the backdrop to this study. Whenever paradigm 
shifts occur, the metaphors which depict human experience and 
._,,;t,denti ty also change. The mechanistic metaphors of Modernism 
are giving way to metaphors derived from art and literature, 
in particular narrative theory. Self, as one of the most 
pivotal notions in philosophy, literature, and psychology, 
should not be excluded from this process of 
reconceptualisation. As the point of intersection between the 
personal and the cultural, the notion of Self now needs to be 
reformulated to become more coherent with Post-Modernist 
ideas. Within this framework the Modernist notion of a Self 
which is unified, substantial, and stable across all contexts, 
is deconstructed in this study to reveal the linguistic and 
ideological codes and conventions which are used in its 
.__,.construction. It is proposed that the Self can be viewed as 
embedded in relationship with others and as inscribed by the 
prevailing cultural ideologies regarding personhood. As such 
-~,t:he Self can be regarded as held together reflexively by 
narrative codes and conventions. These ideas are demonstrated 
in an analysis of two written self-narratives and applied to 
the conventions and practices in psychotherapy. 
viii 
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CHAPTER 1 
LANGUAGE AND MEANING: FROM MODERNISM TO STRUCTURALISM 
Introduction 
This study is an exercise in making explicit the implicit 
discourses and practices which create, organise, and perpetuate 
concepts of identity and interpersonal meaning in sociocultural 
contexts. The assumption on which the study, and in particular, 
the notions of Self are based, do not correspond with the 
traditional Cartesian notion of Self as a fixed set of enduring 
characteristics. Instead, the assumptions follow the Post-
~''"'Structuralist idea of identity as a set of intersubjective 
'negotiations' which is ever in flux, and which has to be 
continually renegotiated in the intersubjective domain. Thus, on 
a philosophical level this study is an examination of the 
fundamental reconceptualisation of the concept of the 
individual, and, as such, it will trace the evolution of these 
ideas from Modernism to Post-Structuralism (both are movements 
in literary theory and philosophy which will be elucidated 
later on) in this and in the next chapter. 
Western countries are currently undergoing a fundamental and 
radical reappraisal of the understanding of the nature of truth 
·· .. and. knowledge. The belief in objective knowledge is gradually 
receding, propelled by the vast cultural movement, Post-
Modernism. Inevitably all the systems of knowledge which 
reflected that belief (the natural and social sciences) are 
facing the uneasy challenges of undergoing radical alteration. A 
number of fundamental assumptions in psychology (i.e. the 
appropriateness of a scientific model for psychology; defining 
people in terms of theoretical frameworks which alienate them 
from their own experiences) need to be questioned and 
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reconceptualised if it is to take account of the Post-Modernist 
movement. 
While Post-Modernist influences are becoming apparent in 
academic spheres, it is also evident in art, architecture, 
music, film and literature. Its influence is characterised by a 
~·xejection of the notion of identifiable essences, an 
acknowledgement of the social construction of reality, a 
disregard for authority and for rational coherence, and the 
,..,.emergence of ironic self-reflection. Science is increasingly 
seen as influenced by social, political and ideological trends, 
rather than as reflecting objective truths. Therefore attention 
....... fis increasingly shifted from a single objective representation 
of the world, to various subjective representations of the 
world. Moreover, these representations are not produced by 
~·individuals in isolation, but are influenced by collective 
narratives which are reflected in literary and cultural 
traditions. It follows from this that if scientific knowledge is 
seen to be shaped by literary conventions, then so too are 
conceptualisations about the Self (Gergen, 1991). 
If psychology is to enter the arena of Post-Modernist discourse, 
then a reformulation of our understanding of the Self is 
required. The Self has been one of the foundational concepts in 
psychology and has until now reflected the basic assumptions of 
the Modernist paradigm, namely, Self is seen as a consistent and 
coherent set of characteristics (which emerge from the person's 
'soul' or 'personality'), which are contained within the 
physical boundaries of the person, and which embody the enduring 
essence or substance of the person. In this study I intend to 
demonstrate how a reformulation of this central concept can be 
achieved which reflects Post-Modernist ideas. The first part of 
--~·i.s reformulation will entail an examination of the creation of 
meaning through language and 
from this I will develop 
narrative structures. Following 
the idea that 'self' can be 
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""'·Cfeconstructed to reveal the modes of its own creation. In the 
"-l. .. ight of Post-Modernist ideas the Self should rather be viewed 
as a complex series of ongoing negotiations between the 
individual and the interpersonal meanings in which he or she is 
._.,:emtfedded. These meanings include the traditional narrative 
conventions through which identity is presented as well as the 
prevailing cultural and ideological assumptions about how to be 
a Self. With this study I hope to address the present 
dislocation which exists between Modernist and Post-Modernist 
views of Self in psychology and to thereby bring about greater 
congruence between them. 
_,if.n Chapters 1 and 2 the broad shift from Structuralism to Post-
Structuralism will be delineated. In Chapter 3 of this study I 
'L~··will focus on narrative primarily as a cognitive schema with 
certain organising operations which contribute to the emergence 
of an experience of meaning in relationships. In Chapter 4 the 
~·,.r-elationship between narrative schemas and the negotiation of 
-'"'·i:denti ty will be examined. The focus will move to self-
narratives or autobiographies as an example of how people create 
coherence in the way they view their own lives and of how they 
convey this to others. In Chapters 5 and 6 all the above will be 
operationalised when the autobiographical texts of two clients 
~rom my own psychotherapy practice will be analysed and 
deconstructed. And, finally, in Chapter 7, the discussion will 
move to the level of cultural meanings, ideology and politics, 
where the concepts such as meaning, Self, and self-narrative, 
will be contextualised from the aforementioned perspectives. 
v 
However, in order to contextualise meaning, narrative, and 
identity logically and historically, I will first have to 
~&Mamine the relationship between language and meaning. After a 
v<;;;,.general discussion of the centrality of language in organising 
human experience, I will consider the development in ideas of 
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meaning, language, and identity from the period of Modernism 
through to Structuralism. 
,Conceptualisations of language and meaning 
The emergence of language, the beginning of awareness 
Human existence manifests itself in different realms of reality, 
such as the material, the organic, and the mental realms. 
Because human existence is embedded to various degrees in these 
realms, it incorporates the three basic structures of reality 
-,·.w~i.thin itself: Matter, life, and consciousness (Polkinghorne, 
1988). These three realms are structured in accordance with the 
principles of autonomous living systems (Durkin, 1981) and 
interact with one another in a complex and nonlinear manner. 
According to the emergent theory of evolution (Polkinghorne, 
1988), the development of new structures and properties in 
living systems is an ongoing process. Although the process of 
emergent evolution is cumulative, it reaches certain threshold 
points of structural complexity where the features exhibited by 
the new organisation represent a dramatic departure from earlier 
ones. The two most dramatic threshold points or points of 
bifurcation in the history of human existence appeared at the 
transition from matter to life, and the transition from life to 
consciousness (Polkinghorne, 1988). The latter transition was 
characterised by the emergence of language skills which gave 
rise to reflective consciousness. This has provided us with the 
...... ~~quely human capacity of experiencing meaning. The acquisition 
.. v~ . .e:f language has given rise to collectively shared meanings which 
culminate in their most refined form in cultural expressions. 
·~·Pee{>l:e are linked in interlocking meanings with others by means 
of this symbolic level of linguistic experience which 
recursively reflects and informs their thoughts and actions. 
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·~hus meaning is an intra-individual as well as a communal 
.l:phenomenon. Communities maintain a system of language and pass 
this system of symbolic signifiers and their related referents 
on to successive generations. Communities also maintain 
···'co·llections of typical narrative meanings in their myths, fairy 
tales, histories and stories. A sense of belonging within a 
~· cotfununity entails, inter alia, a knowledge of its range of 
accumulated and evolving meanings. 
Language: A bulwark against meaninglessness 
Language provides us with a 
familiarity in the perpetual 
comfortable daily 
onslaught of the 
refuge 
newness 
of 
of 
experience. Language has a "rage for order", as Miller (1972, p. 
39) states. We use language and narrative productions of reality 
as a defense against the complexity of the phenomena of the 
world. If we had no choice but to cope with the totally 
fragmented, incoherent, and confusing disarray of human 
experience and life afresh each day, we would all be permanently 
L.d:tsorientated. Thus, we create order and meaning through 
language out of the chaos of our experience (Miller, 1972). By 
~~~Ftue of its selective and reductionistic nature, language 
reduces the "overabundance of life" as we encounter it daily, to 
manageable proportions (Miller, 1972). Language and symbols, by 
their very nature, are abstractive and reductive, combining 
things and events in classes and groups; they represent 
essential features, and therefore gloss over subtle or detailed 
aspects; they transform complex phenomena into simple ones by 
selecting main features, principle aspects, and dominant traits. 
We appear to be locked into sets of assumptions and fictions 
about reality, the hopeless subjectivity of which we seldom 
acknowledge. Our aspirations to attain a perfect correspondence 
between our experience, and an objective reality, have been 
futile. Our earliest 'scientific' explanations about the 
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;;/.~uzz.ling and often frightening phenomena of our world were made 
in the form of narratives, or more precisely, myths: The ancient 
Bushmen thought that the stars in the sky were the camp fires of 
other tribes. Many other ancient myths exist which originated in 
order to explain the unfathomable yet regular phenomena in 
nature: The sunrise and sunset, the thunder, the tides, the 
changing seasons, the vagaries of fortune, the patterns of 
nature. The interpretive and explanatory significance of myths 
are clearly evident -- they provide a way of understanding the 
,.~,ptherwise chaotic and, hence, threatening. Creating explanatory 
stories about chaotic events somehow tamed them. Once they 
fitted into a structure of meaning, they became manageable. The 
early myths promoted the meta-narrative that "the world and the 
mind [were] theatres of meaningful activity" (Nash, 1989, p. 
88). 
Language 
that many 
is not the simple, rational system of communication 
would have us believe. According to Miller (1972, p. 
84), words do not remain simple bearers of messages, but rather 
explode into many fragments of meaning within each 
individual and no one can foretell where the 
fragments may fly, what bruises they will leave, what 
flesh they will tear. There is, then, in any concept 
of meaning in language, both a public and a private 
dimension. Regardless of how dominant the public or 
common meaning language stripped to its bare 
essentials with 'vibrations' held somehow to a minimum 
the private meaning is always there to contend 
with, both on the part of the writer and the reader. 
~h±s unstable relationship between words as signifiers and their 
meaning, that which they signify, will become the focus of the 
discussion on Structuralism and Post-Structuralism. 
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·'"'"'We . cannot but live in language; it does not only embody 
experience nor is it merely a vehicle for expressing experience, 
it actually exists as part of experience it completely 
interpenetrates with experience. 
From Modernism to Structuralism 
The Modernist movement emerged during the period of the 
Enlightenment, a philosophical movement which was characterised 
by a break with the traditional social values of the 18th 
'"'century and reflected an emphasis on reason, individualism, and 
progress. The Modernists regarded reality as a closed material 
system which was organised according to rules that could be 
expressed in terms of formal logic and mathematics 
(Polkinghorne, 1988). The influence of these ideas were profound 
in all spheres of human functioning and pervaded thinking in all 
human activities, from politics, to economics, to science. These 
conceptualisations formed part of psychological thought right 
from its inception: Many of Freud's foundational ideas reflect 
the influence of Modernism, for example, that the rational could 
conquer the irrational, and that compulsion could be overcome by 
freedom of choice. 
It was during this period that formal science 
so-called elixir of all the ills of humankind. 
emerged as the 
The development 
notion that reality, 
objects whose actions and 
of formal 
including 
science 
humans, 
was based on the 
consisted of 
reactions were governed by stable laws. The dualism of body and 
mind was introduced, separating the observer from that which was 
observed. Formal science accepted this separation. These beliefs 
were a profound departure from the previously 
,_,,_:gption that the nature of human existence 
held, traditional 
was 
spiritual and was governed by a relationship to God 
by the laws of nature (Polkinghorne, 1988). 
primarily 
rather than 
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~;:':l:'h.e Modernist movement was upheld by a belief in 
recits, 'grand' or 'master' narratives (Sarup, 
example: 
-* the conquest of, and mastery over, nature 
the grands 
1988), for 
* the liberation of the individual from fate and circumstance 
* the striving for progress 
* striving for the ideal 
* striving for the truth 
* the attainment of unifying general principles 
* the accumulation of wealth. 
Science was regarded as the mechanism through which many of the 
above grand narratives were to be realised. 
~""!Jllre Modernists conceptualised humans as independent, free, and 
individualistic. Each person had an identity which was separate 
from that of the social group and each person had a unique 
vision of the world. Free choice and total mastery over personal 
circumstances were possible. This authentic individual had a 
stable sense of his or her identity and of where she or he 
fitted into the historical scheme of things (Norris, 1982; 
Polkinghorne, 1988). 
v:~.~e-Modernist view of meaning was that it consisted of ideas 
that were representations of an external reality. Language was 
not considered to have an epistemological role; it was relegated 
to a secondary role in the realm of meaning (Polkinghorne, 
1988). The view was that ideas and thoughts existed in the mind 
and that the function of language was to organise these ideas 
and thoughts, and to transmit them to others when necessary. The 
nature of language was not linked to the nature of knowledge in 
any way, according to the Modernists. This dislocation of 
language from its epistemological role was manifested both in 
empiricism and phenomenology. The difference between the two 
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:.t::{,osi tions is characterised by the role that consciousness played 
-4~~the production of ideas. According to empiricism, ideas were 
passively received from the environment; for phenomenology, the 
'transcendent ego' was actively involved in the creation of 
ideas. Language was a secondary aspect of meaning, and not 
involved in the emergence of meaning (Polkinghorne, 1988). 
The failure to acknowledge the role which language plays in 
creating meaning is related to the Modernist view of the role 
that language played in understanding and inquiry. Locke 
(Polkinghorne, 1988) most clearly expresses the Modernist notion 
that language is a 'conduit' between us and the things we 
observe and study. Figurative speech was not considered as 
helpful in cognitive understanding; its embellishments detracted 
from knowing things as they are, and was to be avoided. 
~· Jf'he empiricist movement in science best embodies the spirit and 
methodology of the Modernist conceptualisation of reality, 
language, and meaning. 
The empirical model 
In the traditional empirical model, language is conceptualised 
as an adjunct to the sensory organs. It is regarded as something 
which is added to the cognitive or scientific process after the 
perceptual stage. It is viewed as a means to store that which 
was perceived in memory or to communicate it to others. In this 
'-': .. ""model language is reduced to an instrument for accurate 
description and it should be applied in such a manner that it 
does not add superfluous 
meaning. Ideally, according 
(which include Galileo, 
"·-·"·"_e_mpirical scientists in the 
direct and precise referent 
mind (Polkinghorne, 1988). 
elements to the user's intended 
to the proponents of this model 
Descartes, Hobbes, and the many 
early 20th century), each word is a 
of the actual image or idea in one's 
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This model of language is based on the following assumptions: 
" * 
* 
* 
* 
I General (higher order) ideas are assembled from first-order 
perceptual ideas 
/ General ideas can be reduced to their component parts, 
which correspond directly to reality itself 
The world does not possess 
energy patterns. There 
categories. 
intrinsic mianing -- merely 
are no real essences or 
Language can be stripped of its subjectivity in order 
to permit dinlct access to pure reality. Thus, 
language can be used as a transparent medium which 
facilitates direct knowledge about reality. 
'"?:En the 1920s and 1930s the logical positivists attempted to 
produce such a transparent language, an ideal 
formal science. They aspired to produce 
representation of reality by limiting language to 
statements of phenomena as they appeared directly 
language for 
an accurate 
observational 
to awareness. 
It was hoped that they could eliminate any contamination by 
metaphysical assumptions from scientific observation 
(Polkinghorne, 1988). When this proved impossible in practice, 
they conceded that the names of objects could be included in 
observational reports! 
In literature logical positivism 
following assumptions: 
manifested itself in the 
* A literary 
psychology 
/ 
expression 
text should be regarded as the expression of the 
I 
of the author, which in its turn, is the 
of the historical period and the cultural 
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context in which the author lived and of the race to which 
he or she belonged. 
* "' All human endeavours and productions can be explained by 
reference to these three causes. 
* If literary scholars undertook the caus41 explanation of 
texts in relation to these factors, the practice of 
literary criticism will become a form of scientific history 
which will gain equivalence with the methods and status of 
the natural sciences (Jefferson & Robey, 1984). 
By the 1950s and 1960s the empirical model had come under 
persistent attack. The philosophers of science who opposed the 
model put forward the argument that because words are learned in 
empirical situations where the observer is taught to describe 
certain distinctions in prescribed terms, it introduces bias and 
...,..~,, undeniable subjectivity into the reports of their 
¥·-.st:>servations. Their point was that the theoretical, cultural, 
and value schemas in which the observers were embedded as 
scientists and which were pointedly transmitted through 
training, contaminated the distinctions which they drew in 
language (Polkinghorne, 1988). 
During the last two centuries Modernist culture has gradually 
permeated the values of everyday life, culminating in "unlimited 
self-realization, the 
the subjectivism of 
demand for authentic self-expression and 
a hyperstimulated sensitivity have come to 
be dominant" (Sarup, 1988, p.130). But it has come under severe 
attack from different quarters during the last 50 years or so. 
The critics regard the widespread hedonism, the lack of social 
identification, the narcissism in Western societies as the 
result of cultural Modernism. 
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The Modernist project has been denounced by the French 'new 
philosophers' and their American and English counterparts. It 
has also been rejected by the Post-Structuralists who declare 
4
··that progress is a myth. Foucault (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1986), a 
Post-Structuralist philosopher, takes an extremely sceptical 
position against the Modernist preoccupation with progress. He 
"'-~uates all forms of knowledge with a form of power over others, 
and therefore regards all forms of modern progress (for example, 
in psychiatry, sexual attitudes, and penal reform) as an 
"M···4:Bdication of increasing social control. On the other hand, 
Derrida (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1986), another post-modernist 
philosopher, maintains that we cannot evade the Modernist 
--!tradition -- the only route, according to him, is to work within 
that tradition, but against some of its ruling ideas. These 
ideas will be elaborated on in Chapter 2. 
But let us first turn to the Structuralist movement which 
followed on the Modernist manifestations of the Enlightenment 
project. 
After the Second World War 
fundamentally. The descriptive 
society 
terms for 
began to change 
the newly emerging 
trends vary, that is, 'consumer society', 'post-industrial 
society', 'post-Marxist society', etcetera but they all refer to 
.~undamental changes in the conceptualisation of reality, 
language, meaning, and personal identity. 
Of the many different movements and trends which emerged during 
the Post- World War II period, I have selected to focus on 
Structuralism, since it best embodies the widespread 
preoccupation in the Western World with holism. It was in 
", .. ,.Structuralism that the emergent awareness of the inadequacy of 
the Cartesian/Aristotelian epistemology (and the empiricism 
through which it had been manifested in the physical and human 
sciences) was most coherently embodied. Structuralism therefore 
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,[..ejected atomism, reductionism, and the representational 
relationship between language and reality. Its preoccupation was 
_,~i"th finding metaphors and meta-patterns which transcended the 
boundaries and content of single fields of study. 
Structuralism 
Structuralism can be described as a movement which attempted to 
. ",study the general structures of human activity. The movement 
found expression for its tenets in the metap~rs presented in 
linguistics. 
Structuralism cannot be regarded as a school or doctrine -- it 
is a revolutionary way of thinking in that its principles show a 
fundamental departure from those of preceding models in 
linguistics. Structuralism originated in France during the 1960s 
primarily in the work of scholars such as Barthes, Levi-Strauss, 
Greimas, and Genette, and outside France in the work of Propp 
and Todorov, two narratologists whose work I will discuss in the 
third chapter. 
There are four basic operations which characterise Structuralist 
thinking, namely: 
* Attention is shifted from the study of the content of 
linguistic phenomena to the study of the 
which they are manifested. 
,. 
processes through 
* " Entities are treated as relatfrinal (rather than as 
isolated) manifestations. 
* 
v The concept of 
/ 
whole systems is introduced to replace 
atomistic and reductionistic conceptualisations. 
~ 
* The aim is to discover general laws (Sarup, 1988). 
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As Piaget (Visser, in Ryan & Van Zyl, 1982) claimed, there is a 
·general emphasis on structure in the 20th century. It is 
apparent in many different disciplines, including mathematics, 
biology, and psychology. Structuralism, as embodied in these 
-~~~tj.elds of study, manifests in an interest in whole entities, 
rather than parts or individual elements; in relational 
conceptualisations, rather than cause and effect explanations; 
and it is based on an analogy of functions rather than on an 
analogy of substances and forces (Davis & Schleifer, 1989). It 
is these fundamental epistemological differences from Modernist 
assumptions which situate Structuralism within similar 
reconceptualisations of the 'objects' of study in contemporary 
sciences (Davis & Schleifer, 1989). 
Structuralism, unlike previous theories of literature or 
criticism, is not exclusively linked to literature. While its 
early conceptual roots are to be found in the work of De 
/ 
Saussure, a Swiss professor of linguistics who lived at the 
beginning of the century, the movement first found its 
expression in French circles in the 1960s in the work of the 
/ 
anthropologist, Levi-Strauss. He founded what he called 
'structural Anthropology'. He broke away from the positivistic 
"~:re.cording of observable data and based his analysis of kinship 
relations entirely on the assumption that they were systems 
which were structured like a grammar (language), that is, that 
their individual elements have meaning only in terms of their 
relation to the overall meaning system. 
The work of De Saussure forms the foundation of the 
Structuralist movement. The implications of his theory were so 
powerful that modern linguistics has produced new theories of 
the nature and organisation of literature as a whole, and even 
of social and cultural life as well. De Saussure's concept of 
~--the linguistic sign has been applied far beyond linguistics, to 
the widest possible range of human behaviour and interactions, 
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all of which was regarded as governed by systems of meaning 
which are either linguistic or analogous to those of language 
(Jefferson & Robey, 1984). 
The French Structuralist response to De Saussure's theory, five 
decades later, led to the realisation of De Saussure's vision--
--the formation of a general science of signs semiology. 
Although he regarded language as the most complex and most 
characteristic of all systems of expression, it was, according 
to him, nevertheless still analogous in form and structure to 
any form of social behaviour. The extension of Structural 
linguistics into the domain of the social sciences brought about 
a change of perspective in most of these fields of study: it was 
-lno longer a question of gathering empirically verifiable data, 
of looking at a world of objects through positivistic lenses --
.li-t meant seeing forms of expression as signs whose meanings 
depend on conventions, relations, and systems, rather than on 
any inherent features (Jefferson, in Jefferson & Robey, 1984). 
In Structuralist thought there is a preference to express ideas 
in holistic, synchronous, and evolving terms. Thus, social and 
cultural phenomena are regarded as stable networks of codes 
which exist at a single moment in time. The Structuralist 
theorists have as little interest in the historical causes 
behind meaning as in events or personal motivations that meaning 
<-~Y refer to. Instead of focussing on the content of meanings 
derived from experience, they are interested in the processes by 
which meaning is socially constructed. According to Culler 
(1977, pp. 76-77) Structuralism 
@es not try to explain.~hy an individual uttered a 
particular sequence at a given moment, but it shows 
- why the sequence has the form and meaning it does by 
relating it to the system of the language .... One 
attempts to show why a particular action has 
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significance by relating it to the underlying system 
of underlying functions, norms, and categories which 
make it possible. 
The Structuralist movement has a revolutionary character, though 
not primarily politically revolutionary, despite the fact that 
the movement reached its peak in the 1967-1968 period, thus 
coinciding with the student revolt in France. According to 
Jefferson {Jefferson & Robey, 1984) its revolutionary nature can 
be found in the discontinuity between its tenets and that of 
previous movements in literary theory. It can only be 
incorporated as an alternative orientation and not as an 
additional device or framework to supplement the previous 
orientations. Its most revolutionary feature is the significance 
v~~i~t attributes to the role of language, and not merely language 
as such, but language as a metaphor for the analysis of a 
variety of human cultural artefacts. This is the highest aim of 
~~Structuralism, to "attempt to isolate and define the conditions 
of meaning in culture, to articulate the relationship between 
the tangible entities of nature and the intelligible meanings of 
culture" {Davis & Schleifer, 1989, p. 144). 
De Saussure's theory of linguistics 
De Saussure's basic premise is that 
~"i,"According to his analysis of language, 
words does not reflect the external 
languages are systems. 
the relationship between 
relationship between the 
things which the words signify; words can only indicate the 
organisation internal to a language system. 
Furthermore, language consists of signs which are arbitrary and 
'l<di,fferential. The specific way in which a language organises its 
realm of ideas is arbitrary, with the meaning of an idea being 
determined by the other ideas in the language, rather than by 
external referents. Due to the fact that various language 
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systems divide the spectrum of conceptual possibilities in 
different ways, it follows that the expressions of a language 
are not based on an external, objective realm (Polkinghorne, 
1988). 
A linguistic sign is composed of two elements, a sound image (or 
its written counterpart) and a concept. The term signifier is 
used for the sound (or written) image, and signified for the 
--"jeoncept. For example, the spoken sound or the written word, 
house is the signifier, and the concept of a house, which the 
sound or written image evokes in my mind, is the signified. 
The arbitrariness of the sign, which De Saussure postulates, 
manifests in two ways: 
* except in a few cases (where the spoken image consists of 
sounds that resemble those that are associated with the 
object or action, as in onomatopoeia, for example, 
sizzle, and cuckoo) the association of a signifier with a 
signified is entirely the product of linguistic convention, 
not of any direct or iconic link; 
* there is also no natural relationship between the sign and 
reality (Jefferson & Robey, 1984). 
It is the second postulate which is the most radical and fertile 
feature of De Saussure's theory. It is based on the notion of an 
essential disjuncture between reality and languag-e. Words do not 
merely reflect or express our experience, they shape it; they 
give form to what would otherwise merely be a chaotic and 
undifferentiated jumble of ideas. Thus De Saussure postulated 
,/that reality does not determine the meaning of words, words 
determine the meaning of reality. For example, the signified 
house is not the reflection or product of the assorted 
architectural structures and building materials with which it is 
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'-""~--.cenventionally associated in English. Rather, it is the presence 
of the sign which enables us to distinguish a class of objects, 
houses, from classes of objects such as hotels and offices, 
etcetera the signifier participates in creating the 
signified. In this way the signifier and signified are 
inseparable, or, to use De Saussure's simile, they are like two 
sides of a single sheet of paper. Not only can we not recognise 
sounds as linguistic units unless they are attached to concepts, 
but we also cannot think about concepts independently of the 
verbal forms to which they are attached. 
Yet if the relationship between the sign and reality is entirely 
arbitrary, how can we understand the sign's ability to signify, 
the capacity of language to generate meaning from our chaotic 
,experiences? De Saussure's response to this question is that a r-·-, 
sign attains its meaning by means of its difference from other 
signs each signifier obtains its semantic value only by 
virtue of its differential position within the structure of the 
_:::~language system. We do not identify words by means of their 
intrinsic qualities, but by means of their difference from one 
another, and it is therefore their differences which give 
meaning by dividing up the continuum of experience. 
'/language is not a collection of separate facts, but a 
~, system, in the sense that the function and meaning of 
element depends entirely on its position within the 
(Jefferson & Robey, 1984). 
Thus, 
closed 
each 
whole 
'It is clear that De Saussure's notion that there is a precarious 
,balance between signifier and signified constituted a radical 
departure from the notion of the empiricists that the signifier 
reflects and portrays the signified in a direct manner. Thus, 
meaning was reconceptualised as a relational interplay which was 
arbitrary and changeable. Meaning was socially and culturally 
determined and was, therefore, context-specific, not universal. 
Since there was no longer a stable and ultimate external 
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referent, no closure could be achieved. Meaning was constructed 
in a process of continual reinterpretation (Jefferson & Robey, 
1984). 
The result of these Structuralist conceptualisations was that it 
__ .. J:>ecame widely accepted that we cannot bridge the gap between the 
categories of any language and those of reality. "We are, then, 
.. ,ceaught in the prison-house of language with no way to break 
through to know extra-linguistic reality in itself" 
::.::~{:PRlkinghorne, 1988, p. 26) . Thus, experience should be seen as 
an artefact of language, rather than of reality. The 
~'",,ph:j_losopher, Richard Rorty, maintains that because language is 
"opaque" and prevents our experience from being a "mirror of 
nature", scholars in philosophy should redirect their efforts 
from searching for ultimate truths, toward participation in 
conversations (Rorty, 1979, p. 375). He writes, "To see keeping 
a conversation going as a sufficient aim of philosophy, to see 
wisdom as consisting in the ability to sustain a conversation, 
is to see human beings as generators of new descriptions rather 
than beings one hopes to be able to describe accurately" (Rorty, 
1979' p. 387) . 
Conceptualisations of the Self 
The Structuralist theorists formulated a critique of the view of 
the human individual. Levi-Strauss, for example, called the 
figure of the Self which was created by Modernist thinking "the 
spoilt brat of philosophy" (Sarup, 1988, p. 3). He believed that 
the 'individual' or 'subject' (the term which is widely used for 
the Self in Structuralist and Post-Structuralist works) was 
constituted by the human sciences as the centre of being. The 
.,~ :i.._ndi vidual was seen as not only autonomous but coherent and 
self-aware, as "a narrator who imagines that he speaks without 
simultaneously being spoken" (Sarup, 1988, p. 1). It was one of 
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the central aims of the Structuralist movement to dissolve these 
conceptualisations of Self. 
--c"rhe Structuralists regarded the Self as a function of the codes 
that ground it. They believe it can be thought of as a social 
convention. Such a conceptualisation reflects that the Self is 
not regarded as the centre of consciousness, because an 
individual is not usually conscious of the conventions that 
shape meaning. Such a Self can also not be regarded as the 
originator of meaning the functions of the Self are 
substituted by a number of interpersonal systems that operate 
through the Self. But then, according to the Structuralists, 
---meaning does not need to have an .. author' , since it consists 
entirely of an intersubjective system which has no beginning and 
no end (Ray, 1985). As De Saussure stated" ... language is not 
complete within any single brain, it exists perfectly only in 
the collective mass" (Ray, 1985, p. 112). 
This kind of reasoning not only precludes the notion that 
meaning is attributed by an individual, it invalidates the 
traditional search for the 'author's meaning' in literary texts. 
"Instead, the Structuralists propose a description of the 
structures of rules and conventions which underlie various 
texts. Because these codes cannot be restricted to single works 
or contexts, the Structuralists strive to create a set of 
general descriptions. But they have to limit their analysis to 
the particular set of codes which are operative at a given 
moment in time, since they are continually evolving. 
Conclusion 
The Structuralist notions are revised and taken a step further 
in the Post-Structuralist movement and will be elaborated on in 
the next chapter. Suffice it to say that in Post-Structuralism 
the relationship between the signifier and the signified is 
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stretched even further until none at all exists. In contrast, 
Structuralists still regarded it as possible to construct a 
heuristic or systemic set of 'truths' from the individual 
material in texts; it was still possible to ascertain the codes 
by which meaning was socially or culturally constructed, however 
shaky the relationship between the sign and meaning. De Saussure 
... $tall believed that a relatively stable and useful unity could 
be achieved between sign and meaning, even if it was altered 
from time to time. After all, the belief in the existence of 
something called 'structure' presupposes a centre, fixed 
principles, a hierarchy of meanings and a stable foundation 
(Eagleton, 1986). The Post-Structuralist writers, on the other 
~"fband, shifted the emphasis entirely away from the signified to 
the signifier, so that there is a perpetual detour on the way to 
a 'truth' which has lost any stability or significance 
'truth' is perpetually delayed. 
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CHAPTER 2 
POST-STRUCTURALISM: THREE PERSPECTIVES 
Introduction 
The birth of Structuralism and Post-Structuralism can be traced 
back to Modernism. Structuralism emerged when language became a 
central preoccupation. This, in turn, occurred because in the 
late nineteenth and twentieth centuries language in Western 
Europe was seen to be in a deep crisis. It had become impossible 
to write in a world where language had become degraded to a mere 
J . . vehicle for science, commerce, advertising, and 
there still an audience for written works 
bureaucracy. Was 
when the reading 
public was inundated with superficial mass produced culture? 
Could a literary work be an artefact and a commodity at the same 
time? Did the traditional notion of the representational 
character of language still hold? Was meaningful communication 
with an audience still at all possible in the ideological 
turmoil of the twentieth century? 
It was concerns such as these which were related to the 
historical context of modern writing, which forced language into 
the foreground. It was in this context that the content of the 
literature as well as the reader, or audience, were renounced --
and language itself became the cherished object. 
If objects and events in the real world are 
experienced as lifeless and alienated, if history 
seems to have lost direction and lapsed into chaos, it 
is always possible to put all of this 'in brackets', 
'suspend the referent' and take words as your object 
instead. Writing turns in on itself in a profound act 
of narcissism, but always troubled and overshadowed by 
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the guilt of its own uselessness 
p. 140). 
(Eagleton, 1986, 
Structuralism and semiotics are still a reflection of the 
traditions of Western thought and science. For example, they 
continue the typically Western tradition of finding ways of 
'understanding' phenomena by producing models of explanation 
that offer coherent images of the order of things, images of 
what Foucault calls, a 'principle of unity' (Davis & Schleifer, 
1989). The Structuralist writers endeavoured to account for the 
existence of phenomena and their conditions of existence. 
However, deconstruction (the central technique of critique used 
~·· in. Post-Structuralism) aims at describing the limits of 
understanding. Deconstructive critique analyses and tests the 
assumptions which support intellectual knowledge in order to 
expose and question the 'self-evident truths' they are based on. 
Rather than finding a way of 'understanding' that is, of 
incorporating new phenomena into coherent existing or modified 
..Jl . . models of knowledge -- deconstructi ve critique seeks to uncover 
the unexamined epistemology that produces those models. 
Post~~tructuralism emerged from the mixture of euphoria and 
.,_,__,~~.....-~~--'' 
disillusionment which followed the 1968 student revolution in 
France. The movement swiftly swept across Europe, attacking the 
authoritarianism of the educational institutions and the state. 
In France the force of the revolution actually briefly 
threatened to overthrow the state. But an inability to produce a 
unified leadership structure led to its demise. In the aftermath 
of these events, Post-Structuralism took shape, almost as if, 
unable to dismantle the institutional structures, the proponents 
of the revolution turned their energies toward the subversion of 
,·····the structures of language (Eagleton, 1986). They turned against 
any form of coherent belief-system, specifically all forms of 
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political theory and ideology which attempted to influence and 
control the structures of society as a whole (Eagleton, 1986}. 
It is widely recognised that the complex and intriguing nature 
of the Post-Structuralist movement is best demonstrated in the 
work of Derrida, Foucault, and Lacan (Eagleton, 1986; Jefferson 
& Robey, 1984; Sarup, 1988) . What follows, therefore, is a 
discussion of their contributions to the movement. These three 
prominent figures should not be regarded as a group. They 
themselves would have rejected the notion that their work 
belonged to any clearly demarcated intellectual domain. However, 
in most texts on Post-Structuralism, their ideas are presented 
side-by-side. I have chosen to continue this convention, since, 
although their points of departure differ (i.e. philosophy, 
cultural history, and psychoanalysis respectively), their ideas 
dovetail in such a way as to provide a repre~entative (if there 
is such a thing in the context of Post-Structuralism!) and 
tantalising, if ever-elusive, impression of Post-Structuralist 
thinking. 
Jacques Derrida 
Derrida has made a substantial contribution to the study of 
language, 
educated 
literature, and philosophy. He was born in Algiers and 
in France. He held a position at the Ecole Normale 
Superieure in Paris where he taught the 
He is widely regarded as one of the 
history of philosophy. 
two or three most 
influential contemporary philosophers. Although he was not 
trained as a literary critic, his philosophical works and, in 
particular, his conception of 'deconstruction' has had a great 
impact on literary theory and literary studies since the 1960s 
which continues still. In more recent years his influence has 
spread to other fields of study, most significantly, theology, 
·y",_.sociology, and the newly emerging interdisciplinary domain of 
'discourse theory'. He is a prolific writer and has produced 
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works on different areas of study, such as art, literature, 
psychology, politics, theology, theatre, and of course, 
philosophy (Davis & Schleifer, 1989). Some of his books include: 
Speech and Phenomena (1973); Writing and Difference (1978); Of 
Grammatology (1976); and The Postcard (1980). 
Very broadly speaking, his most consistent contribution has been 
-t:&"question assumptions and to make the familiar unfamiliar. It 
is difficult to summarise his works in terms of his central 
ideas, since he took up a position against general and unified 
'"t;b..eories. His central endeavour was to avoid substituting one 
closed system (of explanations of language, literature, and 
philosophy) for another. Another obstacle in the way of 
-..._pr:av.iding a summary of his works is the inseparability of his 
ideas from their contexts. His ideas are expressed in the 
context of his discussions of particular literary texts and 
become distorted when they are separated from their originating 
discussions (Davis & Schleifer, 1989). 
In order to locate Derrida in a specific philosophical space, it 
is useful to relate his creation of the technique of 
deconstructio~\to a broader effort supported by Barthes, Lacan, 
jt 
and Foucault. They do not collectively represent an organised 
reform movement, which has formulated a set of principles with 
detailed specifications for the revision of existing structures 
into a new, coherent whole. Quite the contrary: They question 
c~~d undermine these existing structures in ways that have very 
little in common, except perhaps, precisely in that they 
undermine existing structures (Davis & Schleifer, 1989). 
Traditional theories of meaning 
relationship between the signifier 
signifier is believed to symbolically 
imply a simple vertical 
and the signified. The 
reflect meaning other than 
,J itself. Derrida endeavours to replace this model of the vertical 
relationship between the word and its meaning by reducing the 
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generation of meaning to a process which occurs within a 
~~rizontal system of relationships. Stated simply, signifiers no 
longer refer to phenomena outside themselves, they refer only to 
, "-ftther signifiers. Thus, meaning is never separable from the 
signifier which invokes it (Davis & Schleifer, 1989) . 
De Saussure maintains meaning in language is merely a question 
ofdifference. 'House' is 'house' because it is not 'mouse' or 
'louse'. Meaning is always the result of a division of signs. 
The signifier, 'house' evokes the concept or signified of a 
house, because it divides itself from the signifier 'mouse'. The 
signified is the product of the difference between two 
signifiers. But the process does not end here: The signified is 
also the product of the difference between a large number of 
other signifiers: 'louse', 'grouse', 'ground', 'mound', 
etcetera. This contradicts De Saussure's notion of the sign as a 
neat symmetrical unity between one signifier and one signified. 
c,~ .• :In other words, the signified, 'house' is really the product of 
a rather complex interaction of signifiers, which has no end 
~-M~.point (Derrida, 1976). Thus, meaning is the result of a 
potentially endless play of signifiers, rather than a concept 
,which is neatly teamed up with a particular signifier. The 
.. :/signifier does not reveal a signified directly, as a mirror-
image of reality; there is no harmonious one-to-one correlation 
between the level of the signifiers and the level of the 
signifieds in language (Derrida, 1976). 
There is no fixed distinction between signifiers and signifieds 
either. In order to ascertain the meaning of a signifier, you 
can look it up in the dictionary, but all you will find will be 
yet more signifiers, whose meaning (signifieds) you can look up, 
etcetera. This process is not only, in theory, infinite, but 
also circular: Signifiers keep changing into signifieds, and 
vice versa; you will never come to rest at a signified which is 
not itself also a signifier. Thus if Structuralism divided the 
/ 
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sign from the referent, Post-Structuralist thinking goes a step 
-further: It separates the signifier from the signified (Derrida, 
1976). 
The above can be reformulated as follows: Meaning is not 
~~.i-mmediately present in a sign. Because the meaning of a sign is 
a matter of what the sign is not, its meaning is always, in some 
sense, absent from it too. Meaning is scattered or dispersed 
along the whole chain of signifiers: It is never fully present 
in one sign alone. It is a kind of constant flickering of 
presence and absence simultaneously. Reading a text is more like 
following this process of constant flickering than it is like 
"counting the beads on a necklace" (Eagleton, 1986, p. 128). 
~·-····There is yet another sense in which we can never quite capture 
the meaning of a text, which results from the temporal nature of 
.. v::, . ,language. When I read a sentence, its meaning is always somehow 
suspended, deferred or still to come: One signifier refers me to 
another, and that, to another; earlier meanings give way to, and 
are modified by, later ones. We do not understand the meaning of 
a sentence by merely mechanically stringing one word after 
another. If words are to create some relatively coherent meaning 
at all, each one has to hold the traces of the words which have 
gone before them, while simultaneously holding itself open to 
the meaning of those which are to follow (Derrida, 1976). 
According to Eagleton (1986, p. 128) "each sign in the chain of 
meaning is somehow scored over or traced through with all the 
others, to form a complex tissue which is never exhaustible; and 
to this extent no sign is ever 'pure' or 'fully meaningful'". At 
the same time as the above is occurring, I am aware, however 
imperceptibly, of all the different meanings which it has 
excluded, or 'fended off', in order to be itself. All the 
•·· excluded signs inhere within the sign, since they are, in fact, 
part of the constitutive process (Eagleton, 1986). 
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This notion seriously undermines the domains of Western 
metaphysics and semantics, which is based on the fallacy that 
meaning can exist beyond its signifier (Ryan, in Ryan & Van Zyl, 
-·'"'·W82) • Derrida rejects the tendency in Western metaphysics to 
regard 'being' as absolute, and to assume that all phenomena 
have a centre and an origin. Each in their own way, Freud, 
Nietzsche, and Heidegger have all challenged this notion. 
Derrida's efforts can be seen as being parallel to this broader 
challenge (Ryan, in Ryan & Van Zyl, 1982). He attempts to 
\ii:Ilustrate that by undermining the notion of a representational 
relationship between language and reality, one necessarily 
undermines the foundations of Western discourse. Language can no 
longer be regarded as a subservient, secondary schema for the 
useful arrangement of reality. Instead, texts and discourses 
should be seen as self-contained and self-reflective entities, 
which invoke only themselves (Derrida, 1976). 
Another reason why meaning is never identical with itself is 
because signs are, by definition, reproducible or repeatable. A 
mark which occurred only once can, by its nature, not be 
considered to be a sign. The fact that a sign can be reproduced 
therefore forms part of its identity; but, at the same time, it 
also divides its identity, because it can always be reproduced 
in another context where it has a different meaning. According 
to Eagleton, 1986, p. 129) "the signified will be altered by the 
various chains of signifiers in which it is entangled". It is 
.,-··impossible to ascertain what a sign's original meaning was, 
because it changes slightly in each different context it is 
encountered. Although it does maintain a measure of consistency 
across those contexts in order to be recognised as a sign at 
all, it is never completely identical with itself in all 
contexts. It is modified by the specific chains of signifiers in 
which it is entangled (Derrida, 1976). 
The above 
traditional 
29 
argument holds far-reaching 
theories of meaning. Within the 
implications for 
framework of these 
--·-theories, language was believed to function as an uncomplicated 
and transparent reflection of personal experiences and 
phenomena in the real world. In my discussion on Structuralism 
some of the problems with regard to this view of 
'representation' emerged, but now even more serious difficulties 
arise. One of the consequences of the theory which I have 
outlined above is that all the transcendental meanings which we 
have traditionally held to be fixed and true are shown to be 
fictions necessary fictions, perhaps, but fictions 
nonetheless. There simply are no meanings or concepts which are 
not contaminated by an open-ended play of signification, shot 
through with the fragments of other ideas. Certain of these 
ideas or meanings are selected from this play of signifiers, and 
elevated by social ideologies to a privileged position, or made 
so central that other meanings are forced to 'orbit' around 
them. In our own society examples of these are ideas such as 
--~Freedom, Democracy, Authority, Order, etcetera (Eagleton, 1986). 
These central ideas are sometimes regarded as the origin of all 
other meanings -- the source from which other ideas emerge. 
However, in the light of the above argument, this does not make 
sense any longer, since for this meaning ever to have been 
possible, other signs must already have existed. It has now 
,. become impossible to think of an origin without wanting to reach 
back beyond it. At other times these centrally dominating 
meanings may be regarded as the goal towards which all other 
meanings are, or should be striving. Teleology, or 
conceptualising life, language or history in terms of its 
orientation to a telos, or end goal, is a way of rank ordering 
meanings in a hierarchy of significance. But such a theory of 
history or language as a simple linear evolution does not take 
cognisance of the weblike complexity of signs, the back and 
forth, the present and absent, the forward and sideways movement 
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of language in its actual processes. It is 
--~omplexity which Post-Structuralists invoke when 
term 'text' {Eagleton, 1986). 
this web-like 
they use the 
Derrida {1976) calls all the thought-systems which are 
<: ___ apparently based on unassailable principles, 'metaphysical' . He 
maintains that we cannot escape the urge to construct such 
metaphysical thought-systems -- it appears to be too deeply 
rooted in our human needs. They can therefore not simply be 
ignored or done away with. Derrida even regards his own work as 
contaminated by these metaphysical thought-systems, despite his 
attempts to escape from them. But they can be 'deconstructed': 
"-
1They can be shown to belong to a particular system of meaning, 
rather than some original uncontaminated 'truth' {Derrida, 
1976). 
/ ~~construction uncovers the dualistic thinking which underlies 
much of what is typical of ideological thinking. Ideologies, by 
,~<- _, 
their very nature, draw sharp distinctions between what is 
acceptable and what is __ !lot, between 'us' and 'them', truth and 
falsity, sense and nonsense, reason and madness, central and 
marginal, surface and depth. Although we are not able to 
transcend beyond this realm of binary opposition into some 
ultra-metaphysical realm, we can unravel these oppositions 
somewhat and demonstrate how 9ne part of an apparent opposition 
~~cretly inheres in the other (Eagleton, 1986). 
Structuralism stopped at the point where a text could be 
analysed to reveal its dualistic thinking and to illustrate the 
dynamics and the logic of the dualistic interaction. 
Deconstruction, on the other hand, illustrates how such 
oppositions are held in place by contrived and artificial means 
and inverts or collapses them. Derrida typically reads a text in 
such a way that he seizes upon an apparently peripheral detail 
and tenaciously works it through in such a way that it threatens 
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to dismantle the dualisms which form the foundations of the 
work. The technique of deconstructive criticism entails the 
illustration of how texts "come to embarrass their own ruling 
system of logic" (Eagleton, 1986, p. 133), by uncovering the 
impasses or aporia of meaning in the text, that is, the parts 
where the text contradicts itself. This is not only a 
characteristic of certain kinds of texts, it is a universal 
supposition about the nature of all writing. It follows from the 
previous discussion about meaning, that there is something about 
writing itself which evades logic and systems of meaning. There 
'"'""is, a continual 'dissemination', a term which Derrida uses to 
refer to the flickering presence/absence of meaning, the 
defusion and detouring of signification . 
.. ,w~iting, like language, exists in terms of difference, a dense 
term coined by Derrida which is, in fact, a non-concept, a non-
thought (Derrida, 1978). It refers to the fact that a text may 
~/show us something about the nature of meaning which it is unable 
.. ,. t.o articulate as a proposition. According to Derrida, all 
~ianguage exhibits this 'surplus' over exact meaning, "is always 
threatening to outrun and escape the sense which tries to 
contain it" (Eagleton, 1986, p. 134). This occurs most obviously 
in 'literary' texts, but it is true of all other writing. Thus, 
writing is no longer seen as that which establishes some kind of 
structure or meaning, a fixed principle, a stable centre, a 
--solid foundation. The idea of writing as endless deferring and 
differing, undermines the aforegoing notions (Derrida, 1978). 
Michel Foucault 
Together with Derrida, Foucault has become one of the most 
influential philosophers of contemporary thought, both in Europe 
and America. Foucault was, however, less concerned with language 
per se (i.e. at the level of signification) than with the 
""~~<relationship between language and social institutions a 
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., relationship which he refers to as 'discourse' . In his work he 
endeavours to examine language at its interface with social 
institutions in order to identify the institutional rules that 
shape the emergence of particular meanings, and hence, shape 
certain forms of knowledge (Davis & Schleifer, 1989). 
In the 1960s Foucault's work centred on 
constitution of 
~ndividual subject 
the Self in discourse. 
language and 
He regarded 
the 
the 
of as an empty entity, a mere intersection 
different discourses. He rejects Humanism which proclaims that 
.... ~,i:ndividuals are autonomous and responsible. Foucault believes 
that the individual has become an object of knowledge in the 
interface between the Self and the social sciences. Foucault 
~ce·csees the confession as a central dynamic in the expanding 
technologies of the human sciences in their quest to gain 
increasing control over people's bodies (in the medical 
sciences) and their perceptions of themselves (through an 
emphasis on normative thinking in psychiatry). The confession, 
telling an expert in a particular field of knowledge, everything 
&bout oneself (a doctor or a psychiatrist), has become a central 
part of the strategy of power (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1986). 
In his early works he identified the conditions that facilitated 
the emergence and development of modern domains of knowledge as 
f~ell as their institutions, namely, conceptualisations about 
madness and the emergence of asylums in Madness and Civilisation 
(1967); scientific medicine and the establishment of clinics in 
Birth of a Clinic (1973); and the development of the human 
sciences in 18th century Europe in The Order of Things (1970). 
After the failure of the 1968 student uprisings in Paris, 
Foucault turned his attention to an analysis of the exercise of 
t~~:c~er through social practices, including the use of language or 
I 
~ d·i:scursi ve practices. He proposed that each society generates 
certain procedures according to which the production of 
discourse is selected, controlled, organised and distributed. 
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In Discipline and Punish (1977) Foucault combined his ideas on 
the development of social institutions (prisons, in this case), 
and the exercise of power through discipline, in particular, 
discipline of the body. This theme is developed further in 
Foucault's last work, The History of Sexuality (1979). Foucault, 
therefore, differs from Derrida and other Post-Structuralist 
writers in that he does not comment on individual literary 
~"WOrks, but rather views literature as a socially constructed 
discursive practice (Davis & Schleifer, 1989). 
Foucault's genealogy of history 
.,,MFoucault rejects any form of universal theorising. He attempts 
to avoid totalising forms of analysis and is critical of 
systematisation. However, there is an underlying coherence in 
his works which results from the fact that he follows the same 
.vision of history as Nietzsche, called genealogy. Foucault, like 
~o(:,N:i:etzsche, rejects the notion of a line of continuity and 
causality running through from the past to the present. They 
~- both separate the past from the present by estranging the reader 
from the past, by making it foreign, and therefore undermining 
the legitimacy and superiority of the present (Sarup, 1988). 
The differences between this approach and traditional historical 
analysis are profound: Whereas traditional historical accounts 
insert events into grand explanatory schemes and linear-causal 
processes, attempt to view events from a central point of 
origin, and celebrate great achievements, moments and persons, 
genealogical analysis seeks to establish the singularity of 
events, eschews the spectacular in favour of the discredited, 
the neglected, and the phenomena which have been denied a 
history (Leitch, 1983; Sarup, 1988). 
;:::,According to Foucault, many forms of knowledge were denied and 
suppressed, disqualified as inadequate and naive, and located 
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low down on the hierarchy established by scientific criteria. 
~~Foucault's genealogies focus on "local, discontinuous, 
disqualified, illegitimate knowledges against the claims of a 
unitary body of theory which would filter, hierarchize and order 
them in the name of some true knowledge" (Sarup, 1988, p. 64). 
~-,,'l'hus, in Foucault's view of history there are no constants, 
essences or static forms of uninterrupted continuities 
structuring the past. 
Power and knowledge 
The main thrust of all Foucault's works is the analysis of the 
process of modernisation. In many of his books he analyses a 
general historical argument in terms of the development of a 
particular kind of institution. In his book, The Birth of a 
Clinic (1973), his focus is still on the medical profession's 
control over social perceptions of health, but in his subsequent 
works, The Order of Things ( 1970), and The Archeology of 
Knowledge (1972), he analyses the structure of scientific 
~~·-d:i:scourses. Discourse is best defined here as practices which 
systematically form the objects of which they speak (Leitch, 
/ ~+933). Foucault's concern is with the conventions and rules 
which determine which statements are desireable/undesireable in 
a particular scientific context and how this process determines 
_,,~/.the content of the 'knowledge' produced. He is particularly 
interested in the effects of power as it is manifested in 
knowledge and refers to an 'apparatus' in this regard, a term 
which represents a structure of heterogeneous elements such as 
discourses, laws, institutions, in other words, the said as well 
as the unsaid. The 'apparatus' contains "strategies of 
relations of forces supporting, and supported by, types of 
knowledge" (Sarup, 1988, p. 71). 
Foucault, following 
the relationship 
Nietzsche, turns the 
between knowledge and 
common-sense view of 
power on its head. 
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Whereas knowledge is usually regarded as providing us with the 
power to accomplish tasks and to understand phenomena, Foucault 
I .-a;rgues that knowledge presents us with the power to define 
others, which gives us a hold over them. So, in his view, 
-·knowledge ceases to be a liberation and develops into a mode of 
surveillance, regulation, and discipline (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 
1986). 
In Foucault's masterpiece, Discipline and Punish (1977), he 
analyses the transformation in the manner in which punishment 
was meted out for crimes in 
l change in how power was 
the 18th century, in other words, a 
exercised. In feud~l times, under 
monarchical power, when crimes were perceived as a threat to the 
king's sovereignty, punishment took the form of cruel executions 
and humiliations in order to restore the position of the king 
and as a warning to others. Public executions were a visible 
display of his power to his vassals, his total control over 
their every manifestation. Foucault (1977) suggests that under a 
~-.mgparchical system, society was structured in such a way that 
individualisation was greatest at the top of the hierarchy, 
represented by the king. Power was visibly manifested in the 
person of the king, who had unlimited power over an 
unindividualised mass of subjects. 
Then, within a period of 80 years the system changed to one of 
/1 
disciplina;ry 
to lea({ to 
individual, 
his/her own 
power, a system of surveillance which is supposed 
the interiorisation of the process in 
each individual leading to the point where 
overseer. The new theorists claimed that the 
each 
is 
new 
system was superior to the old since it is 
continuously at minimal cost (Foucault, 1977) . 
exercised 
. This process of transformation in Western societies is best 
portrayed in Foucault's description 
architectural structure proposed at the 
of the Panopticon, an 
end of the 18th century 
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__..,.-~~by Jeremy Bentham (Foucault, 1977). In the Panopticon prison the 
prisoners could not be sure whether they were being observed 
from a central watch-tower from which all the cel~s were 
visible. The product of this system is hypothesised to be that 
the prisoners would gradually start to supervise their own 
"~ehaviour. Thus overt violence is replaced by moralisation. This 
new form of power, which can be referred to as panopticism, was 
first displayed in schools, barracks and hospitals. Dossiers, 
systems of evaluation and classifying were developed, and groups 
of patients and pupils were continuously supervised. At a 
~, certain point these measures were generalised to other contexts. 
/ } 
The traditi~pal view of power is a negative one -- it is that 
· w~ich limits, obstructs, refuses, prohibits, and censors. It 
presupposes an autocrat whose function is to forbid, to have the 
power to prohibit. In such a framework, any challenge to the 
=c-PQ:Wer can only be seen as a transgression. Foucault had this 
" 
view of power in his earlier works, but later, in 1971-72, he 
replaced a judicial and negative conception of power with one 
which was technical and strategic. In its modern manifestation, 
power produces new capacities rather than limiting anything 
(Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1986). 
Foucault states further that power is not a possession or a 
_..J:capaci ty, nor does it reside in hierarchies -- it has the nature 
of a network, with threads extending everywhere. He suggests 
that an analysis of power should not focus on the level of 
conscious intention of those who apply it but on the point at 
which it is applied. Thus, instead of viewing power as a 
"constraint or prohibition, it "produces reality; it produces 
domains of objects and rituals of truth" (Sarup, 1988, p. 82). 
~ For Foucault power is necessary for the production of knowledge 
and is a natural characteristic of all social relationships. 
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.In summary, one of the central tenets in Foucault's work is the 
J:.JK>tion that social power is omnipotent with respect to the 
psychological formation and functioning of the individual. It is 
this idea which has a direct bearing on this study and will be 
integrated in the material which follows in later chapters. 
Jacques Lacan 
The work of Lacan (1901-81), a French psychoanalyst, has had a 
profound influence, not only on the practice of psychoanalysis, 
but on literary theory and Post-Structural thinking in general. 
Interest in Lacanian psychoanalysis reached new heights during 
the May 1968 uprising in Paris, because it was thought to 
reconcile existentialism and Marxism. Many of the students and 
workers felt that politics could only be liberated through a 
liberation of interpersonal relationships and it was supposed 
that Lacan's thinking could provide the foundation for this 
(Sarup, 1988). 
Existentialism was central to the student movement because it 
provided a framework for thinking about issues of choice and 
personal responsibility. However, as a theory of the Self, 
existentialism was still firmly embedded in the Cartesian 
epistemology. Existential psychology tended to depict the 
individual as a rational, conscious agent who could consciously 
control and explain his or her behaviour. Thus it remained 
within the bounds of a philosophy of individual autonomy and 
rational choice (Sarup, 1988). 
Lacan's theory, on the other hand, offered a way of 
-·coneeptualising the social and linguistic construction of the 
-···Self. According to Lacan, Self and society cannot be viewed 
separately: Humans become socialised with the acquisition of 
language -- and it is through language that we are constituted 
as subjects (Sarup, 1988; Wright, 1985). 
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The content of Lacan's texts is not simple to access 
conceptually; his writing is a manifestation of his views on 
language. He attempts to avoid the over-simplification of other 
psychoanalytic writing and combines the theoretical and the 
poetic in a highly associative style. He does not regard his 
writings as a medium for convincing or persuading readers; he 
does not wish to 'ideologise' ideas or to present a stable body 
of knowledge. He also wants to subvert the normalisation that 
everyday language produces (Sarup, 1988). These features of his 
style of presentation are typical of Post-Structuralists 
",qenerally: They pay scrupulous attention to both content and 
process, displaying an extraordinary awareness of the 
implications of modes of communication. 
According to some authors (MacCannell 1986; Sarup, 1988; Wright, 
1985) one of Lacan's main achievements is the integration of 
Structuralism and Phenomenology. In his early work the growth of 
French Phenomenology and the influence of Hegel and Heidegger 
could be seen. Later, Structuralism allowed him to consider 
systems of interpretation. According to Sarup (1988), Lacan's 
work retains features of both Structuralism and Phenomenology 
throughout. This can be seen in his emphasis on language 
determinism (a Structuralist assumption) without relinquishing 
the concept of the 'subject' (Phenomenologism stresses the 'free 
self') . 
.. I:.a:can rejects any form of physiological reductionism -- his work 
is implacably anti-biological. Organic accounts of madness are 
rejected in favour of linguistic explanations. It is a 
discourse, an attempt at communication, that has to be 
~-~,"i.nterpreted. The emphasis is on understanding the discourse, 
rather than on finding causal explanations. He maintains (Sarup, 
1:988) that we cannot separate the person's 'mind' from her or 
his whole being; we cannot regard a person's 'psychology' as 
separate from his or her personal history. 
When Lacan relinquished 
initiated his work on 
assumptions reflected in 
biological dimension of 
subject, it is "refracted 
'the body' can only 
imposition of cultural 
unavoidable. 
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psychiatry for psychoanalysis, he 
Freud by criticising the biological 
Freud's work. Lacan's view is that the 
existence is always interpreted by the 
through language'' (Sarup, 1988, p. 8) 
be conceptualised in language. The 
meaning on the human anatomy is 
Lac an is critical of Behaviourism and 
the latter because of its emphasis 
American Ego Psychology, 
of the individual's 
adaptation to society. He believes that theorists such as Fromm 
and Horney have devitalised Freud's theory; they have sweetened 
Freud's ideas on the unconscious and infant sexuality. Lacan 
_. ,.al:so disagrees with their belief 
possible without reference to the 
1988). 
that 'self-improvement' is 
role of social factors (Sarup, 
Lacan's work is often described as a 'return to Freud', but his 
theory of language makes this impossible -- much of what Freud 
me~nt literally, Lacan reframes in terms of linguistic and 
metaphoric implications. Moreover, he retains the main concepts 
but realigns them to create a new system of thought, a rigorous 
reconceptualisation of Freud. 
Lacan's psychoanalytic theory 
~9can maintains that our knowledge of reality, ourselves, and 
others is entirely determined by language. His psychoanalytic 
theory illustrates the process by which the infant becomes aware 
of herself or himself as a separate entity through the 
acquisition of language. He believes that subjectivity is 
created through the I-Thou dialectic which defines the subjects 
by their mutual opposition. Language is also the vehicle through 
which the social reality, such as culture, prohibitions, and 
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~-~laws, manifests. The infant is shaped by these various 
dimensions of language without being aware of it (Lacan, 1977). 
The gradual development in the acquisition of language is 
,.,.,.typified in the tale of the child's game described by Freud 
(Lacan, 1986): The child is playing with a cotton reel with a 
piece of string tied to it. She holds the string and throws the 
reel over the edge of the cot, uttering a sound which sounded to 
Freud like "fort", that is , "gone" or "away". Then she pulls 
the string back so that the reel reappears, and greets it with a 
cheerful "da", meaning "there". This game is seen as the young 
-~hild's strategy to master the painful experience of her 
mother's absence, an attempt to cope with her disappearance and 
- reappearance. It illustrates the beginning of language in its 
independence from reality and provides insight into how language 
distances us from the lived experience of the Real (Lacan, 
1986). This distancing process occurs in two stages: The 
movement from the mother to an object (the reel) and eventually 
to language. 
It is in, 
articulation 
what Lacan calls the mirror stage, that the fir~t 
/ 
of the idea of a Self occurs. Lacan returns to this 
key metaphor for narcissism which Freud uses in a discussion on 
the ego (Lacan, 1986), since he believed that there is a 
-«"lftYthical, and sometimes literal, moment of an awakening to the 
Self when a child makes an imaginary identification with his or 
her image in the mirror. The process of self-recognition in the 
mirror occurs in three successive stages: In the fi~it stage the 
child assumes that her or his own reflection is part of the 
/ 
adult's image. In the secgrid stage the child understands that 
the image is not real. In the fi~ stage she or he is able to 
distinguish his or her own image from the adult's (Lacan, 1986). 
Lacan therefore extends 
by Freud. Whereas the 
the implications of 
child, before this 
this metaphor used 
stage, used to 
experience itself 
of completeness. 
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as a shapeless mass, it now acquires a sense 
In fact, this stage has wholeness and 
completion as its central idea. The pleasurable experience of a 
mirror-image is a metaphorical parallel of a perfect union 
between the inner and outer, a perfect control which brings 
about immediate satisfaction of desire. Lacan calls this pre-
linguistic, pre-oedipal stage the realm of the 'Imaginary'. So, 
cthe mirror-image is a "homologue for the Mother/Child symbolic 
relation" (Wright, 1985, p. 108). According to Lacan (1977, 
1986) this stage is very significant since it is the precursor 
for the enduring dialectic between subjectivity and alienation. 
During this stage the child imagines something which Lacan calls 
tfie 'Desire of the Mother' Lacan utilises the double genitive 
'of' on purpose, referring to both the mother's desire and the 
child's desire for the mother. The child imagines it is the 
desire of the mother in that it is all that the mother desires. 
In psychoanalytical terms, the child therefore becomes the 
'phallus' for the mother, all that would complete her desire. At 
the same time the 'Desire of the Mother' is the child's own 
desire for the mother, as that part of her or his experience 
which has provided adequately and promptly in all her or his 
needs. So it too is drawn into this phantasy of completion. At 
this stage the unconscious has not yet been formed since the 
child has neither experienced nor acknowledged repression at 
this stage. 
The child's ego is illusionary at this stage; the child's sense 
of ego is not something which has to be negotiated with the 
outside world; there is no gap between the concept and its 
application it has never been 'tested' in 'use' (Lacan, 
1986). The gap only appears during the Oedipal stage when the 
child is initiated into the order of language, or what Lacan 
calls the 'symbolic Order'. Embedded in language are the social 
imperatives embodied by the Father's rules, laws and 
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definitions, including those of 'mother' and 'child'. Thus, it 
is only when the child has to learn to delay gratification and 
to conform to society's norms, that the split between the 
conscious and unconscious occurs and repression occurs, which is 
described by Wright as "the tax exacted by the use of language" 
( 1985' p. 1 09) . 
Lacan, like Levi-Strauss, regards the Oedipal stage as the most 
crucial in the child's process of humanisation, since it 
~",.r.epresents a transition from the "natural register of life to a 
cultural register of group exchange, and therefore of laws, 
language and organization" (Sarup, 1988, p. 10). Lacan (1986) 
maintains that during the first Oedipal phase the infant not 
only desires the care and the contact with its mother, it also 
wishes unconsciously to be the complement of that which she 
lacks: The phallus. This desire could not occur on a conscious 
level since the child is not yet a subject at this stage of 
development. Then, during the secon~ phase, the father 
intervenes and deprives the child of its desired object. Thus 
the child encounters the power and authority, the 'law' of the 
father. During the third phase the child identifies with the 
father. The father therefore reinstates the phallus as the 
object of the mother's desire instead of the child-complement to 
what is lacking in her. This process can therfore be described 
as a symbolic castration of the child by the father by 
separating it from its mother (Lacan, 1986). 
Commenting on the supreme significance which the Oedipus complex 
has for Lacan, Sarup (1988, p. 11) states it is 
the moment in which the child humanizes itself by 
becoming aware of the self, the world and others. The 
resolution of the Oedipus complex liberates the 
subject by giving him, with his Name, a place in the 
family constellation, an original signifier of self 
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and subjectivity. It promotes him in his realization 
of self through participation in the world of culture, 
language and civilization. 
Lacan's conception of language 
In order to understand Lacan's theory it is best placed in the 
.context of De Saussure's concepts of signifier and signified. As 
illustrated in a previous section, De Saussure describes two 
continua, one of sounds and one of thoughts, both of which are 
chaotic. Through the language process, a section of the level of 
sounds and a section of the level of thoughts are coupled 
-~--····together: The signifier (the sound element) is matched with the 
signified (the concept, or thought). In this way, according to 
De Saussure, the chaotic continuum of sounds and concepts are 
divided up and matched permanently as two sides of a piece of 
paper (Jefferson & Robey, 1984). 
However there is a significant omission in 
He fails to describe how we get from 
De Saussure's theory: 
the chaos to the 
distinction, how meaning is made. He does not explain how a 
disorganised realm becomes sorted out into discrete units. In 
Lacan's theory the match between the signifier and the signified 
is not fixed, or logically secure in their sorting of the 
chaotic continuum of sounds and concepts (Lacan, 1977). Lacan 
refers to the common occurrence of a single signifier which can 
refer to two or more signifieds. Lacan therefore maintains that 
cthe signifier slides over the the field from which the signified 
is selected. A signifier always signifies another signifier --
no word is free from what it evokes on a metaphoric level. Lacan 
refers to glissement (slippage, slide) along the signifying 
chain, from signifier to signifier. Equally important, since any 
signifier's meaning can be altered retrospectively, after the 
fact (the words in a sentence only attain their meaning once the 
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sentence is completed), no signification is ever closed, ever 
''Saturated (Lacan, 1977). Moreover, each word is only definable 
in terms of other words. These observations all point to the 
cenclusion that there is no natural bond between signifier and 
~~ignified. This possibility of signifying something other than 
what is being said, determines language's autonomy from meaning. 
Lacan (1977) maintains that the unconscious not only comes into 
being through the acquisition of language, it is structured like 
a language. 
unconscious 
Lacan draws 
discourse in 
a parallel between conscious and 
that they both 'say' something 
different to what they appear to 'say'. For Lacan metaphor and 
metonymy (the substitution of the name of an attribute for that 
of the thing which is meant, e.g. crown for king) are the 
linguistic equivalents of what Freud called condensation and 
displacement (Wright, 1985). Unconscious desire can mistake one 
phenomenon for another similar to it and it can substitute one 
signifier for another (metaphor). It can also shift from one 
thing to another found with it (metonymy). In repression one 
signifier comes to substitute for another. The original 
signifier and what it signifies is banished 
Through the devices of displacement and 
metaphor and metonymy, the unconscious 
to the unconscious. 
condensation, or 
manages to avoid 
censorship. But by the same means the unconscious invades every 
one of our utterances (Wright, 1985). Thus, each subject builds 
up many chains of signification, "always substituting new terms 
for old and always increasing the distance between the signifier 
that is accessible and visible and all those that are 
unconscious" (Sarup, 1988, p. 13). 
Language and Self 
The most significant aspect of Lacan's reconceptualisation of 
Freud's theory is that the 'ego' is no longer a central concept. 
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In the place of the 'ego' there is the 'subject', a semiotic 
construct used to refer to a way of understanding and organising 
the discourses that relate individuals to culture. The notion of 
a consistent personal identity is rejected. Lacan links 
positions in language as corresponding to family roles (Father, 
Mother, Child), which are then constructed like a kind of 
grammar, that is, 'persons' are seen as markers for structural 
positions (Davis & Schleifer, 1989). The ego is but one 
'position' which is designated as the 'speaking subject' or the 
-'I' in discourse. Lacan (1986) maintains that the 'I' has no 
controlling influence on the discourses in which it is embedded . 
. He believes that the sense of Self that people experience is a 
function of the linguistic operation which he calls the 
'discourse of the Other'. The 'subject' is regarded as an 
inscription in the discourse of the unconscious with itself, in 
other words, it is a message that the unconscious sends itself 
(Davis & Schleifer, 1989). 
In his critique of ego psychology, Lacan states (Davis & 
Schleifer, 1989) that the assumed direct relationship between 
, ... the so-called ego and reality is a narcissistic illusion. It can 
be seen as corresponding to the phase in discourse called 
'Imaginary', since it excludes the mediation of language from 
the model. Thus, Lacan's critique on Freud resembles 
deconstructive criticism very closely: Both attempt to dismantle 
the traditional ego- and logocentric assumptions. Both Lacan and 
deconstructive criticism reject the Cartesian notion of the 
'individual' as an independent, objective, nonparticipant 
observer of a world that stays forever separate from him or her. 
Lac an also considers what he calls the 'dialectic of 
recognition', which refers to the notion that we obtain a sense 
of who we are through our reflection from others. In this regard 
it is useful to consider Winnicot's (1974) discussion of the 
mirror role. He argues that other people provide an individual 
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with a consistent sense of Self, with the mother's face being 
the first mirror. However, as stated before, Lacan (1977) 
maintains that it is impossible to achieve a stable image. 
Although we attempt to interpret our reflection from others, 
there is always the possibility of misinterpretation -- there is 
always the unavoidable gap of misrecognition. Lacan's views 
coincide with those of Sartre, who maintains that consciousness 
cannot grasp itself since reflection always turns the subject 
into an object (Sartre, 1957). 
~::,:Paean stresses that we exist only in our retrospective 
linguistic representations of ourselves, but that these 
representations are always inadequate (Lacan, 1986). Moreover, 
our representations of ourselves are always subject to 
interpretation by others. Thus, there is an inherent tension 
because one's identity depends, in part, on the recognition by 
others. In Hegel's discussion of this theme, he uses the 
metaphor of the Master and the Slave (Sarup, 1988). The Master 
demands recognition of himself from the Slave but this process 
is self-defeating since the Master's dependence on the Slave's 
acknowledgement of him keeps him continuously vulnerable. 
Extrapolating from this, we attempt to transform others into a 
mirror. 
Neither is mutual 
Intersubjectivity never 
recognition ever entirely possible. 
achieves a completeness because we can 
never enter another person's consciousness completely. This is 
partly due to the ambiguity of signifiers -- there is always a 
gap between what is said and what is meant. Therefore our need 
to achieve a state of wholeness and unity is forever frustrated. 
Conclusion 
One of the common threads which runs through the above 
discussion of Post-Structuralist thinkers is their fundamental 
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~~xiom that human experience cannot occur outside of linguistic 
and ideological structures. Their views are unique expressions 
of a larger philosophical trend toward a transformation in 
conceptualisations of the individual. It is this trend which 
will form the central theme of this study. I will therefore 
return to the ideas of the Post-Structuralist theorists in later 
chapters. 
In the next chapter I will present an outline of the progression 
of thought in the realm of narrative theory. This excursion will 
once again trace the development from Structuralist to Post-
Structuralist thinking. The relationship between narrative and 
the construction and maintenance of an identity will be 
articulated more clearly, but will only emerge fully in Chapter 
4. 
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CHAPTER 3 
NARRATIVE THEORY: A FRAMEWORK FOR COLLECTIVE MEANINGS 
Introduction 
We have established in the previous chapter that human 
is ordered and given meaning through language. In 
I intend to illustrate that a large part of human 
experience 
this chapter 
experience is given a form which resembles aspects of narrative 
schemas. What follows is a discussion of the nature of these 
narrative schemas and the evolution of conceptualisations in the 
field of narrative theory. In the next chapter autobiography 
will be examined as a special form of this process of 
narrativising experience. It is assumed that an understanding of 
the narrative schemas which shape the production and maintenance 
of a person's story of himself or herself is a necessary 
prerequisite for understanding the therapeutic discourse: how 
the client and the therapist manage and negotiate the 
perpetuation of the narrative schemas which support their need 
for meaning and their ideas of their own Self and of the Other. 
Narrative: A pervasive and interdisciplinary metaphor 
According to Barthes (Mitchell, 1981) narrative is a metacode, a 
human universal on the basis of which transcultural messages 
about the nature of a shared reality can be transmitted. 
Narrative in its almost infinite possibility of forms is present 
at all times, in all places, in all societies. The history of 
·narrative begins with the history of humans. Emerging between 
our experience of the world and our efforts to describe that 
experience 
meaning for 
(Barthes, in 
in language, narrative 
the straightforward copy 
Mitchell, 1981, p. 2). 
"ceaselessly 
of the events 
substitutes 
recounted" 
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There is wide agreement amongst scholars from a variety of 
disciplines and amongst investigators with different theoretical 
i perspectives that I}~£~9-~:iY:~ i.~'t,9J!~.,.Qty~~tb.~ ... Q~.i.m.a.t:.Y." .. l.oxms.~~bY: .... which 
huma~ .. ~?(:p~r!~!l.£.~ ... J,.§. imPY.~Q ..... !{i.tb_.~.!~l_g,{!J!::i!!9 (Bruner, 1986, 1987; 
Carr, 1986; Connelly & Clandinin, 1990; Miller, 1972; Mischler, 
1986; Mitchell, 1981; Polkinghorne, 1988; Reason, 1990; Ricoeur, 
1984; Sarbin, 1986; Schafer, 1976; Van den Broek & Thurlow, 
1991). The impulse to narrate is so natural, and the narrative 
form so inevitable, that it probably reflects a very central 
aspect of culture (White, in Mitchell, 1981). According to 
Barthes (Mitchell, 1981, p. 1) narrative " is simply there 
like life itself international, transhistorical, 
transcultural". 
Some psychologists regard the story schema as a 'natural 
psychological unit' (Rayfield, 1972, p. 1085) which is as much 
an intrinsic part of the human mind as our inherent capacity to 
learn and to use language and grammar. Gee (1985) notes that the 
ability to understand and to tell stories develops early and 
rapidly in children, without explicit instruction or training. 
Cobler (1982, p. 207), a psychoanalyst, refers to personal 
narratives as the "most internally consistent interpretation of 
presently understood past, experienced present, and anticipated 
future". He suggests that_g. narrative approach should be used in 
the study of personality because it would entail the same format 
as that which is actually used by people when they make 
SP?.c.essi ve reconstructions of their own h,isto:ry . g~::r::i.!!9 ..... ~he 
COl:l..E§.~ ... QJ :t!J~, McAdams ( 1985) proposes that the story metaphor 
should be used to study identity development since identity 
stability would be reflected in long-term coherence and 
consistency in a person's life story. 
Jameson (1981, p. 13), a literary critic, refers to the "all-
informing process of narrative" which he regards as "the central 
function or instance of the human mind". Macintyre (1981, p. 
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"~---1 .. 97), a moral philosopher, maintains: "It is because we all live j 
l 
out narratives in our lives and because we understand our ownl I 
lives in terms of the narratives we live out that the form of/ 
narratives is appropriate for understanding the actions ofj 
others". What is considered better or worse for a person depends l. 
on the nature of the narrative which gives the person's life itsi 
coherence. 
I can add many other similar statements to this discussion, but 
these should suffice as a sample of the wide recognition that 
,/ p:q~vails of ~Q~ ~E-~9.!~! ..... ~-~9~!.!!S~!!S!::: ... !.~!~.~ narrative has as a 
cog~_.th:r:Q~gh whiQlL. g_eQ.gl.~ .. e~Rt::es.§ .tbe.ix: .. J.Uldex:standing of events 
.~!1:.9: ... ~-~E~E.!~~~~s · 
/ In this study, narrative is conceptualised as a phenomenon which_.<" 
transcends its usual enclaves of poetry, drama, and fiction. 
Narrative and discourse have become the preoccupation of the 
present era; the study of the forms of our utterances, their 
functions and effects is no longer the cherished possession of 
~pecialists in literature studies and linguistics. The 
__ d:r;ealisation that our perception and cognitions are inextricably 
linked to, and indeed do not exist separately from, the systems 
of signs through which we articulate them to ourselves is an 
indication of an increased awareness of the self-reflexive 
nature of our relationship with the world. 
New movements 
psycholinguistics, 
have 
social 
sprung up in 
constructivism, 
ethnomethodology, 
critical legal 
studies, certain groups in the physical sciences, the social 
sciences all seeking to apply techniques such as discourse 
analysis to examine their own patterns of perception, 
conceptualisation, and communication. Thus, it is widely 
accepted that the narrative mode of discourse is omnipresent in 
~~·:human affairs: Narrative is a central feature of our cognitive 
activities (Ricoeur, 1984), of historical thinking (White, 
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1973), of psychological analysis and practice (Bernstein, 1990; 
Lacan, 1986; Schafer, 1976), of political critique and praxis 
(Lyotard, 1984); narrative is the central function or instance 
of the human mind (Nash, 1990). 
The literary study of narrative has a long history but it has 
undergone significant developments in recent years. It is no 
longer the province of literary specialists or folklorists 
borrowing their frame of reference from psychology and 
linguistics, but has now become a source of insight and renewal 
in virtually all the branches of the human and natural sciences. 
The work of Booth (1961) and Burke (1962), Scholes and Kellogg 
(1966), and Kermode (1968), are 
American criticism. The work 
regarded as classics in Anglo-
of the Canadian Frye (1967), 
focussed on narrative structure, which links him to the 
emergence of the French Structuralist literary movement in the 
last twenty years. Building on the work of the East European 
linguistic theorists (such as Propp and Jakobson), the French 
Structuralists (in particular, Barthes, Greimas, and Bremond) 
have produced significant works on narrative structure (Carr, 
1986). The contributions of some of these authors will be 
discussed later. 
~~rrative forms a link between perception, the construction of 
'""-'-'' •ov' ~· ~'< '•¥ .,,~, ••'•••''"'-•'""·""''"'"'-""" -·~''"-"''~'"~"-~" _.,,~--··-'""'-,'·""~'"""'"''"'"~'~"-.~·-'0_,-,_,""'""~~"~ •• 
- meaning, and communication. The narrative schemas which we use 
---"'"'""''""'"',.,._,.,.'M"''>«:-,,•,,.,,.,_.."="'"-,-•~·~"''""'~~"'~"'...-~·~>-I'W.,_,,,.,,...,.,...,._,,_ .. ""'""""'~"'""~"""'' ·~•',..<" '-' .~,, 
influence the initial processing of information; they determine 
what is perceived, how the information is organised and stored 
and how it is recalled and conveyed to others. Therefore the 
interpenetration between our perceptual apparatus and language 
___ is such that our understanding and expression of our experiences 
are never in a one-to-one correspondence with an external 
~{reality. '!'~~ .. 9Paracter.isti.cs int1er~nt .. J;.Q ... .!~Jl9Ya9~ .. an9 ... Il.a!"!".a1i:~r.~s 
determine hQW lfl~ ... §.~J~~t, .. grgaiJ,:i§~"-·an<;t.att:r::JJ>Ht~. !REH,J:!l:i!l9 ... J~Q .. QP:!:: 
~~I?!rt::!~.Q:~~~-~ .G:r;i tes ( 19 7 5, p. 32) has expressed it as follows: 
"Even if we grant that we may experience something in the utter 
52 
absence of language, still, if an experienced present is not 
simply a disassociated 'now', but contains at least a vestige of 
memory and a leaning into anticipation, then an incipient 
narrative form will be implicit in it, of which narrative 
language is the irreducible expression". This idea of narrative 
concurs with the view of Barthes (1974) who maintains that at 
."the individual level, P~2P!~.~-~ .P:il:!:E~.!:.~Y.~~ .... 2:f:= ... J:~.~A!:,_<?,~ ... " .. !.!_ves 
en~~!~ .. i::.!'l~.I!! ... J:.o Q.!::i:~!!.t~t:~ J:h~!ll~~!Y~~L ..... !!L .. t~!:!ll.§_Q_:f ___ .... t.!!~.!!:. .. J>..~~-!: .. and 
t!!g_!!' ..... -..... ~Y.t~£~~ At the cultural level Barthes believes, 
.narratives provide cohesion through shared beliefs, transmit 
~-,-. <oe~< ~··~•••">'• > <O<>•• >"J<U>>~•••'<••• >• ''' "~'''"~'' .~•no>'<"' 0 >'<<>•' «c>~,~~·"'~h~W'-'"'"M~ ''"''"'"'""'"' "'~"""·'"''·'''• ""'"~ <''"'~""'~"" "-"''"''"'"'' "~·"·<>'W->•"""'~'~~-·,>"''' ~"'"'""''"'"~;-o'<1~"'"'~""""""'' < "';C>J:\"-~''""•="'->~<''·~· '~"' " 
values, and determine a community's identity. In the literary 
context, the listener or the reader's desire to order and to 
know are the sources of what Barthes (Mitchell, 1981) has called 
the proairetic and hermeneutic codes in narrative. These codes, 
like all codes for that matter, are cultural, namely, they are 
the common 'property' of all the members of a cultural group. Or 
.'-./to. invert the metaphor, all members of a cultural group are 
possessed by these codes. 
Post-Structuralist narratives can be seen as attempts to 
frustrate our automatic application of these codes to texts. 
According to Scholes (Mitchell, 1981) Post-Structuralist texts 
can be regarded as anti-narratives and are meta-fictional 
because they force us to distract ourselves from our habitual 
interpretive processes. By frustrating this kind of closure, 
they bring the codes themselves to the foreground of our 
attention, forcing us to regard them as codes rather than as 
aspects of human nature or reality. Thus, the function of anti-
narratives is to problematise the entire process of narration. 
These conceptual narrativising habits become the manner in which -
we structure not only the stories of our own past lives 
(autobiography), but how we conduct our lives in the present, 
and the same schema also directs our lives in the future. This 
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"" 
/implies that, as Bruner (1987, p. 
ins~_e~~a!:>l_~_!_!om -~_!i~~~~--1:~!~.". 
31) states, "a life as led is lq --~~-------"""" --------~-····------ h 
~dopting a small/grand distinction for a criterion for narrative 
rather than a truth/falsity narrative criterion, Lyotard (1984) 
maintains that narratives become limiting and damaging when they 
are elevated to the lofty position of philosophies of history. 
-"'·cGrand narratives 
and ideologies, 
~ local needs and 
have become associated with political parties 
while little narratives are associated with 
local ingenuity. 'tmall-scale and local 
narratives ensure that the power of communities is not relegated 
to a remote source which is disconnected from the issues in the 
different communities. This view is also reflected in the work 
of Foucault (1967) who collected various texts to illustrate the 
historical changes in the manifestation of power through the 
___ ages. He also examined how society's conception of 'madness' 
fitted into the evolving contextually bound manifestations of 
institutional power. He, together with the other Post-Structural 
writers, is deeply sceptical about power as a single-base 
phenomenon, since the danger exists that this will .lead to 
h;ierarchical and unequal distribution of power. These writers 
--~ropose that the coexistence of multiple discourses is more 
likely to ensure that the dignity and priorities of all parts of 
a social system will be recognised. 
The current changes in the political structures in South Africa 
appear to reflect exactly these Post-Structuralist tendencies. 
Y The single Big White discourse has been broken down to make way 
for the emergence of different discourses which exist side by 
side and which should have equal significance in the Multiverse 
of discourses. 
Functions of narrative 
The essayist-novelist, Didion's (1979, p. 11) aphoristic 
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statement about narrative, "We tell stories in order to live", 
suggests the essential and serious nature of this feature of 
human existence and is best illustrated by the stories born from 
Sheherezade's predicament in A thousand and one nights. The 
anthropologist, Turner (1980) ascribes an equally serious 
function to narratives: !!_~_ll!~!~~ii~!IS._~~f: they pro!~~~- a __ f!l!:~ns 
for articulating and resolving problems and crises and 
disruptions in social relationships. Turner (1980, p.167) 
- regards narrative as the "supreme instrument for binding the 
values and goals which motiJtate human conduct into 
situational structures regards narrative as an 
essential part of cultural riJu;lls and social dramas, the latter 
consisting of four phases, namely: 'Breach', 'crisis', 
'redress', and either 'reintegration' or 'recognition of 
, schism'. Turner therefore sees narrative as serv:i_ng a_ l>J..ndin<J"_ 
function, especially in contexts where conflicts in values and 
interests occur. He states that "the narrative component in 
---~.c-• 
ritual and legal action attempts to rearticulate opposing values 
and goals in a meaningful structure, the plot of which makes 
cultural sense" (1980, p.152). This is reminiscent of Levi-
Strauss's view that mythical thought provides a model for 
transcending contradictions and oppositions (Mischler, 1986). 
According to Bruner (1990) a crucial characteristic of narrative 
/is that it facilitates the integration of the exceptional and 
__ tile ordiiJ.ary in a community. The viability and stability of a 
community depends on its ability to resolve conflicts, to 
explain anomalies and differences, and to renegotiate communal 
meanings. This is made possible by narrative's ability to forge 
- a coherence between ordinary and exceptional occurrences. 
Therefore, a community not only needs to contain normative codes 
and conventions, it also needs a set of interpretive procedures 
to make departures from those norms meaningful, in terms of 
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established beliefs. 
function. 
It is narrative which fulfills this 
Early (1982) 1 another anthropologist, goes beyond the 
ritualistic and mythical functions of narrative, to consider its 
!:.l!!lC_t~QI.l_ --~11~ p_E:mple' s n~ed to generate shared understan<I.~Ilg~_of_ 
~-~911!.(~-~-~.Jl!: event~ in their dai:l.y lives. She analyses everyday 
conversations in order to determine the cultural patterning of 
values in therapeutic narratives which occur in the context of 
illness, its progression, treatment procedures, and other 
related events. She examines these conversations to determine 
which of these aspects of the experience of the illness become 
codified into an elaborated version of the experience and become 
entrenched in versions which are recounted in people's future 
life accounts. She suggests that such narratives are employed 
like rituals and ceremonies which combine common sense 
explanations of illness episodes with shared cultural knowledge 
about illness. 
,/ ---~-" 
:·fo9_ni i:.!.!.~-------E~Y~holqg!~t:s, have studied narrative as the 
\, 
~ntegrating factor in a wide variety of cognitive and 
linguistic skills, for example: Text comprehension TR\nneii'l.art;--
1977); learning and recall (Johnson & Mandler, 1980; Mandler & 
Johnson, 1977; reading and literacy (Gee, 1985; Heath, 1983; 
Michaels, 1985; Michaels & Cazden, 1984). 
In literacy studies significant work has been done on the 
effects of different sociocultural contexts on the level of 
people's articulateness. The particular concern has been the 
patterns of linguistic and cognitive socialisation engendered by 
different contexts, and how these patterns shape children's 
literacy styles and abilities, how they express meaning, and how 
.they take meaning from oral and written stories (Heath, 1982, 
I ~1983). Children typically select, memorise, and retrieve the 
coherent with the content of texts in patterned ways which are 
\ 
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implicit 'codes' of their communities for meaning~making. The 
implications of these differences have been investigated by 
Michaels (1985). She studied the stories which children told in 
classrooms and developed a distinction between 'topic centered' 
(used most frequently by white middle-class children) and 'topic 
associating' styles. Because teachers found it difficult to 
follow and understand the apparently incoherent topic-
associating 
they were 
stories of socio-economically 
hampered in the extent to 
deprived children, 
which they could 
'collaborate' and participate in the discourse with these 
children. The teachers assumed that because they could not hear 
the structure and logic in the child's apparently unplanned and 
incoherent discourse, that it did not exist. However, 
researchers such as Michaels and Cazden (1984) and Gee (1985) 
"'have provided convincing evidence that apparently incoherent 
stories do indeed have structure and cohE}r~nce. 
A number of research studies by cognitive psychologists have 
focussed on the structures of stories (Johnson & Mandler, 1980; 
Mandler & Johnson, 1977; Wilensky, 1983). A central part of 
these 
'story 
refer 
studies has been the development of 
schemata'. The concept, 'story 
to the analogy between the formal 
'story grammars' and 
grammar', is used to 
structural features of 
stories (setting, situation, agent, intention or goal, 
instrument, plot), including the conventions for the interplay 
between them, and the syntactic structures and conventions of 
sentence grammars. 'story schemata' is used to refer to the 
generalised representations which are acquired through one's -
personal experience in typical situations. For example, 
Rumelhart (1975) developed a 'grammar' which entailed semantic 
and syntactic interpretation rules for stories which operated on 
such story elements as 'setting', 'Episode', 'Event', and 
'Reaction'. 
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In his studies on comprehension Rumelhart (1977) described 
problem solving as one of the most basic motifs in brief 
stories: Something occurs to the protagonist that delineates a 
goal which he or she has to achieve, and the rest of the story 
is a description of the protagonist's problem-solving behaviour 
as he or she moves towards resolving the dilemma. 
The functions of stories in everyday conversations have also 
been investigated. Sacks (1972} analysed the assumptions and 
inferences which listeners used to interpret a sequence of 
utterances. Sacks (1978) also examined how speakers arranged 
their utterances in order to announce that a 'story' is in 
progress, which, incidentally, reflected an implicit social 
convention that the 'storyteller' may hold the floor for longer 
than usual in the reciprocality of implicit conversational 
arrangements. Jefferson (1978a), following a similar 
perspective, illustrates how participants in conversations 
insert their stories into the flow of the conversation in a 
manner which appears to be intended to, first, avoid the 
disruption of what preceded the story and, second, to advance 
Jthe progression of the conversation. This suggests that stories 
serve to maintain the overall coherence of social interaction. 
Moreover, people appear to participate in an unspoken convention 
that allegiance, affiliation, and intimacy are expressed in the 
agreement on the sequence, plot, motives and meaning of 
interpersonal events -- they create the same story about those 
events. 
The fort-da game which Freud describes as the child's symbolic 
mastery of her or his mother's absence, can be described as the 
first signs of narrative in the child's development 
(Ei,igleton,1986). The process conveyed by fort-dais perhaps the 
shortest story we can imagine: An object is lost and 
subsequently recovered. It is possible to reduce many of the 
complex narratives in our culture to variations on this theme. 
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In many of the classics the pattern of the narrative is that an 
original arrangement is disrupted and later restored. From this 
perspective narrative can be regarded as a source of 
consolation: To experienc;/--~ss of an object evokes anxiety 
,/ ' in us. According to psychoanalytic theory, our sensitivity to 
loss is symbolic of oth~r--de_eper unconscious losses (birth, the 
faeces, the mother) and it is always highly pleasurable to find 
them restored to their original place. In Lacan's theory it is 
the original lost object, the mother's body, which becomes the 
central aspect which gives impetus to the narratives in our 
lives, driving us to pursue "substitutes for this lost paradise 
in the endless metonymic movement of desire" (Eagleton, 1986, p. 
185). Something has to be absent or lost in any narrative for it 
to find its impetus: If everything was intact there would not be 
a story to tell. This loss is not only distressing, it is also 
exciting. Desire is initiated by that which it cannot obtain and 
this is a significant source of narrative satisfaction. If the 
possession of what is lost were impossible, the narrative would 
become distressing, so we must know that the object will be 
restored to us. Thus, our pleasure in narratives lies in the 
suspension of the gratification that we know awaits at the 
conclusion of the tale. We are able to tolerate the 
disappearance of the object because our discomfort and suspense 
is permeated by the 'secret knowledge' (Eagleton, 1986, p. 186) 
that it will be restored to us. Therefore fort obtains its 
meaning only in relation to da. 
But the opposite is also true: The mother's presence cannot but 
remind us of her immanent departure. Once the dialectic of this 
fundamental narrative structure has been incorporated into the 
person's symbolic realm, we cannot possess any object without 
seeing it, even if only unconsciously, in the light of its 
possible absence. Realist works are characterised by a literary 
style which entails 'sliding' our anxiety about absence under 
the tenuously reassuring sign of presence. This fragile sense of 
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security has disappeared in more recent works, where the readers 
are constantly reminded that what they are perceiving may always 
have happened differently, or may not have happened at all. But 
more of that later on in this chapter. 
The relation of narrative to other forms of cognition 
The question of the prominence which narrative has in relation 
to other forms of experiencing and communicating about 
experience is an issue which pervades all literature on 
narrative. Authors are generally divided in their views on 
whether narrative should be regarded as the only way in which 
people transform 'knowing' into 'telling' or as merely one of 
many other modes of imbuing experience with meaning. Those 
authors who fall into the latter category distinguish between 
narrative conceptualisation and a form of knowing which is 
exemplified by some form of logical argumentation. 
-- !_ll_psyphology the view that narrative is the primary form of 
representation is best expressed by those authors who endeavour 
to reconceptualise theory and research in the fields of 
~-~:r:-sonality, developmental psychology, and psychoanalysis. For 
example, Sarbi~\ (1986) proposes narrative as the 'root metaphor' 
for psychology, because humans "think, perceive, imagine, and 
make moral choices according to narrative structures" (p.8). 
Cobler (1982) investigated how people maintain a sense of 
coherence and consistency in their lives in the face of both 
expected and unexpected changes, discontinuities and crises. He 
regards the autobiographical narrative which is formulated at 
any point in the course of life as the most internally 
consistent interpretation of the past, the present, and the 
anticipated future at that time. He adds that communities share 
certain informal assumptions about what constitutes the features 
of an adequate narrative. He advocates narrative as a more 
appropriate method for studying human development than 
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-~traditional research methods since it is the natural medium in 
which people's ideas about their own and others' functioning are 
embedded. 
On the other hand, there are several authors who ackno~led~~ 
... · that narrative is one of many equally valid forms of knowing. 
r--n---•··~·--·"'··---·~---· ,;,. . .. -. "~ ''". . > • .--·~«··~·~-~-~--~--~--~~---.-··-~--,···---··-··-
I~olkinghorne (1988) distinguishes between narratives and, what 
---~~-"'-·-····~--
~~~-··?alls 'arguments'. He maintains that, i~Il: __ <!E9!l.m~I1t:t. the 
conclusion has to flow from the logic of the statements in the 
argument and can therefore be predicted. By contrast, the ending 
' ·~v'of a story cannot be predicted or deduced in the same way. 
Stories can contain surprises and coincidences. Instead of 
predictability, the story's ending needs to satisfy the 
listener/reader's sense of adequacy and appropriateness. The 
listener/reader has to be satisfied that the narrated events 
could lead to the particular ending. The two modes of reasoning 
require different kinds of intelligence. The argument requires 
an. understanding of logical rules while the story requires a 
sense of coherence, that is, a sense of how plot events and the 
human responses to them are integrated. While listening or 
-· reading a story, we constantly have to evaluate the narrator's 
and our own norms for acceptable coherence as the story unfolds. 
B~uner (1986) distinguishes between the logico-scientific (or, 
~---~-----
what he refers to as the 'paradigmatic' mo<}~l i!ll..<l. tl:le n~rr~tive 
f()rm of rationality. According to him, paradigmatic discourses 
~ypically attempt to justify or demonstrate a point by relating 
it to other statements by means of formal logic. In narrative 
.. 
d.iscourses, on the other hand, the "demonstration' occurs by 
means of the type of reasoning based on an understanding of the ' 
whole as integration of its parts. 
According to Bruner (1986) the paradigmatic and narrative 
discourses can be regarded as codes that transmit different 
1...---""'··) 
~ ---
61 
kinds of messages. The selection of discourse type depends on 
the kind of message the speaker/author wishes to communicate: 
.~.Either a message about intrinsic reference (paradigmatic) or a 
message about the speaker/author's experience of a unity . 
. ~-Thus formal science can be regarded as an example of the 
paradigmatic type of discourse. A variety of conventions of 
formal logic are use~·to organise its statements into a higher 
.. order of meaning. ""arrative discourse, on the other hand, 
organises statements according to how they contribute to a 
unified whole. 
However the distinction between narrative and logico-scientific 
ways of thinking does not have as clear a dividing line as 
Bruner would suggest. Developments in the domains of philosophy 
of science as well as in the philosophy of language have led to 
a blurring of the boundaries between narrative and scientific 
forms of thinking, as will be shown below. 
Narrative and scientific theory 
As I have indicated in Chapter 1, for many years e~piricism 
·· provided the rationale for scientific methodology. As a 
metatheory, empiricism entails the assumption that theories 
about the world can be formulated on the basis of systematic 
observations of a reality which exists independently from the 
observer. By rigorously following systematic empirical 
procedures, it was assumed, one could discover theoretical 
principles which were consistent and generalisable (Gergen & 
Gergen, in Sarbin, 1986). 
However, the attainment of this compelling goal depended on the 
justification of certain premises. Instead of generating support 
for these premises, one of these premises in particular was 
subjected to a number of critical blows -- the premise that 
theoretical terms within a science can refer to the features of 
the real, objectively existing world with sufficient precision 
that the 
subjected 
propositions 
to empirical 
that these terms described 
assessment. However if 
can be 
direct 
correspondence between theoretical terms and reality cannot be 
established, then objectivity cannot be guaranteed. 
This key assumption of empiricism has not withstood attacks from 
different quarters over the last few decades. One attack came 
from the area of the philosophy of language: As I illustrated in 
~,~hapter 2, the assumed simple linear relationship between words 
and their referents has been revealed as an illusion. Ano~er 
/ 
Jwidespread criticism was that objects of observation cannot be 
identified independently of the concepts of understanding with 
which one approaches them. Theory therefore always precedes 
observation. Thus theoretical language shapes and therefore 
partly determines what appears to be objectively observed 
.\/phenomena. In addition, observation statements are as fallible 
as the theories they presuppose and therefore do not constitute 
a completely secure basis on which to build scientific 'truths'. 
Thus, according to Popper (Chalmers, 1978), the empirical basis 
of objective science has nothing absolute about it. 
Although the arguments of philosophers of science, like Popper, 
Kuhn, Feyerabend, and Lakatos have considerably weakened the 
empiricist assumption that scientific theories can serve as 
()Qjective maps or mirrors of the world, they created the 
oppo~t~nity for new criteria to emerge for forms of inquiry. 
Wittgenstein (1963) suggested that the scientific community 
sfiould turn its attention to the effects of linguistics on 
theory formation. Hanson (1958) maintained that if what we 
accept as fact is 
scientists need to 
fact, most critiques 
process of theory 
primarily based on precon~~ption, then 
examine the process of preconception. In 
of empiricism reflected a concern with the 
construction. If scientific theories are 
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primarily linguistic instruments, then 
elaboration may largely be governed 
linguistic practice. This suggests that 
their development and 
by the principles of 
the form and contents of 
scientific theories may be significantly determined by 
conventions of discourse. This view corresponds with that of 
Kuhn (Chalmers, 1978) who gives precedence to sociological 
processes of establishing consensus about what is to be 
considered 'good science'. He states (Chalmers, 1978 p. 107) 
;~t~a-t~ "scientific knowledge, like langua9~, is intrinsically the 
common property of a group or else nothing at all. To understand 
~/it, we shall need to know the special characteristics of the 
groups that create and use it". 
This position has, 
in theories of 
deconstructionist 
in recent years, acquired increased impetus 
literary criticism, most specifically in 
theory. According to this theory, :i,t_ _ _i~ Ci:J:"gued 
~hc:ttwhat the reader brings to a text in terms of expectations, 
... ~.~ills, and affective dispositions are significant determinants 
of the meaning of the text. It is not simply the text which 
determines the reader's response, but the reader who 
deconstructs the 
of it. Moreover, 
literary work, 
intentions of the author in order to make sense 
when literary critics interpret=: and evaluate a 
their reviews will be governed, to a large 
extent, by the conventions of 'p~oper' }l!:t:~:J:"P:J:"~tatioJ1. In fact, 
descriptive accounts of any kind are influenced and constrained 
~~~-!1 guid~I1g metaphor of some kind, whether deliberately-, or 
~~~onsciously (Gergen & Gergen, in Sarbin, 1986). The theories 
which psychologists use to explain human behaviour has recently 
reflected the metaphor of artificial intelligence. If one 
regards human 
the metaphor 
cognition as equivalent to computer functioning, 
of the computer will dictate how mental functions 
are conceptualised. Within the parameters of such a root 
metaphor, terms such as 'information processing', 'storage', 
'retrieval', and so forth, do not surprise. 
64 
The emphasis in scientific activity has therefore turned towards 
~":the examination of self-referential processes of knowled9e 
creation, rather than the discovery of objective 'truths'. 
l-our subjective perspective determines what we regard as 'real'. 
We cannot verify in any objective manner the extent to which our 
perceptions correspond to an external point of reference. We 
' ~ 
~are, furthermore, encapsulated in the 'prison-house' of language 
in terms of how we construct our conceptualisations of 
'reality'. According to this theory any knowledge is 
v''enculturated knowledge', in other words, 'reality' is always 
the result of intricate processes of communal negotiation. In a 
social milieu behaviour between people attains its meaning when 
it becomes coordinated through a process of consensual 
agreement. These premises logically lead to an emphasis on the 
intrapersonal and the interpersonal processes which underlie the 
construction of meanings, thus 
preoccupation with self-referentiality 
in the realms of science. It has 
reflecting a similar 
as can recently be found 
therefore become an urgent 
prerequisite that participants in all scientific fields should 
become aware of the presuppositions which make up their own 
f "' ···perspectives. This essential activity of 'unpacking' one's own 
presuppositions facilitates the exploration of the basis of 
one's commitments. 
After this general overview of how narrative is conceptualised, 
it has 
retracing 
become necessary 
developments in 
to contextualise 
narrative theory in 
from Russian Formalism to Post-Structuralism. 
these views by 
the recent past, 
Overview of historical developments in narrative theory 
In this section I will attempt to provide a condensed overview 
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of the most import~nt schools of thought in narrative theory in 
order to contextualise the study as a whol""er, but more 
specifically, to illustrate the histo~ical background from which 
- -··-"""', ---
Po~t-Structhralism developed. It is important to bear in mind 
'--·~-···~'"""'~ ·' 
that the field of narrative theory is vast and I will therefore 
not attempt to even approach comprehensiveness in this section. 
The discussion will focus mainly on Russian Formalism and 
Structuralism, because the ideas expressed by Post-Structuralist 
thinkers can be regarded as a reaction against many of the ideas 
founded by thinkers in these two movements. It is therefore 
necessary to first take cognisance 
of these before Post-Structuralist trends are discussed in the 
last section. 
Russian Formalism 
Although this movement has only relatively recently become known 
in the English-speaking world, it is acclaimed as one of the 
most influential literary schools of this century (Ryan & Van 
Zyl, 1982). This movement lasted for only a short time, from 
about 1915 to approximately 1935, but it had a profound 
influence on critical-theoretical movements in Czechoslovakia, 
Poland, and Germany, after the Second World War. In addition, it 
provided a large part of the foundation for French Structuralism 
in the 1960s and it continues to have an influence on 
contemporary semiotics. The movement showed a remarkable 
readiness to recognise contemporary shifts in literary and 
general intellectual fields, incorporating many of the ideas of 
De Saussure and Husserl, the German phenomenologist, for 
example. By comparison, the work of De Saussure only started 
having an impact on French literary studies in the early 1960s 
and his work only became available in English in 1959 (Ryan & 
van Zyl, 1982). 
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The Russian Formalists' main contributions to the exploration of 
the structure of narrative were made by Tomashevsky, Shklovsky 
~,~,and Propp. Tomashevsky identified typologies of many of the 
major features of prose fiction: He distinguished between types 
of 'point of view' (omniscient, limited), static and dynamic 
characters (a distinction which is similar to E.M. Forster's 
typology of flat and round characters), and direct and indirect 
characterisation (what a narrator explicitly tells the reader 
about a character versus what the reader learns about the 
character from her or his actions, speech, etcetera) (Ryan & Van 
Zyl, 1982). He also highlighted the distinction between story 
time (or narrated time) and reading time (or narrating time). 
One of the most significant contributions which the Russian 
~Formalists made is the distinction between fabula (or story) and 
sjuzet (or plot). These two terms specified the difference 
between the non-aesthetic material in a narrative, the story 
,matter or fabula, and the literary management and arrangement 
/ 
".,, O;f that material (sjuzet). In other words, story is the cluster 
of presented events in their causal-sequential order; plot is 
the artistic arrangement of those events. This distinction has 
such significance, because it transformed the previously 
ambiguous term, plot, into a device which became a useful 
instrument in the analysis of narrative. The extent to which the 
formalists emphasised plot construction is a reflection of their 
'-1' 
· attention to how the narrative material is artistically 
arranged, rather than to what is presented or even the meaning 
of what is presented (Ryan & Van Zyl, 1982). In his Morphology 
of the folktale (Eagleton, 1986), Propp reduced all known folk 
tales to a mere seven 'spheres of action' (the hero, the helper, 
the villain, the person who was sought for, and so forth) and 31 
fixed elements or 'functions'. He also proposed that these 
'spheres of action' were merely combined in different ways in 
different folk tales. 
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In their earlier studies of narrative the method typically 
employed by the Formalists was to identify a compositional 
device, determine its functions, to compare its use in a variety 
of texts, and then to place it alongside the other 
compositional devices in a typology of artistic conventions. 
The Formalists' rather narrow preoccupation with stylistic 
devices soon become too sterile, since, once the most important 
devices had been identified and studied in the manner described 
above, all that remained was to look for other examples of the 
same devices. The work of De Saussure provided them with a way 
out of this impasse: They moved beyond the view of a literary 
work as simply an aggregate of features on the same conceptual 
level, to regarding it as an integrated and dynamically 
structured system. This enabled them to reformulate their 
position in far more productive and sophisticated terms as 
they gradually moved into Structuralism (Ryan & Van Zyl, 1982). 
Structuralism 
The Structuralist movement did not only transform the fields of 
semiotics and poetry, it also revolutionised the field of 
narratology. The most influential in this regard were the 
Canadian, Frye, the Lithuanian, Greimas, the Bulgarian, Todorov, 
and the French literary critics, Genette, and Barthes (Eagleton, 
1986). The Structuralist analysis of narrative began with the 
foundational work of the Structuralist anthropologist, Claude 
~vi-Strauss, who regarded apparently diverse myths as 
consisting of a limited number of basic themes or universal 
structures. He regarded myths as a kind of language: They 
consisted of individual components called 'mythemes' which 
acquired meaning only when they were combined in specific ways, 
much like phonemes, the basic sound units of language. The set 
of rules or conventions which governed the combinations were 
regarded as a kind of grammar, a set of relations below the 
'surface' of the narrative which represented the 'true' meaning 
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of the myth (Eagleton, 1986). Levi-Strauss went even further and 
assumed that these relations were also intrinsic to the human 
mind itself, so that myths were merely one form or embodiment of 
universal mental operations, for example, the making of 
dualistic or binary oppositions. He viewed myths as conceptual 
devices to think with -- their function is to organise and 
classify reality, rather than to convey a story. This also 
applies to totemic and kinship systems which are not so much 
social and religious institutions as networks or codes of 
communication (Eagleton, 1986). Moreover myths operate on a 
level which transcends the individual mind: Myths think 
themselves through people, rather than the other way around. 
They do not originate in a single person's consciousness and 
have no particular objective. This is an example of how 
Structuralism 'decentres' the individual subject, who is no 
longer regarded as the originator or receptor of meaning. This 
model was generalised beyond the tribal forms of mythology to 
other kinds of narrative. 
The work of the Russian Formalist, Propp (Jefferson & Robey, 
1984) was typical of this kind of endeavour. Greimas (Jefferson 
& Robey, 1984) managed to condense Propp's model even further by 
introducing the concept of an actant, which refers to a 
structural unit rather than a character. The six actants 
(Subject and Object, Sender and Receiver, Helper and Opponent) 
subsume Propp's different 'spheres of action' with even greater 
simplicity. 
(Jefferson & Robey, 1984) applied this 'grammatical' 'J'odorov 
-lform ·of analysis to Boccaccio's The Decameron: Characters are 
seen as nouns, their attributes as adjectives and their actions 
as verbs! This turns the stories in The Decameron into a kind of 
extended sentence, in which these elements are combined in 
different ways. This exercise illustrates the Structuralist 
assumption that every literary work appears to describe some or 
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other external reality, but covertly busies itself with its own 
processes of construction. Thus, Structuralism does not only 
reinterpret all literary works as following the structural form 
of language, it views these works as having language as its 
actual subject matter. 
In Frye's work, Anatomy of Criticism (1967), he attempted to 
view all literary genres as a single system. According to him, 
there were certain universal laws (i.e. archetypes, myths, and 
genres) which governed all literature. All the diverse kinds of 
literature could, according to him, be categorised in only four 
'narrative categories': The comic, romantic, tragic, and ironic, 
each of which respond roughly to the four mythoi of spring, 
summer, autumn, and winter. Frye (1967) maintains that 
literature is an autonomous verbal structure, locked into its 
own closed self-referential circuit, which made reference to 
life and 'reality' only through 
relationships (Frye, 1967). 
a system of linguistic 
I 
This vast 
substantial 
relation to 
system of literature does not change in any 
way. It merely rearranges its symbolic units in 
each other, rather than in relation to an external 
'reality'. Literature should not be seen, according to Frye, as 
the self-expression of individual authors; they are merely 
functions of this universal system literature emerges from 
the collective awareness of the human race itself, which is how 
it comes to contain archetypes or symbols of universal 
significance (Frye, 1967). 
In his Narrative Discourse (1972) Genette distinguished between 
recit (the actual order of events in a text), histoire (the 
sequence in which those events 'actually' occurred, according to 
the text), and narration (the act of narration itself). The 
first two terms are equivalent to the Russian Formalist 
distinction between 'plot' and 'story' respectively. For 
example, 
first and 
what the 
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in a detective story the body is usually discovered 
then the narrator takes the reader back to explain 
events were that led up to the murder. Thus, the 
'story', or the actual chronology of the action is reversed in 
the 'plot'. 
In the next section I will discuss Post-Structural notions 
regarding narrative, or more correctly 'anti-narrative', since, 
in many of their works they deliberately undermine the 
conventions of narrative structures. As described in the 
previous chapter, Structuralist ideas were not merely developed 
further in the Post-Structuralist era, there is a discontinuity 
between Structuralist and Post-Structuralist thinking which is 
due to a ~\lbSt?tntial epistemological shift. 
,/,,,'' --- -,, <' 
,,,<" 
I\ost-Structuralism: From 'narrative' to ..:.anti-narrative' 
'<, 
There has been no century before 
produced such a consistent attack 
the present one which has 
on our beliefs about what we 
6an know and how we can know anything. As I pointed 
'"-._. ______ , __ _ 
~----- previous 
ability 
section, the 
as observers 
previously held certainties 
to produce empirically 
.out in the 
about our 
verifiable 
observations have been seriously undermined. The scientists have 
also alerted us to the observer's unavoidably subjective 
participation in the creation of his or her observations. In the 
previous section it was pointed out that these changes 
a P+,<>found impact on, inter alia, conceptualisations 
-,,, 
meaning is created and maintained. 
have had 
of how 
In literature the traditional notions about the stability of the 
reality created in fictional texts have not escaped the 
influence of this vast epistemological shift. Bell (Nash, 1990) 
~~p~aks of the subtle 'contract' contained in any narrative: 
Narrative seeks to convince, and in order to do that it requires 
the reader's complicity, her/his commitment to its implicit 
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terms. The reader has to make a complex series of negotiations/,~~> 
between the 'real' world of experience and the .b~world' portrayed(/" 
the book. Thus the meaning of the text is no longer assumed 
"'"·--«·· .... '" ""'·,"· 
to be contained in the text itself,// nor in the reader, but in 
their interaction (Bell, ··:rri··-'K"asil;" 1990). The relativity and 
elusiveness of the narrative contract between text and reader 
has recently become a central preoccupation of the European 
novel. The seduction of the reader into the logic and meaning of 
the text has been exposed and foregrounded in the Post-
Structuralist novel. Thus the self-questioning aspect of Post-
l Structuralist writings reveal an ~~~~~tion of the 
' / in~errelation of life and narrative. These acts reveal the 
·V·extent to which we create and maintain our own 
conceptualisations of 'reality'. 
The neat and tidy notion of "identity as a consistent and 
""'·~<~,..,~-. '., 
continuous entity has been exposed to re~eal our own cr~'!t::ions, 
our own need for coherence and stab~lity as they are embodied in 
the characters portrayed in fictional texts. It is on this issue 
that the ideas of many contemporary thinkers overlap with 
astounding clarity, thinkers as diverse as the psychoanalyst, 
Lac an, the c~!:':.':l:!:ill historian,. Fo\}cau,lt, the critical 
philosopher (or anti-philosopher), Derrida, and the Marxist 
philosopher, Althusser (Nash, 1990). They all suggest that what 
·rwe · experience as our autonomous and enduring i~~ti ti~~, may 
1 very well be the products of culture ~nd language, which has 
\.,''-··· " ... ,"'" 
seduced us into thinking as we do -- like · 
some 'emperor's new clothes' in which our thinking has 
been falsely dressed and blandished by a socio-
economic-and-sexual hegemony, 
network of forces, sea-changes, 
by 
of 
a labyrinthine 
which we may be 
only anonymously entangled threads, edgeless, 
unbounded currents (Nash, 1990, p. 202). 
i 
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Thus, the~-ca1:L of the Post-Structuralist writers is that 
/ 
we 
in should '4ecenter' the 'subject', to discard the naive belief 
our autonameus; inborn, integrated individuality, like the 
-· '•,. 
new 
clothes of the 
,eur notion of a 
identity, and 
those whom we 
emperor. we should, according to them, replace 
'private identity' with the idea of a c~~tive 
we should take up an oppositional stance against 
think to be other than ourselves and inimical to, 
and defining of, our being (Nash, 1990). Nash (1990, p. 203) 
maintains that other writers argue that this stance is merely 
another outmoded conservative narrative of heroic struggle, "of 
oppre~..si.on and its eventual utopian redress". In other words, 
I" "' 
this new conceptualisation of identity is also (:c}elusi~~. The 
humanistic concept of the Self has now been replaced by theories 
that destroy many of our fundamental traditional distinctions, 
for example, rational/irrational, appearance/reality, 
interior/exterior, fact/fiction. The concept of a unified and 
i-·-st-able Self has to give way before the realisation that we are 
almost entirely created by a superficial and playful 'pastiche' 
"'~""•,......<•>A'OY;.biY"'-'"--'" 
of so many fleeting collective ideas. Nash (1990, p. 203) quotes 
Mas'ud Zavarzadeh who maintains that 
character today cannot fulfill its traditional 
narrative functions, which were to portray a fully 
individuated person ... rooted in a 'community of 
thought and feeling' shared by his fellow human 
beings .... The old organic world of man and the new 
world of technology ... obey different imperatives, 
different directives and different laws which have 
nothing in common .... Such developments create an 
open-ended and indeterminable system which defies all 
historical and totalizing frames of reference. 
Thus in terms of literature, according to Robbe-Grillet (Nash, 
1990, p. 203), this means that 
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all the technical elements of the narrative ... the 
"'--,, 
unconditional adoption of chrOE_Q.!Q9.ical development, 
linear plots, a regular graph of the emotions, the way 
each episode tended towards __ ~I.?: ... ~_!!_d, etc .... Everything 
aimed at imposing the image of a stable universe, 
coherent, continuous, univocal and wholly decipherable 
..,./has to be relinquished. Narrative structure and chg,racterisation 
---··· /'' "'\ 
belong to th~ . past, according to him. So .. -does· ~:ychology', the 
~p_,<'" •' .- ·~~ •• <O o'o ~·· • • 
cornerstone of realist narrative,. wtfi.c":t~· he considers to be "an 
arbitrary, artificial system of attitudes for the focalization 
of events through the perspective of a named individualized 
human consciousness an outmoded anthropomorphic culture's 
strategy for the projection of a happily bounded and integrated 
"t' •, 
. vision '·o'f existence" (Nash, 1990, p. 203-204). Barthes joins his 
\-=,..¥o.ice. to Robb~-Grillet' s by stating that the idea of a character 
as representing a human person who has an identity which is 
linked .. to his or her actions, is not a scientific, but an 
~ (ld;ological concept 
:-J:~oncept of 'person' 
(Nash, 1990). Thus, the old Modernist 
is no longer regarded as a useful model for 
This means that a narrative no longer 
reader as to the traditional laws of 
I 
~::its representation. 
contracts with the 
continuity or identity outside itself it abides only by the 
?!"~·~~,.,~.-.. , •• _,~,.. .. ,..~ ... ""' • .., .. """"""'""-"'"'"'-·-'-""""""'"'• •· ~ .. , 
rules of language. This means that ~rrative is regarded as 
nothing more than a string of lingu:{~t.:ic signs (Nash, 1290). 
Whereas narrative was 
... ~···""' ·····" 
( \ 
traditionally defined by what came before 
:j.t (a .. Jfotid outside it, an authqr outside it, and 
't:J{int_~;pre~iion of the world), it is now beginning to 
/ '~ 
an author's 
be defined 
!in terms of what comes after it, in other words, in terms of the 
""{.,\i._;;,_·,-:;~···, ~-~~ ,.. r 
' \• M reade~ and his 
"'-"..--~ k ;;~;_;;,..;· ., 
interpretation of the text (Nas~1 ...... J~O). This 
:;:;.<v-:.:;;.:·;·.·:-.::· /. ~~.,argil.ment contains two different notions of in(leterminacy: The 
) '\,'"' / 
:undecidability in the relationship between texts ··l~·±rrt"ertextual 
·indeterminacy') and the undecidability in the relationship 
.between a text and its reference to the 'reality' outside it 
('extratextual indeterminacy'). 
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/ 
- ~tertextual indeterJ'Ilinacy reflects the id~a tbat all 
f communications are (texts whose meanings are mere intersections, 
\nodes in the whole ;;eb of the language of signs wfiichpermeate 
human experience. "Books, traffic signals, advertisements and 
thence the objects advertised, facial expressions, bottlecaps, 
thrown stones, all belong to this 'archtext' that is the world 
of our understandings" (Nash, 1990, p. 205). And these signs 
, j interact in such a way that they con_~_~al1::f:!¥ _____ ~?~.~-!=Y each pther. 
J _lin essence this means that what is said is never said::~:;;.,Si~~e it 
, ! can always be said differently. "As we write, as we "''·i~ad, what 
L~edo is not to find a 'finished' meaning but merely to unfold 
the seamless fabric of possible utterances which the text draws 
into the open" (Nash, 1990, p. 205). Thus, every text exists at 
the intersection of many other texts of which it is 
simultaneously the rereading, the accentuation, the 
condensation, and the displacement -- in a sense, the value of a 
text is the extent to which it int~g~~tes and q~stroys other 
texts (Sollers, in Nash, 1990). 
Therefore intertextual indeterminacy is a function of the 
perpetually e!~~-~~~-~ nature of the possible relationships 
between signs. And to complicate matters even further, the 
(~"r:~ad~r, too, can be regarded as a plurality of other texts, of 
h ·, ' i\ an---infinite number of codes (Barthes, in Nash, 1990). 
Given the arbit~ary relations between all signs and their 
referents, the proponents of extratextual indeterminacy 
(Barthes, Derrida, in Nash, 1990) argue that since we discern 
what words signify only through their di,f£erence from other 
words, (and since they always contain the\traces pf what they do 
not signify) words evoke not the presence 0£-- events, but their 
/_ •• - "'·\'< 
absence. In this way texts always\defer fixed and conclusive 
me~:i.~gs,,,/they open up chasms betwee~·--themselves and the events 
"•·""'"'~-«-··~··~"-"'' 
or actions they refer to. Seen in the light of this definition, 
narrati~~s are sets of signs which create nothing but 
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therq~t~lves, and in creating themselves they undermine or destroy 
,.< o•' ' '",._,~"-"-,,""'-
themselves. 
So, <;lue--t-o __ the probl.em of the in~~terminacy c:>:f t.b-e 
r' ~ / 
s:ubject, the 
unce~t:ainty of th~. 'who' and ~: 'what' of Qarratives, many 
·~ ~· ""···-~~·''' ··-
recent fictional works have been based on the p~~ that the 
only worthwhile activity that authors can engage in is to 
produce texts which illustrate the pl,ay__ .of .conb::ad.ict.ions and 
infin~-~e signification. This takes on many 
number of which will be mentioned below. 
different\ forms, 
-----~~~~~·-H·' -·--.~ ··-
a 
A narrative may play with our expectations of what constitutes 
the proper perspective of a story. In contrast to depictions in 
the traditional realist novels of complete descriptions (say, 
the depiction of a character in the context of all her 
relationships and her significance 
Post-Structuralist 
in a 
novels N descriptions in 
.':U.acus only on the desc:r\i.Q_t~on _Qf the 'pai"t' 
. ..,., 
of how it is situated in<:fhe 'whQ1e'. Nash 
""''""'·""-' 
social context), 
will g~~berately 
with ~o in~cation 
"""-~"-''-'''"'"~;-.:<.~-·" 
(1990) likens this 
""'"'"-kcind of text to being handed a t~lescope which is far too 
/f :::er:~~1:or is th=r~:~=~e~:~~ s~i::~t ::ly w~~-~!l~~;~:=·=::::~t :: 
_reduces the 'subject' to an insignificant speck. Ill_Qther words, 
~·-·-either obtain a view of the 'subject'. with 6~ sense of its 
... ·=·······--;-"'""'~'·'·-'' 
;i position in the larger context, or we are given a se.pse of the 
-;i/totality, but it appears so distant that it seems like -a:n-·empt·y 
void. 
Alternatively, our familiar sense of continuity may be tampered 
' .. 
with. In novels by Pinget (Nash, 1990) and Calvina (1983; 1984), 
for example, the names of people and places are changed at the 
author's whims and any events which have occurred in the past 
are all described as having occurred 'ten years ago'. This kind 
-"···Of technique seriously undermines our understanding of 
;phronology and causality. 
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]-.or the text may :~~- certain s_l:_il!_~ments and then C!_~_voke them in 
the same breath. For example, in an early novel by Robbe-Grillet 
(Nash, 1990, p. 151) we find" ... the apartment door is wide 
open, despite the late hour, the apartment door is closed ... ". 
Or, in Beckett's Molloy (Nash, 1990, p. 207): "Then I went back 
into the house and wrote, It is midnight. The rain is beating on 
the windows. It was not midnight. It was not raining". In other 
texts verbal orientations are dissolved, re-formed or oscillated 
~\until the reader is in a perpetual state ot' disorientat_l:.,on and 
'',j ~--~~'"'~-'"··''' "' ~···· '"'"'"-'"~'"""'·-., \\ ,, 
/Huncertainty. 
-~ 
Or in the novels by Calvina (1983; 1984), Flann O'Brien, Robbe-
Grillet, Becket (Nash, 1990), the narrative has a deceptively 
simple structure, except tlnat a crucial -~yent i.~- ,Qill,:i,J,!;:gg: the 
reader's realistic expectations are frustr'ated by replacing the 
central pivotal integrating moment in th~ ~i:o:r:-y ,with a .!~.!.<!.· Or, 
in narratives by Borges, Calvina, Pinget (Nash, 1990), and many 
others, the reader may start to read the story, only to discover 
that there are four or five other parallel alternatives being 
,;~· ,• .-·--'-"'\' , , 
presented in the same text. '1'his creates ap~reh~psion and a 
"-•,,., ,, .,;: , 
reluctance on the part of the reader to involve him:::.,, or herself 
in the text. 
Or the narrative may be structured in a recursive 
fashion. In works by Butor, Mauriac, Calvina, and 
1990), there are an endless series of false 
or-.. :r~g:ressi ve 
Pinget (Nash, 
starts in the 
telling of the story, or the author continues further 
reconstructions of past novels. The narrativ~ may refer 
regressively to events from which the event origlnated, or it 
may refer recursively to other passages of narratidn from which 
the current discourse originates, and these layers may be 
structured in such a way that they blur ,i"nto one another. 
~eit,her characters nor events are depicted as 9!iginal or 
auttientic everything is imitation and the novel itself, an 
imitation of infinite regress--:' 
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In other novels by Barth, Borges, Pi,ngea::"'·-...\O'Brien and Beckett 
' ' 
(Nash, 1 99 0) the narrative appears di~cular, the read~!"~ .. £~tY:.:rns 
to where she/he had begun, without any sense of progression or 
change. Or, in the works of Nabokov, Simon, Vonnegut, Sukenick, 
Mauriac, Sollers, and Sanguineti (Nash, 1990), the inevitable 
linearity which literature is embedded in (the letters, words, 
and sentences have to be read in a linear order), the sense of 
something happening, and of causality, is denied by a number of 
strategies. Or the re~tion between narrative and 
refers to is disrup~d, for example in a story 
Continuidad de los Parques (Nash, 1990), the reader 
one of the characters. Another example is that of 
the world it 
by Cortazar, 
is killed by 
Vonnegut who 
invented a novelist-character, Kilgore 
novel, Venus on the Half-Shell, which 
from bookstores, but is published by 
Farmer (Nash, 1990). 
Trout, who writes a 
is actually available 
the writer, Philip Jose 
V~.he ·'"'t·eehniques described .above 
""'\ 
:r:;edefinition of our relationship 
clearly le,.ad to. 
with :6arrative 
a substantial 
itself: They 
f~ree·uB"to become acutely aware of our ~~pectations of what is 
supposed to occur, of the conventions which hold narratives 
together. Moreover, these techniques·:teveal the illusory nature 
of these conventions (Nash, 1990). 
/ But the Post-Structurali~t movement goes even further: It also 
suggests radically n~w ways of thinking about tiow narrative is 
creat~d,__ different principies regardingwhat occurs on the page. 
/ \ 
_"'··"Th.e ~uthor/< is no longer conceptualised as a finite .~~.!::iJ;,y 
'behi~d-r-·t:h-e work who can be relied on to p~.;;d~··the reader 
with a coher~ht world view. This tendency is supported by the 
ideas of Lacan, Foucault, and Derrida, who argue against the 
traditiqn~l real;f~t.conceptions of the individual as a discrete 
; ,/·"P ··-··,,. ,, •>·••c.;r1r,t;'.,'ee,~ ..• ,-,.,_..,,,·_,;·) 
fpsych~:ogica~ entity, as discussed before. Thus narrative 
\ Characters f .Or anything denoting personal 'being I f are Viewed as 
1-a±tificially and self-consciously created by the mere flow of 
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the signs on 
dissolved by 
the 
those 
page and which can just as easily be 
Thus authors such as Sollers, very signs. 
Federman, 
construct 
Writing 
Cortazar, Riihm, 
narrat~_y_es __ ~from 
,,-·"·~- ~-~" 
is rip longer 
presentatfon 
drawn tothe 
~f···:reartt::y, 
processes 
-.;;_{again, the emphasis is 
~cientific enterprises). 
\_;V~ssil$ilities of <language, 
Roche, and Brooke-Rose 
grammatical and phonetic 
motivated by( mimesis, 
(Nash, 1990) 
permuta t:!-ons •-; 
' \ 
or th~ re-
but has become· di:~get_~_<:!. Attention is 
through which the 'rea-l' is produced 
"-~~'""="'···-- ·""'""""' 
on self-referentiali:t;:y_,_ as in recent 
/' , .. -·· -~"'.. 
It is a c~~ebration of the 
~ ...... , .. ~ 
and a reminder that reality does not 
------·----·-··~--'-"~~- <' "-" -·· '''"'"~---~--~"·~··,~-il ~ ,_ "., 
, \ exist outside of the-parameters set by language (Nash, 1990). 
"'f na,~rative, in its traditional definition as being about 
someone, abOQt something, and written by a distinguishable 
~""-·author, is d~stroyed, it means that narration itself is given a 
~p~eme -~Q!?it.ioii"''i:md, thus, r.eifi~d. Thus there is a shift from 
("" P3"~~ati?_n with ~~;t":-~~·.: to ct_ preoccup~~ion with the 
, ex~Eien~~/~the telling, o(the dis~rse:· '"''scholes (Mitchell, 
-·----·---~~- -~----·-·-----· --··-"· .. ·~--
1981) refers to Post-Structuralist works as 'anti-narratives' 
due to their attempts to frustrate the automatic application of 
narrative schemas to our reading exgeriences. He maintains that 
__ _.......,..,"~-""'""'"""'~"''•""""'"''"""'•~•«'•"-'•'•>,A>4'"'"' ,,.,,..,__ .• •nc,·- • .~~''''"''' •··"·"' ~·J~4<'"''"'''"'"'"' '"'" 
they should be regarded as met~-fi~_!:ional because they distract 
us from our habitual int~retive processes. They frustrate this 
way of providing closure and bring the narrative codes to the 
foreground of our critical attention. The Post-Structuralist 
texts require us to see them as codes rather than_as_.~_ali ties 
which are intrinsic to human nature or to reality itself. 
\::::::~s t::::~~re in b::: s::~:~;::~-~;~s~~t~ 9~~-)-~t:=~f ~ro:::s ~: 
-.:::-----=----~·---\::15~~~~:~:· top~::es:t~=:~~=~ a:~de:::::: ::5~~.;~:::~~~hi::i:~: 
{.text dq~;~~~~a.t say. Writing § longer needs to__2onform to 
\. f cultural -~r ideological conventions, or the rules of logic, such 
'as those concerned with time, place, action, causality~- identity 
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which used to be prerequisites for the depiction of 'reality'. 
f:;.t .is onlx subject to the rules.-Q! __ ~_language itself, and these are constantly altered, even by the act of utterance itself (Nash, 1990). 
These.···· developments should be seen as part of a wider 
""-, ,,·~- . . '"·-~ .... 
revolutionary process which is taking place on a(C::ultural 
"" .... --.. 
level. From this perspective traditional narrative structures 
are viewed as part of a cluster of psychosocial 
interdependencies that inhibit both individual development and 
necessary social change. The Post-Structuralist thinkers 
therefore regard the deconstruction of narrative schemas as a 
prerequisite of social change, they view narrative ... a_~ an .onig,te 
which has to be given up in return for the ensuing sociocultural 
advantages (Scholes, in Mitchell, 1981). 
However, as Nash (1990) points out, it is a mistake to assume 
that the human search for narrative structure can be dissolved 
by means of the Post-Structuralists' endeavours and literary 
innovations. No matter how hard the new forms of narrative 
attempt to~ tell us about anything, they actually emphasise tl 
f ) 
........... __ _.,.,/ . .,_.___ .. 
the fact that they are re~s~!!!9. Qf" __ l!:Y<?i.Q._!.!!9~~~!:E-~!:.._P.a!:.!:.~-tive, 
~~---i:l!f:.ernati ve 9.<:l!l.§.t:r:uctian~ .. o.L ...... §J,_g_gs. These new texts which 
( attempt to deny or conceal the rules which govern their own 
I 
\..\. construction 
concealment. 
ca~ll()t:~ .. }J:~!P=~=Q~t Qla~~-- .. ··. ~~-RliJ~.it .......... t}}g __ J>l!~iness of 
It may be argued that these rules are determined ·differently by 
each reader and can therefore not be bound to any permanence. 
--~ 
should be recognised that this argument~eli~s on But then it ~4::11-e rule "':··· that readings are determined .. b¥- .t;he.i.~ ... conte.~fs:--Such is 
the paradoxical 
----illustrate that 
emergence (that 
nature of this kind of argument: One cannot 
is n_()~E~tiE~~--~-!?,Y~-~-Il,Y!.h!!!g but its own 
is indeterminh.te), without ii'~trating at 
a text 
it 
the same time that it is det;e::rJnate, that is, it is···oound to 
/ 
) 
80 (,_..---------; 
i~ contexy. The same argument has to be extended to the 
'auth·o;~-- especially since every writer is his/her own reader. 
Therefore even if the form of the narration tries to deny it, ,/ 
ti::ery i::~:~e~s w:::!'?~~ ~:i~D.::-tg__v~~~o!::~=~:~d, w:::n ~: 
insignificant, etcetera (Nash, 1990). 
Another point in the argument against the claims of the 
/Post-Structuralists, is that if the principle of 
1 
_:{,.self-referentiality is accepted, then writing has never informed 
us of any new or fixed truth which has its point of reference 
outside the text. Texts, even realist texts, can do nothing more 
than in-form our thinking about things -- it merely re-forms our 
existing sense of truth. In this sense there is really not a 
d ~ very substantial difference 
! Structuralist writing. 
between referential and Post-
In addition, time itself has undermined the 
appeared as re_:yQJ:Y!::ign~tryJn._,the_." _____ 19.60s has become 
tradition-- despite the movement's rejection of 
continuity, and conventions. Metaphorically 
movement has become 'middle-aged': 
movement. What 
an established 
predictability, 
speaking, the 
Like many things middle-aged, it's not quite so nimble 
as it once appeared, it's developing the suggestion of 
a metaphysical paunch, and it shows signs of a mid-
life crisis; it does break out in unexpected hot 
flushes, hoarse hysteria, myopia, and the general 
display of nervous defense mechanisms and tics of an 
idea, no longer quite sure of its own sex-appeal 
(Nash, 1990, pp. 213-214). 
Eagleton (1986) 
adopting an 
criticises the Post-Structuralist movement 
invulnerable position: The adherence to 
for 
the 
/ -Y4~sumptions that we are prisoners of our own discourse and that 
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we cannot make any claims about the truth, because such claims 
would be relative to the structure of language, enable the Post-
~~~ Structuralists to dismantle everybody else's beliefs without 
W-aaving to adopt any themselves. It liberates one from taking up 
I 
1 
a position on important issues, and even if you state a point of 
view, you cannot be held responsible for it, since your 
statement would be regarded as no more than the fleeting 
progression of the chain of signifiers and not as sincere or 
serious. 
Another aspect which Eagleton (1986) highlights is Post-
Structuralism's mischi~viously radical stance with regard to all 
.)/other points of view. v1:t is able to dismantle and undermine many 
foundational ideas in our culture as a mere insubstantial play 
-~-------~·- --------~--
of signifiers. However, since it does not commit itself to 
anything nor affirm anything, 
-~~~~~~-';;:'"-; ''' . c'>" ' ... • .v• 
it is in fact totally harmless 
it is actually utterly 
Of course, this is not to say that the movement has not been 
for ~~· remark~!?~ generative, 
imaginative works like no 
""-"""'··~.., ""'"·'..,""'"""~-'"""'"''""' 
ideas which are generated 
exhausted t ... "and."w.e cannot 
opening up the 
other movement since 
po~sibili ty 
"'-~, 
Romanticism. The 
by this movement have not yet been.~ 
discount or ignore it. But it needs to~"· 
r·"'~ ... ,,.,._"''~,\ 
be cp:~te_?f.!:.!lCil:i~ed, before it, too, becomes merely another 
tyrannical, elitist, or fashionable ideology. We should be fully 
aware, and even critical, of how we apply narrative structures 
~but it is d_!._!fi£1.J:lt to conceive of human c9gr:itive and 
1nteractional functioni!lg ... wit.Qput them. I wish to propose that, 
elucidated above, narrative processes are 
the codes of human communication and 
functioning to be discarded at the whim of a new theoretical 
movement. It is one of the propositions of this study to/~ 
how we create and maintain a stable and consistent sen~~ of a 
... ~-----~-·-~-,.., , ............... - . ...,.,.,, 
~ Self, how we cling to our mechanisms for self"'feferentfaTI'Y 
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constructing ourselves, in conjunction with the sociocultural 
influences in which we are embedded. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I presented a comprehensive literature review on 
developments in conceptualisations of narrative. Special 
attention was given to its pervasiveness and its 
interdisciplinary status, but also to its fundamental relation 
- to acts of meaning construction. Its relation to self-
- referentiality was also emphasised. The discussion culminated in 
~ a review of Post-Structuralist attempts to deconstruct and 
~ dismantle narrative structures. 
In the next chapter the ideas in this chapter will be extended 
to the domain of self-narratives, or autobiographies. I intend 
to highlight in much greater depth the self-referential 
processes by which people construct meaning from their sense of 
their life story. The significance which these processes have 
for psychotherapeutic endeavours will be clarified, which will, 
I hope, provide the necessary backdrop for the next two chapters 
· · which contain an analysis and deconstruction of the life 
narratives of the co-participants in this study. 
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CHAPTER 4 
NARRATIVES OF THE SELF: FROM THE SINGULAR TO THE PLURAL 
Introduction 
In this chapter 
identity will be 
the relationship between narrative and personal 
examined. The point at which these two 
concepts intersect is in the self-narrative, a term which I use 
to denote all those interactive processes, discourses, and codes 
through which a person negotiates, privately and publicly, a 
cohenint set ofr·"·meaniilgs which can be calle<t~'i.t-- S;lf. Self-
__ J~'narrati-;-~-can be----defined as the most basic conceptua:L_ !"~f!:IIl-~!":or~ 
for determining or ascribing meaning to all perceptions and 
e~p-~~~ences of Self. This makes it imperative, in the context 
of a study such as this, to examine the self-narrative as a 
'!unit of meaning" (Epston, White & Murray, 1992, p. 97) and to 
disclose its cultural and ideological underpinnings. 
This chapter starts with a historical view on conceptualisations 
of identity, including the most recent Post-Structuralist 
notions which have led to the idea of the 'decentred Self'. 
Thereafter the interface between 
narratives is examined, including 
narratives or case studies in 
psychotherapy, in particular. 
concepts of Self and self-
a history of the use of self-
the social sciences and in 
In Chapters 5 and 6 this 
dimension will be transposed to an actual therapeutic context. 
The enactment of Self of two clients will be analysed by means 
of an examination of their written self-narratives. 
(Note that various terms, life story, life story, life history, 
self-narrative, psychobiography, psychohistQ;r:~ case study, 
biography, and autobiography are used i~terchangepbly in this 
''""-..,... ' 
- study to refer to indiVidualS I application or----~narrati Ve SChemaS 
to their own life history. Of course there are differences 
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between them, but they are so obvious that it is hoped that the 
----~-~------·--
meaning of each will be apparent from the particular context of 
the discussion in each case.) 
Conceptualisations of Self 
It is Bruner's (1990) opinion that our understanding gf -Sel-f as 
a concept has been hampereq_~!?,_y __ t~e assumption of es~entialism, -~ 
-·· "'·"~-- "' "'"'-""• .•• ~ ,. "'~. '"'-' ~·~--~·- ""~'''"-" "'""'"'"" '"' "'"'"'·~~'- ,.,,.~ ·- ;r...,~(::-:,. ' . '•""~-~-----·~--- ....... ~/ 
which was one of the hallmarks of the Enlightenment ·a.rnr··--of 
Modernism. 
£self "were 
Attempts --to study the Self ... were conducted .as if the 
-·~···· .. ··•··•·~•"'"""--· ~ , ••• v'• -\ ,4'<W<''·'·,·~·---- • ·- '·-.---··-·~·---· • 
a ~bstanc~c or an e~sence that R_~e-existEfd our 
efforts to describe·--rr, as if all one nad to do ~as -~~:.!!::1:~-~~~-t:. 
it in order to discover its nature" (Bruner, 1990, p. 99). This 
ontological description of Self has been discarde~~rt of 
the transition to a 0\~~------~-i_~;~_!gm in which se~-e~=-=~~:tial 
assumptions and contextuaTlsm replaced the old essentialist 
ones. Any descriptions are viewed as observer-dependent and 
/intersubjective and follow the culture's dominant narrative 
" ----
"---rorms. In the ~!_~"!- 1?~.!:~<!!_9~ __ !:!_1~-~-~-!-~.--.!-~ .... regard~~~--~-c~!!~~P!:_,_/ 
w~-~c~ ____ the observer creates ~to<J.'~~~~-~---~~!-~ ....... <Jthers in his or ( 
social environment), much like any other constructed concept. l-
··• / 
their meanings with others 
environment, hence these meanings are 'distributed' between 
them. 
r The cha{!ges .. __ :i,.n the description of the Self coincided with 
_ ... -~-- ~-
fundflmental changes in Western society which profoundly 
infl.i:teaeed--·ttrEr··;;;y in which people experienced themselves in the 
20th century. Although Structuralism may have been premature in 
its pronouncement of "a transcendence of the first person 
singular" (Clifford, 1978, p. 43), it is correct in claiming 
.,..-that the experience of individuality in modern industrial and 
p()st-i~~ustrial cultures is becoming increasingly_p~~blematic. 
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_L~Y.~=~~rauss (Bruner, 1990) considers 
crisis' in the Western cultures to be a 
the current 'identity 
passing phase. Those 
who are afflicted by it, he maintains, are merely realising what 
ancient cultures have always accepted, and what modern sciences 
as diverse as mathematics, biology, linguistic_§...,. Jind philosophy 
--· '\ ""~a:re rediscovering, namely that personal i~entity is largely 
..•.•.• ·········~ ·-· ·· · · · •~~--..cc·.c·oo · · ·•·· .... ·• •··• 
relational - "that 'substantial identity' can never be assumed, 
--~---~~~~.~=~~~~:·.~:::~:·~-·-" 
but must be constructed from given historical and natural 
relationships which are supremely ... !!1-~~:~-----E~ ... <? .. ll:~--<~~tism" 
(Bruner, 1990, p. 11). 
the recent developments 
conceptualisations of Self, Markus and 
.... , .. _,. ------ ------------~ 
with regard 
Wurf (1987, p. 
to 
301) 
state: "What t>egan as an apparently singuli3T, ~tat::i..£,1 .!l.J!IlJ?.:::!i]{e 
entity has become a multi-dimensional, multi-faceted dynamic 
f -~~!ucture. _Self -~,§--~6~~--'as a psychological variab~e and 
l more as a comppsi te w.hol,e which consists of different 
l - ;-,..._, ·~" '·. . _,, ... ,!/ 
,_compc;:)!lents. They matnt~n-'that 
l Self was a formidable sb1~ling 
the globalising approach to the 
block in the domain of research. 
Such a fixed, static and\\ undifferentiated concei>.!- could not 
possibly be adequate in any attempts to understand the 
impressive diversity of human behaviour and experience. An 
/)-n((~easing numb~;.F ... .o:f~ve~~~_9ators have taken to studying the 
(~lf as a mui·tJ-faceted: phenomenon, in other words, as a 
'{.._-~"""" '' ·--,. ••-'«"'••·•-·•~•,,,,,.,,.m,,,,w,••" """ .:--.,..,_._,~•··--·•-••••••• """"-~--·~···---' ----
l structure which is COmposed Of ... activi ti~-~L .. 99~!~! Jh,~Q_!;j__~~J ~-ld~-~logies, images, schemas and prototypes (Bruner, 1986, 1987, 
1990; Hermans, 1993; Markus & Wurf, 1987; Rosen, 1988). 
Whilst relatively new in psychology, the socially constructed 
·------·~--~-""-""''"-·~~"'""""'"'""'~"~"""~·"'-~'"'~'"· " "«••'·""'·"",.,..,·"""""""'"'''~·..-.. - ""''""""-""""""" -.. 
view of Self had already been established in anthropologx__and 
~!-~tc:>EY for many years, that is, in the tradition of 
interpretive history and in the interpretivism found in cultural 
anthropology. The anthropologists and historians were soon 
··, 
joined by the symbolic interactionists in the field of s~~iolo~ 
c::·:-whe-proposed that our concept of Self is a refle(?tion of h;w~~ we 
,/ 
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believe we appear to others. They emphasised the manner in which 
v,. -~- '<>·~~~----~-----
concepts of Self are validated through others' perceptions of 
our enactments of ourselves. They proclaimed that the Self 
~~heuld be regarded as a c6~~truction which " . . . proceeds from 
-.......,~, "<>,, ~ • '·-·' ~~·"' • 
the outside in as well as from the inside out, from culture to 
mind, as well as from mind to culture" {Bruner, 1990, p. 108). 
The emergence of the ~w contextual~sm prompted the emergence of 
a new set of quest~~~s-··regar<fi~g the .. Self. What are ... the 
processes by which people formulate descriptions of Self? What 
kind of experiences do people base their descriptions of Self 
on? What kind of Selves to they formulate? Perhaps, as William 
James {Markus & Nurius, 1986) suggested, the Self should be 
~--~ '-----~ ---- --- -~------ ____ ._ ________________ ._ ____ ------- ·--
extended to incorporate significant figures in one's life as 
well as possessions, and so forth. Or does Self consist of a 
r cluster 
l Selves' 
of Possible Selves, including a number of 'Feared 
and 'Hoped-for-Selves', as Markus and Nurius {1986) 
J 
\ ~::g::t :he pure and endurin~L-~I_lU(!l_<ms but-J."•~ .. L~he sum and 
~~-----~~:.ticipations" (Perk~~2s, in Bruner, 1990, p. 
Pe:r:_~.a.:.!2~.--t:~e " .. :.: J>J:"C?per .. E~E~~~----~-~----~~!:.!::~E-.. ~~!l~~i ve~ ••• 
swarm 
106). 
Questions about the tr~nsactional nature of Self also emerged: 
Perhaps Self can be ;·~g~a/"as a transactional relationship 
~between a speaker and an Other, or more specifically, a 
l 
'j l Generalised Other? Or perhaps it is a manner in which one's 
consciousness, one's position in the world, one's identity, and 
e0.,.,.·--~----"<.-~ • ...., 
one's CQIDm.!tril~nt to Anot~~r is fr.amed (Bruner, 1990). Self as a 
f' . .#···""''"'~ -"' - "" ,• .. ,.· "'""-.. ,. ...•.. _,_ 
~~·..ftialo~~=~ep~!<}ent process becomes the focus, rather than as a 
i '"·· ........... ··' 
1 1~tati~_! ...... ~~_!::g!~2!9.i:t!.! .... ~-~~t:E.!l:P~Ychi,g __ ~!!ti ty. ~-~!~ .. -.!?~~~1!'~-~-.. --~~l!!~!hing -J(~~.!_~~ ... we .<l~~i,_91l ····-~or interperf;onal contexts, for discourses, 
solll_*:_':!:t_~-~5! we sometimes .P.~~~-·an~---=.1!'~~~~<, (Goffman, 1990) quite 
deliberately. 
_;:ch.i.s~mposi te view of the Self is not entirely new. Already in 
( 
\. 1890 James. {Damon & Hart, 1982) made a distinction which was 
'\~,. 
slibWil-··tO be significant in how Self has come to be seen, namely 
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the distinction between 'I' and 'Me'. He saw the I and Me as 
essential aspects of the broader concept of Self. The I he 
---r-
/
describes as the Self-as-Knower, as the active ga~~~!er of 
1 knowledge, and tpe M~ as the Self-as-Known, as the object of 
I 
' knowledge. This suggests that he saw the Self as entailing 
recursive processes between a kind of 'epistemologist-self' and 
a Self which is the object of description. Therefore, already a 
-----century ago, Jrun~s re::}ecj:ed the essentiali{;t concepJ:malisations 
- u~ .~- ·~ ~·~·~,,~,--~~~,~·---~~><··-
of Self as a permanent and bodily bounded entity. 
In more recent years in the field of ps-y~h~logy, the composite 
.. ~ ... --··-~-~~ 
['view of Self first developed as a t:.~action against the~st_~!e 
') obtE::.~~ivism in psychology and in conceptualisations of 
personality in particular (Bruner, 1990). There have been a 
number of revisionists in the field of psychology who have, in 
recent years, redefined, extended, and 'opened up' the 
r boundaries of 
sociocultural 
the concept of 
~;.:;:;..~,-
the Freudian Self: .. Efikson emphasised the 
--~ ··-···~··<>·< •.. ,~~-- -~···. "'-~..,_"·--. .• 
influences on the personality and ~aing extended 
.. ...,_, ____ _ 
'individual' to include a 'political' network of 
interpersonal relations. 
/ !( In the field of social psychology ~rgen ( ~ 982) was one of the 
'I first to incorporate the interpr~:J;:ivrsr: constructivist and 
I ~ 
d~stributive notions mentioneq_~ab~e. In his early studies he 
.. l ,,. ··' .. , 
-~l:l-ustrated how people's t~elf-este~I!J: _____ %_!!!£.t.!!_ilted in different 
contexts, depending on the relational dynamics which they 
encountered. In contexts where they had to relate to powerful 
and egotistical people, they reported lowered sel-f-esteem, while 
the opposite was the case in contexts where they found self-
effacing, disempowered people (Gergen, 1982). 
It was (6ergen ( 1982) who alerted us to the two astounding and 
'····:t 
u~~-~-~-~_:;-~ capacities of humans: The -~7~eflexivity) that is, our ability to 
-.to Chcrnge/the :e_~esent in relation to 
f;tfst is our capacity for 
/" 
look back on the past and 
~--·---------· 
it, or to change the past 
/ 
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(our interpretation 
,--~ 
both the P.iist and 
of itl_ in the light of the present. Thus 
the ~;es~nt be(ome rela(ional dfltt~~;lgns by 
--.---~---- / -- ~ -- - "-,.__ __ .... "~·· 
virtue of this ability. The secodd is our capacity to imagine 
~""""~~llernati ves, the ability to env~sion al ter6~ti ve way-s of being 
--~''··-··""-"·~--'-'~--·4•-"' .. , ... 
and of acting. Thus, we are p~!:_J!!.~-~Q!"J~al creatures, tied to 
the past, and part autonomouS agents. Or as Bruner (1990, p. 
110) states: 
The -~'.then, like any other aspect of human nature, 
stands-. roth as a gua~dian of per~~l}~gQg_g and as a 
bar91D~-t:~~---E~~!?.onding to the local cultural weather. 
···The. culture, as well, provides us with guides and 
stratagems for finding a niche between stability and 
cha~ge: it exhorts, 
-~~-
the commitments that 
~-........._~-~'"'"''"''......___,,, ...... <•"'""'""'" "' ~"'~'"''"''"·"·'' .-,.. 
forbids, lures, denies, 
the Self undertakes. 
rewards 
And the 
Self, using its capacities for reflection and for 
envisioning alternatives, escapes or embraces or re-
evaluates and reformulates what the culture has on 
offer. 
Initially ~rgen (1982) focussed on the 'rules' which we employ 
yo construct · and neg<?_t_i~~~- .. -Ql!I.~~.<>.~!.~! ... E~il-~!t:.~~~. The Self was 
-l~eeptualised as a mixture of 'decision-make~~ 'strategist', 
and 'gamesman' who carefully managed the business· ... Qf.~m;:.e.aenting 
f ~----~~-!-~---~~--gthers. Working in th~---···~~;~-· .. ·;~~ld~-~ Goffman ( 1990) 
maintains that, in a sense, all utterances in day-to-day 
conversations, however self-protective,/ however deceitful, 
however self-censored, constitute a pres~ntation of Self. At the 
- . . --
a same time, these ~n-~tly conscious strate~~~s ____ \are also 
~pc;trt of "that never finished business, the qonstruction of a ~ -1 socially constituted self" (Rosen, 1988, p. 74). 
:".0v--· The latest in this tradition of revisionists is ~~can ) ( 1986), 
1 who persuaded us to see a person who is rad(~~lly de'cen~:~~d, who 
\ resides in an external symbolic order. This leaves··u:s·-- with the 
concept of an individual 
itself: The first sign of 
89 
as an ego which is continually outside 
the emerging ego, acco~d~~ to Lacan 
. '· 
( 1986) , occurs during the so-called pre-Oedipal '~rror /stage' . 
-~-------· 
~Lacan's use of the metaphor of the mirror is entirely coherent 
with the views of Self as a composite cluster of meanings which 
are distributed amongst people. According to Lacan (1986), the 
child, who is as yet physically uncoordinated, sees an image of 
\itself reflected from the mirror, which has a stable and unified 
appearance. The child's own image of Self is still merged with 
its mother's - the boundary between subject and object is still 
blurred (hence the term 'Imaginary' which Lacan uses to refer to 
this pre-Oedipal stage of ego development). But when the child 
sees itself reflected in the m~~or in such a unified manner, it 
commences the process of constr_u_~!:!!1:9 ____ ~9-~nt!:_~d Self. Contained 
in the metaphor is the narcissism inherent''i.p the process: We 
·,, 
___..-,--construct a sense of an I by finding that I 'reflected back to 
-------.. --·----
ourselves by some object or person in the world. This object is 
f at the sa!!l~--_time part of ourselves (we identify with it) and(!i_Qt part of ourselves, it is the domain of the Other. Therefore the 
image which the young child sees reflected in the mirror is an 
r ~~nated One: II. • • the Child 'misrecogniSeS I itself in it, 
finds in the image a pleasinq_~nity which it does not actually 
experience in its own bedy" (Eagleton, 1986, p. 165). 
For Lacan (1986) the 'Imaginary' is precisely 
during which we make identifications, but in the 
this process 
very act of 
doing so, we are led to misperceive and misrecognise ourselves. 
The child continues this process of somewhat alienating 
imaginary identifications with objects through which the ego is 
formed. For Lacan the ego is precisely 
process whereby we bolster up a false __ .. sens~ of 
'"~~,~ 
by continuously identifying with//~omething 
world. 
this narcissistic 
unitary selfhood 
or someone in the 
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It was stated in Chapter 2 that Lacan reconceptualised Freud's 
theory in terms of language. He therefore linked the above 
process to the distinction which De Saussure made between the 
'signifier' and the 'signified' (See Chapter 1). The infant who 
( is cont~J!!I~Jating itself in the mirror can therefore be regarded 
l) as atthter1· b' ~~m~~e~ ra·--n~ 1: ngin1 other words, something which is capable of and the image it sees reflected, as a ~---·- ·-··---·---------"~---···---·-.. 
kind of 'signified'. 'l'trtis -th~ image the child sees can be 
.,/ 
regarded as the 'mean:!-_!!9. __ of__,-:~Uself'. At this stage of 
development the harmonious ~~~!tY between the signifier and the 
signified has npt. ygt .. been- .. d-,:arupted. No divisions or gaps have 
occurred yet: objects reflect themselves in each other in a 
perfect correspondence, in something akin to a sealed or closed 
circuit. According to Lacan (1986) it is a world of 'plenitude' 
with no lacks or disharmonies. The child attains, for a brief 
period, a 'fullness', a whole and unblemished identity. _No gap 
has as yet opened up between the signifier and the s5"~~j_fi;d, 
the subject and the world. 
~-~ver, as I have illustrated in Chapters 1 and 2, language and 
reality are not as smoothly synchronised as this situation would 
suggest. At the Oedipal stage, when the Father enters this 
tranquil scene, " ... the child is plunged into Post-Structural 
~· anxiety" (Eagleton, 1986, p. 166)! At this point, according to 
Lacan, the child has to learn that one's identity emerges only 
~~b-y ... :virtue of difference: Any subject or linguistic term achieves 
its identity only by excluding another. Lacan (1986) regards it 
as very significant that the child's discovery of sexual 
differences and the acquisition of language skills occur 
approximately simultaneously. In the domain of language the 
child understands (albeit unconsciously) that a sign has meaning 
only due to its difference from other signs. The child also 
learns that a sign presumes the absence of the object it 
signifies (refer to the 'fort-da' game which was discussed in 
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Chapter 3). In other words, words are substitutes for objects, 
and therefore metaphorical. 
This process of learning on the level of language is echoed in 
the domain of sexuality. Through the presence of the Father, 
the child learns that it has to take up a place in the family 
which is determined by its gender thus it is defined by means 
of exclusion (since 
girl her father's) 
the mother's body, 
"""ttlerefore learns 
a boy cannot be his mother's lover, nor a 
and by absence (a boy has to separate from 
a girl 
that its 
from the 
identity 
father's). 
is created 
The 
by 
child 
its 
relationship of similarity to, and difference from the other 
family members. The child has therefore moved from the 
'Imaginary' to what Lacan 
existing relational network 
forms the fabric of society. 
calls the 'symbolic' order: The pre-
of social and sexual roles which 
However smoothly the child's passage is through the Oedipal 
landscape, it emerges as a divided being: Divided between the 
conscious and the unconscious, which comes into existence at the 
time when the desire for the Mother (or Father) is repressed. 
The child now finds itself in the position where it can never 
again have any direct access to reality (specifically to the 
body of the Mother or Father, which is out of bounds). The 
child has been exiled from the 'full' imaginary possession into 
the 'empty' domain of language. Referring back to Chapter 1, it 
--was--stated that language is an endless chain of difference and 
~sence hence Lacan (1986) speaks of the empty domain of 
language. So, instead of possessing something fully, the child 
/ 
~an now only move along an endless chain of signifiers. No 
person or experience can ever be fully present in this chain, 
S;in~e words only attain meaning through the absence of, and 
"-\'xclusion of others. Now the child will never again be able to 
come to rest in a single object, or a final meaning -- meaning 
is forever postponed. The entrance into language is therefore 
v 
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what separates us from the 'real', that inaccessible domain of 
fullness, now always beyond 
Lacan's words: " language 
(Eagleton, 1986, p. 166). 
the reach of signification, or in 
is what hollows being into desire" 
From now on the child has to be 
satisfied with substitutes for the Mother's or Father's body, in 
his futile attempts to lessen the absence of the 'real'. Not 
even transcendental meanings (religion) can satisfy this endless 
yearning, according to Lacan (1986). 
For the sake of clarification, it needs to be pointed out that 
we would not be able to speak coherently or function adequately 
at all if the process of constantly sliding and postponed 
meaning occurred on a conscious level. Of course, if I had the 
whole body of the language in mind when I spoke, then it would 
be impossible to articulate anything. All this uneasy activity ~ 
r1fiS repressed and temporary an<'t3!P£~oxi~!!_c~J~-~- meanings are assigned 
:\J 1 to words. Lacan ( 198~;;£~;~ to the sli~--""~f the tongue or the 
Freudian slip as that which occurs when a word or segment from 
the unconscious surreptitiously enters into consciousness . 
. ,J~eeording to him, all discourse is of the same character as the 
slip of the tongue, namely, we can never mean exactly what we 
/'·~(~a:, and we can never say exactly what we mean. So, meaning is ltf~always "... an approximation, a near-miss, a part-failure, 
I 
!mixing non-sense and non-communication into sense and dialogue" 
i \(Eagleton, 1986, p. 169). It is therefore clear that we cannot 
;\convey the 'truth' _in .... ~ome unmeditated manner. 
••···· ·~~··""-"'"'" ·~--•• " •. ~~~.,..-~. ~ '"<>. ·-~~ •• ...,..,..,.,.~-----
We manage to create a relatively coherent and unified sense of 
\'ourselves on a conscious level, which facilitates action and 
l provides the ... ill\lsiop.. pJ: .. J!l_ga{ling. All this, however, occurs at 
the 'Imaginary' level of the ego, which is merely the smallest 
possible part of the whole human subject. 
\::The '~g<? which is never quite identical to itself or in unity 
l\ \\with itself is suspended somewhere along the chain of signifiers 
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and discourses which constitutes it. According to Lacan (1986), 
-~~~------"-·--~-.,.-~---"·~ 
the gap or discontinuity between these two levels of Self is 
most clearly illustrated by the manner in which the Self is 
referred to in a sentence. In any self-statement the I gives 
~-the ~ppearance of a unified and stable point of reference which 
conceals the "murky depths" of the I who is making the statement 
(Eagleton, 1986, p. 169). At the time of speaking, these two 
I's achieve a brief correspondence or unity, but it is not an 
authentic unity. (Or, stated in the terms coined by James 
[Damon & Hart, 1982] the I, and the Me attain a temporary, 
seemingly uncomplicated correlation.) But the I who resides in 
the "murky depths" can never be fully represented in what is 
?rticulated. The Self can only be referred to obliquely, 
--¥~·through the substitute pronoun, I. The submerged part of the I 
will always elude the confines of language, according to Lacan 
( 1986). 
\ / ~~?:::: ::a:::~:::!::::~~:::~:~?=~~:~:~::s~::~~~::::::h:~ 
\all, entails that his or her meaning is always somehow (. / 
~dispersed, divided, and never quite at one with itself. In~ 
~""') 
~act, not only the meaning but the Se~f is obscu+ed: Since we 
fi\~~--consti tuted through language, ( rath~r--Tnan·I~~guage being a 
convenient tool which we use), the notion that we are stable and 
unified entities is not logical. Therefore, not only is it 
impossible to be fully present to each other, we can never be 
fully present to ourselves either. We still need to use 
language to look into our minds or to search our souls, and this 
·~means that we can never experience any full communion with 
ourselves. It is not that we start off with a pure, unblemished 
\meaning, intention, or experience which then becomes distorted 
' 
land refracted through the flawed ?edium of 
~essentialist notion), rather, because ~anguage is the very air I 
language (an 
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breathe, I can never have a pure, unblemished meaning or 
experience at all (Eagleton, 1986). 
~~ ::ar~::1t;~~by s;;P:~;i~t~~~~~~:~~~t~~~; · ach~::;s w~:: 
1 the self-referential process of its own production is revealed, 
I 1or unravelled, doe~_:!:_!te gap or disconnectedness between I and Me 
l~.appear. The sel(-na~riitive is one such a means of self-
rlproduction which, ~when decdi!_~~!ucted, reveals its particular 
( methods used to construct an apparently unified Self. Thus a 
\T.self-description which remains unexamined in terms of its own 
. construction can be compared to the perceptions of Self during 
I the mirror stage; whereas a deconstructed self-description 
ruthlessly undermines the idea of a whole and seamless Self. 
notion that the 
~--~ Al:thus~er's (1984) views are similar to Lacan's 
humalrt ego has no essential unity -- it can be regarded as the 
various social determinants, structures, or 
Although we experience ourselves as unified and f
product of 
" conventions. 
independent, as possessing a strong ability to influence our 
destiny, on the level of social structure, I as an individual, 
am entirely dispensable. Anyone else could fill in for me, do 
my work, etcetera. Althusser believes that this discrepancy in 
~/our perception of ourselves and our actual insignificance, is 
.i bridged by ideology. We tend to experience the world as though 
\we are occupying 'centre stage', as if we are centrally 
significant to the functioning of the world. According to 
Althusser, the process through which we attain this experience 
of central significance, lies at the heart of ideology. As a 
\['set of beliefs, practices and discourses, ideology becomes the 
subtle all-pervasive medium through which we enact our 
connectedness to society. It includes the domain of codes and 
conventions that link us to the social structure and give us a 
coherent and purposeful identity in return. In this 
conceptualisation, ideology includes a wide array of 
;/ 
(_..."~ 
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presuppositions, actions, and attitudes: It may entail how our 
relationship to authority figures are shaped through the 
educational system, it may include the fact that we avoid social 
taboos, whether or not we cast a vote in elections, our social 
standing, the way we dress, the suburb we live in. 
If Althusser's (1984) notion of the function of ideology is 
- translated into Lacan's terms, ideology serves to provide the 
individual with the illusion of a satisfyingly coherent 
identity, much like the mirror does in the 'Imaginary' stage. 
T~-n""both cases, however, the situation is a mis~,e.p;~~~~~~tion of 
reality: The child is not actually as integrat~(f"-·as-its mirror 
-~±mage suggests. Similarly, the individual in society is not 
9ctually as coherent and self-directing as he or she experiences 
i'himself or herself through ideology. In reality we are a 
I composite, fragmentary product of various social roles and 
I 
functions, according to this view. 
Narrative views of Self 
Looking back on the history of psychology, it is clear that 
narrative and biography have played a significant role in 
conceptualisations of the Self. The 'individual' has, right / (;;:: 
f from the inception of psychology as a discipline, been regarded 
.~~ 4 
J,Las a central unifying concept. It is interesting ___ tJ!at early 
/' ~-"" 
rpsychological studies made extensive use of the case study which 
~can be regarded as a speci~l·-f~~ of the self(~~~~~~tive. It was 
:partly due to the application of this medium or narrative 
iframework that the individual was able to gain 'centre stage' in 
psychology. 
The case study was also the traditional approach of most 
clinical res~arch. Bolgar (Polkinghorne, 1988) reminds us that 
much of the knowledge which has been incorporated as the basics '/ 
I ~ 
1( for all clinical training today was derived from information 
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gained in the case study format. The study of individual ~ives, L: 
[
as presented in detailed case histories, provides "the only 
possible way of obtaining the granite blocks of data on which to 
build a science of human nature" (Murray, 1955, p. 15). 
In 1911 Stern was the first to provide a coherent framework and (:/"' 
~--" 
methodological foundation for the study of individuals 
(Polkinghorne, 1988). It was he who proposed the term 
!'individual psychology' for that part of the new discipline that 
I 
.. I would deal with the psychological dimensions of the individual. 
He created a clear distinction between 'individual psychology' 
and 'differential psychology', which concentrated on the 
differences between groups, in which context individuals were 
--reduced to mere vehicles for personality traits. Stern proposed 
that personal biographies should be studied (in addition to 
statistical analyses of character traits) in order to understand 
the unity of the whole personality (Polkinghorne, 1988). 
By this time Freud (1§93, reprint 
the first case studies of his 
1981) had already published 
patients to illustrate the 
functioning of the id, ego, and superego. Still today the case 
studies of Freud are regarded as rare works of art and a record 
of the human mind in one of its most unparalleled creative acts. 
In the same year that Stern published his suggestions about 
'•,"-,. 
individual psychology, Adler (Polkinghorne, 1988) published his 
own theory of individual psychology. In 1938, Murray (1938) 
promoted the study of individuals and recommended the use of the 
-"·---ease study, which had contributed such invaluable material in 
the field of medical science. 4llport (1968) also contributed 
much to the development of a biographical perspective of the 
individual. He valued the uniqueness of persons and urged 
psychologists to choose a methodology which would reveal this 
individuality. As an example of such a method he suggested the 
use of personal documents and case studies (Polkinghorne, 1988). 
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During the period between approximately 1920 and 1945 the study 
of individual lives came into/!J.~own. In addition to Murray 
(1938) and Allport (1968), DQ_l}ard (1935) made a significant 
-~--eon;~=!J>~on to the l_!f~----~~~~~o~y }ll~tbod. Historically, 
psfchoanalysis has been the dominant conceptual framework for 
-......... ~ 
the approach to life histories, since the 
psychobiographers were psychoanalysts themselves and saw 
field as ap~~-~=~- psy~hoanalysis. (1!-"(}Yan ( 1982) argues 
early 
the 
that 
psychobiography should be defined mC?!:!t::::~?::dely to include the 
application of other psychological approaches as well. 
Psychobiography also developed within the epistemology of 
objectivity and truth, but it attempted to obti:i!l!.. Ci!L9Qj_~_9_i:~ ve 
view of the person from the inside-out, that is, by trying to 
~--
reconstruct the inner life of a person on so-called scientific 
principles. This g~n~~~-of l~~e-writing was introduced by Freud 
with a psychobiographical essay on Leonardo da Vinci in /1910 
~~·--~·--·~-" 
! (Schabert, 1990). This was the beginning of a whole new method 
I 
i for e~~~~?~ting the world of the psyche. Many psychobiographies 
about politicians, poets, artists and scientists of the past and 
present times have subsequently been written using the 
psychoanalytic framework. 
Although theorists have argued for the use of other_~~thods, for 
example, JunSLian, Gestalt, 
fin practise, psychoanalysis 
the genre. 
or behaviourist approaches 
A / ,/ 
as well, v 
~'"' 
still forms the exclusive basis for 
Due to the complex interrelationship which psychoanalytic theory 
propounds between actions, motives, and personality, the casual 
inferences drawn in psychobiography tend to be indirect and 
highly complicated. biographies, 
·'"'"'''•·" 
In contrast to conventional 
interpretations in psychobiographies tend to 
'minimum of documentary ~~b;t~~tiation. 
conspicuo~;,.-;~t;;·-~n a di~;;; (or the 
be based on the 
An unusual ~~~~ing, 
absence of an entry, 
a 
in 
98 
some cases), or an anecdote entailing an instance of abnormal 
behaviour is typically interp!'~ted ii~-~- .Ci symQi:;QJ!l pf a particular 
/
psychopathology. This results in detailed descriptions of 
conscious and unconscious conflicts. 
Probably because this form of life-story goes against the grain 
of traditional ideas and the humanistic ideals usually 
associated with the genre, psychobiography has received a 
considerable amount of criticism. The main obje~tio~s refer to 
~~."' .. ~·' 
the limitations of .J>~yc:::hoanalysis as such, for example, ,. 
~psychobiography r~d!:J:ces the person to his or her internal 
psychi£ confWcf~; it tends to coaeeivELQJ .h~an life in terms 
of psychopat;.hology;-··rt is not concerned with understanding the 
1::'"" --•'"'="'~ ~ 
• unique aspects of humans, only with the confirmation of g~~ral 
laws regarding a developmental patten with ino::r.dinat..e, emphasis 
...... 
on early childhood experiences (Schabert, 1990). Many 
ps~?,.h9~Qj,-~raphers have heeded the criticism and have produced 
mot:~ socially:~ensitive psychobiographies like Manuel's Portrait 
-----'"--~-·---,---~-·>'' - ,-·· ~ 
of Isaac Newton (Schabert, 1990). The E~iksonian school of 
{psychobiography acknowledged the ~<!~quacy ~f- E'fie predominant 
I f focus _ on childhood history-,· and focused instead on people's 
... Le~~ative potential in adult life. Psychobiographical theory has 
proposed the ideographic mode of representation so that it could 
counteract the tendency in mainstream psychology to indulge in 
generalisations. 
r 
However, out::;;J_g~ __ J::h.~ .. P~Y~hoanalyt:ic 
\\ ;.study virtually disaP.J.>.~~red in the 
field, the use of the ~if~ 
period a_!:!:~!" .. ~J~Q::r.Jg_ War II 
I, ' " 
... ~ ctw~ei1 the epistemology and metaphors of the physi~a;t __ sciences 
!were adopted in the social sciences. According to Polkinghorne 
(1988) a review of Psychological Abstracts in the period 1960-
1978 revealed that only one percent of the contributions 
j·re~:.~cted bfography research on did not 
"i:'-" ...... .....,...., .. """"'"'-------..... ·~ ·"'""' ~,..,~ "' •' 
individuals, and even 
feature prominently 
in these studies 
as a method of 
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investigation. In most articles case material merely served to 
provide credence to a proposed therapeutic technique or theory. 
has been a renewed interest . However, since the ~<.l.::~1 .. ~70s there ~-i:n · l.i_{~--~biatorf. Runyan ( 1982) provides an overview of the 
substantial body of work produced during this period in areas 
t such as normal adult personal!!::Y .. ~<Ievelopment, life history and 
psychop~tbology, and li~~.§pan development. A central theme in 
these works is the int~acllon between individual lives and 
their social and historical contexts. 
Self-narratives in psychotherapy 
~TMost forms of psx~~otherapy can be described as a process by .,. .. 
I which the therapigt and client cooperate to produce a coherent 
I and ada,pti ve self-:-n~~rat:i,ve for .th~ ~lie~t. But befor;-···ihis 
coherence is achieved, the client and therapist explore the 
viability of different aspects of his or her Self during the 
course of therapy. This resembles B~~hti~'s (1981) notion of 
the multiply manifested Self( in that different positions of the 
I are ex~i:ried · in the context of the client's life 
circumstances. 
appears that the codes and conventions which have Moreover, it 
evolved in psychotherapeutic practice regarding the evaluation 
of success and .:fCi.:t.J.ure of a particular therapy can best be 
understood by examining the narr~t~Y-~--".c..oherence of the 
therapeutic ... E~~atiQI1~h.ill.. .as a ~ole. Therapies which are 
regarded as 
where the 
successful are those which have reached a point 
client's original life narrative has become more 
{·/ 
complet~, more complex, and more internally coherent. It would ·-
-----~ . 
...,."~--f<Ollow logica~~!.Y.~-.. f!om this that a therapeutic encounter is I 
. e 
regarded as ~uccessf~LI not only when it has conformed with the r prevaHing ps;-.;J;~~o;;~c~l the~ries or narratives, but when it has 
'-. 
') 
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been brought into line with central issues in the therapist's 
own life narrative, as well as with the dominant narratives in 
the community regarding adaptive functioning. 
--:--·~----
Initially it ~s thought that the life ev~nts which the client 
related during therapy were all actua~~.llQ.Qbjac±.i.Y.eJ_~~-~ved 
occurrences. Therapeutic procedures were designed tjL]!Q9QJrer 
these events and to interpret the relation between them and the 
symptomatic behaviour. But gradually it was recognised that 
\\ ~th the client's li:fe story and, indeed, the therapist's 
- ·~ tl!eories of human functi~~ing took the form ()f. Ai!J::Teti ve 
structures and schemas. We have already referred to the rich 
narratives in Freud's psychoanalytic theory, where the narrative 
structure is less obvious, for example the relentlessly 
progressive notion embedded in developmental theories, as well 
as in Jung's notion of individuation. 
i ::::~e ( ::84) e::~ic~~::fer c~::::!~ bo::e psy::~:al ~~:~· ri;~;:ti~ 
conceptualisations of Self for psychotherapy. Whereas other 
,more conventional analxtic techniques such as interpretation are 
\\ f still based on the Enl(:l~ht~i;.ment assumption that (t~~t·h should be 
i '• 
/!sought, and illusion and mystery should be reduced wherever it 
/ 4~,occurs, these analysts worked with the assumption that there is 
I r ,~,,,'''~"'""""""' . "'. -, ~._" , I ! no irreducible~cor~ Self to.discdver in analysis. 
I 
I ~ence (1984) regarded the s,_~_l_:t as .. a .. QQJ!Str!:!.~!:sit,> of narratives 1 l~o~t a life. The therapist aids the patient in developing an 
adequate and coh!:_:r,:~llt .. JJ . f~ ~tory with a Self as a central 
figure, regardless of whether the life story which the patient 
brings into therapy was 'archaeologically' true to memory (or to 
( 
' 
f'reality') or not. It was the patient's 'narrative truth' that 
mattered and became the material for reconstruction of Self. He 
/-~~-~ 
also maintained that riei_t_~e~_ -~~~-- :PCi~ient nor the a~.~!_yst could 
• t th -<. I b ga1n access o e actual or(: r~aJ .. QI:oblem, ecause it was 
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'indescribable' (Spence, 
'"''·"·--·~·-·-·--·--···"'·"•. 
1984, p. 63). Nevertheless, therapist 
and patient can work 
provided 
Q!:QPJ:.~m. 
it contains within its 'cgq~_' J~b~ _ p_gJ;j,.J~Itt.~,-~, ..... :.rgal' 
By code Spence meant something similar to ~·artli~s' s 
"-,n., •. ,,,."-
1:::~::t 0:if;~{;~;:~~Il<!::~=:!~~=~ u::i~~~ b:he a:=~~== ~: 
some positivist residues in these statements can still be heard 
A 
i""' -l:n terms such a~.::.r~~-!. problem I . These aspects of Spence Is idea 
were i!"gned out later by ~olonoff (1987) who maintained that a 
··se~f-nar;~tive does(~t adhere .. to some h~<l<i~l!. '~~;!!~ but 
\ ratherestabli shes "e?!ternaJ .an<L :internal. coherence~.-· Li.Jlabili ty, 
and q(J~quacy" (Polonoff, 1987, p. 53). This corresponds with 
,[.t_he distinction which was made in Chapter 3 between narrative as 
a form of knowing and other forms, such as the logico-scientific 
or paradigmatic modes of knowing . 
'! 
! 
. ~----~ 
/'"" "\ 
S~afer's (1976) contribution to the field drew attention to the 
dimension of the mode or,/form of the narrative telling. Besides 
····the straightforward Self-stories we tell others about ourselves, 
., ... ~-··--"··~·-~/"'''....,._,""'·--~ 
J~'" 
we also tell them to·''O\~·.L~~-!yes. In the latter case we are 
_, "' ·-·-··~·-""''" ·-·~·-- ·-· 
enclosing one st.Q!:LKU~b.!!t !ln<:>th.~r: We are relating somethinq, _ _!:o 
l
a Self which is also based on a set of narratives. Thus the 
narrat1vised Self becomes the audience to wh1ch we tell the 
i1 stories of our experiences. The 'others' in our social world 
• c '"!' =~-· .....,, __ .,,,.. 
are a-l~o ~i!f!"9t.iv:i.~~Q-~£O!!~J:~!Jc:ti.QDs,11 so that, when we tell 
others about ourselves, we are embedded in 'double narratives'. 
In therapy, according to Schafer (1976), the pursuit in personal 
development takes the form of altering the important questions 
[ tha t-~e addresses to m~e.' s life "St~~~-.-;;-,.-;Jt.;t;-;;-:LJ:;,;?s-~; ·'"our 
significant others·:/ He views the analytic process as a 
cooperative venture between patient and therapist to co-create a 
life narrative which will provide the kind of e~positlon of the 
~ pa tient:'~m,ea!'!.Jll[S _ _ilJl_d_<J_! fficulties in Which a '·narrative about 
therapeutic change will be "conceivable and attainable" 
(Schafer, in Mitchell, 1981, p. 38). In other words, an 
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-~·i:mportant part of whether the constructed story is considered 
{adequate is whether or not it can accommodate change. The 
4'"''''"_.,...-d~'"'-"'"~h-,..,_.,.._...,., __ .. ..-,_.._.,c< ·>' 
analyst focusses on the content as well as the form (the genre, 
the circumstantiality) of the narrative. Thus the manner in 
t wh~~E---~he patient tells his story is . ~f regarded as a 
r"'t:r~-~~!-~nt med_i~.' but the patient Is Self is viewed as a 
narrator with a ···c:ii~ti,n~~t:i.ye style and this style is 
incorporated as ~!:!: . ..:~·:·of. th~. self-narrative. Bruner (1990) 
I .J.~-summarises this view of the therapist aptly by describing it as 
~~--~-
that of an e~!.!:~.r or li terary<ii.ssistant. 
These narrative reconceEtualisations 
r,_.. .. ~~~ -------.--- ····-. 
gave a new impetus to the, /:/ 
notion of the (e~sentialist _by now, widespread r~jection of the 
( Self, the view of the ~ers9n as a 
\ "----··· 
·; 
I bounded, unique, more or less integrated motivational 
and cognitive universe, a dynamic centre of awareness, 
emotion, judgement, and action, organized into a 
distinctive whole and set contrastively against such 
other wholes and against a social and natural 
background (Geertz, 1979, p. 229). 
Self in relation to culture and ideology 
Since the (~lt is not only the outcome of a refle_9~,_p_rocess ( / 
but of complex .. cultural and soc:to:c::politica.L ... :fat;iors, we also 
---:::::::~=•"'""''-"::::CI."' 
need to examine the P(actices in which the meanings 
Self are achieved and maintained -- the conventions 
regarding 
through 
which ideas of Self are buttressed. Such a method would bring 
us closer to articulating a distributive view of Self. The 
j' experience of Self always involves ~ ... -~=~~~.~.~ ve .J?:?~ess between 
1 th~~~~.9"~..dQipg. A culture 1 s or a person 1 s ift,eology about 
Self does not only exist on the level of conc~~alisation. It 
... ,o• •~,~-~~,.,.._,,"·"• •"'A•• """ .,_, -• 
is manifested interpersonally 1·· it exists in a complex network of 
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--eemmunal codes . It can therefore be said that I!'~E:!!.!!!q, __ ~lll~~ges 
from action as much as meanings give rise to action. 
The existentialist philosopher, \Heidegger (1967), believes that 
existential .... authentici t-r·--·-·:i..s closely related to the issue of 
--~authorship' . He deem~ i.t important that the individual should 
compose the int~_gri ty ____ Q_:L~ __ _a:r:_.-heL-.own----Lil.ELstory, rather than 
\drift al()Jl\1_ a~co~dinq.J;;q ,{: .script of indeterminate or anonymous 
authorship. Drifting entails, according to Heidegger, the 
evasion of responsibility: We are responsible for our own lives 
-·-;,.."-·-··~ -·-~-~ ~-~ ... 
only if we are the sole authorS"_.-r of those lives. Or more 
ipFecisely, we are responsible whether we realise it or not; the 
question is whether we accept or evade this responsibility. 
It is clear that 
epistemology 
Self or the 
which does 
Self which 
H~i~~pg~r' s ideas are embedded in an /? 
61~ include ideas of an intersubjective \..... __ ~- --·-.... .,. . 7'"'"---'"-· ""~'"~' "" , .. , 
can never be quite ~:t.-"''one with oneself. 
i 
Hence hisL ideas have received criticism from (Sch~pp (Carr, 
1986), who believes that the interlocking storie~-~f-which life 
l consists, are not authp:r~g" _a;r;e~~~-t--~~~~~-~- Rather, one 'finds J. • j >~_,.,· .• • ••• ·'-' .,. .- .. . . -. ,.,_ 
? them' ("man f1ndet sie vor") , that is, they·-, __ are already there 
·-~-, ••• , •• ,.,.~,.»-~•<e•- ·"'''"-"'"""•··-~~-~---· ,.., . ..,,,,_,...,.,.~·--
- and are ongoing. One is e.!:!h~.:L.~.-·C1!~9hJ; ___ J!P in one's own story 
("in sie verstrickt"), together with ~he others who are likewise 
caught up ("die anderen mitverstrickten"), or one takes a 
/ 
distance from tl'l~ID as .. an.'"_out~;iq~ ,:Obs.eJ::y~r. The vivid term used 
by Schapp, "verstricktsein", to be caught up or entangled in, 
L.J:ndicates the extent to which the story of the Self is enmeshed 
in the various other stories of which human reality is made up. 
-----~·-·-·<-.......,_ 
Mc(~~J.'l.!:Y~e ( 1981 , p. 199) also responds __ ,!:~ _____ !Jeidegger' s ideas by 
pointind out that "we are nevermore (and sometimes less) than 
the ~~~11h9J:~ of our own na;~~~~~s". Macintyre's criticism is 
actually directed at the sense in which Sartre uses the term 
'authenticity'. For~~~, to be involved in any narrative is 
to play a pre-established,~cial role and thus to be in 'bad 
•-•-~'"~,...,....-<·-..-=~~-.-., . ..,,.~.-~."'~'-~ .-~----.,r·-,.-""""'"" ___...----~·""' ~..._~··--·- "" 
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faith', since the role is always other than what I really am 
(Macintyre, 1981). -B~-t····th~---ii~k-·-;ith. HEQ_degge~.. is this: The 
pre-established character of the role suggests that: !_ am not its 
,~uthor. If the I could only c~:r-~~-~EQ~_g ful~J with my_~!!e!"E?~.! .. !~, 
1''1 I would be its author and, in fact, the hero of the story. 
Thus, both Heidegger and Sartre share the same belief in the 
.· "'""' ideal of authenticity as self-authorship: However ~!e 
believes this ideal is impossible to attain (Macintyre, 1981). 
Both ftc::happ (Carr, 1986) and Macintyre (1981) believe that the 
1 idea of_ self-authorship is an Cil.i~~-itin created by modern 
I indi~iductlism and sel~.::::cEmti-ednes~~;""···· · According to them the 
"-!,""><f'·"'· """--..... .,,.. 
social world consists of p~'e":>.,.~tablished social roles and 
~\J·1 ongoing st~~~~~~---~~~ .. Qf .. }!lY ..... -Q~making. . ~!!~~;~=;-~_t~~i!'; fitting 
/- .into these ongoing stories and existing repertoire of roles. 
1 
'.<C-on'e' s own life story is incorporated and -~~~!-~xtualised by these 
roles and social stories. They suggest that we should not 
!regard this as lamentable and alienating from one's 'true' Self. 
1
,There is no Self apart from the intersection of these roles and 
{stories. ·E;~h···-;;;;on' s own story was underway in the minds and 
bodies of our parents even before we became aware of ourselves 
as distinct individuals. 
Chatwin's Sqnglines 
established p~f.terns 
way. He describes 
(1987) expresses this idea 
which we participate in in a 
the practice in the Aboriginal 
of already 
very moving 
culture of 
going on a regular 'walkabout' in order to honour the Ancestors. 
This practice entails following so-called 'songlines' left by 
the Ancestors when they walked the earth at the beginning of 
time and 'sang' every part of the world into being: 
Each of the Ancients . . . put his left foot forward and 
called out a name. He put his right foot forward and 
called out [another] name. He named the waterhole, 
the reedbeds, the gum trees calling to left and 
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right, calling all things into being and weaving their 
names into verses. 
The Ancients sang their way all over the world. They 
sang the rivers and ranges, salt-pans and sand dunes. 
They hunted, ate, made love, danced, killed: wherever 
their tracks led they left a trail of music. 
---------~-----·--·- .. ----·---·---~·-·,-··--··-
They wrapped the whole world in a web of song; and at 
last, when the Earth was sung, they felt tired. Again 
in their limbs they felt the fr._~~~~---~~?bility of 
Ages. Some sank into the ground where they stood. 
Some crawled into caves. Some crept away to their 
Eternal Homes, to the ancestral waterholes that bore 
them (Chatwin, 1987, p. 73). 
When a child is born in their culture, he or she is told by an 
elder in the family w~-~OJ!9line he or she 'b~lon9s' .. to. Each 
songline is embodied in a particular route through the 
countryside which the child has to walk along at certain times 
in his or her life in a c~.J.:.~~~~!!ti.9n of his or her connectedness 
to the Ancestors in a rather direct way. 
7/ 
y»- ~- ---4 
example of being.,part of a a<?llecti ve story which can 
be viewed as ,af~~r:IIl!!l9. ... .2~ .. t.l!~ cl~::i::J:d's !::··~fQ§IEion in the world and 
as affirming of the child's relationship with the Ancestors. It 
is probably due to our emphasis on individuality that, in the 
~ ... -.... ........ ~,.,_,._,,.,._,_, 
Western culture, the idea of collective authorship evokes such 
••c ,.,., -·; ""'"·"<''""'"''"""•'"~-;•.-o··~·""''-·ci- ''·•"• ,.. 
negati,ye meanings-:· Compare the idea contained in Songlines with 
r\ - . \ f the works by Kafka. The plot of .Ka(ka's Der Prozess (1960) is so 
\ unsettling not because of anyt~ing which is explicitly 
{threatening, but because it is 
""'"S' guiding . P.Xin.cipLe.sG··· a.x:.e.y,b;i,dgen. 
Songlines and Kafka's work is 
people have not entirely lost 
anonymous and its authorship and 
Perhaps the difference between 
the fact that the Aboriginal 
contact with their Ancestral 
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beliefs, while traditions in the modern industrialised society 
~-·~· .. -·~ ·----·-· -~-----~--·----~- ---~--~-~-
have been devalued and traditional have broken down. 
People are 
faced with 
cast adrift in a chaotically changing society and are r-~· 
a plurality of sociaVr~l;; -;hi~h are as standardised 
--~---·-•-"· "*""''""'"~e··-""'•,..._.,,_,,,_,._,,_,,~,.,....._,~~• 
as the mass produced products of the society. Perhaps this is 
,~\Jj the reason 
~ ~· notion of 
,..---...------~', 
wh~···· ~ metaphor such as iJi!rrative with its inherent 
coh~rence 1\~s emerge<L_~~n .this era, as a means to 
least axffii~;i~ of an intact whole .identity. provide at 
----·-~~---~--~--- ., ... --~v.·- --~---~--···-·-
In an excellent essay ..... in~.!"Jhich he attempts to redefine the 
biographical subject, .:fliffo~ (1978) addresses the question of 
... '------.. 
'where does a person' begin and end?' As part of his attempt 
to come to terms with this question, he discusses a study of the 
Melanesian people in New Caledonia, Canada, which provides a 
vivid counterpoint to the Western ideology of the 
_). .......... \ 
The Melanesians do (not conceptualise a person as 
entity. For example, an ~u~~~ried woman would 
--~-~-
referred to in the p..LlH'aT form, in this 
the children she may one day bear. 
way already 
In this 
individual. 
a single 
always be 
including 
manner her 
reproductive role is incorporated in her definition as a person. 
People who a.pL£~!ated to one another would be referred to by 
means of q.,.-··<relational term which contains an element of 
, .. 
... t~n~§~. v.·· Their language shows an abundance of dual terms to 
denote the relational dimension between, for example, 
grandfather/grandson, maternal uncle/niece, husband/wife, and so 
forth. These dual terms would apply, even in the absence of one 
of the parties in the relationship. 
Thus for them, relational entities are not, /~~L .. ~ tend to see / 
Jh~m, composed of two entities. For them, (Jwo i~ the .basic' 
;'·"·· ·· ."'-~ II • • • ·-.. ..... ·~""""'"''..,....~ 
-T -G.R,J .. t, An 1nd1 v1dual who cannot be circumscribed with a locution 
t··c;f plurality (relationship) is ... adrift, without consistency, 
\ not a 'person'" (Clifford, 1978, p. 47). The person exists only 
t" ------------------------
as a double in reciprocation with another. This example 
illustrates that it is possible to live as a 'decentred' S~l.f, 
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even if this would be hard to achieve in our present society. 
But the opposite 
singular identity 
attempt to find a 
a Self entirely enclosea in an 
~-' • "->oM.,_ __ "'"""":-""""'''""•o".J<':..'~''"•'~·" 0 .~,>T, ,_, o"•-'""'"~ ~'""',' ~,_c, _,,..,~_...,·,"·~-~··'" •"•" 
-- is also (not possible-, therefore we 
compromise. 
insular 
have to 
Following this idea, Clifford (1978) suggests that biographers 
should attempt to portray a person's different doubles, that is, 
those relationships and sg_g_:!i!! ____ pj_£[les within which the person ~enters the space of the Other. These participations should be 
~ ... 
;portrayed as recurring constituents of tJ:l~ .. Person's iden~~.!.!. 
these occasions an(not Care should be taken that the sum of 
depicted as the sum of the.. __ p~rson' s personali 'l;.Y configuratJ:uns. 
However foreign this idea is to the biographical and cultural 
tradition of depicting a person as a compromise of different 
influences which he or she negotiates once and for all, however 
much biography insists on constructing a Self, we have to begin 
rto visualise a Self-narrative of ~.transindiv:idq.9,J_ occasions' 
__1-Gl-ifford, 1978, p. ·52), and visualise a person as 
of culturally patterned relationships, a forever 
complex of occasions to which a name has been 
permeable body composed and decomposed through the continual 
relations of participation and opposition" (Clifford, 1978, pp. 
53-54). 
:::t::::onw~:hi: n::::!!:~!~n l::o:~e:heg:~::~de:;:~::en:: t:: 
f ,... ·'"'';l'"'•'t>-
relation to others. Such analyses su~ported the idea that 
groups who propounded official or desira~le notions of Self were 
able to thereby gai~. control over othei q!;Q\U?§ ,. !Q.,J;h~!f_.Q~~~ 
for dominance. (It should be borne in mind, however, that \this · 
is, of course, }(~t another na!"rative c6_nstf-uction!) An exam;i~ 
--, ''""• ' ~~-· ,.,.-··· 
of this relates to the manner in which dominant Western forms of 
Self are taken as the touchstone to which the functioning of 
other marginal, 'non-Western' cultures are compared. The 
predominant Western view of Self currently refers to clear Self-
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Other boundaries, and control over Self and personal context, in 
..,.~,etcher words, persons who are in control of their own personal 
destinies. According to Parker and Shotter (1990) this view of 
the individual has been firmly entrenched by __ :P~X-~~~:!:~!:~~.1 
psychotherapy has helped to 
t 
~heories and pract~ces. --~<:>~eover, 
maintain this partiq~lar set of 
This theme will be elaborated on in 
!C'jf') ~onventlons re§(:lrdlrig (~-~lT:'l,/ 1 /,c.--
the last cha~ter of this_/; 
study. 
-~-Another very obvious example is the manner in 
nariatives appear to be valued more highly than female self-
_ _,_ ~~'"'"'"''"h"l-P<..,.-.•1!,,.,','"''"''"" .. ~'""·"«'>' . 
which male self-
. ~·-- ~~· 
narratives in the Western culture. Feminist critics maintain 
that women's autobiographies have been marginalised due to 
predominantly male conventions and canons for writing and 
judging autobiographies (Bertaux-Wiame, 1981, Gilligan, 1982, 
1 Kristeva, 1974). Men present their life stories as a series of 
!self-aware, self-directed acts, a rational pursuit of clearly 
l 
'defined goals (Bertaux-Wiame, 1981). Their life stories 
typically revolve around the sequence of o~cupatidns they have 
had, as if their work is the area where they·· are more active. 
In sum, they present their own 
lives. In c~ntrast, according to the study by Bertaux-Wiame 
<~-::(1981), wqmen typically focus more on their relation~hips. 
Their own life stories will include Qar.ts. _____ o£w ~-Li.f.e. ... ~tories of 
#";,:-·~.,.,. ~~~<-~-,~., .... -,.-..,._, • .,.., _,,,. . - - ,_ ---
othe,PS. Their stories therefore take the form of communal 
~ -
stories. These differences are reflected in the expressions and 
.£-~~eech forms that men and women use in their narratives. For 
---example, men _)!.§JL __ I.more ... of±en. tha:rl WQIDJ~n. From the context of 
........ --··-
the narrative it appears as if men use I to indicate they are 
~ferring to the subject of an action, whereas when women use I, 
it does not necessarily designate the narrator as subject, but 
"" the Q?·;··;~.le of a relationship (Bertaux-Wiame, 1981). In the 
"''"'" 
study women often preferred to use we or one, to denote a 
particular relationship. They therefore often subdued the active 
"I. These differences illustrate that, not only do people have 
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-Gifferent stories to tell, they see themselves in a different 
relation to their own life, which is 
about it. 
reflected in how they speak 
~--~~_, •• ,_, __ __..,~ '~""·'""'' ,~, '·""""'""4\•:::"ft~'-"' 
Clifford (1978, p. 41) describes a researcher's efforts to 
document the life narrative of a Wintu Indian woman as follows: 
It 
When I asked Sadie Marsh for her autobiography, she 
told me a story about her first husband, based on 
hearsay. When I insisted on her own life history, she 
told me a story which she called 'my story'. The 
first three quarters of this, approximately, were 
occupied with the lives of her grandfather, her uncle 
and her mother before her birth; finally she reaches a 
point where she was 'that which was in my mother's 
womb', and from then on she speaks of herself also. 
is clear from this example that the boundaries of this 
woman's identity overlapped with several other people's. 
Rosen (1988) disagrees with Barthes (1982) who says that 
narrative is present at all times and in all places. According 
to Rosen there are places which are tacitly declared as 
prohibited to stories, where, as Foucault (1970, 1977) suggests, 
both the space and the discourse which belong to it are closely 
'policed'. In this regard ~Bf;~h'ti'n ( 1981) refers to the 
difference b~tweE!fi interna_Pl'y persuasive discourse and 
authoritative discourse. Contained in this distinction are two 
important ':(Q..I:~-~~' which are always at work in language, the 
centr~E_f!_~;:;til'" and the :~entrifugal (Rosen, 1988). Bakhtin 
distinguishes between these as follows: 
The cenb;r-ip;'tal is constituted from everything which 
'-
pulls us towards a--centre of l:il'!9!!.!.§.!:_=!:c_~~<?rms at every 
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level, the pressures to conform to one language, one 
-:c;;.-~~ ---;.,-
dialect, one set of ruYes, the order of certain 
,-------
discourse etiquettes, and, indeea ,_"(jenre conventions. I/ 
The counter force is ~e~t~ifug~l whi~h __ ,_i__;-~~~sti tuted 
from everything which ~~'fY(iiis ~· ·~;;:ay, _fro_I!_ _ _!!!e 1_!9rmati ve 
centre, the m_!_~-!~ . ·'of dialects, -l~xical and 
syntactical inll~yatio~, play with !C1P.q11age, "~~ft~!lce 
of the genre conventions, use of a genre considered to 
be inappropriate, persistence of stigmatized language, 
phonological mockery (1988, p. 82). 
According to Bakhtin, these two opposing forces are brought to 
., -~ 
bear on every q:~terance we make, this is where tb.~Y intersect. 
He maintains (1981, p. 272) 
centripetal forces control or even s~e~~ess the 
crucial attempt we all make to st;2Q9"~.~ ~2(linst the 
given and already determined in language, a struggle 
which is an attempt to assert our own meanings against 
the matrix of already codified meanings lXing '"~11 wait 
for us. 
Bakhtin (1981) identified the essential differences between 
/
discourses which are certt;~~~~l (the reli~!ous, moral and 
politically authoritative word, the word of the Father, in 
~-~-~-""'n" -•• ~ ....... ,_~ ~ 
Lacan's sense, the com~u!sory, the word of the teacher, and of 
adults) and cer(t~lf~ga;l (which is not backed up by authority, 
which is frequentiy not even acknowledged by public opinion, or 
scholarly norms, but which satisfies because of its sense of 
..,_ ........ ,. .. _..., __ ~" 
aut~~nt,i,Q;ity:J. Autht:rrilative discourse, he maintains, demands 
our unconditional cooperation, the authoritative discourse is 
entirely 'fused' with its authority and allows ng_(!~~ibility, 
no ____ Y,_i!:!:.!~tion from the norm. The internally pe:x::suasive, or 
centrifugal discourse, on the other hand, is not finite, it is 
""'-~~~~'""'·"""·"~·--~-. 
1 1 1 
t f t t' · it is tightly open o ever 1!~~~:1:".~. ~5l.Y1? o cons rue 1ng mean1ng, 
interwoven with p~ople's own '~9rd'. 
,/ /_,./ .. -. ~--......,"-\ 
.l!lf:Se\f-narratives clearly fall within the 
.. ,'-., 
speech: The diversity of intentions 
domain of c~p.trifugcil 
---,~,~ ............ ~- "·~" . 
and meanings found in 
autobiographical narratives, and its inherent context of 
interaction and part!£ipation make it fundamentally centrifugal. 
,--~ .. 
The narrator has a different kind of authority from the official 
authoritative voice. This is because the narrator negotiates or 
can be offered the right to narrate, or, as Lacan (1986) would 
say, can be offered a chance to recruit the Desires of the 
Others, to be given a temporary authority without being 
authoritarian. According to Rosen (1988), analyses of everyday 
discourse have revealed that narrative occurs easily and without 
inhibition when the conversati~;;··i_~ . among·. ~fiti~~tes. It is 
oppressive power that distorts and muffles it. But narrative 
prevails, even if surreptitiously, in the "sly and gossipy 
practices of everyday life" (De Certeau, 1980, p. 42). 
Self-narrative is a resource which is utilised by all members of 
"'~"~"''-' -~oo--<•-=,_ ... ~·~'""~0 
a culture ·"and yet the 'autobiographical impulse', as Rosen 
(1988) calls l:t., i~GOpstantly thwarted, put down, apart from 
\ 
being explici tlY.,21f.~:r,-!>idden in our educational systems and in 
official or lofty discourses, such as in research endeavours. 
For example, the most central instrument of research, the 
... ----~ 
interview, has been re-examined in the light of narrative 
\ 
"· -·-~~-· 
considerations by Mischler (1986). He analysed the differences 
in convedtions for natural conversations and for interviews. He 
i 
"·rllustra~ed that interviewers assume that respondents will 
answer 
formal 
their questions in the categorical form 
exch:g:nges·, rather than in the narratives 
required in 
of natural 
- social intercourse. Interviewers frequently interrupted 
respondents when they started to tell stories, in order to guide 
v{hem back to more categorical forms of explanations. Mischler 
noted that, if researchers did listen to respondents' stories, 
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they did not often include them in an analysis of the 
respondent's life situation. Thus the Selves that emerge from (/ 
r such an interview were ~~~-_;d: by the interv:(~!=~~-~--~~~J?late for 
how they should describe themselves. And yet, in fact, it is 
the interviewer's assumptions which are out of place, rather 
than the respondent's stories of Self. This study illustrates 
that traditional research instruments used to study Selves were 
originally 
physical 
based on assumptions which were taken over from the 
not at all coherent with the sciences. They are 
-narrative configuration of how people themselves describe and 
understand themselves. 
Rosen (1988) warns, however, that the nature of narrative has 
changed over the years. The ori_gi~k sf:~ries have become 
' "domesticated into cosinea-s:""-~ ,(Rosen, 198if;-,··p:·-a6) and have been 
mad~ sub~-~~~~nt to S9<:::tQI?.Ql,i,ticq), id~0J_ogy. Rosen maintains 
that the very universality of folk tales contains its own 
surreptitious menace. It means they can be used to manipulate, 
,-~· - .... -......._,,,. __ ,"-~ 
<;9.1!t:r:-ol, to ~rea,J;,~ ... a."'.!D...arket for ideas, and often to "massage us 
• into forgetfulness and passivity" (Rosen, 1988, p. 86). In 
South African an examination of the Apartheid era offered many 
Vexamples of how this is done: The history books turned complex 
--sociopolitical events into over-simplified stories about valiant 
heroes who trekked across the mountains to be free, and about 
the barbarous deeds of the indigenous villains, who were to be 
_,,conquered and kept under control. These distorted narratives 
contained more than sufficient justifications for White 
supremacist ideology. 
Rosen (1988, p. 86) also reminds us that alongside the 
'autobiographical impulse', there is the 'autobiographical 
compulse' of the cou~room, of the governmen_t __ j,nspector, of the 
psychological evaluation, of the curriculum vitae, and of the 
torture chamber. He states: 
// 
(_ 
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We are not free to limit our pasts to unpoliced 
crannies and congenial moments. Stand and deliver. 
There are many ways in which power attempts to ~-t 
l f_!'.Qm us our .. past and _ u.s e ... it~. f.or . .!J.~ .. QWQ_"···"~!l.<!.s . . . . Such 
invitations do not coax and tempt memory for they 
surround it with caution, fear, and even terror. 
An examination of this nature inevitably has to include the 
psychotherapeutic context. What are the unspoken conventions 
regarding telling one's life story? Do they form part of the 
domain of the autobiographical compulse? The analysis which 
follows in the next chapter will attempt to include this 
question as part of its parameters. 
J'-........ ~~--""~"'"'''"-~•·f~-,__,0 -.4..._, 
!'~ ~ 
But first we need to examine the form of s~.~f-narrati ves in 
greater detail in order to achieve .. a-·ctearer understanding of 
/,x·' ,, ", 
~how they provide the sc~ffolding for the continuation of the 
'',l\J il~~;-~~~~r:y .... notion of th;---~~!Jj_~,.Self. Sinc~.~~-::JJ,arratives 
can ··:be regarded as one of the beht ve:UieTes for our Western l .. 
culture's current do~~~-.. ~.<!~91Q~.~Q;( .. Self, the specific manner 
in which this is expressed should become clear in the next 
section . 
.. "'Self-narratives and literary autobiographies: 
From monologue to dialogue 
Surprisingly little has been written about autobiography, with 
virtually nothing being written on the 
psychological foundations of the genre. 
studies would include only a handful of 
However, this state of affairs should 
philosophical and 
A complete list of 
books in English. 
improve due to the 
resurgence of interest in self--.fiCl.rrati;es in the .. sOcial sciences_ .. 
\., 
over the last decade or two. 
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In 1810, when the Enlightenment was already under way, Coleridge 
"', (Clifford, 1988) descril>ed an emerging_£!1.!:'::!!FC3:t .. ~ .. ~~f~nd which he 
termed 'the a~~"···"~f l(e:i';~~allt\r"":· It was in this context of 19th 
' """"-··--=~'''"'·'"'' 
century 'individua-lism' that the biographical genre developed, 
that most Anglo-Sax~~':'of lit~:r:.i!X.~ ... -.f.orms, according to Clifford 
(1978). It emerged from, but transcended its traditional 
{
forerunners, the 
hagiography .tt:fie 
"'1;.-<~'f, .<- ~-~>•Ho<-~,,C,' ,.,,,. '""''' 
spiritual autob~ography and the 
biography of the saints). The 
religious 
history of 
autobio,2!E-..J2.b.Y ill .. the literary field has been interpreted as the 
history of European self-reflection .and indi~Y.i..dlli.U-i ty (Kohli, 
1981). In fact, biography would be out of a job in a culture 
where notions of individual uniqueness did not exist: The 
autobiographical format assumes the presence of a self-conscious 
/i, who is able to conceptualise itself as the organiser of its 
\ 
own life story, an I with a developed sense of individuality who 
experiences i ~S.~E;!lf. as dist,t.Q~t. J~om ... i.ts..'"'sQQJ.a,l. "¥ox:ld. 
J,r-'·"""""''""· 
In a prefatory note to his own autobiography, Mark ~piri (1960, 
p. 3) comments on the limitations of t:h~, .. §t!!!:Q,Q!~9rcl:phy in the 
following manner: 
What a wee little part of a person's life are his acts 
and his words! His real life is led in h'i;;~·h;~d and 
.,.._ .. ,~····--·?'" .. .. "'''' "· .... ' ,., ... . ·..•• •· •. ' ' 
is known to none but hims~if. All day long, and every 
day, the 
thoughts, 
''"~.._,..,,..,..,,...,_.,.~~-t.,,,,.;.:u·!·." .. '.',;, ,, 
His acts 1 
crust of 
'>••~'""•~"' ,_ -~r-~•'"·'-"¥1 ,., . .,..,~~'""''~'~"·=~,.,...,_.;o<•·o·t,"l 
mill of his brain is grinding, and his 
not those other things, are hi,,§.,., .bts..to:r:y . 
and his words are merely the visible, thin 
his world, with its scattered snow summits 
and its vacant wastes of water and they are so 
trifling a part of his bulk! a mere skin enveloping 
it. The mass of him is hidden - it and its volcanic 
fires that toss and boil, and never rest, night or 
~day. These are his life, and they are not written, 
I and c~nn,9:t _Q~ wx:itten. Everyday would make a whole 
book of eighty thousand words three hundred and 
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sixty five books a year. 
clothes and buttons of a 
Biographies are but the 
man -- the biography of the 
man himself cannot be written. 
Yet, despite its limitations, it can probably safely be said 
,<'> .... -----:-; 
.} that-L..___for the ordinary reader, autobiography is one of the(ID.Q~t 
·..J'\J_ .~l~g forms of literature, followed closely by biography. 
~ .. appeci~s that autobiography is the genre that most immediately 
·, 
and deep~y engages our interest, probably because it brings an 
increased awareness, through the understanding of another's 
--~~·-- -"-""" '" ~if e, of our. o~--~~~-2.1:!!". £QnrteJ::t~dne.s.s_ .. :witlL.the .. .llUIIlaiL.CQ:Qg!!:!.Qn. 
vit is therefore probable that, in reading an autobiography, we 
--···are as involved in our own life story as we are in the story of 
the narrated life. Informal and ongoing self-narratives are a 
fundamental manifestation of people's int~~qgJ 'stream of 
.«---,..-..... 
consciousness!·· ... (Schutz & Luckmann, 1974). It is also a 
pervasive phenomenon: In fact, even quite young children can be 
heard saying, "When I was little ... " . 
..,., ... ~ 
;•· ' 
~pov ( 1972, p. 396) noted that 'QJ"al .accounts of personal 
·~."''"'''""'"""'" 
experience command a unique kind of attention from listeners: 
"Many of the narratives cited [in his study] ... commanded the 
total attention of the audience in a remarkable way, certainly a 
deep and attentive silence that is never found in academic and 
political discussion". Rosen (1988) suggest;:; .tllp.J: the 
particular quality of attention which 
elicit is due to the following: 
pe~Sonal life stories 
It is cloaked in narra~~~e form; it corresponds with a 
---communal way of thinking and imagining through which we all 
experience our kinship. 
It is spoken in 
popula.E..._ __ knowledge 
the voice 
which 
considered to be valid. 
of 
is 
'\ 
c~_sense, 
informal, but 
a realm of 
which is 
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-~t invites us to consider not onlx. the ·~I19 .. Efgduct of the 
narrator's understanding.~· 
_.,¥'./ join in the experien~, to 
•·---·-··~--·-··~·"''~c•'-" "-""' ·~~- ····~~~. _,..,_·--·-----"·~-~ "" 
reaching :that understanding 
his or her experiences, but to 
live through the process of 
it's therefore a kind of 
/'/ 
par~~~~_{fatory folk-drama. 
It is regarded as 
enter the living 
self-narrative is 
testimon~; it moves us 
space 'vf the Other. 
by allowing us to 
The structure of 
..... -·---- ~--"-~-- ''"fi~~"·~~-~~_.-...... -~--~·--·~··.'. ~· 
such that it engages the listener in a 
complicit manner, it suspends the boundaries between Self 
and Other for the duration of the telling. 
Apart from requiring the 'suspension of disbelief', a code which 
~-~----... ·~""''·····''"'"""'''-'·'··""·""·'~"' 
is universal to the role of the Listener, it also 
code of 'identifying fully with the Teller' for the 
... '~-~ ........ ·-"'-""'~ ....... -~'-"~-......, ....... " 
the telling. Listening in this context is therefore 
'""'"' ""''' -~"' 
requires a 
duration of 
:~ct of empathy
1
• In fact, Rosen ( 1988) maintains 
a profound 
that to 
particityat~·'fn any conversation means, among other things, to 
··stay alert £o" autobiographical information, however obliquely it 
may be prese~~d. Thus what he calls the 'autobiographical 
impulse' is a wa~~of listening as well as a way of telling: It l is, in essence, ~~~9gi~pl, even when we are alone, because the 
~ monologue is always dialogical even when the Other is silent 
l (Bakhtin, 1981). In fact, even when we are listening to 
ourselves telling an autobiographical anecdote, we become part-
listener to our own story. Rosen (1988, p. 77) writes: 
I know of someone who wrote about her childhood, 
setting out to recount the games and inventive 
pastimes which seemed to her both inexhaustible and 
full of meaning. At the end of it she said 
thoughtfully. 'It's about a lonely childhood.' Thus in 
the art of articulating autobiography, we do not 
r simply unmask ourselves for others, ~~ .... :t:oo await 
\ know the face under the mask. 
to 
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In contexts where the conversational participants have a shared 
history, the personal narratives become part of a continuity of 
disclosures which began in the past and which will proceed 
beyond the ends of stories. Written autobiographical discourse 
is different. It has to "enter the silent unknown" (Rosen, 
1988, p. 79). 
There are certain occasions when the Listener is not only a co-
producer of the meaning, but takes ove;~{~~ main function. The 
•, , "'"''' ,.,.,,;,<.," • ~'"· ,.,,.,.,,,., ~· ' ,,. ••• ,~ \20' +•···· ~., •..• : • ..,.  ..,- "' " 
Teller i§ r~9,uced..._to"'"' .a. •.. data .... s.ow:.ce; the autobiography becomes a 
'hete~o~~~graphy' (Kohli, 1981) which is then ascribed to the 
Teller and is often 
reference document. 
" --
iinteractions between 
!clients, for example, 
objectified in the form of a record or 
This is typically the case in the 
agents of social control and deviants or 
in police or·p;;~~~~;~~ work. 
..;-"-"""'"""""'"'' .............. ---""'"' ~· .. "> 
;/ 
!.--
Self-narratives can be regarded as a kind of "longitudinal 
version of self" (Lejeune, 1989, p. 132) of which the telling 
itself is an enactment of Self in pursuit of fitting into a 
social environment. Therefore, as I pointed out above, the 
Teller has to leave room for the meanings of the Other, in a 
generalised and a particular sense. The telling itself is 
inevitably influenced by the format of the medium itself and the 
circumstances in which the Teller finds himself or herself 
during any particular telling. In this regard Medvedev and {/' 
---~ .--··. ' . Bakhtin (1978) maintain that all sp~ch genres COD$~itute a way 
.. Lot" thio,king and l~.QX.ning, in other w~;d~·;···-~ partic~i;;··aspect of 
•,\ "''~·~"''·' 
1 reality can only be understood through the medium in which it is 
represented. And every genre has its methods and means of 
seeing and conceptualising reality which is available to it 
alone. According to these authors we think in the genres which 
we have been provided through our experience of discourse . 
.. -The· structure of the autobiography as a genre is unusual in that 
it is a story by a narrator in the present time about a 
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'"'"""' l prbJ:a.291!~ s t who . l>e&:r:~L hi.s ...... ar~·· he.:r .. naxne-~ ... :wbo.-~i.st.~. in-t.he-.Ra.::i.t . 
The account ends in the present at which point the narrator and 
the protagonist merge into one figure. To increase the 
narrating Self 
evaluating the 
proceeds. 
complexity of the structure even further, the 
j also acts as a-n·-aud.Ie.!iOe during the telling, 
coherence and a'd~~~~~;·-of the tale as the telling 
However, in relinquishing e~sentialist notions, we also have to 
give up the hOPJL;f ~yEg:·:\k~owing, in a pre-Lacanian sense, who 
the author of the aut@"f)i()?~~-Ji>.llY was. However, we are able to 
knm~ ···---~ll_c;t,t_ .... hll.11!.2:!!iJ;_y,_JJ~~L .... Q~~-n, what farms 
possible through history and literature. 
of living have been 
And thereby we can 
know how we can live, how to think of our own lives, how to set 
the parameters for a life which will fit into this tradition of 
humanity. 
One of the conventions regarding self-narratives in Western 
-··-··---"~ 
cultures is that they 
/~-----·~ 
should have a devef.2e~~~tal or (~~~-~g~nt 
developmental plots consist of smaller P~?t structure. 
........ '>.__ ..,-,.,__~;-<C'••~''"'""L~P~"'"""' ',_ 
These 
subplots, ··~maller stories (occurrences, plans, diversions, 
projects) wh\ch achieve meaning through their relation to the 
larger scheme\\Of 'a life'. In this sense they illustrate a 
universal conv~~_ion in narrative. 
·, 
On the level of th~"- schema of life-narrative, tellings in our 
Western culture can ~_ex~cted to often take the form of the 
most prominent narra~ye genre~ that is, heroic tales, (more 
\recently, anti-hero n~~at-iv;s), tragedies, comedies, black 
\comedies, the Bildungsroman, Wanderung narratives, and so forth 
(Bruner, 1990). The main character is a Self which is still in 
the process of 
turning points 
experienced) in 
emergence. In each life story 
or 
a 
critical junctures 
critical junctures which 
culturally recognisable 
are almost always evoked 
there will be 
(and 
These 
are told 
format. 
by 
insight or a new consciousness after an experience of 
gaining new 
defeat or 
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victory, by a betrayal, a great loss, or recognition of the 
protagonist's value in a new context. This apparently universal 
phenomenon is what prompts Bruner (1990, p. 121) to state that 
--~'-·-·. not only [did] life imitate art but it did so by 
choosing art's genres and its other devices of storytelling as 
its modes of expression". 
Sometimes the form and conventions of storytelling are so 
compelling that we end up telling anecdotes in a way which is 
entirely different from the meanings we wanted to clothe them in 
originally. As Rosen (1988, p. 80) says, " ... no sooner [is the 
first sentence uttered] than a set of choices beckons me which 
are all narrative choices, some of which will be so im~~ 
tthat they might betray me into a loss of meaning" or, as~=-~~~ 
1(1978, pp. 4-6) puts it, to "stifle the force under the form". 
,...,-·---..:-~----........ 
/" '"' 1~other part of the narrator's task is to~select the material r\ which is to be to!_Q;,~,.,.Q~~~ this narrative of ltm!~.:tltJ.,§_~§~leilign, is "''~ ,,........_, mgde_ and on whi~~ premis,es it is made is hardly ever revealed. 
, _ n N'v'"' 'F '" P •' -~~'•J,-~··~•>•,-'O•<'<'-"':'"''''HI'-"'~"·'~'"'' ""•"~•''"~<~\\;<;,r~~' '~""•":><'f'A>r•-:->'>\"-f''-;;.~'"•'"' ,- ' 
It remains implicit, unless the Listener asks to hear it. But 
if the Listener should ask for this level of the narration, it 
will undoubtedly alter the course of the main narrative, since 
\
the 
the 
--Liste~~:r~_"!!~~!,!~, .. Jte~ , acJ;en:t:v..~_tJ.Qq_JJ.j,.§ __ QJ:". be:t",,, P.!!JJ:!.S,!~.~tion in 
narrating,f/process. The Listener will then become an 
___ .,_,;...:_".'' 
explicit part of the 'swarm of participations' in which 
intersubjective Self participates across contexts. 
~ 
·. /t~;~:~g::::i::~~:ri;ry 0::::::. m;::e:::g 0~~~;:!~6:::: 
,J ~erceptua.l_ly before i.t._._ can be remembered. Rubin ( 1986) 
I " <, ·········~ ••... 
I maintains that it is higher order .. _gchemas which determine the 
·----...___ 
r 
likelihood that s9mething which is ~ansistent with one's 
\ protot_ypical self-concept is remembe~accurately than 
information (Markus & Sentis, 1980; Rogers, 1980; inconsistent 
Mischel, Ebbesen, & Zeiss, 1976, in Rubin, 1986). Thus the 
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J 
higher-order self-schema helps to medi~~~~Jn_co!!l~-~~t ____ ~!!.fQ_!:!!l~tion 
so that it is made more compatib-le--with one's existing self-
------------=--
knowledge. Inaccuracies generally tend to increase as time 
r-----~"-
passes because generic aspects of events and activities may 
become condensed and blended further with continuing exposure to 
similar incidents. 
-~e lite story differs from other stories in the following way: 
~r _.- .v~~.::-~'lc-,.:rc.,". , • .~ .. ~ 
We ~nnot remember (and therefore 'author') our own birth. Nor 
ca~!~~-~-~~P~{f~~~_our ____ qg~J]!. Although w~ca_Q!!Q.t .... wi!:J:less .--~~e 
beginning a~d cannot view the who.le---·· from a retrospective 
..•.. ).,....... ·-------. 
position, ~e behave as if we ca~ we tell our story from a 
o'" ~K,.._.,.._..,.,..,._.,_..,_,..~ -·'•'•" •, '""""""'- ~,, O>v•><-• •' ~- ~"' •"•~··-~ •'-"'"'' 
quasi-r~:t:£Q~p~gj;_iy.~(QQsiJ;j.on, as if we were someone else looking 
back on the whole, even though we may only be halfway through 
_Qy~ life. In literature and in historical narratives, the 
narrator has control over which events are selected to be 
included in the narrative. But in t~e life narrative, by 
-~~ceontrast, theCs;i:f _!_~.J::P,~ _:g.utho:r.:~ .. .aruL.t.ha.~·- ::.·;~)' . This means 
--!·the narrating Self has to restructure the plot continuously, 
" 
without knowing how the story will end. The author of the 
literary 
stable 
author 
and historical narrative is therefore able to sustain a 
and coherent orientation and perspective, while the 
of the autobiography has to do the best he or she can, 
from moment to moment. 
There is also a difference between ordinary narratives and life 
narratives with regard to the dimension of the interrelation of 
parts. In org~nQ.ry stories actions obtain their meaning from a 
highe:t:::;-Q;t:Q~;rc'''theme, but the events in a life may be linked to a 
larger schema only in the trivial sense that they all happened 
to that person. Biographies of well-known people are often 
· _\written as if all their actions and experiences occurred in such 
r{~a way as to lead to them becoming president or writing beautiful 
symphonies, for example. This convention in biography is 
probably responsible for the tendency which 'ordinary' people 
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have, of insisting that one's life should have some single (P,urpos~~~~E end, the performance of some particular feat, or the 
production of something remarkable. However, very few of us 
lead such single-minded lives. Most people are involved in 
different aspects of living which simply run parallel, rather 
than serving some larger goal beyond them. 
According to Dilthey (Carr, 1986) autobiography is only one 
example of the kind of reflection on life as a whole that we all 
frequently engage in, namely that which entails rendering the 
H~e~-~t ~£;~ with and compre~~~~!'?:te in terms of the (Jii~-~;~t 
l~and t~-~--~-~J:ure. Sometimes the framework which we construct in_ 1 
' such a process undergoes a sudden change, as during political or 
religious conversions. Such a conversion usually entails 
changes in the person's expectations of the future, which 
necessitates a reinterpretation of the past. Psychotherapy can 
--·.a± so produce this kind of radical revision. The events which 
were congruent i9 ct'erm;, of one story are now seen as part of 
anothe~_!. __ r<5E··~~ample, what was lived as the innocent, self-~iested pursuit of life's pleasures is suddenly seen as a 
lllife of sin; early family life is radically reconceptualised as 
an Oedipal drama in which sex and violence are prominent themes / 
(Carr , 1 9 8 6 ) . 
Although these radical shifts in framework are not that 
frequent, we are all inclined to engage in some form of 
autobiographi~Q! revision, especially at certain transitions 
' b~tween li~sta~s, because the relationship between the parts . and the whole of life is never static or completed. A complete 4±.ewof one's life could be attained only at the hour of death, 
from which vantage point one could obtain a view of the whole 
Unfortunately until then, ~~ ~ the /t/ 
_ ,rfthe meaning of the (~_ho_l~--~~[1 ___ !?e ___ -~o~~-~~1H~~L .. ~:9.o1~ from :f::Y 
'\J'\perspecti ve of cone of the part~~ Understanding always hovers 
its relations to the parts. 
1'between the 
our view of 
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/,,,, ...•... -~·~·\· r",,,,,,, .. ,,., 
p~spective of the(pc;trt and t~ .. whole. 
the meaning of life changes constantly. 
This is why 
, .•.. , 
~:9.'hus a self-narrative is ~~t !! .. __ ~tatic set of meanings which is 
extended and added to as new events are experienced, but it 
entails a continuous restructuring of past events within the 
framework of the contingent aspects of the present situation 
(Fischer, 1978). The author of the self-narrative ensures that 
there is sufficient consistency and 
circumstances but it is flexible 
continuity across time and 
enough as a schema to 
accommodate the demand characteristics of the context in which 
it is conveyed. In this sense self-narratives are coherent but 
highly adaptable, evolving theories of Self. 
Yet, despite our need for a coherent set of 
up to a Self, it is impossible to get an 
meanings which add 
understanding of the 
Self directly, due to the many different interferences in this 
endeavour which have already been mentioned in our discussion of 
~Lac~~~ s ideas. The ,..s,lps~~t we can come to such an understanding 
is e~t_,.!:-.2 .. }::.22~ ... ,§.!:.:.:.-~~ht at the Self I but obliquely I or sideways I 
as Olney (1972) suggests, to an experience of the Self, as in 
self-narratives. We have to, in our tellings, create an 
approximation of this experience in each others' minds, through 
which the real experience can echo or be reflected. In this 
process the other individual's experience of Self may be evoked 
more fully than in everyday being (Olney, 1972). 
v~ut<>,biagraphy as " ... 
up of i~coherences into "",,,,,.,,~'Iff.#- /" cohe:r:~e" . 'V When someone 
the knotting 
tells their 
""""' ~ ·~--"~~-, .... ~· .. -· 
life story they 
more to do with 
characteristics 
are busy with cohere:nce ,, on a l,,~yel which has 
consisten«'between story schemas, the demand 
----.,.........~·-··-
of the context of the telling, and all the 
abbreviated versions of the previous tellings, than with 
\:~:;;~~;:~i :::~. w:e r;~::;;o~~;ri~t_:!!'!~~;;lll;~~ll~~=is::~~~~~ 
'"-. 
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-····~ .. sequences. Therefore, the existence of a genre such as the 
personal narrative, which we have all participated in through a 
thousand tellings, offers us a coherent framework in which to 
or~;;h~~~rits and to cont:r::ol the chaot:i,(t"iiow: of our experiences. 
'' _«"~ '·~--~--''''''·'·•·''"''' J•w'"""''''"'~·'-'•'-''--'''.'-'""·C•"'' <'·.-·•·'' 
• ,-o~. 
"""'~~"""-- ... ~ 
Already as children, we learn to gr~~-~~ of an anecdotal 
<. 
event in life. We also learn how to~.J!EE!Y .... -.!:!!.~-~-~-<0-~~~.<::dotes in a 
manner which will promote the progression of conversations. The 
particular methods and means of the narratives of personal 
experience include a strong social dimension. Such narratives 
are an interplay of concern for the material and a concern for 
how the material will be received by others. 
as part of a social interchange. 
They are offered 
self-narrative typically 
justification: Great care is 
contains 
usually 
an 
taken 
aspect of 
to explain 
exceptional events in terms of their significance to the overall 
coherence of the story. But not only exceptional events are 
~lt with in this way. It appears to be a common part of the 
function to justify why the life as a whole had taken 
particular course. This justification is not so much a 
but a moral or ps.y-chological ju~ti~ation . 
..,.,.,--'· .,__,,,.,..,....,._.-...,, 
l'' '"-.....,\ 
\ ,~The biogra~.~f:.il genre 
/ ~Jh.u to satisfy our need 
to Clifford (1978, p. 
is part of a 6._;ii~·;·ign we all participate 
.................. ,,_,.._.-.. ... ,., .. -"" 
for a coherent and whole Self. 
45) 1 we II strain for an 
According 
unlivable 
identity". This effortful process is upheld by a set of codes 
which produce and perpetuate what Clifford calls a cultural 
myth, the "'myt~.~! ... l'~I"~qnal coherence'. The conventions of the 
biography can be regarded as belonging to these codes. 
When we become aware of our expectations when we read an 
autobiography, we discover that we expect to find 
'' 
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not only the public and private events of a life 
but its intimate existential and perceptual textures, 
all adding up to the whole sense of the person. Freud 
and Jung on the one hand, and Proust and Joyce on the 
other, are among those who have provided models for 
the intricate and nuanced notation of interior states 
of being.... We tend to b~1I~i:~~:-~~--i_~-~};:_i~y that 
j:~!"P:;-~£=:;~;e!_~!!~~;;~it;~:"[:!!~~:a~"~::-.-"::ic:h:: 
will find if only we dig deep and long enough (Kaplan, 
in Aaron, 1978, p. 2) . 
...., ... ----~" 
/'"' " 
We can attain the 
through the reading 
f ~-:: ........ , 
\!_1~~-~-~on · of unity, at least vicariously, 
of biographies. Because of the demand on 
\the 
! and 
~than 
genre to deliver a Self, it emphasises clo~_'::!r~L-~-~EEi!!.llty, 
celebrates the progression t()~~rds individuality, rather 
communality and discontinuity. The biographers and people 
row,.;;--'"'"'""··-··'' ·"' ·,,,, ,. 
in everyday life who tell others about their lives, tend to be 
sceptical of abstract theories. The idea of Selves who are 
forever losing and recreating themselves in their social 
contexts, i~--::~th~Ts-;·~---·;;;d_·-·- 'in language', seems to make it 
,/ 
impossible to tell/a good story. 
---~ ·- -~--·· ,. ___ ,' «-·~-·~. _,._, 
According to Clifford (1978, p. 44) " biography contracts to 
deliver a self. Howev~E- ~ the personality described, ~ 
I however discontim.J,OtJS"---··"Efi-E; experience, the final written effect 
I is of wholeness". It is, in fact, a remarkable feat that so 
~~-~--,.,.--·-· 
maoy biographies produce such a coherent, apparently unified 
Self, especially in a culture whose philosophers, psychologists 
and poets cannot reach agreement about which structures, 
practices and discourses add up to a 'person'. It appears that, 
without a great deal of theoretical sophistication, by relying 
merely on the well-worn tools of the storyteller, biography 61 
~-manages to make us believe in the existence of the Self as a 
~bounded individual. 
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~ftUS biography is caught up in producing a one-sided picture of 
-~~ife. It creates an Ql~~i~n t6f-wh~l~'hess which is a reflection 
----··-··· '"'-----·- """ """-
of how we would like a life to be, instead of portraying life 
experiences in their in(~;~leteness and d~&~;~tinuity. In his 
.._. .... ~ ....... _,_,_ 
Carnets, Camus (1966, p. 17) wrote the following notes on this 
subject: "Nostalgia for other people's lives. This is because, [ ::~:r ::m ~~;~:~;::~:e :~~~:-~~-~-:~~d~-~t~~=~. w:~: o~:a~~~e ~e s:: 
It should be clear from the above that narrative is fundamental 
to our sense of coherence, even in the face of our discontinuous 
and incomplete experiences. Biographers and 
-·-re·ly on the knowledge that everybody creates 
autobiographers 
his or her own 
ontology of Self, his or her own theory about the history and 
the course of his or her life by linking his or her unique 
successes and fortunes, gifts and choices, misfortunes and 
private disasters, togethe~ __ J;Q.. .. _£o:X::.I!," a ... gg~~rent, explanatory 
narrative. Through the se~<:..~i ve grid of . ~:!..~vY, we highlight, 
emphasise, rearrange, and give-··:new·"·-c6XQ.iii:.~to the events of our 
··••·· ·- ----·-~ 
t ' lives. We endow certain fundame~al episddes with (~mbolic \ J' meaning, often to the point of turning them ~~~_i~hk. -;hese ~.~ mythological structures are created by virtue of their 
/1 centrality in the explanatory system of the Self. Presumably 
I ~.-~-~ .... -·~~,,., .. _.,.~.~~-·~···~--"·-·--·· "" ~ 
/ .these myths are intimately ,·""~ted to the primary life 
strategies or scripts. These \myth~. are only relatively stable, 
~-_,,,.,..,.,-· 
since they have to bridge the ~~p between past and future, the 
old an~ .. !:.hc:L new in the process of accommodating to the ever-
changing context. 
-... ,_,.) 
Apparently the validity of depicting individual l~ves as en~~ in 
themselves, was challenged almost from the ince;tlon·""-of./ the 
genre, despite the ongoing fascination with individual people's 
lives on a popular level (Clifford, 1978). However, the genre 
has, to date, not been very responsive to these pressures. In 
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recent years this challenge was intensified by Structuralist and 
Post-structuralist thinkers, who undermined the assumptions 
regarding the status of the individual subject. 
Yet despite the efforts of the Structuralists and Post-
Structuralists, our culture has not yet developed a literary 
form for the experience of an interrelated Self. Clifford (1978) 
believes the break with the biographical tradition of personal 
coherence does not have to be so sharp: The more successful 
,, ~i-ographies have always been those which have woven the communal 
and the personal threads together into the experiential world of 
the individual. Since biography cannot relinquish the narrative 
of identity entirely, it should aspire to attain something of 
the openness and flow of some novels, for example those of 
Achebe, Woolf, and Eliot in which the cultural and personal 
narratives are inseparable. 
Because the genre is embedded in a long tradition of cultural 
expectations of individuality, it is understood that biography 
cannot 'dissolve' the individual entirely. However, it is hoped 
that the myth of personal coherence which biography embodies can 
make room for a concomitant myth of transpersonal participation. 
In this way, a ·1-ess ~e~tre'd>l>i~g~;}pfiy can emerge which will be 
peopled with l·;~·g-··~~~Eted. ~~a;;~-ters~ 
~·""'"" 
c-•·- .,.~-r"C ~"" 
Conclusion 
No doubt the pressure on the biographical genre not to cling to 
its subject will continue, since we live in a time when the 
t 'beginnings and endings' of the mythical entity that we call a 
.}person' have become uncertain. In the words of Woolf (1942, p. 
V195-196), the biographer "lives in an age when -~t:~~msand ,_ 
camefas are pointed, by newspapers, letters, and diaries, at 
every character from every _c.tngle. The life writer will be 
incr~asingly obliged to admit contradictory versions of the same 
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face. And yet, biography will enlarge its scope by hanging up 
looking glasses at odd corners. And 
diversity, it will bring out, not a riot of confusion, but a 
...,___..---......-. ............. ~~"---~ 
richer unity." 
In the next two chapters the central issues which were discussed 
--,,in-~tbis and previous chapters, will be applied to a therapeutic 
context, by means of an analysis of the self-narratives of two 
clients. 
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CHAPTER 5 
THE SELF IN ACTION: THE RESEARCH STORY 
Introduction 
The purpose of this part of the study is to examine the 
intersubjective Self in 'practice', namely how a Self (in the 
-:form of a self-narrative) is negotiated with an Other in a 
relational context. In this case the relational context is a 
complex one: It includes the numerous Others in the 
participants' lives, as well as the therapist/researcher. The 
self-narratives which are presented in this chapter are those of 
two clients from my psychotherapy practice. 
In this chapter I wish to provide a brief overview of 
participatory research (the research format of this study) and 
deconstruction before I articulate my own assumptions regarding 
the procedures involved in the analysis. The latter is necessary 
in order to remain congruent with the proclaimed observer-
.... -~~,~ .. ~,.,...,."·"·, 
dependent nature of the study. This is also meant as a 
;;tt' d-;~~~~£~;;~fl~~cor·1my(own Rieanings <~~nd forml,J:!iltions in order to 
foregr;;;Jn(t.the mode by which I arrived at them. By omitting or 
by not emphasising this level of the procedure, I would be 
participating in one of the conventions regarding academic 
discourse which Van Maanen (1988) calls 'interpretive 
omnipotence'. While it is unavoidable that I will select, 
organise and maintain or temporarily 'fix' certain preferred 
meanings in this analysis, I can pf~~~~them from gaining an 
undeserved status .... of perman~n~'--~t'E~th-. and aut9.-_2Fi ty by 
high~ghti~g thEt' pr~b;d~-~~-~ cb;·-~~i-~~ they were constructed. 
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Participatory Research 
The concept of participatory research is 
an action science and emerged from a 
linked to the notion of 
y"l'ce>''''·"· ·'-,o, 
tradition of ~ritic~l 
/'' ----t~~O:f\Y and huJi!aniptlc psychology (Reason, 1990). It refers to an 
"emergf(lg form ·--~.f .. " .. r. esearch which is done for and with .. P~~-~!e, 
j rather than on. J>e.?Ple. It follows from this that the usual 
distinctions between 'researcher' and ':_sl!_l;>ject_~ become blurred 
in a process where all the participants~ ___ ,;M:d:~g~------and needs are 
regarded as equal_!y____§j._gnificant:; nreaiiy all the participants 
should contribute to the format and focus of the research as 
well as to the action which is the end product of the research. 
( ...... ~-·- -·····--·--· ... _____ ") 
From these descriptions it is clear that J>,.a:r:ti:ei-~£~.~earch 
.i.L.al.ls within the realm of the poS,(:_posi ti vis tic.. research 
paradigm. Participatory reseaFc:rr can be ;~garde(f as. a part of 
tthe ne~--~ .. .!9.~!~ ____ !.!~~--wnich is emerging in opposition to the 
mechanistic, atomistic, and reductionistic nature of 
positivistic science. This new world view is advocated and 
manifested in different realms, for example, ecosystemic 
thinking, feminism, education, as well as in the philosophy of 
human inquiry. Many authors come to mind as representatives of 
post-positivistic inquiry: Bateson (1972, 1979); Capra (1983); 
Lincoln and Guba (1985); Reason (1990); Schwartz and Ogilvy 
(1979). 
Geerf.z (1983, p. 21) summarises post-positivistic inquiry as 
follows: 
dawned on social scientists that they did It has thus 
/"~ 
( not_.need to be mimic physici_~!:~---~.!" ... ~l~~~! ..... !:l.:~anists or 
~--,' ;;;''""~"~-
to invent some n~~ ......... realm of being to serve as the 
object of their investigations. Instead they could 
proceed with their vocation, trying to discover order 
in collective life, and decide how what they are doing 
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was connected to related enterprises .... Many have 
taken other 
positivism, 
approaches: 
neo-Marxism, 
structuralism, neo-
micro-micro descriptivism, 
sociobiology. 
social life as 
representations, 
the terminology 
macro-macro system building, and 
But the move toward conceiving of 
organized in terms of symbols (signs, 
signifiants, Darstellungen 
varies), whose meaning (sense, import, signification, 
Bedeutung ... ) we must grasp if we are to understand 
that organization and formulate its principles, 
has grown by now to formidable proportions. 
In the USA the fundamental 
research were originated 
endeavoured to develop a 
ideas associated with participatory 
by Torbert (Reason, 1990) who has 
form of research which would be of 
practical use in the work setting instead of a "reflective 
<t( -.,.,._..,"""'""""'""'_, 
science about action" (Reason, 1990, p. 2, italics added). The 
emphasis in the participatory research format :i§ .QJJ.""exgm:i.ential 
t:JI:''··· -· ~~··~"·~-··· '''"""'· •· • 
learning. In the UK participatory research has similarly been 
·~ ~-"·"'"~·---.-~~ 
linked with experiential learning and humanistic psychology. At 
the forefront of this movement in the UK is Heron (Reason, 1990) 
~~ho emphasised the relationship between personal development and 
research. In this holistic format of research the divisions 
between inquiry, learning, and action or intervention become 
diffuse and insignificant (Reason, 1990). 
The different versions of participatory research all conform to 
what Maxwell (Reason, 1990, p. 3) calls "a philosophy of 
wisdom". He states (Reason, 1990, pp. 47-48): 
The 
remembered, is 
people realize 
But in order 
inquiry, let it be 
.,, 
to help \promote f:!uman welfa~e, help 
" ,...,_..4 ·»-,-.,,,_,~. ,. ,_.~.--'""" 
what is of val:Y-e to tilem.··-·"in life 
~ "' ""' 
to realize what is of value to us in 
life, the primary problems we need to solve are 
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pr~blems of action 
<'"" 
personal and social problems of 
actioir-as-encoimtered in life. 
Participatory research is an endeavour which is therefore not 
entirely restricted to the domain of scientific enquiry. This 
form of research promotes the notion that the boq~d~~i~~ between 
/'>-'"--"'""'"'''""' 
inquiry, education and politipal action in the ·community should 
be cii~:~~~i;~a. According to Reason (1990, p. 10) " 
participation means empathy and empathy implies 
_,responsibility". This requires that the researcher immerses 
himself/herself in the research context in order to develop a 
deep understanding of 
form the backdrop to 
that the participants 
research. 
the social and interpersonal issues which 
the research project in order to ensure 
benefit in a tangible manner from the 
In this form of research there is a preference for procedures 
which are useful to 
--W"' 
on procedures which 
the field. ·TfiEir~· is 
"--~'"""'""" .. 
,...,.....,-----------""' ... -........._ 
the practitioner in the field, r{!:):l_~r thail 
emphasise reflect;iqp .about t.h~ Ph~1!91,1!~!1~ in 
an emphasis on a search for that which is of 
pragm~tic Y.plue, rather than for that which is es~ic. As an 
example of participatory research, this study demonstrates some 
of the aspects of this kind of methodology, especially with 
regard to the shared benefits obtained from the endeavour. In 
the first few discussions I had with the participants in this 
study, we explored and agreed on themes which had been central 
in their therapy with me. These themes were included in their 
self-narratives as a specific point of focus. The new insights 
gained during our collaborative efforts were fed back to the 
t ~~-----···--··--·---.., 
\'therapeutic context. This is an important departure from more 
l tr~dltio~-;l--f~~~s of research, where, more often than not, only 
ithe researcher benefits from the research~p;od~ct'. 
",,.-, .. _-vr'''"' ·~•>'v'"''~...__.,...,....,.-~,.----·-• 
This study is also consistent with the participatory research 
_.model with regard to its self-recursive format, that is, it 
< \ 
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I' 
/-contains the elJICidation of my 'ow:n assumptions ·aQ,<:!,,_~:r:"~l'll:ework for 
\ the analysis in order that the readers may scrutinise them. 
/-,~According to McNamee and Gergen ( 1992, p. 1 ) , ·~~~ to the 
/ field of observation a lifetime of cultu:r:;?'':~.~xperience, 
"' -~ "'""''""",:-:------
languages that provide th~ .. rationale . for /6ur looking, and 
of description and ex~~~~~~-i~~>o'""'"t;+ what is vocabularies 
-., .. ~ 
observed". Thus we "confront life situations with-"codes in han<l) 
--~-----""'~·~--~··"«•'- v ~- ~"· ,_.,-~,~·"""' 
forestructures of understanding" (McNamee & Gergen, 1992, p.1). 
>' "··' ·-· ........ - •• _.,,_. -~·~'· _,.,, •• _.,.," , ••••• 
The reader needs to be cognisant of such forestructures if he or 
she is to interact with the text in a meaningful way. 
The present study is also consistent with p~r~cipatory research I"/ 
,_,_-i,.n that it assumes and promotes plural~ic descr~ptions and 
mult(f_ple voices in its depiction of tb~· ~elf-iiar~atives. The 
-~ .. "-··~·,.~~"'-'··"" "'~·"'''"~-··" ~ """ lfr-..' .~.analysis contains the co-evolved mea.J!1ngs of the researcher and 
the authors of the self-narra~ives, which were developed during 
many discussions ·~"·-·I,t is hope,{ that in this manner the analysis 
/ .. ·· "'\ / 
will produce networks of understanding, rather than the single 
authoritative the researcher. This analysis is a 61/1 
.product of collectively cons(~~~~- -~~tte.Ens of nie·~~i·;~=~~k-lrtg, 
which include the following: 
* psycho(ogical theories (predominantly aspects of 
* 
ecosystemic fh~~ry. However, since no theory of 
psychotherapy can be regarded as entirely 'uncontaminated' 
by other theories which form part of the therapeutic 
tradition, the analysis also includes aspects of client-
centered, psychodynamic, interactional, gestalt, and 
existential theories.) 
aspects of psycholo,g~cal 
-. ···-... ... _ 
become incorporated into 
-..,. ____ " 
knowledge 
theories which have, over time, 
popular cu1ture and <\61nmon sen~e 
~- ~·~ """'"',~,~--,.-v-' 
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* 
---~ ·--<;;o~C>n s~.!lse theories of how the Self should be construed 
and of h~man functioning in general 
* liter~:y ...... theo!:~4.,,.,(e.g. Post-Structuralism) in the form of 
the deconst':r;u._cti ve conventions and perspectives which I 
,// 
bring to the texts · 
* literary con~entions regarding how characters have been 
portra-yid···i_~''conteqtpQr~;; literature and other media. 
___ ... '·, 
The methodology described above 
(1988, p. 136) calls "jointly 
characterised by what Clifford 
approaches what Van Maanen 
authored texts" which are 
(1983a, in Van Maanen, 1988) 
f calls dialogic _____ ()~:" polyphonic authority. Clifford (Van Maanen, 
~~-·--"-~· 
1988, p. 136) maintains that such texts display the "discursive 
and shared character of all cultura~t .. de.scr:J_ptions", but they 
.. ·· '-... 
contain an obvious and probably unavoidable flaw: Even though 
" ··-..... "'';.,;-·__.} jointly told tales are negotiated untl'-1:-·--·a--eorrs·~nsus has been 
reached with regard to the meaning, 
of the final product, that 
of the ef!i'ti~g- and gets the 
.,, . I 
the researcher is always in 
..,....,..-~-··=·-· 
is, the ~~c:irch'er is in 
credit for the publication f
charge 
···-·charge 
...... (Tyler in Van Maaneh, 1988). So the process of negotiation is 
\ 
always tipped 
final text is 
in t~ favour of the researcher as far as the 
concer~ed. Work of this nature often takes the 
\ 
form of ~--~~~~~~-~ggy~L- abQ.'!t .... ~ . ., ... -~.!2:.!,~.2~~e" (Van 
137) which Tyler (Van Maanen, 1988, p. 137) 
Maanen, 1988, 
attributes to 
p. 
the 
following: "No amount of invoking the 'other' can. establish him 
as the agent of the words or deeds attributed to him in a record 
of dialogue unless he too, is free to interpret it and flesh it 
! 
out with caveats, apologie4, footnotes and explanatory detail". 
Unfortunately this study falls prey to this same shortcoming. 
Even though sincere efforts were made to involve the t( 
· participants in t.be proce
1
l:;s of interpretation, we did ~()1: ·.f~iry 
share the s~e fram~ offrere£~nce, the theoretical ori~nEalion 
or the responsibi-lity· fe-:r:····· i:liEegrating the text. As this is a 
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central issue in the research methodological participatory 
J 
format, it warrants further investigation and researchers should 
be encouraged to find solutions to it. 
-·-"''•--".,·-· 
Since partici_patory researeh p1::omotes subjectiV). ty and "hcl:mours 
/pi,_-- ~n--..,"\ "----·~~>·--·~·-•·· • • ·-· ·-"··-~-·~·"'~.-~.....-·~·~-"·.....,,_.., 
personal E(_xperierice as the touchstone\ of valid psychol,bgical 
inquiry" (R-;~;~~, 1990, p. 2), it i~(~d, longer appropridte to 
/ 
-.--strive for results which can be gem(ralised to other contexts. 
''j"''~'~-"""' c~•-·-..~ ~''""""'"1<'''"""'''''" 
Such a methodology can be said to be consistent wit~ thf Post-
Structuralists' ideas regarding the preference for lobali§ed or 
particularised narratives, as opposed to 'grand nar:datives' due 
to the implications they have for power ~m~~s in {society, as 
----------------- \ 
discussed in chapter 2. 'official knowledge' i~ seen as 
I 
inadequate. The promotion of such a stance has given\E~se __ to a 
--\l{;r;ecent upsurge in interest in locii!_~,?-~!teug-e;--··a:r· ·· 'E:~~~-~ -~~nse 
knowledge', that kind of knowing which is generally 'taken for 
granted' (McNamee & Gergen, 1992). 
''"""---. ~ 
Furthermore, notions of empi-~Jcal .. vc.~i'(di~y and objective 
representations are discarded ~-!!.~,~~J~vou~''<: __ of the notion of e{::: 
""{ptnowled~e as a s~cic:l.i construct~~ an a6.~ive, cooperative 
lenterpr1se of people· InreTati~nship. In this study the term 
'validity' cannot be used in the same manner aJ in positivistic 
studies, that is, it does not mean a measurEf''of the empirical 
correspondenpe between an observation, state,~nt, or claim, and 
,_ ...... •'""?,~"· ·-~••'·· '''' "•c o-,·>-<·~''•h'' 
the real' !world. The nature of a study such as'~his requires a , __ 
reformulation of how !alidi ty is understood. Inst~il~~ -~K- g__~§~~ng 
that the 'real' world is reflected to us in an ~ncontaminated 
in this study that our. per~~~pfr<>n-~o·r·~-the it is e;r..QQQSed 
.,!/ ,~ ""'·· 
world is m~diated through .. · laf!g_w~ge-r · and will 
inevitably be -~xperie~ced in_ -~---~~~j~9\!!~_"_!!}2,!1_~er. 
therefore 
The validity which is possible in a study such as this can be 
described as the shared domain of meaning which emerges from 
numerous discussions (between myself and the participants) and 
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interpretations of the self-narratives. Reason (1990, p. 47) 
_"calls this form of va:([d.it;---~~~-th~nt.i9ity'. He maintains that 
""·-"'-
the authenticity of a 'con·c'el>t·~ or an interpretation is 
established through agreement in action or use. This form of 
-.;/ --v.alidi ty is based on the idea of conductiong numerous research 
cycles, that is, the repeated progression through phases of: 
* reflection:" ori the material of the self-narratives 
~~.,H., 
* dis~,!H~,sing the interpretations that ensue from the 
re1flection, with the participants 
* integrgtirtg the new information obtained in the 
', 
discussion with the participants, with the previous 
interpretations 
* repeating the cycle . 
.... ---~·-"=""" 
Reason (1990) suggests that this method of establishing validity 
does Cii_~~\ n@k~ it·· i'obj~~·five in the positivistic sense of the 
word, but it --~~xim~~-es'''fh~- input at the individual level and at 
the collective level at which consensual domains operate. The 
researcher's own thinking needs to be fully open to influence by 
his/her experience, the experience of each participant, the 
I )participants' reflection on the researcher's experience, the 
i participants' reflection on their own experience, their 
reflection on their reflection, and vice versa. 
However, the f~mat of participatory research described above 
.. •·' ""--"" nee~/~_!:Q ..... J;>e}·-~.:CJ.:~vi~'ed in terms of the notions suggested by 
decQpstruct1bn, which will also form part of the analysis of the 
'""•••._ ~•~u •. ,~·· ;;h~,·.<'"oY1'"" 
self-narratives. 
Deconstruction 
The analysis in this study will be done along deconstructive 
lines in a general sense. It is not meant as an example of 
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deconstructive practice in its purest form, but will contain 
some of its elements. 
Although deconstruction follows from ~ermeneutics and semi()!;.:lGi:s, 
.;·- _: __ , __ ,.,-'-""''"~~~' ''"-~ ~ ~-•" ~--•'~'-'· ~ '"~, n~ -'-''' v • '•'·"'"~<->•"""-•' •'"~·""""- ,,.d•H .,•,_,,M' ' ( 
it heralds a discontinuous shift from its forerunners with its 
"'emphasis on diff'~~-n-;;es instead of identities, frag~~t~tions 
instead of uni ties~--phii~s-~phy of '~~-;~ag-~ __ _!"Q§.t.~flQ_~_.:Q! __ :_~~tgJ-_pgy, 
~e;·toci~-:·:iJ:lsi;.eg_g___ 9.f epistemology, ~~e. instead of p_resence, 
on-unde_cidable spaces and gaps instead of --~ciosore, playfulness 
and 1{\y~t~ia~:(c:;K,, .",··:;> -·· . 
""'-~---·-- _.:;-;,.,.;,:"''........._ .~-=-~-·:"':_~'""-
instead of p':r::.pdEmce and_ rat!Pnality (Leitch, 1983; Sarup, 1988). 
In a deconstructive reading the logocentric oppositions in the 
"'·'·"'--·-•·•·•···"''"'• ,,_,," '""~._,., •. ,;,,,,,oyc,,,-,,,., .. ~ . .-;m,if,;~f"'"'" 
text will be reversed. and questioned in such a way as to 
n~u...tLUi.s~--ffiem. This 
-~ ' 
exclusi v~"\ dominat.ion 
'il.~·~'*'"''~,_.-,..,...,._~----·-·-" 
of 
endeavour is aimed at uncovering 
But since 
the 
its 
power 
the 
over our think1n~ 
best we can do is to 
logocentric thinking. 
and linguistic habits is so pervasive, 
d::tsmantle its substructures from the 
inside, according 
___.....---·-'-•• 
1985). However 
to the deconstructivists 
not only 19gocentrism is 
(Jefferson & Robey, 
under attack 
deconstruction goes against/ the convention of upholding any 
traditional classifications (and categ()~~es of thought; they are 
deliberately collarxS~~- ..... 
~ ... ~·c..,,, .•.• 
\ 
According to Eagleton (1986, p. 133) the 
tactic of deconstructive criticism ... is to show how 
~texts come to embarrass their own :!:~:i).J}q_,_ .. ~ystem of 
f I ~i:ic ~ s;::to=:~::~t:~=~:~ s:~:s ~;;.~ b:r {!~:~~::9 :~ 
l me4;;·j_-~g, where texts get i~to t·;~uble, c~~~ unstuck, 
~ ""'' '"' .,.,.,..,,..,,~,.,""_ ..... 
\. . -~ 
offer to contradict themselves. 
'·· 
Beconstruction is the unr~y~lling of any idea in terms of the 
particular sy_stem of meanin,g which supports it. It is the 
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--critical operation by wh_:i,ch ..... the opgositions contained in an 
/....... - . . ... - - . 
argument can be partly u~dermined:-,·"or by which they can be shown ______ ..._._.......,__ 
partly to undermine each other in tl'le'"l>~o~-~~-~----QK ... !:.g~J::.Y.9~~~-~ 
(Eagleton, 1986). In the deliberate process of ~~!~rting 
traditional oppositions the deconstructor illuminates·'ihe play 
!,"><~>/•'" ~L' ·'~,;t:..A'<C'' ,..,~,_,_.)4l'o.0:''"' 
of previously in~-~-~ible and often illegitimate .,-'foncepts that lay 
unnoticed in the gap between opposing terms. The text "explodes 
..........---~·"· 
bey(?nd stable meaning ..... and. __ truth towards the radical and 
cease1ess·····p±ay"··cr:f'"'1ni~~i te me~~lngs" ( Sarup, 1988, p. 59) . Thus, 
critical analysis which previously prided itself on its 
coherence, profundity, and meaningfulness, now becomes 
anarchical, playfully illogical, and fragmented. 
~_.,..,, 
r_ .. _____ --- "" 
Deconstruction also ~~ntle's the tradi tiona! conceptions of --~-" 
\,)
, _ 1 :he d~ a!l~hgr~-~-d-· ~~h/' ~~~~ we:Tlh, -~ :he conv~:tidonal ntotiofns o
11
f 
. . rea_.!!!~ an ·4 i . e ... ""- .~.:-~-- an auan. onmen o a 
reference to a cen_tg:~,j to a fix~ ~~bject, to a privile9ed 
reference, to an Q£igi~, to an absolute f~unding and controlling 
1 first principle" (Sarup, 1988, p.59). It offers t:.e';t{;~ in \ .. ,. ?ti 
\ J:he place of ~~i ta_t.!_v~~- ~J{'(>~~-~-~i v~_,. ___ ~_l!_q ______ .QJQa~-~2:. ...... !:~~£,;-ies. "It 
~ills the author, turns history and tradition into 
'\ 
:intertextuality and celebrates the .:re(lder" (Sarup, 1988, p. 59). 
" '·•' •' -''~--·"' 
' ~Yet even the reader, like the te}{:l::tis unstable. 
~-------~ 
The deconstruction of the Self is one of the most prominent 
featu~~s of Post-Structuralist theory. It proposes a 
~,ku~ifa~;;ted disintegrating ph!y of Sel~"s, instead of a unified 
\ and __ ~t~,t?!.~ entity of awareness, as indicated in the previous 
t chapters. The self-narratives in this study will be interrogated 
and unpacked with these ideas in the foreground. 
However, before the analyses are undertaken in Chapter 6, a 
number of interpretive conventions need to be foregrounded and 
questioned in the light of the notion of deconstruction. 
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The conventions of the inte~pretive process: 
A ~constructi-~ii 
-~hat follows are a number of the assumptions which underlie the 
framework for the analysis of the texts. As stated before, these 
The {llusion of interpretive omnipotence 
'\..,. :;: 
,_ 
/~ 
Van ~ane& (1988, p. 51) lists the different devices and 
""'··-
conventions whieh are frequently used to sustain the 'godlike 
pose 1 of 'inter(~;~~~~-~~iP<:>,tence 1 in academic discourses: 
* the use of 
are linked 
....... ,..~ . ._.~-.... ---·· 
/"""-·"' ...--.---.....,..___\ 
abstraet pefinitions, axioms, and theorems that 
.,.,...,"/:··::::· '·~ "•, 
in a QQ.hererit and logical manner to serve as 
,.·· •-. .. ,.., 
expJ(ali"~"tionS, ror: phenomena. 
•''",'""·'' 
·"""'"-"'"'·~ .,,."~·· .. ~·-, 
* the use of 'aseptic 1 and "{~personal( language. 
·-.... ... "·.. " 
* 
* 
* 
the use 
r honoured 
of 
and 
a theon~tical system 
respect~ble""""fi'g\i;es 
which originates from 
or academic traditions 
! 
\ (e.g. referen~~J;:.~.}f,r,:eudian and De Saussurean theories, and 
to the ideas of Post-Structuralist figures, such as Lacan, 
Foucault, and Derrida in this study) which Van Maanen 
(1988, p. 51) calls "standing on the shoulders of the 
giants". 
~--.. -----~ 
the selective presentation of cbtterent, and 
information to ~~-- lhe .. ofte~--(Rh~~~i'C·· 
situations from which this information emerged. 
unambiguous 
and. complex 
";,..,.,., .... _"""·'"·~· 
"Foot.notes and theoretical asides are 
sup~~t~;· part(~~l~'r intE\:CP~~~tion, and 
orchestrated to 
when other views 
'·,~-.. ""'-.,_ "-,.,,~_,_ 
./ 
[/ 
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are presented they are given s~g}::t .. sh:r::ift; they are merely 
foils representing mistaken or foolish perspectives" (Van 
Maanen, 1988, p. 54). 
Van Maanen (1988, p. 73) calls the set of conventions on which 
of based, the 'Doctrine such .~int~llectual practices are 
"v---~ ·~'<t-..,. 
Immaculate Percep~ion'! This emphasises the numerous strategic 
·.,, ,/ 
phoic~s·~ ···"S·~tn:f(;ns, and constructions which form -part of the 
elegant and articulate documents which scholars are taught to 
write (e.g. which details to include or omit; how to represent 
controversial or ambiguous data in an acceptable and unambiguous 
manne~ ___ which quotations to use, etc.). Instead he advocates 
.-mul:~cai'~~:~~;c.ts,. in which " ... an event is given meaning first 
in one ·-way, then another, and then still another" (Van Maanen, 
1988, p. 52), and the construction of theories which reflect how 
people achieve communal understandings. 
While this study inevitably falls prey to the same tradition of 
,1•-J"'CC/ ''"""*• ~- .... 
apparent omnipotence the /method'~ which I use to uphold this 
,.- '-~: 
tradition will li.ot be conceare:d, thereby providing the readers 
with the opportu~i-ty to · ']'udg~ the merits of . :tl1~ .... text for 
themselves, instead of having to accept the authoritative voice 
of the researcher. 
//··-~ 
~he 4:usion of ll{lcontaminated original meanings 
According to Jameson (1984, pp. 9-10) 
~·---..., 
... (text's come before us as the always-already-read; 
we ~P~~ehend them through ~!~e~t-~ii····i;~~;s of 
-· pre.vious interpre..t_~tJQns#·· -er-···~_:-::_ if the text is brand-
~---------------"-------~-·~·~ .. ·~··---
new through the sedimented readiJ'l9 --~~!?.its and 
categories developed by those 
traditions. 
inherited {nterpretive 
~'·~-b.:;,o-,,- ,,,,r_,.-~,,....,,_,....-8.,,, '""'"·· Hd'··:-,:•~- · ""-' ;~-··· '" .. '''"""'0'~" 
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,/·-----------
We ~annot gain :~ccess to an uncontaminated text, 
..... ____ ,_- ~· •" ,~ •• ·~·,·· ·--,~. c 
we only have 
-access to it through our codes for conironEing and appropriating 
~~"'"*'~-;.;;.;;:,;;;,-, ...... :..:- ... ~--··~·"~···-- . ··•-'~'"""''"'"·'->,"·"~>•· 
it. According to Jameson ( 1984) interpretat:i,on-.--~8" a.:ri · ~llego;;icalii t I .. ,. . ~.- ···•- ''""''''"''"'·"•"M-""''"'~-.. ,, ... _,,. 
\ ·. ftact which ~t:_~l~r~_w.r~~~Lng- a·particular text in terms of a 
." /! sp~ci_!!~_ijit;,ig~~th!~. Therefore in this analysis I do c~~t 
·J assume to discover meaning which is !9cgt,~g .!!1 .. th~ .... ~.E.~?Cts 
themselves, nor do I assume that I can gain access to the 
unco~taminated Rl~~ngs which t;he.. au.tbors of the self-narratives 
' had intended when they -constructed them. An echo from Chapter 2 
...):.eminds us that there a:_e e~9ings which are not contaminated 
by an open-~~fl .. J.?:lay'""····of signification, shot through with the 
.. /'' 
fragments of other ideas and texts. Thus, meaning cannot be 
e;;capdui~ted and stated une~uivocably. The Post-Structuralist 
..Jn~!:JQP .. =that)!t~~ing is bothp;;~ent and absent, that it is a 
{.lickeri'ng ('"'rather (than a .·consiant, will prevail in this 
. ' "'-,:,·~ .. , .. " 4,, 
ari'ai}r'sis. The analysis will be done with 'respect' for all the 
----~ ···---······-~·· ' (/gaps in the process of attributing meaning. Starting with the 
''-...::..---~·· [processes which preceded the act of writing the self-narratives 
~we need to consider the meanings the participants did~ 
-~ \ ~~Y, <(2.U!!i~.ng_t_ ___ 92.!!Vey, or ~-·~d not want to convey? 
In the analysis of the ... self-narratives I assume that the texts 
~ .. a .. s. e.t .. of. coq~·;~~~··;i~~ifi:rs which doJ,e~i\ stand in a .· .s·i.mp .. l. e. 
M .~ one-;:~~=.?~~-!:".:lationship with "the signified. I will atte~et .... ~~ 
1L !\·· .conduct the analysis with a full appreciation for the 'teb-like 
jl ··.r '!c.~ .• ~ ••. ,., . ..,,~.'"· •. , •• 
" I complexity of language with its tenuous and illusionary j 
interplay with meaning the back and forth, the 
present/absent, the forward/backward movements in language 
(Eagleton, 1986). 
--~--
The illusion of the se aration between the and the 
Int€;;~rete~ ··---·-·· 
"--·-......... ~/ 
Another illusion which needs to be dispelled is that of the 
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separate positions of the 
the text. To assume such 
rest of the discussion on 
€~th~~.. and t~~ .. ~-;~ader I Interpreter of 
' ' "' 
a disti~ctiorl would be to build the \ , . .,./ 
a false ai~hotomy. 
McDermott (Tannen, 1988, p. 63) states: "Our words are tools we 
use to shape each other" . Thus, the seY~~·~;~;'t1 ve texts can be 
_,~-"'' '-
regarded as one part of <<'fi'~i~uef I will-·-·;a:a:· to it my part of 
., 
the 'conversation' . And conversal:·i.on, according to Schleghoff 
(Tannen, 1988, p. 6) is the "primordfal._site of sociality and 
social life" and, one could add, of co-constructed meaning. 
Harre (1983, 20) maintains that 
\- .. t.he fun~JDe~-~~i (h~~an r~_~i ty (~s a coh.~e:~.~~-~?-~) j eff~~vely_J~·t.thout.. ... he.ginning ____ .QL..end, to which, from 
time to time, individuals may m~ka. ___ QQ.I!i.!"ihutions .... 
The structure of our thinking and feeling will 
reflect, in various ways, the form and content of that 
conversation. 
Thi~/~~w reiterates the 
k~~~id~) is (!fo longer 
)..,," .... ~-~""'-c-,.,_..,~,.,_,~ '-'-,·~ 
as a cul~ural artefact .. 
\,,_"' 
view expressed in Chapter 4 that 
·' ,,.,.,,,_,, __ '":.---, 
conceptualis~g .as-a ~atural object 
''e•, ,J-·" 
,.. ,.,n~ ,~ ~ """~"'"'"' • .;;""w 
'·~--.. - ' 
the 
but 
·Commenting further on the essentially social nature of language, 
Friedrich (Tanne~,.., ... d-~8, p. 91) states that ~~~··'"'''2f ....... ~~-e (/ 
conventions of d~alogue in narrative is that it make's story int~ 
~~wa: -- "a drama·· sfag~d in the speech of one··---i~d.i;·id~~i"'··~~~ 
enacted in the mind of another. The creation of drama\ from 
,··"' ,. \' ., 
per~gnal" experience and heresay contributes to the .(~.!!!2~!9~~}-
i6volvemertt that is crucial for understan.tH:n"§ and becomes the 
-· _:':::~~.;_:.:.:~.J>~'~""'"'"'"'"" 
b~r 
i~-~-~-tion 
activate the 
human We activate each other's 
through speech. It is this ability of language to 
imagination of the Other, that makes it possible to 
at least partially understand someone's utterances. So humans 
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' /------~ 
? -"" (;' ~ar~ ~erlocked in language in their creation of mutuality and 
-kaning ~---D~scriptions are both guided by and limited to the 
shared conventions of discourse, or 'textual histories'. 
~s Anderson and Goolishian (1992) suggest, the development of a 
with others is a recursive process of continually 
~ 
.. ~;rati~e r~~--
1 redefining who we are in conjunction with others' perceived 
! 
I understanding of us. Lax (1992) elaborates on this idea when he 
· (]-:·states that @ only do we arrive at an understanding of 
~ ~'t' ;~~~~=~':~~~~~=~u:i_t:i:~:~::~ :~ th o::::r:~rd:~t w:~: 
" we regar<r· a:s· rea::t:±·ty is encapsulated in our descriptions of 
---... ........ ~.., """'"""'"'" ' ' ' ' ~-~, '•"' 
1experiences, bu~~e are seldom aware that these descriptions 
evolve through sociial interchanges that are themselves shaped by 
those descriptions. 
Therefore texts such as 
-should be conceptualised 
reflect the notions that 
the self_:-~:;~~i·v,~-~- used 
,..,,.~ .. ~·.-''" ~., ,.,.,,...,. ~; . 
as p:rtoducts o:fl relatH;)QShlps. They 
,..,._;.,::.. .. "'"'.~"···~·----··- *~~,~-..... ,,~·'" .~~-··'' 
in this study 
information is socially embedded 
~-=~-----~·-'""··"'"·>•-·""""'""""""""'"'~'""··~,...,_ ......... ~"·"'" 
and 
constructed and that the unfolding of meaning emerges throE~ 
. '"~\ int~-q.ct_~~: Such an approach is coherent with the ~ial (!}.v il{c~struct~vi'st view, which assumes that know~~ge.,"-"" views or 
--··~"~-------·~-··-~·-•. ~ ~ ""'"'-'~""-"""""'-'•'"'-'"""'"' 
ideas are_ -~~ial.. ... -,Cml.S.t.t:uct.Jons which are evolved in social 
.....,-·~·--~·-~~~~~~ 
interaction~which are mediated through lagguage (Fruggeri, 
1992) .. DeS~~-~:.~orls, instead of being -~'bj~!~~~~~ccounts, are 
social_ products ''emerging in a context . of 1 communal interchange 
(Gergen, 1985; Gergen & Kaye, 1992; McNamee, 1992). 
e 
·····During the discussions I had with the participants a communal 
narrative was developed which will be reflected in this and the 
next part of the chapter. An interpenetration between Author and 
Reader/Interpreter occurred even before the participants in the 
study put pen to paper for the first time. The fact that we had 
,been linked through a therap~uti~---;E;Iat.!9nship, with all thee 
traditions and con;;~p_'ons which . -~-~~!~--,·---~:qta j Jed, 
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already shaped the texts even before they were actually 
"'"'fU"Oduced. For example, it can be presumed that the stories would 
reflect aspects of this relationship, such as depicting 
themselves as 'learners' in the process of life, possibly as 
somewhat disempowered and faltering. They were more likely to 
include descriptions of their so-called problems or 
inadequacies, since this is the traditional 'fare' of the 
therapeutic discourse. The therapeutic encounter can be 
described as a process of becoming increasingly articulate about 
the nature of so-called symptoms. An analysis of any therapeutic 
relationship over time would reveal an increase in the degree of 
clarity and sophistication in how the client's symptomatology is 
verbalised, both by the therapist and by the client. Thus 
.......... f(i;Pto~ are an intrinsic part of the conversation which the 
'"--·----··- ~-·-
client conducts with the 
discourse which evolves in 
therapist. This particularised 
each therapeutic relationship can 
even be viewed as an explanatory model, reflecting varying 
degrees of sophistication, coherence, clarity, and explanatory 
power, much like any other explanatory model. Over time £~t~~ 
"'---~,-~~~~->-"~ 
1r::~~~=~;-r;~~:e~~~~:!:::il!~~;~e:::;:::i~~~:=~~:~=~ social stigmatisation, helpless/helping interactions). Thus from 
!the above it is clear that symptomatology is a specialised form I '•••·•-•"''''"''''· ··•··•·•• •••••-••· . , ... , ._,, ''""''''•'""w'-·"•-~---,.~·••·••·" ''"'" •••• ,,..,,,_,,,_.,,. , 
\of discourse. The present analysis will include an examination 
o~~~ this discourse manifested in the self-narratives of the 
participants. 
Already in the very first meeting when the outlines of the study 
were discussed with each of the participants, the boundaries 
between these two functions of Author/Reader became blurred: I 
indicated my preferences regarding the structure, content and 
the length of the self-narratives before I had started reading 
~"'-any texts on the Post-Structuralist conceptualisation of the 
Self or on narrative theory. I include these guidelines for two 
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part in shaping 
and should be 
keeping with , the self-recursive format of this 
obviously had a significant 
of the participants, 
reasons. First they 
the self-narratives 
included, in 
And, secondly, they should be included 
J 
study. 
""··previde an excellent e:kample of 
because they 
Modernist how pervasive the 
conventions about assumptions 
autobiography. 
·' 
are reg;lrding the 
) 
./ 
/ 
I // _ .. ·-;;71 
' . 
Self and 
The following cj,uidelines) were given: 
'. rl/ 
* 
* 
.
1
. q"he participants had to w:rrffe an acco~nt of the..i..E ... ~~.~~~ 
which was 'entirely their ow-;;··~ ··They were asked C!£~ to 
discuss it with anyone, lest these people 'influence' their 
~-----------~ ... -
own perceptions of their lives. This g'l!.t<:le.J.ine was given 
·:;.:;;:...;.;~-
when the participants expressed uncertainty as to their 
ability to produce an adequate narrative and was meant as 
assistance and encouragement. However I later became aware 
'that this guideline enhanced and entrenched the notion of a 
"<:".,...._.....,,....""'"1•-"'»< "'""hi~" I• '"'~-~'~~· ~>'· "<. ~~' <OIC"'" "~""'"'-"">--~'""l&tll>i'l,:.t~·~'>!,"';<m'I#A· 
4' bounded and separate s€lf. This is an example of how I 
participated in creating descriptions of individual rather 
than more intersubjective Selves. Or stated differently, in 
the cultural context in which the study was conducted, the 
_ .... :view of Self which is currently dominant, 'wrote itself 
into' our discourse. 
I suggested that the participants could give \iiQY structy.re 
to the story that they preferred, but tha:~, if ti;;y wa~ted 
to check that they did not omit .. arfy significant material, 
~"""~""'"'""''"'"'"""""'"'"·" -i 
they could scan their lives in··-~i.ve ye·a;··-~·peiTgtis. Though 
this guideline was 
none other emerged 
clearly contained 
"":""·~ .... --~--"''"''"'~"'·•"'""""~'·'""·'""-"'"'-'~"'' .. ~. ""'·'•"'""""' ''"'" ~· 
merely meant as a possible structure if 
through the author's own efforts, it 
the implicit assumption that the 
narratives had to be as com~r~J:t~.I:l.~! Y.e. .,~.~L.l?.Q.s.sible. While 
comprehensiveness was not an essential requirement for the 
narratives in this study, it is one of the traditional 
* 
f3\ 
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conventions by which the adequacy of autobiographical texts 
is measured. Although narrative 'adequacy' was furthest 
from my mind when I made this suggestion, the culturally 
predominant requirements for such texts were so much a part 
~f-~~on~ptualisation of them, that they inadvertently 
became incorporated in the study. 
.. ~I requested . "~~~ipants to include their perceptions 
of their ~. futures in the narratives. This was 
explicitly r~~es£ed, since this dimension is not usually 
understoqd'/ to be part of conventional autobiographies and 
wa~.-----~~nded to provide a glimpse of their 'anti-~ipat~d\ 
~~lves'. In this case I was guided by a currenf omission in 
the culture regarding autobiographies. 
It can be seen from the above that it would be fallacious to 
assume that the texts which the participants produced, started 
off as inscribed only by them. Even if these guidelines had not 
.. been given, they would still be influenced by the prevailing 
conventions guiding narratives of this nature, as well as by the \ft autho!_~,:,~-···~~p~~!:.ations (lbqut. how .. I ... waa. ga~to J..:~.!;e.!J'.~L .. ~~,~m, 
even before they were written. As Bruner (1987, p. 32) states: 
_.,.----~ "',.r'"'"'""",._\ ,/"",,,.-~-...... -·- ,,., . ,,.-----~·----....,.__ !l;~~~d (s ____ I'levei ... _ free(;from (~:r:eco~~~~~g~ There is ~----~~~"-cent 
H~:' iee~: :~::h:::s ~ha:e::i!!:~t"~~:~:!!l!!~;!~~~!~~ · Th:: 
f 
::::~e w:::i v:du=~~~~~~-Q::-u·~---~::l:!!~:::~~~ns ra::::t t:::t 0 :he; 
-~-"---"··----~--·--·-............. _ .•. ·' .. •·•. #'''•'/;'•-"' 
--.. \ were going to write, they h(?f expectations ~b()'l!!::_ the (reading of 
\ ) th~-·-~~-~t~:. ~hus the stories we;e----r~--f~ct b~?~I'l at" the ";ii~~.::···· at 
\ ~- t~.:._inter~~~:-~-~~on. ·- ····----~-----····,c·· ··-.. 
\..,.., •• ,/ ""'''"'-'"""''~W~~~-- <' '\,/~,~' 
/'",.,.·· ,-r'"'' ,.--··-~:sf ··. t·· 
According to Efran, Lukens and Lukens ( 1990) ~~maries are(_not / ' 
.~'historical records' or true transcriptions .. o':f 'actual events, ":, 3)~\ :Out 'p~;f~~~~ces' . wh·--·~-~~---~~~- enacted by- {Seople in a particular 
context, w1th spec1f1{c goals. in mi'nd. Similarly, for Bruner 
'·<;~~~'::. \, 
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~ ..... , ____ ,,,,,_.__,. __ ""'"' 
t~;:~~~~ed fe an~s r~;-~t!.~;;;:~!~ ~::~· -~~~- £::=~=~ ~::te~= of 
adopting a Modernist stance by describing self-narratives as 
being "notorious:J.tY inaccurate and unreliable" (Gergen & Kaye, 
~92, p. 168) ~ can say that they are constantly evolving, and 
~highly sensitive to cultu~~l, interpersonal and linguistic 
inf~u-~"'n,c~s (Bruner, 1987) . Thus the text of any self-narrative 
ex(~ts olliy in the partiquiar i~teraction. The story is 
,,:~·~ontinuaiiy altered in accordilnce' wl.'th new___i.m;ights, and with 
the need to reint~~pret and embellish our life history in the 
context of each new Ot!t_e.r .. l!!l~L .. tell it to. Every narration is 
,,,. "'\ ,;:;~"',..-.-"'"'--·-=-".,··~ r~::::;~r~Ep::o:~rb~~~~ -&-~;~~~on~2.m::~;~_g;~. th~u:l::e:; 
'"''··~~~ (~~~~ inrerprel:i, ve, is coherent with the norms and 
sta;dards of wilat-tS""·-~'ur:r.~ntl¥.-"'woLth.,,t~,lling, and proceeds in 
'"""'"'"""''"·"'~"''·''"~""'"'"~'·' ,_,., '*" • \ 
accordance with the prevai~ing conventions of the particular 
....,....,.-.,......_,._,_,.,,·,,,,"''·'·-·" 
social group or rela~±6nship. 
The illusion of a separate bounded Self 
In the analysis of the self-narratives I subscribe to Lacan's 
notion of the Self as 'subject', as a substitute for the 
traditional notion of ego (which is imbued with all the 
derived from the Enlightenment and Modernist era, the previous ~ters) . ~t. in this context c/ 
indicates a way of under&t~~<aad(-organizing the discourses 
assumptions 
discussed in 
r 
that relate individuals lQ. __ culture. We are reminded of 
f-Eoacaul t' s ( 197 2) notion of the individual as an object of C / 
\knowledge which comes into being at the interface between the 
Self and the social sciences. He proposes that the emphasis on 
~rmative thinking in psychiatry and psychology has led to an 
increase in the control which ideologies about mental health 
have over people's perceptions of themselves. 
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'"~~person is therefore conceptualised within a context of social 
and cultural meaning, rather than as an intrapsychic entity, and 
the process of developing this narrative about one's life in 
conjunction with Others and with the dominant ideology becomes 
th~s of personal identity. Therefore there is(~~~·deeper, 
--~den Self to be discovered and interpreted -- the narrative is 
'-"~··-·--·····~·· 
our Self in discourse with all the Others (personal and 
culturally institutionalised Others) in our life. This is echoed 
,-,bjGergen and Kaye (1992, p. 180): " ... selves are only realized 
Ws a €~uct of relatedness". 
J'' .·"'/ 
Even when we attempt to conceptua'l.;i,se a Self oursel,l-es it is 
f.,~:~-ci:us:::~~~o:~a::d it~:::, a~~ a~::~:ct~:::s 0:heat:::~::t :: 
_lc~ntemplation int~'-·a.n object. Lacan ( 1986) states that we exist 
1~- ~-our retr~pe~fi ve €~~~iitic ·~.:c~presentations of ;;u;~elves, but that theset:i-epres~~tations are ~iwilys inadequate. ~ -... -.. " 
Moreover, we leave these representations open to interpretation 
by others. Thus this creates a tension because one's identity 
depends, in part, on its recognition by others. 
Although we attempt to create an illusory coherence and 
stability, we often misconstrue and misinterpret these 
reflections -- the inevitable gap of misrecognition according to 
Lacan. 
Mutual recognition is also not possible. Intersubjectivity never 
achieves a completeness because we can ~-~-r.?:!.~E., ....... e~f!~~~-er' s 
r f.sl~~~e:~~ness cofpletely. This ~~tly. due t.o ... the ~-~-~-uify of 
#~gnifie:r:.s -- 'ihere is always_' a gap between what is said and 
J '>..'"''>•··~ ,,,,,~.·"""'''~•·"'·"""'· ' ~,-/ ,,yP·'''''''''"'--·•····~-·~·--.,,...._ 
what is meant. Therefore our neea-to obtain a s~ wholeness 
is forever frustrated. This yearning for wholeness or completion 
' through the Other is evocatively 
expressed by Gertrude Stein (1966, pp. 489-490), who was one of 
the most subtle explorers of everyday conversation: 
//" 
! 
;,,A.&"'e 
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Slowly every one in continuous 
minutest variation, comes to be 
Every one who ever was or is 
repeating, to their 
clearer to someone. 
or will be living 
sometimes will be clearly realized by someone. 
Sometime there will be an ordered history of everyone. 
Slowly every 
recognition. 
kind of one comes into ordered 
Research procedure 
I originally 
practice but I 
obtained five self-narratives from clients in my 
eventually used only two. I did not apply any 
formal selection procedure to obtain the five participants. I 
mentioned my intention to undertake a study of this nature to 
all my clients and seven of them volunteered. One client dropped 
out even before attempting to write the self-narrative and 
another gave up after she had already written parts of her self-
narrative. Four of the five remaining clients/participants are 
still in therapy at the time of this analysis. I had terminated 
therapy with the other client/participant shortly before I 
commenced the study. 
All five clients were 
study, either because 
enthusiastic about participating in 
they were interested in the theme of 
the 
my 
study, or because they saw the endeavour as having value for 
their understanding of themselves and in this sense, as 
enhancing their own therapeutic process. The client/participant 
who had completed therapy, saw the task as a meaningful way to 
review and to round off the therapeutic process. Those clients 
whose self-narratives I did not include in the study were each 
given verbal feedback. 
The self-narratives of one female and one male 
included in the study. I shall call them Freda 
person were 
and Trevor. 
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(Their names have been altered in accordance with the usual 
conventions regarding confidentiality.) 
After the participants formally consented to take part in the 
study, I had a meeting with each one, during which I explained 
--~the rationale of the study. Due to the participatory nature of 
the study no information was withheld from them. I maintained 
total transparency regarding my research goals and procedures in 
--------·~-..... 
my discussions with them throughout the study. 
After the self-narratives were completed I conducted a series of 
interviews with both of the participants during which we 
discussed and analysed the self-narratives together. Thus the 
_ideas presented in the analysis reflect the interpretations 
which we constructed together. 
These discussions were experienced as personally beneficial by 
all the participants. In Freda's case, for example, the process 
of dealing with her life narrative in such depth became a very 
significant 
invaluable 
turning point 
opportunity to 
for her. She regarded it as an 
come to terms with the past, which 
enabled her to continue her life in a manner which introduced 
new themes an<t.-possibil.ities. Telling her story had enabled ./ 
~ .Qer to·"·,··g~~i',;;:·· ~~ntrol over her past~ .,She had become less of a 
1 victim of~-t.h;-I>aEtern·s··c;·:E···her piisE~'<,, 
'·-~-. .---, / 
Conclusion 
The self-narratives in this study are perceived in much the same 
way as Post-Modernist texts and discourses are viewed generally, 
~:::~~e:h:~ic:r:o c:~r~::ok:s =~~;:~d:n:f -4~~;~~:~ti ;: 
addition, writing '··Is no longer seen as that which establishes 
some kind of stru~tdre ~r m~aning, a ~~d' P(inclple, a0tablle 
"·"'~·,, 
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centre, a solid foundation. Writing is rather regarded as an 
~ e_Ed~~f!-~ c!~t~!:~t;rtg __ j:m<t 9 . iffering. 
The self-narratives presented in this study can all be regarded 
as self-conscious performances of Self, 
itself, self~rentially. Moreover it 
mind turning around upon 
is essentially a public 
performance: One of the selective 'grids' or 'lenses' which the 
participants utilised for this particular telling is that of 
_:self which is public' in contrast to 'private Self'. In 
addition, it is not only Public Self, but 'self-in-
psychotherapy' which is performed here. These themes will be 
explored and elaborated on in the next part of the chapter. 
151 
CHAPTER 6 
THE SELF IN ACTION: 
AN ANALYSIS OF THE SELF-NARRATIVES 
Introduction 
In the aforegoing chapters we examined the implications which 
the cultural shift from Modernism to Post-Modernism have for 
conceptualisations of identity. In this chapter I wish to 
particularise the discussion of these changes by examining two 
self-narratives in detail. The analyses which follow below are 
1 not an attempt to chart the _P.h~nq!.llenqJ.ogy_p:e __ tl!~ __ Self or its 
<t essential natui"~.Q_::r; §,i;:I.\:l.£t11re, but rather an examination of the 
"I 
.1 language and codes of self-reference. In these self-narratives 
wefTn(f''·a '"'puoii'c . presentation of the private Self, a Self-
conscious-of-Self, in other words. We are presented with a 
narrative format in which Self reflexively contemplates itself. 
~n this analysis I will attempt to identify the interpretive 
schemas used in this self-contemplation. Obviously these 
interpretive schemas are not found in the texts themselves nor 
can they be regarded as the actual interpretive schemas of the 
participants. They have been co-constructed by the participants 
and myself in the discussions about the texts. 
The interpretive schemas found in the self-narratives take 
different forms: Some of them conform to the conventions used in 
the narrative tradition, some of them are predominantly 
linguistic in nature and others are predominantly cultural, 
reflecting the dominant notions regarding lifestyles, social 
trends, fashions, political ideologies and gender stereotypes. 
Regardless of their particular classification, they are all 
/,..-~~~ ... ~-·"~,.,.,----·~- ~- ·.~"''"·····~"' "' <'--""""·---. .. ~·-
collectively orga~ed pa~rns for c~eating meaning which we 
all share and partici-~-;;t; .. ~in every day. "·"""- ·~·"·-····~·· 
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The self-narratives in this study reveal both Modernist and 
Post-Modernist aspects which characterise a transitional phase 
between the two cultural paradigms, as I will illustrate in the 
analysis which follows. Both the Modernist and Post-Modernist 
assumptions on which the self-narratives are based will be 
highlighted. 
Both self-narratives are based on two sets of dis:?~~ses;~ne ~ 
discourse is organised around the notion of ro~tic sel~ 
r\ {ulfillment. The other is a discourse reflecting ~;p~;;ts of 
( all~n¥1o~--and-dlspossession which can be described as Post-
Modernist. As I have described in the aforegoing chapters, the 
_ Self-centred-in-itself has gradually become decentred in the 
vast socio-cultural shift towards Post-Modernism. The belief 
~ ~~ and objective truths have waned. Words and meanings 
"»- ' \ "'---,.._-.---~ 
in 
are 
t-- no· longer :Elxed and :!:]ependable there are onl y_____Q_~ferred, 
1 
postpo~~~ meanings and a confusing array of multiple vjewpoints. 
I will endeavour to deconstruct the two self-narratives in order 
to reveal the interplay between the above two types of 
discourses in the process of constructing the Self. 
Trevor's Story 
(See Appendix I for Trevor's self-narrative.) 
~Byery story is like all other stories in certain aspects, like 
some other stories in certain aspects, and like no other story 
~n other aspects, according to McAdams (1985). In reading 
~~-----., 
Trevor's s~=~ar(a~_ive every reader will recognise something of 
his/her own life\··-s.t<n-~-,.. since al}~ .. ~~~tqp_iogrg..Q!}Y~. is universal on 
\ 
a fundamental le~el: a, . .. .i_ ts very nat.u.re the genre implies a 
·· 
1 
~~;-~ri6i'Ogy, a c:oh-;re;;ce in·· ..... terms·~f--. .Jluclear episodes (j-~ and 
\other conventional narrative 'features, and a ~ntral~.-... pivotal 
'~...._Jet/;~ '"i:!W'"'o•>••y&o•~· ,_.., 
character. This self-narrative also contains some of the 
elements which are found in all Mo~t tellings, namely the 
~A 
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~characterisation of the Self in terms of the Romantic tradition, 
~ .. -~~ 
while in other respects it contains elements of Post-Modernist 
narratives, especially in its self-consciousness and self-
¢~eeonstruction. But this self-narrative contains many unique 
aspects which reflect a singular life, albeit a life plagued by 
uncertainty, alienation, and ambiguity. 
The Modernist features in Trevor's self-narrative are 
overshadowed by the more Post-Modernist aspects of his story. 
While the conventions regarding the Self which are usually found 
in stories of Self (namely the conventions of a substantial, 
coherent, continuous, and whole personhood) form the backdrop 
for Trevor's self-depiction, they are often undermined and 
.ridiculed in this story. The character which he constructs is 
shot through with doubt, insecurity, and yearning for the 
impossible reunion with the _Qthe~- However, even though he 
undermine~ __ _!:._l!~ .. _!_g~a!_ __ 2f-j;;be ... -~(;dern.i.~--Se-±f throughout his self-
-~--- ....._______ '" 
narrative, the latter is still uphe'ld as the ult!l!'?-:':.~ .. 9~al to 
which he aspires. 
,,. . . ' .," 
The M~-dernist ideal 
charact·~-risat1~an of 
is also evident in an inverted sense in the 
He clearly the Self that Trevor depicts. 
-·regards his seit-as-charact~.!: ....... gS. bav:ip.g'"_ JC!J!~d: His central 
character failed to live a progressive plotline in which there 
is a gradual increase in agency, intimacy, and wisdom. The 
following excerpts from his text serve as illustrations: "I just 
couldn't physically be anything"; "I wasn't all there"; II 
there was just a touch of something missing"; "I was unable to 
formulate my problems"; "A life was unfolding which had a cul-
de-sac sign at the start"; "The world threatened"; "Puzzled by 
my attraction to this woman, and also by a feeling of alienness 
that I felt with respect to my very own self ... "; " not 
really having a sense of who I am". 
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/"'-
his ! The narrative 'E,~~:-~-- -OE ... conventions which Trevor used in self-narrative (such as plot, imagoes, Quclear ..... , .. epi-sedes, ' ,, ·-'~··'·-'.!'' '""~" "''"''"'" I characterisation) can also be regarded as g,&~;~ elements. 
~ ,_""-·'·"- ··•· . '"-o.,.,.."'-''·'" .••. 1 These codes are the means through which the notions of 
\essentialism, consistency, and coherence are manifested. These 
~:=___.~ """~,~=---- ---:;:;.,.~.':"~ 
will be examined in the sections which follow. 
Narrative codes 
The beginnings 
The beginning is not quite the beginning in Trevor's narrative, 
since he starts telling the story twice. The first story starts 
with a series of positive memories of his childhood and ends 
with the Kundalini experience (an unusual mental state which 
will be discussed later). The second story starts with a number 
of unhappy anecdotes from his early childhood. These two 
beginnings are in part due to the suggested structure that I 
proposed during the initial interview, but it is interesting 
"'..:::.that these two beginnings reflect a juxtaposition of the ideal 
and the non-ideal, a theme which permeates the whole narrative. 
The first beginning provides a montage of close-ups to the 
reader: "I have quite a few memories of when I was small, such 
as a very vague memory of seeing a red light probably when I was 
born, of pushing my mother's nipple into her breast when I was 
feeding, and some of the toys I received when I was only 1 or 2 
years old. Until I turned 7 or so, I was happy; life was sweet. 
I used to be fascinated by the fire we had in the fireplace. 
When I was about four years old, I remember having had all my 
teeth removed. My mother used to make me lick a handkerchief to 
clean my face with." 
These pictorial glimpses present disconnected fragments of a 
childhood. They do not reflect the continuity of a chronicle, 
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_ .. ra.ther, the reader is invited to supply the continuity, to fill 
in the gaps. And like a montage in a good film, it is evocative 
enough to suggest a richer and more 'whole' childhood than is 
actually presented. The effect of the montage as narrative 
convention is precisely that it presents a few parts that 
represent the whole. It also involves the viewer/reader in a 
more active role in supplying the interrelations between the 
selected events or images as well as between the told and the 
omitted, untold dimensions. 
Plot 
Elsbree (1982, in McAdams, 1985) maintains that all storylines 
are reducible to a few generic plots: ArchetYQal actions, or 
"':::-,-~.-~-···'~~····~~,.~ •. ·~··' ~--"'"" ........._,..,.,...,w,•~~ .... , '-~·.~ 
"universal action sequences intelligible to all people in all 
cultures which are felt by the audience to have something like 
the authority of those rituals which articulate basic phases of 
...---..;;...,._..,._ 
human growth and express primary human needs" (McAdams, 1985, p. 
' A~O_.......,., ""'-'"''"~"''V' 
56). These are: 
-engaging in a contest 
-taking a jour~ey 
-enduring suffering 
-pursuing consummation. 
Trevor's story contains elements 
proposed by Elsbree and McAdams 
of all the generic plots 
(1985) but most obviously 
resembles the last 
r·-tells a tale of a \ --·~·~~.,;.. 
plot, namely 'pursuing consummation'. He 
heroic and sometimes tragicomic striving for 
~-~~·~~··t< ' 
~wisdom, spirituality, integration, wholeness. It is an account 
of a courageous but thwarted 
unobtainable, the forever Lost 
Other. This corresponds closely 
attempt at obtaining the 
the perfect reunion with the 
to Elsbree's delineation of this 
kind of generic plot, namely the striving for transcendence, 
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liberation or self-actualisation. In essence, stories with this 
kind of plot (like The Divine Comedy, War and Peace, The 
Wasteland, and Revelations) involve a striving for goodness, 
truth or beauty. It also often involves the merging with 
something more inclusive, more encompassing (see the so-called 
Kundalini experience which is discussed later). 
Trevor actually presents two stories. The first storyline can be 
regarded as more successful in that it ends on a high note with 
the Kundalini experience and the implied transcendence which 
usually accompanies it. 
In the other story the Kundalini experience occurs in the middle 
and his depiction of how his life continues subsequent to that 
does not bear out the hope and suggestion of transformation. 
This is therefore a less 'successful' presentation. 
At this juncture it is interesting to consider the stories which 
..were excluded in this telling. What were the omitted 
experiences, meanings? One possibility would be that he has 
omitted positive experiences in his selection of material. Since 
failure and rejection are such primary or nuclear themes it is 
.l"ikely that he has reported predominantly those experiences 
which are coherent with that theme. The same can be said of his 
idealism: since he is so bent on having virtually no life at all 
if he cannot have a perfect, ideal life, he evaluates all 
experiences by those stringent standards. 
After Trevor had scrutinised my interpretation of his self-
narrative, he felt surprised that an Unintended Self had sneaked 
into his self-narrative! He had intended to ironise himself but 
he had still intended to emerge as a kind of heroic figure. He 
had not intended to emphasise the anti-hero as much as he had 
done. He thus conveyed meanings which he had not intended to 
convey. 
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How would his story have been different if he had also recounted 
episodes of acceptance, contentment, and joy? Although it would 
have conformed to most readers' expectations, his self-narrative 
would have lost some of its dramatic impact. In Chapter 3 it was 
r-:mentioned that loss (and the ensuing effort to regain that which 
is lost) is an essential element of a successful narrative. 
According to Lacan (Eagleton, 1986, p. 185) it is the Mother's 
body -- the original lost object which gives impetus to 
narratives, thus choosing "substitutes for this lost paradise in 
the endless metonymic movement of desire". This therefore is 
narrative at its best, except that the striving is in vain 
there is no resolution of this dramatic tension at the end of 
the narrative. Instead of a conventional ending, Trevor conveys 
····-the seemingly endless continuation of a struggle against 
unfortunate odds. The proper, conventional ending is deferred, 
postponed. But the author is not entirely without hope: " 
whilst I do not exactly have faith that I will of neccesity 
survive this harrowing process, nevertheless I do sense an 
improvement in myself and at long last, an increasing sense of 
self-worth and some inner stability". 
Nuclear episodes 
self-narrative contains frequent references to the Trevor's -~fleme of success and failure which reflects a strong Modernist 
influence. The Modernist ethos of progress and success impinge 
on most aspects of the tale, mostly in the form of the 
unattained ideal. Although he strives to obtain recognition from 
others for his good qualities in his work milieu, all he gets is 
humiliation, embarrassment, and disillusionment. He is rather 
,~-~rciless in his portrayal of his Self as failing to live up to 
the Modernist ideal of a progressive plot in which there is a 
gradual increase in wisdom, power and recognition. Instead the 
main character which he portrays feels confused and alone, at 
the mercy of others' rejection, or carelessness. There is a 
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painfully wide discrepancy between his vision of the future 
(highly idealised, and thus utterly unattainable) and the 
present. His failure to achieve power and dominance by means of 
his masculinity is expressed poignantly in his account of one of 
the conventional cultural rituals of masculinity, the 'stag 
party': "I considered it inevitable or necessary to have a stag 
party -- in retrospect, I just don't know why. So I organised it 
myself. If I had not done so, it would not have happened. I 
~,-~alJted to be a man, I suppose, even if it meant pretending that 
these guys were my hearty friends. I was duly sick. I had had my 
party." 
Imagoes" "''-
\ 
~,~Imagoes are described by McAdams • \,.,....._~ . ' I ( 1985) as dom1nalte·-,,.c)laracters 
or symbolic 'positions' in the story. He defines imagoes as 
follows: 
Unlike Jung's structural components of the collective 
unconscious, life story imagoes are by definition 
personified and exist not as a part of a phylogenetic 
collectivity but rather as highly personalised, 
r,·i:'diosyncratic images defining how a person is 
j different ,_~Eom others as well as simi!a,r_ to t.!l-EW!.: .. · .. 
1- They are structured as personified and (dealis~d 
\ i~~of self, highly individualised and created to 
tPlii:y··r~s in specific life stories (McAdams, 1985, 
··-
PP- 182-183). 
An examination of the imagoes used in Trevor's ~elf-narratives 
reveals the powerful and competent Self and the tragicomic 
figure who has failed. In terms of imagoes these two positions 
can be described as the Hero and the Anti-hero and are linked in 
a complementary fashion. The 
invokes the discourse of 
discourse of failure automatically 
the ideal, the idealised, and the 
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godlike; the one opens up to the previous one, 
shifting back and forth. 
continually 
.,.,-Jflre Heroic Self is illustrated in the 
enjoy the philosophical debates, in 
following: "I used to 
fact [I enjoyed] any 
opportunity to demonstrate my superior understanding .... I 
liked to impress others in this way. For once I had some 
--·~espect." The Modernist ideal of the unique and successful Self 
emerges 
still 
sense 
at certain points in the narrative: "Initially I was 
very much in the psychological grip of my parents, in the 
that I would tell them with great enthusiasm of my plans 
for the future. These plans were always intended to demonstrate 
my ability to inevitably forge ahead and rise above everyone 
else." It is interesting that his ideals for his heroic and 
exceptional Self are reported as occurring in conversations with 
his parents. This suggests that his ideas about what constitutes 
-··an ideal Self are inscribed by the expectations which he thought 
his parents had for him. 
But at other points in the self-narrative, Trevor undermines and 
ridicules the character which he constructs and thus depicts him 
~·as an Anti-hero. He dismantles the Hero as rapidly as he creates 
him. He mocks his own very lofty romantic ideals for his 
personhood, by referring to the gaps, the inadequacies, the 
painful meaninglessness: "I aimed for authority but was 
hopelessly immature"; "Sometimes, very occasionally, I felt that 
I impressed girls with my sheer brain-power and warrior-like 
attitude. At other times I simply felt alone and even stupid". 
Trevor uses many of the conventions which are associated with 
the anti-hero figure. He is caught up in ambiguities and double 
meanings and remains entangled in his own ambivalences. He is 
therefore unable to resolve problems in any clearcut way. He is 
-·t:he victim of his longi~g for affirmation from the Other. So 
intense is this longing, that he experiences himself as 
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-~·.Hagmented, his sense of significance and wholeness perpetually 
postponed until the moment of recognition by the Other. 
Characterisation 
Trevor's style of telling the story of the Self is exceptional 
because he clearly foregrounds the processes and discourses 
through which the character of the Self is constructed. One of 
the features of his self-narrative is that he utilises two 
--d±stinct I-positions in his text. As I have pointed out in 
«.---ebapter 4 the I and the me or the Self-as-subject and the Self-
as-object of consciousness are acknowledged by James (Damon & 
Hart, 1982) as definitive aspects of the Self. These two 
positions are thought to have an ontological existence in the 
fluid procession of experiences. However in this study an 
alternative view of these two positions has been proposed. 
According to Harre (Potter, Stringer, & Wetherell, 1984) these 
___ ....two positions of I and Me are merely the products of linguistic 
conventions, of rules of grammar of personal pronouns. These two 
positions are inevitable aspects of the construction of any 
account of events and experiences. According to Potter et al . 
., ..... ft984, p. 159) this distinction emerges through the "conventions 
for explaining and justifying one's actions, a conceptual 
possibility which is then extended until it becomes a complete 
self-diagram". In addition it is a narrative convention which is 
more likely to occur in the format used in this study, namely 
autobiography, since it is a genre in which the Self is both 
author and main character. 
Usually in self-narratives the I is buf one position which is 
designated as the 'speaking subject'. ~he 'speaking subject' due 
'"···--t,o. linguistic and narrative conventions, sustains the illusion 
that it has a controlling influence on the discourse in which it 
is embedded. It is this I that has the task of convincing the 
Reader of the 'success' (the agency, continuity, wholeness, and 
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boundedness) of the Self-as-character. It is this I which 
therefore utilises the narrative conventions (coherence, 
continuity, wholeness, substance) in presenting a believable and 
adequate character to the Reader. 
If we were to depict the nature of this relationship between 
The-l-as-Narrator and The-l-as-Character, it could be described 
'\'as reflecting a degree of congruence between the two 
'positions'. However, in Trevor's narrative, there is a 
significant tension between The-l-as-Narrator and The-l-as-
Character. The Self-as-Narrator does not take the position of 
an omniscient Eye, as is congruent with the dominant convention. 
Instead, it sometimes offers a bitterly ironic commentary on the 
actions of the Self-as-character, actions which spring forth 
from the impossible romantic ideals which the Self-as-character 
is pursuing: "I tried to move quickly away from G, and find the 
archetypal woman with whom I would live ecstatically ever 
after." He mocks his own hopelessly grandiose dreams as 
follows: " ... perhaps I wanted recognition as the philosopher who 
had discovered all the secrets of god and life, time and space". 
Sometimes this biting sarcasm from the Self-as-narrator is also 
aimed at other figures in the tale, for example, "A few months 
later, in May 1991, I consulted a psychiatrist. He said some 
interesting things, and reviewed some of my writings. Having 
diagnosed hypergraphia, the clever chap, he proceeded to 
-prescribe anti-depressants". Instead of 'supporting' The-l-as-
Character, The-l-as-Narrator ridicules and undermines The-l-as-
Character throughout the text. There is virtually no congruence 
or overlap between these two I-positions. 
The l-as-Narrator's voice 
numerous interpretations, 
nature. His dialogue with 
is prominent in the text, he makes 
especially of a quasi-psychological 
the reader is therefore prominently 
foregrounded. It results in a highly Self-conscious presentation 
of the Self. However, instead of alienating the Reader from The-
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I-as-Character, The-T-as-Narrator successfully involves the 
Reader -- in fact, through his disarmingly honest, transparent, 
frank style of narration, he seduces the Reader all the more to 
feel a great deal of empathy for the hapless and vulnerable 
Anti-hero in his monumental struggle for meaning through a 
reunion with the Other. 
However, thanks to the ironic voice of the Self-as-narrator, the 
story only barely escapes the description of 'tragedy'. From 
time to time the Narrator makes a comment which disrobes and 
dismantles the 'tragic' figure of the Self-as-character to 
reveal his melodramatic playfulness and vulnerability. He does 
not believe his own parody as Tragic Hero fighting against 
impossible odds and deconstructs him as fast as he creates him. 
The Self-as-Character is treated as a shifting set of flimsy and 
sometimes melodramatic constructions which are held together 
only very tenuously. For example, he describes his mother's 
death in the following manner: "My mother died at age 75. This 
is an event that is remarkable in that it did not upset me, as 
far as I knew". This event gains significance in an inverted 
sort of way -- it is signified by the absence of significance. 
The phrase "as far as I knew" is an example of how the Self-as-
-~na-:£rator treats the Self-as-character as an object, as an 
externalised figure whose meanings are not accessible to even 
himself, almost as if his Self is also an Other from which it is 
alienated. 
His presentation of the so-called Kundalini experience is 
~canether example of his alienation from himself. He describes it 
as if from a distance, almost as if he treats himself as an 
object under observation. He juxtaposes formulations 
statements which undermine 
of 
that certainty side by side with 
certainty again almost 
speculations as to what 
that it has occurred as a 
immediately: "Regardless of my 
has caused this kundalini experience, 
specific event is the surest thing in 
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my whole life". His assertions about the verity of the 
experience, his certainty about its exceptional nature is 
~~peated so often in the text that, paradoxically, it reveals 
~is own uncertainty about its significance. He invests so much 
_..Qn&rgy in the attempts to convince his audience, that it flips 
over into the opposite meaning. In this instance particularly we 
are reminded of Lacan's notion that the use of a signifier (here 
taken to be the assertion and affirmation of profound meaning 
and transcendence) often leads to an awareness of lack and 
absence (Jefferson & Robey, 1985). The subject, and particularly 
the reader, becomes aware of the alienation from what was 
originally represented. Therefore, viewed as an 
he presents and manages his Self interpersonally, 
about this experience, (centrally placed as it is 
narrative) does not quite succeed. 
example of how 
the discourse 
in the self-
Trevor provides the reader with a glimpse into the interpersonal 
context of this experience. 
work. "As to L's role in all 
thought me intelligent. It 
He was in love with L, a woman at 
this, I know she admired me and 
seems amazing that someone else 
respecting me in this way could be sufficient cause for this 
transformative experience to have occurred. Perhaps there were 
other reasons as well." He mentions other reasons: in Eastern 
mysticism such an experience is viewed as an experience of 
illumination. He also thought it heralded the reintegration of 
the separate parts of his personality. He describes it as a kind 
of rebirth: "It was as if I came to life for the first 
time". But he adds another, very interesting reason, namely: 
"The novelty of this experience made me unique; not only 
intrinsically, but also in my capitalising on it to try to 
achieve an even greater identity than the one I already had". 
Therefore he presents some 
Eastern mysticism, another 
psychological notions, 
traditional explanations based on 
explanation based on popular 
and an interpersonally useful 
explanation, which he presented to L in their romantic 
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conversations. The presentation of multiple clarifications can 
be seen as an invitation to the Reader to decide which is the 
most suitable explanation. He therefore relinquishes his right 
as omniscient Author/Interpreter and gives the Reader the chance 
to complete the process of interpreting the experience. 
~reover, it seems that an important aspect of 
for him is how it defines him interpersonally; 
the experience 
he is unusually 
conscious of the impact which this experience makes on others. 
He presents this experience to others as if to obtain their 
affirmation of the experience -- as if to legitimise it for 
himself. 
However, it is not only the experiences of the l-as-Character 
that is depicted as alienating and insubstantial. He creates 
insubstantial characters and relationships throughout the text: 
He depicts his parental figures as insubstantial figures who 
could and were 'replaced' by 'surrogates' from time to time: 
"When I was in standard five, my parents went on long leave 
overseas and we had a Mrs Ross stay with us as a kind of hired 
mother . ... My eldest brother choked me off as if he were my 
father. I came to respect him as a kind of father image, and he 
came to respect me a lot less. I was twelve years old, he was 
nineteen." Elsewhere he mentions a rejecting experience with his 
father and concludes: "I was quite prepared to say to him, 'Go 
-~-and find another son! ' " Another example of the apparent 
interchangeability of characters is the following: "I left the 
meeting at which my boss, B, had made a faux pas on my behalf, 
early, and went home". This suggests that others (like his boss) 
could represent him, speak on his behalf. 
The discourse of the Romantic Self 
There are two major literary conventions with 
depicting a character: 
regard to 
* 
* 
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the Romantic discourse of an entire and unique 
is striving for and guided by the ideals 
fulfillment and self-actualisation; of "people 
their personalities with no remainder" (Potter 
1984, p. 139). These Selves are depicted like 
Self which 
of self-
[who] are 
et al., 
characters 
from a Dickens novel who portray and manifest their 
disposition as a consistent continuity, as the sum of a 
unique set of determining traits (Potter et al., 1984). 
·-r-tne discourse of the Post-Modernist fragme_r1ted Self, the 
i dissolved ego, of the alienated, inauthentic and 
' l ~-- -~·-·--·-·-l disintegrated consciousness (Potter et al., 1984). 
Both participants in this study base their descriptions of Self 
on Modernist assumptions which reflect the predominant codes and 
conventions of consistency of personality traits across time. In 
producing their self-narratives they are guided by cultural 
discourses 
consistent 
of Self which 
characteristics 
require the characters 
and dispositions across 
to show 
different 
situations and which endure throughout a lifetime. This is a 
convention which is used to provide a character with coherence, 
to give it the illu~,:i.QP. "Q,f_"'·i)-"_"_c.eil.tre that can hold it together. 
However, as I have pointed out before, their characterisations 
have not escaped the influence of the Post-Modernism. But before 
we take a closer look at how these different sociocultural 
trends are manifested, we need to examine the conventions 
regarding the Romantic Self, a common form of Modernist Self. 
According to Potter et al. (1984, p. 155) there are two forms of 
,,,,-'·""~~......,·--·-···-·.,.."·-. 
l ~IIlantic ·Selves: One which they call a 'natural, authentic, impulsive' Self which is in 'mystic, harmonious union with 
\nature'. This discourse contains ideas such as 'one can find 
one's true Self only once one has 
created by culture'. Only then 
relinquished the inhibitions 
will one experience one's 
'natural, wholesome instinctual and unconscious nature'. The 
166 
other form of Romantic self-fulfillment is the volitional 
Romantic Self or the "willed self that one deliberately creates 
out of the wreckage of the cultural debris which clutters up the 
psyche" (Potter et al., 1984, p. 155). In this discourse one has 
to overcome a number of impediments before attaining a proper 
Self. 
The two forms of Romantic Selves differ primarily in terms of 
how much effort and control it entails to create and sustain the 
Self. Obviously the 'natural Romantic Self' requires very little 
effort or concentration, since spontaneity and 'simply being' is 
emphasised. Once one has demonstrated the courage to let go of 
'civilised restrictions', one achieves an 'authentic' Self. The 
other form of Romantic Self, in contrast, requires hard work in 
order to construct and arrange 
the different essences and elements which should be artfully 
combined so as to ensure the attainment of a self-actualised 
future. 
Cohen and Taylor (1978) point out a strange irony with regard to 
"';.:..;.:..this process of self-construction. Each person is required to 
assemble an individualistic, unique identity from elements which 
are, in fact, culturally shared codes: Idiosyncratic modes of 
presenting a public Self, leisure activities, material objects, 
musical styles, clothes, and so forth. They describe the 
difficulties and paradoxes which ensue as people attempt to 
elude the 'collective mythology' (Cohen & Taylor, 1978) in their 
-sea-reb for a unique Self, only to choose elements which will 
soon also become 'cultural cliches' (Cohen & Taylor, 1978). This 
search is doomed to be stuck in a self-perpetuating, self-
deluding, self-eluding vicious circle. 
Literary examples of The Romantic Self abound: One example is 
Joseph Conrad's character, Kurtz, in Heart of darkness (1981). 
The romantic aspect of Kurtz's nature is emphasised through its 
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juxtaposition with the character, Marlowe, an inhibited, 
civilised Englishman. Kurtz, who has relinquished the trappings, 
conventions and moral codes of society in order to explore his 
darker nature, manages to win the respect of Marlowe, despite 
his savage ways. Kurtz is portrayed as having the courage to 
explore this aspect of human nature which we all share. He 
achieves a kind of authenticity through the expression of that 
which lies below the veneer of civilisation. 
Other depictions of the Romantic Self are more positive, less 
instinctual. There are discourses in which the Self discovers a 
mo~e natural and authentic Self through mystical experiences. 
"''""'This occurs when the individual achieves a peak experience which 
is brought about by a special quality of awareness during 
fatigue, drugs or meditative contemplation. Examples of these 
experiences can be found in the works of Maslow (1968), 
Castaneda (1973) and Lilly (1973). These peak experiences are 
usually inexpressible, indescribable. They reunite the 
individual with a cosmic force' or 'primal scource of harmony' 
found in all things in the universe, while simultaneously 
reaffirming the individual's uniqueness and wholeness. This 
type of discourse divides people into those who are able to 'get 
in touch with' their mystical fountainhead, and those who 
cannot, who are confined to experiencing only the mundane and 
the trivial. 
A similar kind of cosmic harmony is depicted in the novels of 
Virginia Woolf and D H Lawrence. It is particlarly vivid in 
D H Lawrence's work where the union is experienced 
organic as well as spiritual or mystical. Typically 
as something 
the setting 
is rustic: A simple man or woman lives in atunement with his or 
her environment. Embedded in the wholesomeness of nature, the 
person experiences the turmoil of subterranean forces in his or 
her innermost being which is the prerequisite for the emergence 
of the individual's 'real' or 'true' Self. 
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Volitional romantic self-discourses follow a different course: 
They require a more laborious process of self-investigation and 
self-disclosure. The prototypes of these discourses in 
literature frequently involve characters who struggle through 
the problems of social and inner pressures and restrictions. 
After many painful experiences they discover their 'own' 
'authentic' identity. Especially if the young child is exposed 
to damaging interpersonal patterns, the Self becomes obscured 
behind layers of neuroticism. The person has to gradually 
relinquish the distorted Self and discover his or her 
'authentic' and 'real' Self through therapy, political 
reorientation, social movements, or just through life itself . 
..-·•rfiTs process is always depicted as an arduous journey: There are 
several pitfalls and delusions along the way. In some versions 
the 'real Self' is never actually discovered, the person merely 
moves toward a series of approximations of the 'authentic' Self. 
Counterparts in psychology are found in the texts of the 
humanists such as Rogers (1961) and the neo-Freudians, for 
example, Horney (1950). 
Both these forms of discourses of the Romantic Self appear in 
the two self-narratives in this study. At different junctures in 
the two tales, either one or the other form is emphasised. One 
:~G~" the most fascinating aspects of Freda's self-narrative is the 
way in which she consciously incorporates artefacts from 
Romantic cultural discourses in her composition of her Self. 
Even though the fragmented, dislocated, dispossessed Self 
predominates in Trevor's self-narrative, he still advocates and 
strives for the ideal of the entire and unique Romantic Self, 
which possesses exceptional powers and which has exceptional 
experiences. For example, he recounts the previously mentioned 
Kundalini experience which occurred at a crucial juncture in his 
<.::::-~Iationship with his ex-wife, as giving him the impetus and 
justification he needed to separate from her. He describes the 
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experience as though it were orchestrated by his unconscious, 
thus invoking the uncontaminated, more authentic, romantic part 
of his Self: "The scene was set, I think, for my subconscious 
mind to generate the most significant transformative experience 
in my life the kundalini experience, probably intended 
specifically to boost me out of the marriage, which my 
unconscious mind had no apparent intention of doing". Further on 
he states: "It seemed as if my subconscious mind was doing all 
the talking, and what it said wasn't nice". 
Thus the manner in which he presents the Kundalini experience 
appears to be coherent with his strong desire to live up to the 
ideal of a unique and exceptional Self. However, instead of 
depicting the subsequent Self in a more positive light, in other 
words in coherence with the romantic ideal of a more integrated 
and fulfilled Post-Kundalini Self (which would lend legitimacy 
to the authenticity of the experience), the Self which he 
continues to portray is as hapless, alienated, and confused as 
before. Thus he not only undermines the romantic ideal as a plot 
and framework of the narrative, but he transgresses a 
fundamental narrative convention. 
I 
~It is clear from the above deconstruction of Trevor's self-
narrative that the Self which he presents reveals a number of 
cultural and ideological influences. Trevor's self-narrative 
reveals many examples of essentialist assumptions about the 
Self, thus linking it firmly to the Modernist tradition. The 
influence of Modernism can also be seen in the narrative 
structures and conventions which were used in the depiction of 
the Self as character. However Trevor's self-narrative also 
contains aspects of the Post-Modernist characterisation of the 
Self. In the next section I shall examine the Self as inscribed 
by the Other. 
Trevor relates 
which he "was 
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The Self and the Other 
a brief period during his early 
happy; life was sweet". Again at 
childhood in 
the 'second 
beginning' of his narrative, he describes his relationship with 
his mother in terms of a perfect union. He describes himself as 
being "cheeky" towards her. This suggests that he felt secure in 
the knowledge that he would not be punished by her. It conveys 
the idea of perfect acceptance by her, of acting in the security 
of knowing that he is cherished. 
This is reminiscent of Lacan's idea of the Imaginary phase when 
the young child has a sense of perfect union between the 
inner/outer dimensions of his/her being, a unity with the figure 
at the centre of the identification process during the Imaginary 
stage, the mother. There is no discrepancy between his 
experiences of himself and how he is reflected in his mother's 
face (symbolic of the Mirror) at this stage. Thus the child 
misrecognises its reflection for itself. So even during this 
seemingly idyllic stage, misrecognition lies at the heart of 
identity -- a false sense of wholeness and unity which barely 
camouflages the already-present alienation. 
However, this illusion of harmony is of short duration: At the 
end of the Imaginary stage the child's sense of union and 
wholeness is destroyed since he/she reacts to the Self as an 
opponent (the child identifies with its own body as if it were a 
figure external to the Self; the Self becomes its own rival). 
This causes a sense of discord, distress, and anxiety which 
permeates all subsequent experiences. In Lacan's terms the ego 
therefore becomes an imaginary structure whose goal is to deny 
and repress at all costs the absence and lack at the centre of 
.,~ its own origin (Dean, 1992). Therefore it is only through 
repression that the illusion of wholeness and authenticity can 
be upheld. 
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In Trevor's narrative this painful emergence of the separate and 
alienated Self is poignantly portrayed: "One day [Mother] 
exploded in anger, shouting at me that I should stop it. This 
happened in the presence of my brothers. It had a profound 
effect on me, as if from that moment in time, I realised that I 
wasn't protected by her anymore. I had to please her rather than 
just expect unconditional love." (It is extraordinary that he 
has virtually no response to her actual death, many years later 
·~·-·-=·~ perhaps for him she 'died' symbolically when he was four 
years old? However, a few months after her death he reports 
having an intense and, for him, profound spiritual experience 
..,·:(Kundalini) , which can be viewed as the reunion with the 
(M)Other in the spiritual realm.) 
This traumatic separation opens up a chasm which Trevor attempts 
to undo from that time onwards. The rest of his self-narrative 
-~an be summarised as a series of painful attempts to heal this 
divide between his perception of himself as adequate and lovable 
versus the presumed reflection from others that he is unworthy 
of their acceptance. The very next episode he describes is the 
first in a long sequence of rejections: "I wanted to be popular 
and could not understand why I had not been invited to Lorry 
Bean's birthday party, to which almost half the class had been 
invited. I gate-crashed the party, and was allowed to stay 
although I was reminded that I had not been invited." The next 
~···episode is another example of the discrepancy between his own 
sense of worth and that which was reflected back to him by 
others: "I was puzzled at not having been chosen as a prefect in 
grade ii". He acknowledges the pervasiveness of the theme of 
loss and discrepancy in his life and announces it as follows: 
"These experiences set the scene for the rest of my life, in 
that I would forever be wanting recognition and not getting it". 
But the ego undergoes another 
stage: After the Imaginary 
repression during 
stage the child 
the Symbolic 
forms an 
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·"'identification with the father as a symbolic figure who 
represents language, social institutions and structures. In 
other words, he represents the cultural discourses on norms and 
values. During this stage the child is expected to repress 
his/her sexuality and to sublimate the inevitable aggression 
which the child feels toward the figure of identification. Thus 
the child enters the social order and becomes inscribed by the 
~~cial relations 
~Ulture. The Self 
which are typical in his/her particular 
therefore becomes constituted through the 
dominant discourses about being a Self in a particular society. 
Such was the process by which the Self 
conscious of itself in Trevor's narrative 
emerged and became 
it led to the 
inscription of the Other in the Self in a very specific manner: 
The devaluation that he experienced from others became 
reciprocal. In other words he started devaluing others. In time 
he developed an apparently stable set of codes which appeared to 
guide his functioning which took the shape of "an outcast, a 
.. ,vfebel, and a heretic" (his description). The identity of Rebel, 
Outcast and Heretic resolves the tension created by: 
* his need for acceptance 
* his rejection by others (selectively reported as it is) 
* his distress, anger, and refusal to accept their view of 
him. 
Thus he creates a particular discourse with others about his 
acceptance/rejection. This discourse appears to follow a popular 
plot line of increasing severity the Self-as-character is 
depicted as bravely struggling against others' negative 
perceptions of him, attempting in vain to prove his worth and to 
gain their respect. If one accepts the apparent coherence of the 
story line 
point when, 
internalise 
of increasing severity, one can see a crucial turning 
at the beginning of Standard 7, he started to 
or introject the negative view which Others had of 
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him: "The family was involved in a car accident in which my 
mother's face ended up being very badly scarred. My father had 
driven into a stationary car in front of him. Kevin, the middle 
brother, told me that I had pushed the passenger seat that my 
mother was sitting in from behind, and that was why she had hit 
her head on the windshield. Of course it was the momentum that 
-- dig_ it. I was guilty anyway." From that time he waged a battle 
against the Internalised Other who had now become entrenched as 
part of his presentation of himself. 
Levor's self-narrative can be regarded as the depiction of an 
alienated Self, teetering between humiliation and ridicule on 
the one hand, and a Self who is nevertheless striving to gain 
recognition for his uniqueness and exceptional status as an 
intellectual and philosopher. It is important to note, however, 
that Trevor's self-narrative was written at a midway point in 
the therapeutic process, while Freda's autobiography was written 
at the conclusion of therapy. Although no conclusive ending or 
final perspective is possible in an autobiography of a person 
who is still alive, Freda's self-narrative has a more 
'satisfying' conclusion in the sense that it is more 'complete'. 
-She reports that the process of writing this self-narrative had 
the function of reappraising herself in terms of the past and 
the future. The author's vista in this story is therefore wider, 
more encompassing than in Trevor's tale his perspective of 
,...-l'tts life is limited by his struggle to attain a position from 
- ~ich he could determine the meanings about his life. Most often 
__ Ji-t. is Others who define (and therefore limit) him. Trevor has 
not yet attained full 'authorship' of his life story (Heidegger, 
1967). 
Freda's Story 
(See Appendix II for Freda's self-narrative.). / 
I . 
Freda's self-narrative contains many dichotom'ies and dualities 
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'"' which could be regarded as conflicting ideologies. First there 
is the dichotomy between conventionality and marginality. Her 
family belonged to a church which is regarded as not belonging 
to mainstream religious groups. The strict code of conduct which 
was enforced by the church further marginalised the parishioners 
--~1a the wider community. The ideology of marginalisation was 
further entrenched by her father who was a minister in the 
church. It is therefore not altogether surprising that Freda 
selected her first boyfriends from this church community, and 
later on from other marginalised groups (e.g. Portuguese, 
____ Polish, Hungarian, and Black). She tended to avoid the normative 
and conventional in her relationships but thereby invoked 
precisely that which she presumed to be absent. This will be 
elaborated on in a later section. 
--:l'Phere are many discontinuities or dichotomies in her depiction 
of herself: Throughout the text there are references to herself 
as both Madonna-like (virginal, pure, passive, feminine) and 
sexually initiating, active, dominant; as both shy and bossy; as 
popular or desireable ~s well as inadequate and rejected; as 
submissive towards her father and rebellious towards her mother. 
Another dichotomy is that of rebellion and oppression: During 
her adolescence her rebellion and anger against her mother 
resulted in harsh, physically and emotionally abusive discipline 
by her mother. Later on she also rebelled against her father's 
(and, later, her partners') double standards for men and women 
with regard to sexual behaviour. But she could not sustain the 
defiant position of rebellion; she frequently succumbed to the 
oppression of the discourse of male dominance over women. Her 
struggle to liberate herself from the categorisations and 
meanings which men impose on her is a long and arduous one. 
175 
The above is merely an introduction to many other examples of a 
se·lf-defini tion through exclusions, oppositions, and omissions. 
Ffeda's self-narrative therefore does not present a whole, 
-~turated Self or a sum of personality configurations. Her Self 
- is almost entirely colonised by the Other. Her depiction of 
herself is an example of what Clifford (1978, p. 52) calls a 
self-narrative of 'trans-individual occasions'. Her identity can 
be described as a "sequence of culturally patterned 
relationships, a forever incomplete complex of occasions to 
which a name has been affixed, a permeable body composed and 
decomposed through the continual relations of participation and 
opposition" (Clifford, 1978, pp. 53-54). 
Characterisation of the Self 
Embeddedness 
Freda's narrative exemplifies a Self which is almost entirely 
inscribed by others. In this aspect her self-narrative conforms 
to the pattern found in many women's life histories. In Chapter 
4 Bertaux-Wiame (1981) referred to women's autobiographies as 
~~tories of relatedness -- they are communal stories. 
The communality of Freda's story is most vividly evident in how 
long it takes her to introduce herself in the story. She 
preludes her own story with the stories of (in the exact 
sequence): 
her paternal grandfather 
her paternal grandmother (short) 
her father 
her maternal grandparents 
her mother 
her brother 
her sister. 
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Her own story begins only on Page 7 of her text. Even at that 
point, she starts her own story by briefly recapping her 
parents' histories. Even when she does eventually recount the 
"-~~vents in her own life, she uses relational descriptions very 
frequently. Her self-narrative 'opens up' to include the stories 
of several other people -- a story of interlocking lives, one 
embedded in the other. In Gilligan's (1982, p. 6) words: "It all 
goes back, of course, to Adam and Eve -- a story which shows, 
among other things, that if you make a woman out of a man, you 
are bound to get into trouble. In the life cycle, as in the 
Garden of Eden, the woman has been the deviant". Gilligan (1982) 
proposes that it is because the masculine pattern of development 
has been regarded as the blueprint for all human development, 
that concepts or characteristics like 'relatedness', 
'dependence', 'embeddedness', 'affiliation', and 'responsibility 
and concern for others' are actually regarded as a failure to 
develop to one's full potential or to reach one's full maturity 
and individuality. According to Gilligan (1982) there are two 
-'"'-ideological 'voices' or clusterings: 
justice, rights, abstract principles, autonomy. 
compassion, care, concrete responsibilities to others. 
~ese two 
are more 
views may exist in both males and females, but males 
likely to interpret success and failure in terms of 
autonomy whereas for women success depends on how adequately 
they have negotiated the bonds of interdependence in their 
relationships. Gilligan (1982) warns that the predominantly male 
interpretation should not be regarded as the more mature ideal -
- both these patterns are equally valid expressions of maturity. 
They merely represent two different discourses. Male prototype 
patterns of functioning are regarded as preferable only within 
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the broader ideology which predominates in patriarchal 
societies. 
~he notion of embeddedness is exemplified in several different 
ways in Freda's self-narrative: It is best illustrated in the 
issue of names. In her account she pauses to trace the origin of 
her name. Typically, however, she starts with the naming of 
another, in this case, her mother, who was named after her 
paternal grandmother. This led to trouble between Freda's mother 
and grandmother, since Freda's grandmother redirected her 
negative feelings regarding her husband's family (who apparently 
treated her as lower in social standing in relation to 
themselves) to her daughter (Freda's mother) by mocking her 
~~a8out her name! So strong was the power of the name, that 
Freda's mother later changed her name. The name was so potent 
that it invoked a complex set of feelings and attitudes in the 
relationship between Freda's mother and grandmother. It stood 
for, and symbolically represented the entire relationship. The 
plot of Freda's self-narrative is introduced and encapsulated in 
this seemingly insignificant aside: Freda was named after this 
disgruntled grandmother who tormented her own daughter by 
equating her name with what her in-laws stood for. The theme of 
-·:the---transference of relationship patterns across generations and 
across individual boundaries is one of the ways in which the 
embeddedness manifests itself. Some of the collective family 
meanings which were generated regarding her maternal grandmother 
(mostly negative ones) became part of the network of meanings 
regarding Freda. By naming Freda after herself, Freda's mother 
could perpetuate the feud between her and her mother into the 
next generation. Predictably, the set of expectations which 
accompanied the naming and the history which it invoked, set the 
scene for Freda's turbulant relationship with her mother. But 
more of this relationship later. 
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~~The above is an example of how the Self can be viewed as a 
particular position in a symbolic order. The Self becomes the 
-Feceptacle of collective meanings from the past. Therefore the 
concept of 'heredity' should not be limited to the level of 
biology (i.e. the transmission of genetic material) -- it also 
refers to the transmission of meanings regarding a person's 
position in a social-symbolic order within a patriarchal system. 
The Romantic Self 
In Freda's self-narrative (as in Trevor's) the two forms of the 
Romantic Self (i.e. the natural and the volitional Romantic 
Self) are clearly present. The first part 
characterisation of herself conforms mostly to the 
Romantic Self, whereas the latter part of her story 
aspects of the volitional Romantic Self. The change 
format of these two Modernist discourses of the Self 
of her 
natural 
reveals 
in the 
occurs 
after her suicide attempt: After this event she undertakes a 
slow and deliberate attempt to rebuild herself, guided to a 
large extent by the process of therapy. However, this division 
of Freda's self-narrative into these two versions of the 
Romantic Self is somewhat oversimplified. While there is a clear 
process of shedding the ideology of the church and a return to 
a more uncontaminated natural Self in the first part of her 
self-narrative, this process simultaneously contains elements of 
~e volitional Self: Freda reconstructs a new Self in a rather 
conscious and deliberate manner from selected aspects of the 
Alternative Pop culture of the sixties and seventies. Thus these 
two forms of the Romantic Self cannot be entirely separated in 
this self-narrative. 
~,·:rn the first phase of the natural Romantic Self, Freda rebels 
against the imposition of the church's values and norms which 
had formed part of her Self throughout her childhood. She 
replaces these with a Self constructed from the cultural 
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artefacts which she encounters outside her home environment. It 
is interesting to note that this process focusses very 
specifically on her depiction of herself as a woman. This 
particular emphasis on her femininity probably developed from a 
heightened sensitivity to masculine and feminine discourses 
which stem from her relational context in which patriarchal 
values and norms were particularly dominant. 
-E:;reda was in contact with two dominant ideologies regarding 
femininity: One ideology was represented by her parents and the 
other she acquired through her contact with the different social 
and cultural niches in her environment. Predictably, her 
identification is not with her mother, but with the female 
heroines in the books she read and figures from the Pop culture 
of the sixties and seventies. 
Her mother's behaviour as a woman was strongly coloured by the 
rules laid down by their church and by Freda's father. Sexuality 
is devalued by the church and therefore adornments, fashionable 
clothes, and other attempts to beautify oneself, were strictly 
prohibited. Because these prohibitions were primarily propagated 
by her mother, mother and daughter had frequent confrontations 
around this issue. This pattern became particularly intense 
during adolescence when her mother disapproved strongly of her 
explorations of conventional femininity, for example, shaving 
her legs and varnishing her nails. 
The images which provided Freda with fictions for a Self came 
from the books of the Bronte's and D.H. Lawrence, amongst 
others. At 13 she is so deeply touched by the plot of obsessive 
and passionate, but frustrated and thwarted love, that she read 
Wuthering Heights six times! She incorporates romantic love as 
one of her primary goals in life which lays the foundation for 
a future which is narrated in a manner which strongly resembles 
the plotlines of the novels she had read -- tragically thwarted 
is formed by the omission of 
180 ~omantic love. ~us her identity 
what her mother stood for. In 
~<'""'s:beds all the influences of the 
this process she systematically 
church. The void left by this 
by heroines from selected texts omission, is promptly filled 
which proceed to have a dominant influence on the course of the 
rest of her life. 
--she therefore actively constructs a Self out of the artefacts of 
her literary milieu during adolescence. Later on at university, 
she incorporates the elements of hippie culture into her 
presentation of herself: She wears the long flowing cheesecloth 
dresses which were typical of that era, she meditates, wears 
black lipstick and nail varnish and John Lennon sunglasses. The 
music and the poetry of that cultural revolution had a strong 
impact on 
strongly 
her consciousness, more so because of her already 
entrenched sense of idealism and romanticism. The music 
of Janis Joplin with its searing intensity and despair expresses 
her barely disguised sense of rebellion, anger, loneliness, and 
her identification with an unconventional lifestyle. 
Still later on she develops a fascination with Marilyn Monroe, 
whose life story resembles her own to such an extent that it 
would be reasonable to speculate that she was also incorporated 
-~s,<a role model they share features such as nal evi ty, 
vulnerability, setting themselves up in relationships with men 
as sex objects, experiences of being simultaneously adored and 
exploited by men, intense despair which ultimately leads to 
suicide, or in Freda's case to a serious suicide attempt. 
She is highly selective and specific about the imagoes ('real' 
or literary) from whom she constructs a Self. Like a montage of 
"".,images or a pastiche poster, she collects and combines certain 
features of other Selves and presents this combination to the 
world. In one of our discussions about my interpretation of her 
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--self-narrative, Freda added a few more names to the ones she had 
mentioned in the text: 
Zelda Scott-Fitzgerald, who 
disturbed person who spent 
asylum; 
a 
was a colourful, 
large part of her 
but extreme, 
life in an 
Edith Piaf, the French singer, who was a very intense and 
passionate person, and although she was promiscuous, she never 
became the victim of her relationships with men; 
Simone de Beauvoir, the emancipated French feminist writer who 
focussed her entire life on Jean-Paul Sartre; and 
Anais Nin, a French novelist and sexually emancipated woman who 
was obsessed with relatedness. 
-~'~1though she rejects the kind of woman whom her mother 
represents (submissive, passive, dependent, and 'boring') these 
features play a role even in their absence. She is never free 
from the desire for recognition by the Other, the first of which 
(in the succession of figures of identification or 
misrecognition) is the Mother. In Jameson's (1977, p. 367) 
words: "a previously biological instinct must undergo an 
alienation to a fundamentally communicational 
relationship -- that of the demand of the Other 
or linguistic 
in order to 
find satisfaction". Thus the Self is formed through the absence 
of the Other, in this specific case, the Mother. 
However her father problematises her identification with these 
fictional figures by communicating two mutually exclusive 
messages about her femininity to her: As the representative of 
the values and principles of their church for their community 
and therefore for his family, he has to endorse the prohibitions 
regarding physical attractiveness. Yet, when she starts dating a 
182 
boy at the age of 14, he conveys his relief about her ability to 
engage the attentions of the young male and confesses that he 
had feared that she might never develop any sex appeal. He also 
comments on her (typically adolescent) self-consciousness and 
clumsiness in the company of boys. She reacts very strongly to 
this confusing message from her father: The illusion of 
fully accepted by him is shattered. Her father endorsed 
being 
the 
dominant male ideology regarding womanhood: The paradoxical dual 
imago of woman as Madonna and as Sex Object. 
·~lni~s theme is repeated in almost every one of her relationships 
with men. The pattern is originally strengthened by the fact 
that her first boyfriends are from her church community. 
Predictably, they are simultaneously attracted to her and 
respectful towards her (the latter especially so, since she is 
the daughter of their minister). She responds negatively to this 
idealisation by men and regards it as sexual rejection and moral 
condemnation. 
She is immobilised and trapped in this acutely ambivalent 
ideology, not because she accepts it, but because she, as a 
woman, cannot transcend it. Even though relatedness is still a 
primary need, she experiences the conventional features of a 
love relationship (the traditional female passivity during 
courtship, the notion of 'belonging' to a male, etc.) as 
stifling and oppressive. She rejects the culturally dominant 
female stereotypes (e.g. submissiveness, passivity, dependence, 
chastity) and chooses to become sexually daring and uninhibited. 
Unfortunately her brave attempt to debunk the Madonna/Sex Object 
~eology does not succeed. She does not manage to transcend this 
image of herself successfully. Within the patriarchal system in 
which she lives women's meanings were inscribed by men. She 
cannot break through. Their meanings eventually supercede her 
own. They diminish and devalue her definition of herself as 
inappropriate, unproper. In a few cases, the men become so 
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intensely threatened by her demanding emotional appetites, that 
they become either emotionally abusive or impotent. 
The Desire of the Other 
In the words of Roudinesco {Dean, 1992, p. 49): II human 
consciousness is formed through interaction with the desire of 
the other". Freda's self-narrative can be interpreted as a 
dramatic and near-tragic struggle to liberate herself from the 
Qther, whose recognition she strongly desires, but cannot 
-~~tain. In this sense she tells a story of her struggle to free 
herself from the 'mirrors' which are" ... at once the source of 
human slavery and human pleasure" {Dean, 1992, p. 52). 
_,'J')le, . first manifestation of the alienation which the Self 
undergoes in the struggle for recognition by the Other occurs 
early on in Freda's life, during the stage of narcissism which 
Lacan calls the Imaginary. During this stage {between 6 18 
months) the Other is represented by the Mother who is the first 
figure whom the child identifies with. Misrecognising the image 
of its own reflection by the Mother/Mirror as its Self, the 
child experiences 
the illusion of 
a Self which 
wholeness is 
is unified and whole. However, 
soon 
identifies with its own body as an 
shattered since the 
Other {a figure outside 
child 
the 
-.self), thus becoming its own opponent. This gives rise to 
-~aistress and aggression which, in Freda's case, is expressed 
towards the mother. In her self-narrative she recounts how she 
had allegedly refused her mother's breast and pushed her away 
when she tried to cuddle her. In the very same paragraph she 
recounts her jealousy of her younger brother, who became the 
subsequent target for her projected aggression. 
Thus at an early age an Other is placed at the centre where the 
Self is supposed to exist. So" ... the ego [is] now an imaginary 
structure whose function was to resist at all costs the absence 
at its origins" {Dean, 1992, p. 54). It is only through the 
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successful repression of the awareness of this absence that the 
illusion of unity, coherence and authenticity can be achieved. 
The second significant identification occurs during the Symbolic 
Stage when Freda turns to her father as the patriarch, the 
representation of culture and the symbolic system, language, 
which forms and shapes the unconscious. It is through the 
~,id~ntification with the Father that the child accepts and 
incorporates the normative demands of the culture. It requires 
of the child that it represses its sexuality and achieves 
sublimation, which enables the individual to live peacefully in 
the world of others. 
Patriarchy 
For Lacan (1986) patriarchy is the preferred social order 
because it was the symbolic vehicle through which language is 
transmitted. So deeply is this notion embedded in Western 
culture that in Indo-European languages the generic form is 
represented by the male and the female form is considered alien, 
Other (Dean, 1992). Patriarchal structures "expressed and 
facilitated the progressive evolution of humanity toward ever 
higher levels of civilization, in which men became increasingly 
gentle toward and respectful of women" (Dean, 1992, p. 85). (It 
is beyond the scope of this thesis to offer a critique of 
Lacan's position on this.) Freda's father exemplifies this kind 
of patriarchal influence -- strong but benign and wise. Instead 
-wof behaving in a domineering manner toward women, he acts 
protectively, albeit patronizingly . 
. ~ is important to distinguish 
father and the symbolic Father 
--aDd maintained through social 
between the real person of the 
-- the imago which is constructed 
discourse. This symbolic Father 
operates as an agent of society's norms, values, sublimation and 
prohibition. It is through its identification with the symbolic 
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Father during the Oedipal phase that the child enters into the 
patriarchal system. Once again repression plays an important 
role in this process. The hostility and ambivalence which can be 
expected to surface in relation to the object of identification, 
is repressed and sublimated. Thus, one can gain access to the 
symbolic Father only through sublimation. No direct 'knowing' is 
possible. 
Thus in the resolution of the Oedipal conflict, the child's true 
Self is accessible only when it is lost, repressed, barred. 
Furthermore, the Self's illusionary sense of unity with the 
Other has to be broken, the Self has to realise that its desire 
for the Other can never be satisfied. The child's entry into the 
symbolic world of social relations can therefore only be 
achieved through its acceptance of the chasm between Self and 
Other. 
As mentioned earlier Freda was born into a patriarchal culture, 
particularised in a unique way in her family. The overarching 
context, that is, the ideologies regarding male and female roles 
in the South African culture perpetuate the social conventions 
which sustain this mode of family life. It is therefore not at 
all surprising that the male members' stories in the self-
narrative precede those of the women in each generation. Even 
~,the organisation of the text therefore reflects the male-
dominated hierarchical structure of the family. 
~r father t~rows a big shadow over most of the characters in 
""'"'···her story: "is meanings, wishes, interpretations dominated not 
only her own life narrative, but those of his family of origin, 
~pecially his brother's. He adopts a sectarian religion which 
initially marginalises him in his own family, but they soon 
follow him into this church. He also interacts with his brother 
in such a way that he not only supports him when he experienced 
difficulties, but he behaves in ways which actually camouflaged 
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his brother's shortcomings. He writes a number of books himself, 
but publishes them under his and his brother's names. He uses 
the funds from the sale of the books to buy a farm which he 
-txansfers to his brother's name. But it is more than a farm 
~ich was transferred: It is almost as if he transfers some of 
his prominence and confidence to his brother. In this sense the 
j 
~ndaries between his and his brother's ego's became blurred. 
Once his brother coped better again, he proceeds separately with 
his own life again. 
~turally he is the pivotal figure in Freda's family. He is the 
-~ominant figure in the marriage relationship. She describes her 
mother as totally dependent on her father, as passive, naive, a 
bit incompetent, as having poor coping skills, and as entirely 
~..dominated by him. Her father determines the meanings in the 
~~~amily. Freda relates to him through a haze of idealisation. His 
public image is very positive: He is regarded as charismatic, 
popular, and is revered for his wisdom, especially in his 
capacity as a minister in his church. For Freda there is no 
__ separation between his public and private personas. The public 
and private domains merge. 
Her early relationship with him she descibes as characterised by 
behaviour one usually associates with a child who knows she is 
~ored and cherished. 
~Llirtatious towards him. 
She even describes herself 
She learns how to please 
as 
him. 
quite 
This 
description evokes Freud's notion of the Electra complex. It 
invites one to speculate about an unsuccessful resolution of 
this psychosexual stage of development: Freda continues to feel 
a strong if somewhat ambiguous attachment to her father. She 
fails to sublimate her sexual feelings for him in order to 
-ieentify with her mother. The failure of her identification with 
her mother is reflected in her problematic relationship with her 
mother, which remains so until, significantly, after her 
father's death. In Freud's theory the identification transfer of 
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the girl infant from the father to the mother is a prerequisite 
for both appropriate future sex role identification and the 
incorporation of the standards and conventions of the culture. 
This interpretation is tempting, since Freda certainly does not 
wish to conform to her mother's notions of femininity. However, 
unlike Freud who views the ego as emerging from the perception-
consciousness system, or as governed by the reality principle, 
I 
"'~acan (1986) regards the ego as emerging from the repression of 
the misrecognition and subsequent self-alienation which 
originates during the Imaginary Stage. The Self emerges after it 
has acquired the "regulatory fictions" (Butler, 1990, p. 33) 
regarding how to be a Self which prevails in the particular 
culture through the acquisition of language during the Symbolic 
Stage. 
The male/female ideology or regulatory fiction which emerges in 
Freda's self-narrative should not be regarded as representing 
the biological diffences between men and women. It is 
Mmal.eness/femaleness as part of the relational-linguistic 
discourses which govern the social relations between men and 
---women. It is the unequal distribution of power between men and 
women in social structures and institutions which she addresses 
in her self-narrative. Lacan regarded patriarchy as the anchor 
of cultural fictions regarding men and women (Dean, 1992, p. 
96). We should, however, distinguish between the real father and 
the symbolic one or the "totem that effects sublimation" (Dean, 
1992, p. 93) during the Symbolic stage. The father remains the 
"fundamental condition of normative identification, regardless 
of the foibles of real men, regardless of the lack of natural or 
scientific basis for his authority" (Dean, 1992, p. 93). Thus, 
~t~ kind of patriarchy which Lacan refers to is the pervasive 
and systematic linguistic patterns which organise, maintain and 
perpetuate the relations between men and women. 
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Patriarchal family and marital structures form the ideological 
backdrop to her telling. The form of male authority (i.e. her 
struggle to obtain the recognition of her father and of each of 
her male partners in her story) which she describes in her self-
narrative is not based on nature or physiological differences, 
~··· rather on cultural forms (e.g. language structures and 
social systems). Freda's self-narrative can be described as that 
.-m a woman who defines herself almost entirely through the 
linguistics of maleness. 
of reference, but as a 
She experiences herself not as 
receptacle of the meanings of 
a point 
the Male 
Other. In fact what she describes is a monumental struggle to 
liberate herself from the ever-postponed affirmation by the 
male-as-the-Other. Her Self is therefore always inaccessible, 
always repressed, deferred. 
Ending and beginning 
Whereas Freda's earlier life story opens up to include the lives 
of (predominantly!) her forefathers, her account of her life 
fr~m the time she goes to university, is entirely equivalent 
with and tot~ly inseparable from the story of her relationships 
.....with men. J.t this point her preoccupation with obtaining 
approval/disapproval is transferred from her father to other 
men, yet she is unable or unwilling to conform to the expected 
female role., Thus both the struggle and the outcome remain 
·--·unehanged. ~e acceptance of these men is so pivotal in her 
definition of herself, that her sense of Self, her life, her 
future collapses totally when each relationship ends. The Self 
is almost totally dismantled each time her attempts at 
relatedness fail. This occurs so frequently that it creates a 
steeply descending plotline until she, driven by hopelessness 
and despair, attempts to take her life. Paradoxically, however, 
from this point onwards the plotline starts ascending again 
slowly, because she undertakes a deliberate reconstruction of 
her Self through therapy. 
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The paradox evident in the idiomatic expression 'take her life' 
is particularly relevant in the context of Freda's self-
narrative. The conventional meaning of ending one's life is, in 
~r story, not an end, but a beginning. It is the turning point 
in her story. Thus in this case 'take her life' can be 
.--:interpreted as 'taking ownership of one's life'. She gives up a 
number of the less successful 'regulatory fictions' (Butler, 
1990, p. 33) through which her life was constituted, (e.g. the 
patriarchal pattern of relatedness between men and women, a 
particular plotline of thwarted love as discussed earlier) in 
order to put together a new Self. 
Yet unfortunately the Reader's anticipation of a 'happy ending' 
plot structure has to be frustrated The deliberate and 
self-conscious reconstruction which Freda undertakes occurs 
within the context of a therapeutic relationship (which is not 
an ideologically neutral context, no matter how much the 
therapist strives to remain neutral) in which she is exposed to 
the psychologically dominant conventions regarding how to be a 
Self, as expressed through her therapist (in this case, me). So, 
_--in fact, the reconstruction of her Self could be describes as 
the exchange of one set of 'regulatory fictions' for another. 
~ychotherapists have obtained official 'license' to provide 
~people with knowledge about their Selves. A person's ideas 
'"""·'Eeqarding their Selves are defined, demarcated, controlled and 
managed through the ideologies expressed in the field of 
knowledge called Psychology. In an addendum to her self-
narrative Freda describes her experience of therapy in the 
terminology which she has acquired in therapy, that is, 
'control', 'assertiveness, 'resistance', 'obsessive fixation', 
and so forth. These terms all rely on the Modernist assumption 
of a separate, coherent, bounded Self which is typical of the 
prevailing notions about Self in the field of Psychology. 
190 
,,··'l'hus Freda's 'taking ownership' of her Self is an illusion. She 
places another Other at the core of the Self thus continuing 
the process of repression and alienation, albeit in a subtle 
form. Through the interaction with the desire of the New Other, 
.. the therapist, a different awareness of Self emerges: It could 
"--~--prol>ab~e-en be argued that it is a more 'adaptive' Self, but 
the M dernist ideal of an emancipated, authentic, whole, and 
,_.~·" 
saturated Self cannot be achieved. The Self is still imprisoned 
by the mirrors it has constructed through its identification 
1ith the new Other. (We will examine the particular processes 
~through which the Self is 'colonised' by psychological ideology 
yh greater detail in the final chapter.) Freda's story thus 
~l:lustrates how interlocked the struggle for so-called freedom 
and autonomy is with the ever-unsatisfied desire for recognition 
by the Other, which continues to perpetually displace the Self. 
Conclusion 
In this analysis I have examined how 
--~obiographical form. Autobiography is 
the Self is presented in 
shown to be one of the 
many codes which are available in our society to 'authenticate' 
a Self, it is a set of conventions within which one is provided 
with the opportunity to display a Self which is coherent, 
consistent, 
phenomenology 
authentic. It 
unified, and real. There is 
of experience which validates our 
is not an assertion or claim 
nothing in the 
experiences as 
of truth or a 
personal history as it really was. Instead autobiography (or any 
other everyday telling of ourselves to others) provides us with 
an opportunity to validate our Selves publicly. Autobiography is 
.. a' socially constructed narrative code which is used to validate 
the author's theory of Self (a code through which the author 
constructs and organises his or her beliefs, plans, feelings, 
actions, as well as attributions, explanations, and 
justifications for all the aforegoing). 
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It was the intention to provide a fine-grained analysis of the 
many different codes and conventions which are used in methods 
of situational self-characterisation, to study the construction 
and organisation of self-discourses. The two self-narratives 
/,.,.;Whi,?h I examined i~"'~·'"...thi.s_"' chapter illustrate that the concept of 
( i,self is a set of (,,.,m~~!!!.Jl.gS which are coordinated and negotiated 
"-·~- within a r socio-cultural context. Thu;'"·, in these two self-
,, 
narratives the authors h~ve depicted decef!t.t~Jl S.el ves which can 
-.·~--··- .,..,.,.· 
be regarded as positions in a symb~ic order (Lacan, 1986) 
rather than as seamless, whole unities which are stable across 
time and context. 
In the next chapter I will conclude the ideas which have been 
developed so far by applying them to the field of psychology, 
~d in particular, to the context of psychotherapy. The 
~-E·erent ideologies which form part of the therapeutic context 
will be examined and deconstructed in order to consider how they 
influence the clients' depiction of their Selves. 
I'/ 
! • ; 
./ 
/ 
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CHAPTER 7 
FROM CENTRIPETAL TO CENTRIFUGAL MEANINGS IN PSYCHOTHERAPY 
As psychology 
the enormous 
Introduction 
~ from the t);;~:~ni~;:~;~-{~t era 
~hallenge of reflexively ~e=~xami~g 
,/ - ·-·~'""'"''" premise~ and practices .. in term~ of the r :~Q.~.t:::t4..2~l~:rnist 
it faces 
its own 
movement. 
f Such a re-examination requires the uneasy process of moving away 
f m_.. . ._"t;:~~->s! _, 't_r_u_~' which had, until recently, created the 
sion /of certainty for psychologists. It requires a 
. '--·- -- ' 
reappraisal of precisely/ __ ~se concepts which we have taken for 
r~~!!.f::.~d until now. The ~-~ is one of those taken-for-granted 
concepts which served as a receptacle for numerous Modernist 
assumptions 
intention 
about human 
to produce 
experience. In Chapter 1 I stated 
the concept 
my 
of 
Self which is more 
a reconceptualisation of 
coherent with the current Post-Modernist 
ideas. From the preceding chapters it should have become clear 
that such a reconceptualisation requires a radical departure 
from our traditional views regarding identity. 
In this, the concluding chapter, I wish to start with a brief 
overview of the main themes of the study so far, before I 
examine the influence of power and ideology on the 
intersubjective creation of meaning. In the final section of 
__ --thi~--.Chi!.~ter I will conclude with recommendations for 
M tr~r!"Jng the al.;~~~~~es anL=-~~~~ti?ces of psychotherapy in ltfr - ---····· / 
u accordance with the shift towards ~st-Modernism. 
As we have seen in the 
the. previous chapter, 
described primarily in 
---·-···-·--·-+"''" 
An overview 
analysis of the two self-narratives 
the tw~t~-~!-~-~~ .. _century cJ,;;it has 
the vocabulary of Romanticism 
' ,..~--.·~·---
in 
been 
and 
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--~~~~~. ' M~e~ism (Gergen, 1991). The Romantic conceptualisation of Self 
med from the nineteenth century and was characterised by the 
~I personal qualities of passion, self-fulfilment, 
\J.lilniqueness, and self-actualisation. ~ever, with th;---:;:dvent of 
/' ,...--~-~·~ ,, >' 
/ Modernism, roughly in the firs~;r!_~f the twentieth century, 
1:::n, ~::~i==~~~~~:~s::::s ~:~~:::::, ~n:f:e:d vo::;~::: ~ 
• -..,..,.,.. __ ,,~,..--~---~- ~,,,...,"···~'-'"""'"'&-- . -~ 
~ individuals' experience of themselves were shaped and 
constrained by the languages of Romanticism and Modernism. But 
now, towards the end of the twehtieth century the conventions, 
codes and discourses which have supported these ideas of Self, 
are being r~·ati~~"bt Po~-Moderni~. 
------------- .,. -------·- '··-... ... .__.._ _____ ,_~---~·""·~·· 
)
Instead of replacing Romantic and Modernist assumptions about 
}1 Sel?·_ ..-_ ... · ___ gg_~:~·t-M~--~i~{~~J[€~~~;~8 the fr .. ee. expression of multiple 
dis~ourses (and frameworks, while acknowledging that they are 
'• ~---~ .----·-·· . ...._ \~.. e r~:~e~iations of Selves, and c€~:-~_:r:-.:!:2:-«;.ction of the true 
Lnature of people's identities. For the Post-Modernists the 
d( "vocabularies of personhood are less mirrors of truth than they 
~ . 
are means of relJ!tlng" (Gergen, 1991, p. 247). 
~-------~--· 
~--when paradigm shifts occur, 
,,..----"'\ 
the-··Rt~taphors through which their 
tneori es .ar.e.-.... exgress~G"- (e: g. the earth was viewed 
the heart as a pump, lf9ht as a wave, the brain as 
as a magnet, 
a computer, ~ 
, the ~-~~~-- as a balloon) --.. a~~- ~hange (Geertz, 1983). In //{ 
psych(>log}r~ as in those other social sciences which have moved -·/ 
' ' ···- ,...----.., j / ~ ·· ~F::pho::om ar:":~:~~~~!::!~:: domU:!a:?:~t!l:;~ws~ e!!; ::: ~:_ 
) th~re, the visual arts, lit~-~~~:y__j;!leory, and li~ture. But 
whenever paradigm shifts occur, the representations of the Self 
--a-Fe·also altered: While narrative theory may not fully deserve 
the description of a paradigm, it has made a valuable 
contribution to the current debate on the representation of tf. 
_ ~~ ty in scientific fiel~s- The depiction of humans . as h~mo lf!Jif'. 
~arrans has provided an a~ernati ve to the model of r~Olliil1 ty ~"' 
....._  _./ ""---/ ~ 
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which has dominated Western thought since the time of Descartes. 
a clear departure from There is 
individuals as "simply in society as 
the representation of 
object~ ?~re in boxes" 
~-~---~-------.. --~~~-,..,---
(Morley, in Stringer et al., 1984, p. 139) towards 
representations of a person as "like a stone in a wall or a drop 
in a stream through which the energies of the whole pass" 
(Musil, in Stringer et al., 1984, p. 139). 
~ ' 
- Thus R{?st-Modernism frees the Self from the narrow constraints 
' 
of the prevfous-~ystems of representation of Self and encourages 
the free interpl-ay of discourses. It is acknowledged that 
- /' --.,,._______________ .. 
..-.ea-li ty ~nnot _be repre~ented dir~~tl}' <?E __ , __ <>._!?jggti vely, hence ~ 
'"'rl n0ilive ··---is _I>E~_!erred as a use~phor for the 
\J trep~-;~entati~ of ~-~-~J.:rtr~_:!!lsJ.:.~-~g ____ gf~§m. According to rL 
1~re (1995, p. 7) "i~ the m~t_i~an_engj.neer guided by the (1laws of ss_~ence ,,-/· ..... & po~odernist is a ~1~eller inspired by t" the imagination" 
..,..,.~~~-~-~ 
.••• :.~:t--is recognised that there is an (qp_stable relationship between 
words and that whi~h .... tbe.Y..-~:i~~i1:':Y. As I demonstrated in the 
~f-narratives .of Trevor and-~;reda, th~ is created thr~ugh t··/ 
rarrratives in 1~ and should __ -t:rierefore be regarded as a 1--dq~~in in ~hich inters~ftie~ - meet;_~;r:~~~S th~n as ~; ~et ...,.~ / ., of discrete, coherent, and continuous rsonality traits. In the 
·- -- ~--·. .. t/ 
1 yV\ words of Clifford ( 1978, pp. 53-54) the Se_> '1s a "sequence of 
· ~-culturally patterned relationshi_p~_foreve~ 'incomplete complex 
of occasions to --whi~h-~~~-hcts b6~~ affix~~~ permeable body 
>J;.f ,{ ·' _y;l~" ,, e--""'"'·'"'""""'-·"'''"'"""'""'~""""'-' ... ,, -···~'" ~·· 
composed and decompo~-- thr9H(ih the contin2,'a:~~-rela tions of 
-~~--·~·-~="·· -~ . ~ i;l" 
-participation and oppositio~t~. Moreover, human experience cannot 
be seen as existing ··-·sep~rately from the realm of language, 
culture, and ideology. 
The concepts one uses 
set of possibilities 
one's identity and 
to describe the Self open 
as well as constraints 
for participating in 
up a particular 
for experiencing 
interpersonal 
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relationships. In the Modernist framework 
entail organising relationships _, __ !~---
.-------~--~--· 
it would, for example, 
,'flie·i:-~rchles, having 
,.,.,~.~-.-........... -~--~'"'""'"""""" 
expectations of progress, building for the future, using science 
as an explanatory basis for the world. A different example can 
be found in Freda's self-narrative: Her experience of her Self 
~ profoundly shaped and limited by the moral codes of her 
church community and by patriarchal norms. In Trevor's case the 
Modernist framework of success/failure kept him perpetually 
locked into dichotomous experiences which he described in the 
~f.s~e terms. However, such frameworks cannot be regarded as true 
or superior to other frameworks, instead they are "potentials" 
or "cultural life-forms that possess internal coherence and a 
local validity" (Gergen, 1991, p. 247). 
~Any attempts to restrict people's choice of frameworks is to 
limit their scope for relating. Post-Modernists endeavour to 
prevent any totalitarian domination of single discourses, for 
lexample, in politics and education. They promote the coexistence 
of different discourses to ensure that the widest possible 
reservoir of potential solutions which are made possible by 
different frameworks, are available to a society. 
In Chapter 4 I referred to Bakhtin's (1981) notion of 
centripetal and centrifugal forces in society. Modernist 
.kiscourses act as ~1 forces since they result in the 
suppression of ou;:./essential struggle against "the given and 
already determi~·· in language, a struggle which is an attempt 
.l 
to assert our:./ own meanings against the matrix of already l codified meanings 1 ¥.!~9. __ :!_1! ___ ~~.:~ t: _ !=.2-~--us" ( Bakhtin, 1981 , p. 27 2) . {:!' 
~ ~~~:i_·~; .p;~motes .. ot_~t;ifdgal discourses which celebrate 
[
diversity and complexity, and which are neither scholarly nor 
authori t~d;--~--... b~t which embody local wisdom and are intuitively 
\ persu~;~. 
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Modernist preoccupation with si~~~~=- truths, with 
metaphors for depicting people and society, with 
-narratives progress recedes, greater value is 
,_.____.---·-·- -· -----·-·······-·· -----·:::::=;;::.:o:c:""-=--' 
attached to es, margi~_~d truths, and (~~usual 
traditions. Human patterning in _a._~~----~-~~ sp~e._ll:~~~ dive:r::!'i~-~r_ 
emerges more fully. In architechture there is a preference fo~ 
-~~~ (incorporating local designs in structures, instead 
of striving to represent the International Style of Modernism). 
In the visual and performing arts .there is an emergence of 
~ocali~-.:..eth~es aml __ vie\ois, ~~ t~'---·· and on _j:_h~ 
political front-,- there is a tendency towa!~~sm: Regions 
or cities opt out of their dependent relationship with central 
powers and link up through technology with regions which share a 
common vision with their area (Gergen, 1991). 
we are 
human 
encouraged 
functioning~ 
to accept 
All that 
the inherent 
remains is 
with the Other. We should seek dialogues that transcend 
~~~-'" 
the- existing sig_nifiers, that facilitate new discourses and 
_____ .. __ ......_..,.,..,_.,," --¥"'""'~""'""" 
language structures, and that allow diverse discourses to 
coexist. As we erase the boundaries between genres, it is 
possible to see that 
itself, and that the 
knowledge are defined by 
antagonisms develop through 
signifiers of a particular 
those of another (Gergen 1991). 
language 
field of 
pL&,th self-narratives demonstrated that we live and 
c·· .. . .....__"" 
co'rAmunicate -~~-~~:-~----·---' I 
\ through the linguistic, cultural and political codes 
\ - -- . .. 
in which we 
are embedded. In both analyses the Self became 
a more or less continuous trajectory of point 
a code in itself, 
of view through 
which the ceaseless flow of coded, colonised experiences could 
be organised and conveyed. In other words, the Self became a 
mere utility, a function through which the codes of society were 
expressed. In a well-known quotation from S/Z, Barthes (1975, p. 
17) claims that in our Post-Modern times our subjectivity 
-------~-"~--- -- -.-- --------~- --- ----- ~--· -- ----------
acquires the generality of stereotypes, our identities are 
merely the "wash 
Hochschild (1983, 
private loves and 
emotional system. 
the marketplace 
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of all the codes which make up the I". 
p. 13) describes it as follows: "To manage 
hates is to participate in an intricate 
When elements of that system are taken into 
they become stretched into standardized 
social forms. In these forms, a person's contribution of 
feelings is seen as coming less from the self and less 
directed to the other. For this reason [one's feelings are] 
susceptible to estrangement". 
This alienation, partly enhanced by the introduction of a vast 
number of technologies (the proud achievement of Modernism), 
not only led to a steady increase in the number and types 
relationships people are engaged in or to the amount 
joformation available, but it 
our awareness of ourselves. 
has also altered 
Gergen (1991) 
the quality 
refers to 
has 
extraordinary proliferation in communication techgologies (from 
railway to air travel, from radio to television, from the mail 
service to the telephone and the cellular phone, from the 
business computer to the personal computer, modems and E-mail) 
and describes their contribution to a contemporary Post-Modern 
condition which he calls the "saturated self". 
~~ we participate in an ever increasing number of social 
Eelations, we ~;~~increasingly ~to. portrayals of other 
people's lifestyles, values, opinions, acti~~Ut-,-..and we engage in 
~~~ .. in~~~~~:i.~g number of plots, we ~~.-~~~~~~~~~-~~-~~!~~ern 
-./~O!!~sc_!~~~ll~.~s (Gergen, 1991). The notion of a true and knowable 
Self is lost .. In Gergen's (1991, p. 256) words: "As we become 
aware that our sayings lack foundation in either passion or 
reason, and as our commitments slowly reveal themselves as 
postures, we can scarcely avoid a sense of deep humility. We can 
hardly advocate our own beliefs, reasons, and passions above all 
others, for the very effort attests to the hollowness of their 
bases. And we are thus invited to defuse the hegemonic explosive 
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to remove the detonators of 'ultimate significance' and 
'greatest good'". 
Any attempts to retain one's uniqueness becomes an exercise in 
. pa:£Oadox due to the fact that the choices regarding how to be 
unique are culturally fully prescribed. Images and lifestyles 
come prefabricated and preprogrammed as part of a pattern of 
collective identities which are externally controlled through 
the media and commercial enterprises. The Self has become 
""·- celonised by ideologies and inscribed by the prevailing cultural 
trends. 
Commenting on the "perilous predicament" in which individuals 
find themselves, Parry (Friedman, 1992, p. 439) states that 
l~ft[~d~;~m has produced the (~ih~~~cal means through which we 
L~ g(iitlfy'·-~')6ursel ves: We regard our rights as sacred, we demand 
F to be . happ;·;· we are free from obligation;·to-~thers. However, at 
i ------ "'~~~ ·-
\-tthe same time we ". . . find [ourselves] ~ess in the face of 
/\massive so~ial ~~~-----~C::~n<?~-~!:: ... ~!?rces---~at [we] - are utterly unable 
to influence; that is, [we] may think that we are making free 
· !choices when, in fact, [we] are making choices that corporate, 
political, and entertainment bodies want [us] to make" (Parry, 
in Friedman, 1992, p. 440). Therefore instead of relishing the 
}J freedom from political, religiou~ economic, 
brought about th~ol!9h ""odernism, our 
and hygienic /// 
desires and t. 
i 
factors 
~~ULasies are managed and organised by 
institutions which were produced by the 
and ratiol)(;l:l.j..sa,!:JQ!l p:ro{~~~f Mg_<lernity. 
"'·.-..-....• ~, .. ,., ..... """, .. ~..-..-"'......,_. 
those massive corporate 
technological advances 
Through the astounding 
advances of technologyyproducts and services (and therapeutic 
techniques) wereG'~;,eloped 
fulfil every desire. At 
on a mass 
the same 
consumerist level 
time corporate 
to 
and 
sociocultural powers of influence marketed these commodities in 
-.:.:SJ.iU~h a manner that people's desires were shaped to need exactly 
those products which were already available. They only needed to 
purchase it or vote for it. The ~aradox is clear: While 
199 
~ernity attempted to free people from the _g~ip Q.f.}lQ!!.::!:ill.Q.D.al 
t;regimes of enslavement, it created a~ system of enslavement. 
LAs Parry {Friedman, 1992, p. 436) states "the citizen of the 1( 
modernist world is a powerl~-s~::;· P.~rson with Q09Qdle~HL.desi.r.es" . 
..--
//~ 
~odernism produced economic, scientific and sociopolitical 
st.r·uctures which opened up prefabricated 'spaces of meaning' 
into which people could fit. The 'spaces' were designed by 
discourses which 'fixed' the meanings about how to be a Self in 
~-~~~ 
such a manner that it ensured the enhancement of those 
economic, scientific and sociopolitical structures that 
the meanings about personhood. In the next section 
~.explore the influence of power and ideology 
intersubjective meanings are constructed. 
' Ideology and the struggle to control meanings 
very same 
produced 
I will 
on how 
It should be clear from the previous chapters that ideology or 
power is not always a visible, prominent part of socio-political 
processes. More often than not they are manifested in subtle and 
indirect ways. 
According to Pare {1995, p. 7) " ... cultures do not create their V 
realities through language in a neutral way; rather, the 
~~9~~;~:dl~ti~gti~ns that cultures make are inherently 
\ id~~~gicai'". ~~FJci:r { 1989, p. 17) describes language as the 
"cartilage of culture";.,_ "i-t'w aoes not merely describe, it 
,,----"-'·-"" 
---e:htrenche.s-'"or ··cnanges the .?e,~a tions between people in the very 
\"' ' 
process of description. Mair ·~Pare, 1995, p. 7) adds " we 
.;.,/-t;;Rink and speak and act in the ~orms .. o.ur cu 1 Lure has prepared. 
-~ -- "" ~.~--..-=-
-=~is through these already existing and unquestioned means that 
--1112,. are molded toward what we suppose we know". Thus we are 
-.inscribed and 'coloured in' by the ideologies of a particular 
culture. 
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It should also be evident from the previous discussions that 
~: ~s not a state of mind or the intrinsic and enduring 
cliaracter1sti.9 of a particular person or group of people. 
-Instead it can best-be described as a set of practices which are 
,~."~-__,.,--~~-~~-··--·---.-.-.~·"'·'"-" ~--·· -· 
~--eollecti vely expressed in human 
periodic shifts and reversals. 
systems and which 
.""' 
undergo 
These practices have the goal of fi~ing the meaning~ in a 
~-r--·-----~--~-------............... """"'' .. 
particular context in such a manner ,{hat they can only be 
interpreted in prescribed and predetermined .. ~C!YS that promote 
the posi.ti~n ~f··· the prevailing ~o~r hierarchy. Any alternative 
':::-------.. ______ ·--~·-._,,, __ ....,._.....,.....'"""_~ .. ,......._ __ :::::::--....... ".· 
interpretations are discouraged or, if :Qf~Ges..sa:r.y,. ___ Q!!!!!§hed. 
,-----.. ·----~-···-- ·-·-···- / 
According 
political 
to Parker (1989) power becomes a(/dynamic in socio-
rela tionshi ps in which res~--__is._.~..Ji\!QQ_!:-essed. 
Wberever disagreements over meanings occur, the practices which 
accompany ideology and power are present. 
According to Clegg (1993, p. 28) we should not think of power as 
consisting of certain dimensions or as having a particular set 
~---of characteristics, but as a process which may undergo periodic 
shifts from phases of ~ to phases of resistance He 
- i5herefore refers to 'ci€_~t~-·--~~-:Power. The present broadg 
Modernist revolution is an example of one such a shift in the 
circuits of power dynamics: The Post-Modern consciousness has 
..... . . ·.,..-•"'""w·-·· .. -·-·'"""5.,' --·----·-·---' 
f =~~:;;;~~-: .. ~~~~~i:ll~-~~~~9~~~:r;::~c::,l~~~ 
-~~~-P:r.!.:_~~!-=---·-·ex eriences of ~he individua~. Th~~~9'll. str:-a~~?_i~s // 
such de onstru tion---Pos.t.-Modernist thinkers have made the ~ 
i~~si:,~~~-=~:~~:~::d ~:e c:~:::~~~:b/~E-::i~ ~~~=~ 
curre~. po~er dynamics. -·rnteresting examples -Of reversals can be 
--~· ··-· ·----·- -~- -"'"· .,. -":;_,::,,< :: _,..;:".- ~--~::.-~~-_,.;,.;,.:, •• - ............... 
found in TV commercials in which the stereotypical roles of men 
and women, poor and wealthy, black and white are reversed (e.g. 
the Vodacom commercial in which the old, apparently 
disadvantaged black man is confronted by an arrogant, wealthy 
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urban white man who accidentally locks his keys in his car and 
who is assisted by the black man and his cellular phone to 
retrieve them; the detergent petrol commercial in which well-
known sportsmen men make statements about the cleaning ability 
of the petrol which are identical to those statements usually 
made by women in washing powder commercials). 
Clegg (1993) proposes that any study of power dynamics should 
include a description of how "power arrangements are fixed, 
coupled, and constituted so that, intentionally or not, certain 
'nodal points' of practice are privileged in this unstable and 
shifting terrain" (Clegg, 1993, p. 28). The fixing of meanings 
typically occurs through language and inevitably lead to the 
establishment of hierarchies in which those persons higher up in 
the hierarchies have greater privileges, or more access to 
desired commodities, or more communicational access to others in 
the organisation than those in the lower echelons. 
In a typical ~lassrobm, for example, the teacher is the one who 
<>.~··-~·:"•.-::::::~·.N~'' 
~<:.·controls the pupils access to information and who interprets 
this information to the pupils. The power of the teacher is 
d~r!ved from at least two sources: His/her pos~ion is ensconced 
through the institutional power of the educational system, which 
is linked to government power structures and political ideology; 
in addition the teacher's role is further ensconced through the 
/ 
tr&ditional power of adu1ts over children, which is so clearly 
evident in 
~hority 
family dynamics. Should this teacher be a male, his 
/ is even further enhanced by the patriarphal discourses 
f 
and codes in our society, which, according to feminist writers, 
leads to the marginalisation of both women and children, 
especially in the family. In addition the knowledge which is 
~~pounded in the classroom is never value-free: Knowledge is 
always embedded in language (which is never neutral) and often 
serves to ensure the continuation of the dominant culture. 
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The recent political transition in South Africa provides a 
~~~luable source of examples of how a change in institutional 
power dynamics brings about a revolution in people's perception 
of themselves and others in their culture. Many South Africans 
.. ~ubtedly experienced profound discontinuities in their own 
private as well as public values and yet most of them seemed to 
move effortlessly into the new 'spaces' designed by the meanings 
which had recently been fixed in an entirely different way by 
the new regime's ideologies. This transition from one set of 
ideologically inscribed meanings and values to another which is 
almost diametrically opposed to the former, is an example of a 
sbift. in the circuits of power. Relationships between Blacks and 
Whites were officially redefined, thereby opening up 
interpersonal 'spaces' which are regulated by a different set of 
prescriptions for relating to one another. 
~er should not be regarded merely as a negative. Clegg (1993, 
p. 26) maintains that "the conception of power needs to be freed 
from its 'sovereign' auspices as a prohibitive concept". Power 
can open up new 'spaces' rather than being "merely the zero-sum 
of a set of antagonisms" (Clegg, 1993, p. 28). Instead of 
regarding power only as a constraint or a prohibition, it could 
, _____ ...._...,.. ~--- ·-·--·-··-
be viewed as the dynamic through which realities are produced. 
According to Sarup (1988, p. 82) it produces "domains of objects 
and rituals of truth". Foucault (1977) also regards power as a 
natural and inevitable aspect of all social and cultural 
relationship~. In his work he emphasises the omnipotent role 
which power and ideology plays in psychology, i e the individual 
is almost entirely brought forth through ideology and cultral 
power structures. In the next section I will examine some of the 
processes in psychology, and psychotherapy in particular, which 
relate to ideology and power. 
~·----..... 
/"' "' Cent~~etal discourses in Psychology 
""· ·"' ..... '-' ~--,•••o-•'""'-~~...---""-~ 
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In this section I wish to examine the procedure through which 
psychology creates and reproduces certain relations between 
people in Western culture through ___ id~~~~ power. In 
particular, I wish to trace the processes through which 
experience was individualised, problematised, and quantified. 
('~----~"' 
.......B.uring the M6Qernisb , .,period human behaviour became 'scientized' 
----~.._,_,, '. 
(Gergen, 1991, p. 14). 'Mbdernist science maintained its own 
~tatus by developing discourses of , ~~;;~~;~!~~L usua!ly~ by 
{'1 ,11re~ to t,!!§-~·"'·grand nai:f~tive;·, for e(alnple Truth, 
\ ~;iectivity, and(Rati~illity. In th" modernist era ~~~~~t o~. 
=~nowl_~-<!~~.protected its domain by delineating.nits ~~si tion t<.>_ 
ot_her __ ~~~!ls ... J:>.:e .... knru!lledge-; This provided adherents to this 
~ledge base with a false sense of solidity and permanence. 
Post-Modernist scientific inguiry., on the other hand, ins~ on 
~1:i~;::i:::~:: t::, ::~f~~=:~;~:~!:~. ~~j'::::: t~:th~0.;~"_dg;"-
_.. ·~ "·----~ .. -- -- . -- ~ 
---~ 
Until recently ~~ychology 
\~:::-~ 
discourse of .('l(Odernist 
has participated in the dominant 
science by aligning itself with the 
attempt to enhance. its credibility and 
endeavour has led to the development of 
,,./ "-...__,_ ...• 
empirical ~e~ls in an 
academic standing. This 
many useful procedures for the improvement of people's quality 
of life, despite the fact that its methods have proved largely J\ 
unreliable and its th~ften contradictory and non- / 
predictive. According to ~dsl~~d (Gergen & Davis, 1 985, p. 85) 1,~ 
"[t]he ingenious and heroic--attempts by methodologists to make 
the irreversible a.PP~!!E ... _E~versible, the unrepeatable appear 
<1""·---·----~"""""-,......, ... ---.- - -.., ""'""'--,~ .. --~-,~·-·'-'~~ 
r~~_Qle, the lo~~! .... ~ppe~=.J!.~neral, and the s~}:)j_~~t:tY~ appear 
objective are, indeed, the stuff of a major tragedy". We need to 
~---·-<>-'" ~--·- -·-~--. 
understand how psychological knowledge achieved such a position 
of privilege even though it displayed these shortcomings. 
I 
lone of the reasons a scientific framework, in 
-
particular, the medical-biological science's framework, from 
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which it originally emerged during the Modernist era. One of the /~· 
Ji~ny ;::~:ce~~: pr;:::::: p!!cho~~y :: a w;:~en~~~ 
/i,l - - ---r~~_90~~~!:U.C!lise_<:] ___ a_~_<:] __ ~~~P-<?!-~!:~cised. For decades psychology was 
; '· .. ,.._,"""""'~-·,._,,, '"'- .. ·-1 considered to be devoid of cultural and ideological influences. 
The actual presence of such influences were obscured behind the 
-~insistence that knowledge produced by psychology 
ah~~:!:cal, apoli!:ical., and ~versa!. This 
... scientific 1 discourse ensured fha:t ---- -ps.yetiol~al 
--- " 
acquired an privileged position with regard to 'it-s. 
explain human functioning. 
was 
kind 
true, 
of 
ledge 
~.-.-~- -·~·-·'-"...~-----,..._,, 
~""---....._.__ 
Psychologists and psychiatrists developed d~nostic systems 
which described abnormal or undesirable ;behaviour in 
deficit/ excess ter~· -The---~~~~b~l~~y-~f···--p~ych~p~;:th~-~ terms 
with its underlying unspoken normative prescription for 
behaviour was disseminated through the popular press and through 
personal contact with professionals from these fields. Soon 
these terms were incorporated into everyday parlance. The 
pejorative descriptions continued to expand as new syndromes 
were encountered and old concepts were honed and refined 
(Gergen, 1991). Thus, we now have an ever-increasing vocabulary 
r
of deficit ~n~---~-~_?apacities, which was entirely absent a century 
•ago. As people absorb the vocabulary, the deficit terminology 
,_ 
influences the way they describe, and hence experience, 
themselves (Gergen, 1991). 
Gergen (1991, p. 15) cautions that one of the disadvantages of 
this phenomenon is what he calls the "spiraling cycle of 
enfeeblement" which ensues. This occurs because _people who e 
, describe themselves and others in these teE~·;~- i~~~9·~t, have i ~().'!!'-' ,,lp r::egard psychiatri~s and psy~~ologists ~sent1ial for 
( recovery 1 • ·-
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But since the emergence of P~t-Modernism it has been 
more and more spheres---'th~t science is "forged in 
ongoing cultural concerri~, framed within the 
acknowledged in 
~the crucible of 
'· 
culture's linguistic codes, and rewarded or\peglected in accord 
'\ 
with cultural needs" (Marecek, 1995, p. 163) .. _Any knowledge base 
\ 
becomes ideological if it does not alln~ self-reflexive 
scrutiny. It runs the risk of becoming totalitarian knowledge. 
~-~-~---:.:----·-----·~~~-~-
So it is essential that psychology should ;e(lexively examine 
/ its foundational questions and basic assumpifions. 
We need to reveal the ways in which sg~!gtal struggles and 
cultural politics shaQg RsychologicaL_LQi~ng, for example, how 
~~ ~··--~-----·~---' " --
it out~~~--!Di!!:.9::i:P._a~ ,··g;oups i~ch as the poor, women, blacks, ~tcetera.In some contexts ~chological research has even been 
/ 
employed to justify the (status qu~, just like any system of 
~--... -... ~·· -...-. ••• <'"·····<>~~ 
knowledge serves to promote the goals of the dominant culture. 
Foucault (1977) contended that psychiatry and psychology have 
fundamentally changed the relationship between social power and 
the human body. Socio-political systems maintain their own power 
base best by regulating human behaviour through codifying, 
quantifying, supervising, and enhancing individuals' levels of 
.·:?"'"'"_...,...,.-"·.,..-.~-........... 
functioning. According to Foucault ( 19 7 7) ~::=~~~~<?~!.~ proved to 
1 
be a useful device since it could produce !.~ ... ~:~:_~_p-~i~ devices 
which individualised subjects and which o~~ed up the human soul 
l as a domain which could be des~ed, quan~ed, and, h~~e, 
i_ controlle.d . 
.,----......... . 
PS¥chology wa~ useful to the regulatory systems of power, 
because it produced di~nostic categories, assessment~techniques 
\ 
an~~es~-~--~:?-ic}1 could port~(lY the individual's experiences (some 
1 of which were of a transindividual and communal nature) in terms 
i l of clas~ic.ations, stat-i~.!~.~-~-~ figures and stcwda:rgisations 
which endorsed the notion of stri~.9:~!!.!:._i.!l<:l:i vidual ism. According 
to Foucault (1977) tests and diagnoses embody power, truth, and 
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~ 'subjectification' simultaneously, thereby transforming human 
experience into a domain of public knowledge: The person becomes 
a subject which has to submit to normative assesments and a 
hierarchical relationship structure, in other words, to a 
discourse of disempowerment and even punishment (Foucault, 
1977). Thus the power to describe something is tantamount to 
owning and controlling it. Gradually psychology broadened its 
sphere of influence and control to include institutions like 
schools, factories, prisons 
individuals' efficiency and 
satisfaction and contentment. 
and the army 
productivity, as 
to 
well 
enhance the 
as personal 
Although psychological power is not 
-claim to objc€£:L;;-t-;9ihs makes it 
political structures for governmental 
Thus psychology operates at the 
structures such as mental health 
industrial relations, parent-child 
needs, anxieties, and frailties of 
politically 
amenable to 
partial, its 
utilisation by 
mental health programmes. 
interface between public 
systems, law and order, 
relations and the dreams, 
individuals and families 
(Parker & Shatter, 1990). Thus psychology has played a key role 
in the discourses which have produced the modern subject. "In 
the family, the factory, and the expanding systems of 
counselling and therapy, the vocabularies of mental hygiene, 
~roup relations and psychodynamics are translated into 
--eechniques of self-inspection and self-rectification .... Through 
_"_,..our attachment to such technologies of the self, we are governed 
by our active engagement in the search for a form of existence 
that is at once personally fulfilling and socially beneficial" 
(Parker & Shatter, 1990, p. 114). 
~~ 
~~ychology has 'colonised' __ descriptions of the Self and 
Self/Other interactions. Through the 'scientising' of human 
behaviour, it has provided the gran~--about Selves. 
Psychoanalysis, in particular, reflects conventions which 
-··perpetuate the power position of the analyst: For example, their 
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a interpretations refer to t~e function of the unconscious, 
.fkmlain of meaning which i'S 'only accessible to the analyst and 
requires expert interpretation it no longer belongs to the 
"""~"·~lf. Thus clients learn to devalue their own meanings. 
~characterisations can be found throughout the history 
of ~!?JLY 1 but are especially apparent in the work of the 
trait theorists who depict people as firmly bounded and 
internally coherent narrative characters who participate in a 
clearcut plot (S!rin~er et al., 1984}. Theorists such as ~-llp_ort 
( (1968}, ~l (Polkinghorne, 1988} and Eysenck (Polkinghorne, 
1 1988} claim that human behaviour is ordered and guided by the 
personality. They believed that people's personalities consisted 
of quantifiable amounts of intelligence, self-esteem, 
aggression, and so forth, which can be classified in terms of a 
taxonomy and assessed along a continuum of normality-
~normality. In therapy individuals were evaluated in terms of 
/ 
'-'·this prescriptive framework and the goal of therapy was to 
correct imbalances which deviated from normative behaviour. In 
this manner psychotherapy became an instrument through which the 
public was made controllable and governable. 
e._···-~· ··-,,"\ 
But ....i.n.___ psychotherapy the best portrayal of the ~~ ~cti v~'\ Modernist paradigm is found in the '~ehaviourist 
-.::approach with its rigorously l~~~?_l_~i of human 
functioning. Embodied within the Behaviourist approach is the 
Modernist ideal of human conquest over all phenomena through 
scientific method. In this approach it is assumed that by 
disrupting and altering the established linear-causal 
contingencies in human behaviour, the therapist could bring the 
clients actions entirely under rational control. This 
~lustrates the grandiose Modernist ideal of of obtaining total 
control over our environment and our own functioning. 
__..."--............... 
/'./ '\ 
In contrast, ~t-Modernist thinkers 
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as 
r
.· E;!o;idal (Mumby: 1993) and use it 
views of the world. Post-Modernism has a reduction in the 
f vtherap~~infl~s-an-expert in mental functioning. It has 
f· also qu"estToned the···-TegTtimacy of the therapi.s,_t's, at:~@y~ 
L__ know' and ~~7;~~-;··-th~--,-;~~-t~l state' of the 'p~t:ie.nt' . Instead 
I ~-~~Qe client is regarded as a participant in a large network of 
! relationships and the client's problem is --~-;;~-~-i·d~-~~d-~-~roblem 
\ . b~~~\1~-~---~t is construed as such in some of··- th~~-~ relationships_.,_ 
~~hus the therapist is required to help the client to change 
( !~o~~ relationships in such a ma~~~:r:. .. !~at the meanings that are 
expressed and maintained within them, can be altered, thus 
making the problem behavio~r, ... ~- The therapist's role 
ref.o~.-.. e . mes that of _a ~-~.-:-~a_rticipant __ in ~e clien!:. 
q,!:e~ __ new real~s, ~' or' narratives for 
... '" --.; ·------ ... 
e~Re.!iencing his or her life. At the end of therapy the client 
~hould have learned the skills for re-negotiating and 
maintaining new discourses in his or her relationships. 
One of the logical consequences of Posy4~;~:-~e in 
~ychology is the emergence of 'co~n sense . psyc=~?log!' , 
sometimes referred t~ as ' folk psychology' "~or"·----'-~f'"logic' . 
With the Post-Modernists' celebration of small or local 
narratives and their appreciation of the uniqueness of cultural 
circumstances, psychologists a_:.::e . beginning to fg£us c;m.~ .. the 
subt~~ti;;·;eanings and expl~natory ~bdels which ordinary people 
·- .. \. 
produce··colie.ctively to depicl:~'tlieir lives. In the next section 
I will briefly explore the outlines of this new development. 
(/~ 
~?n sense psychology as ~~-J:"~fugal discourse 
--~-~··---<~-····~-· 
Bruner (1990, p. 35) maintains that all cultures have 
~ychology, a "set of more or less connected, more or less 
normative prescriptions about how human beings 'tick', what our 
own and other minds are like, what one can expect situated 
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action to be like, what are possible modes of life, r-~~ 
.S .. 9JD.IIti~\ oneself to them, and so on". It is a form oi.~ommunal: 
knowled~e which we learn very early on, when we learn our mother 
tongue.aqd which provides us with the appropriate guidelines for 
··,. .. , 
negotia ting.,,shared meanings with others. As such, it serves the 
purpose of ~anising experience, in much the same manner as the 
~'··-··--... 
\.
Modernist prescriptio~or·. progress and successful living do, 
but it embodies the acc~lated local wisdom and reservoir of 
----~-----~---·,<- ~ ....... ~-- ' 
;stories about the history, the 'heroes' and the 'villains' of a 
'~-····· ... 
particular community. 
:f.olk~ psychology includes a wide variety of communally held 
~~i~f~ including tradi tiona! idiom~ic_·~·. expressions, 
sup~IS~itions, for example, notions about the characteristics of 
different nationalities, guidelines for lower and upper class 
people's behaviour, for women, men, and children's behaviour, 
guidelines for parenting, how to treat strangers, etcetera. It 
also includes communally held (~ about significant 
,..., 
transitional experiences in life such as..,~Q.l!:.:f:Q..c. ... Ja!!.ing, in love, 
marriage, and death. The reverence usual!,y_ __ shown towards 
psychologists is partly due ;/_ . .t..cl~ the auth~~itaWe position 
j ~~;;::ge~ro:.:he P=~~;u::eii_<:~rti~~io::tu:r::edpsy~::O<Ji:i~ 
l' psychology: It reflects the same mixture of reseect and fear traditionally reserved for the druids, mystics, and healers of 
' ~gone days. r. --·~, 
~~-psychology is co~""eyed }n 
! form. It contains all the 
(~--"'"'~'-~,~-""-,_ .. ~-~,-~ '"''"" 
. ( ~. 
r}qrrative"rather \.than 
na;::rfci'tive. element; which were 
o;;---·-----· 
\ discussed in Chapter 3: It is structured around the actions of 
--....,-~----
/ ch~~!:~rs (the agentive Self, in particular) who exhibit needs, 
,. 
ideals, and desires, and who encounter obstacles along the way 
(a plot); it contains sequentiality 
r·--~-,.--·--~ .. -- .-..... 
---
~_!"arne; and it forms a coherent __ ?nity. Thus in much 
as it does for the mediating of experience of the 
world in a general sense, narrative also serves as a "symbolic 
210 
schema for mediating between sign and the world" (Bruner, 1990, 
p. 46) in folk psychology. Bruner (1990, p. 52) maintains that 
folk psychology is structured in the format of narratives since 
it concerns itself with human action and human goals. "It 
mediates between the canonical world of culture and the more 
idiosyncratic world of beliefs, desires and hopes". 
Already in 1916, Wundt, one of the pioneers of psychology, 
maintained (Gergen & Davis, 1985) that all the material which 
,,_the .human sciences study are, in fact, produced by the social 
community itself. While this is true of the social sciences in 
general, it is particularly true of psychotherapy which deals 
. with meanings 
with others. 
and perceptions which are created and negotiated 
stories which clients tell The autobio hical 
psychotherapists 
idiosyncratic, 
validity, and 
are ce trifugai in character, since they are 
"""-;;..,_, 
internally cohei~n:t stories which have local 
which contain non-rational insights into the 
~----------~·~ ·-· 
~icissi tudes of li viJl·~-; We all participate in folk psychology in 
~, ... ~""~"""''·--·-'"'·-~ '-~-
that we are all linked to the world of culturally determined 
meanings which we co-create through language with others. In 
this sense folk psychology "taps into people's knowledge of the 
local rules of the game in the part of society which surrounds 
them" (Bertaux, 1981, p. 40). 
Wundt (Gergen & Davis, 1985) maintained that the concerns of the 
social 
terms 
sciences cannot 
of individual 
be comprehensively explained merely in 
consciousness alone; it assumes an 
-~terindividual connectedness and socially co-created meanings. 
This view suggests an acceptance of the notion of Self which is 
~oposed in this study, namely Self as embedded in 
relationships, as opposed to Self as a singular, separate 
experience. It is extraordinary to imagine that if history had 
taken a different route (in other words, if the human sciences 
had not appropriated the methodology of the physical sciences) 
'" Uris interrelated view of Self may have continued to prevail. It 
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would not now be necessary to reinstate it as a valid 
alternative concept. 
/./ ..../1 / 
·"" ...... --~·-, ,_,...~ ...... ~'"'-' '''·--··--~,.__, if 
; \ !' 
Sinc~~-jJ~l'L"' ince~t.t~on psychology _ !la§__~d--in .Q~~~dt_ opposition to 
,-/· . ------ . ---..... c~~~·---~ense, and has'- replaced it -~=-~ s~~-~-------~-~:e'~:S -- it has /.I 
competed for the same space in people's minds. Yet, in fact, ~f 
~ychology' s field of knowledge overlaps with that of common t{_:~ ,, • 
.Jsense. It has taken psychologists a long time to acknowledge 
J ~'·'that t~e domain which they had claimed as their enclave of 
/Y 1expert1se, in fact, belongs to everyone. The ~ig ~!vide between 
•common sense knowledge and expert knowledge is gradually being 
~- ' ·' '"''"'"-""-»•~,~-~--r 
,~E~ded Despite the Modernist psychologists' attempts to 
~~onise' the territory of the Self, the current Post-Modernist 
~thrust ensures that those meanings (such as folk psychology) 
·\which were previously marginalised are reinstated, restored, and 
valued anew. 
Students of psychology already have opinions about many of the 
aspects covered by psychology. Drawing on t~e~i~r--~o~w_n __ ~e_xper~pes 
as well as collective common sense experiences, most people can 
the core give lay explanations for the phenomena 
material of psychology. And yet students 
their common sense knowledge in 
which form 
are discouraged from 
discussions primarily 
because it is considered to be unscientific and it contains many 
contra~ons. The latter criticism is founded on the notion 
\ :;:ntif::h ::~U:~t;'<;!:~~~!;l ~e~~~~~J:~ =~=~ ~:;) ~Y ~~: 
viewpoint s in contradiction to the position taken in the 
'---· l :f:Jeld rhetor~, where it is acknowledged that qontrary _truths 
/'\can exist side by side. In addition it accepts that truths are 
open-ended and evolving (Rorty, 1987). In psychology the ideal 
_..or-~producing theories which can offer clearcut explanations for 
human experiences, has not materialised. Instead a vast and 
complex body of research has emerged which itself contains 
innumerable contradictions, even in its theoretical structures. 
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~ever, I am not suggesting that folk psycholog~~anacea 
for oppressive pr~~~~ces in psychotherapy. F~ -~ychology 
contains many co~trai~n2 or ey~ILQPllressiv~:nao:a.t:L4::Li~eJf: 
f ~:er:::~::~ ::::e-~===~=t·,~e <:'!~~!~i~;~~~s-i:~d~~;.i::: 
with the same care as those limiting influences which 
sociocultural ideologies have on people's life options. It is 
-also true that folk psychology embodies the norms of society in 
--much the same way as other sociocultural ideologies, but at 
~ least it does so 
I 
~~::~:=~p:::ic va~~=ct~:es i~:or:r~o€~~~;?G..:~:: 
which usually prevail between the client and the therapist when 
the therapist is seen as the embodiment of Modernist scientific 
Truth. It is meant as a counterpoint to those particular 
centripetal forces in therapy. 
It goes without saying 
accumulated, has to be 
~-referentially how we 
that the knowledge which psychology has 
retained. But we need to examine self-
apply it, in order to prevent these 
practices from subjugating and controlling others. 
The implications of 1(ost-Modernist trends for psychotherapy 
In the final section of this study I wish to conclude with a 
number of tentative suggestions and recommendations for therapy. 
These suggestions are not meant to be comprehensive nor 
prescriptive. In the spirit of Post-Modernism they are meant as 
-st.a.~~,t,_Pg~~t§."_{Q:r: .. _.~_"'gj.aJ__ggue with the Reader. I hope that some 
of the Readers' responses will take the form of continued 
exploration of how psychotherapy can align itself more 
congruently with the Post-Modernist movement in the field of the 
social sciences. 
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/~~~-_,.~.,-··-·--··· ''-~ 
The ~t-Modernist insistence on sel!--::reflexivity has far-
reaching -conse~ences for human consc:i::'ousness. Reflexivity in 
"" psychotherapy wouta-,~ntail that Jh~( therapist's scrutiny should 
..... not only focus only .rih·J:he c)A:·ent' s world, but should encompass 
·'-, /. 
the whole context of therapy, thus including the therapeutic 
--- ---·-----~-.-.--"'"""'-.--""""'-"-""-"'-'-'~' """"' .. _ .,...,.,-"""'""'~'"'" '~""'-<, 
practices we use. 
····"· 
This is, of course, not a new ~4ea: Reflexivity has been 
propounded by family therapy theorists for some time now. But j1t 
its application was, until recently, ~."reflection of their i/ 
concern with circularity an? _9omp_!~!:~--- :f,~-~9:~.~~ . ..,. :l_oo s. In the t"'"-,.,..__, __ """"'--,~' -~ 
context of Post-Modernism reflexivity has a d ion: 
It is meant as a kind of bulwark against oppr ssi-re __ piactices in 
,-
t+t.' __a.politi?-al=ide~o.~ogical sense. It pres~poses an acknowledgement 
0 of the i~erdependence of the socia~and the political domains. 
~ """'-·---... , ,,_, -'" . ,,... _,_,_ .... ~ .. --~---~ "''''"''''~-"'"~"-----··->-~~--~----~..._.,~.--•'"'-~·~-.-~----·~"-''"-""''•'•' 
For example, in. the personal realm even a seemingly simple 
! 
process of attem~ting to reach consensus about a certain issue, 
the social condtruction of meaning always involves a struggle 
between ideol?~s, and in that sense it is always a political 
process. M~ing )y$tems (such as psychological theories) are 
~~~~~i:~~;~~~~~~~~d~~thi~~:ia::on~t ::::~disbeas~:::ta:: 
"-.. '• -.,~. , 
ensures an essent~al relative balance in force and counterforce 
""·· 
as in any other do~~in in nature. The nodal points which fix 
.. " 
meanings in a particu}Qr way will be changed each time that a 
··, 
particular ideology ~~verturne~. _It is :ssential that we 
understand our ow~~~~ati~-~ .. -- --~~~ pro~~~es --
~~pecially how we are more willing to accept cerl]rrfi-1realities' 
than others and how we become constrained by these 'realities'. 
"~e illusion that psychotherapy is 
is a legacy from psychology's 
a polit'~cally neutral context 
·-...., 
Modernist scientific phase and 
needs to be abandoned. We need to become more sceptical of the 
wider sociocultural discourses, codes, and prescriptions in 
--wttt'ch the practices of psychotherapy are embedded. We need to 
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beco~~_awa±e-----0! the manner in which practices in psychotherapy 
~r~ate ide~logies which are sometimes 
-----·-·~----·--~-""''"'". ··- .... 
limjtjng 
We need 
and 
counterproductive in the lives of our clients. to 
examine these practices in terms of the kinds of power relations 
and Self-images they perpetuate. This means we have to become 
more critical of our discipline's history. We need to asses 
--whether our practices reproduce "oppressive social structures" A/jl 
(Parker, 1989, pp. 3-4). We need to 'uncover. the framework ofr'r.t:::-t:::Pti:::nt~::~a~!qu~~ti:::~s an:.d 1nt::~~i ~~:::::ru:: . psychological theory that incorporates its own situatedness in 
culture and history. Recontextualizing psychology in this way 
r...can help psychologists see more d~~£1Y_E~~,. _ _g_g_<>_I).Q~J9L.-~~~;i,-~!t and 
l P?liti~<?~a_!___ for<:?e~--~re implicated in all endeavours to know the 
world, even scientific ones" (Marecek, 1995, p.163). 
~Jil.e:,- should ensure that ideoloq!_cally based pr9,ctices are not 
-.".,>~--~"., ~ "'' ,- .. -- ,.,_.., 
camouflaged, 'sanitiz~Q.J---TParker, 1989, p.16), and justified in 
s~tl~ ways. 0;; way of ensuring a.g ___ ....elnrarene;;=::c>f - the / ~ 
" ~ ~:-
aforementioned problems is to create ~of resistanc 
(Parker, 1989, p. 17) within therapy. In other wor s, not only 
~ 4hould clients' doubts about therapeutic practices be accepted 
without defensive justifj..ca.tions a_gd.-r,e;fer~J).ce-,.tP theories, but 
.f:F:!'~·-S~~uld constantly q(estio:; o(r own ~~~~pti~s, -~~~~~' and 
~'~9tiohs. Since we cannot remove power relations, we have to 
abandon the ideal of a harmonious society. We can only ensure 
that spaces of resistance are present in contexts where power 
relations exist. Such spaces of resistance should become an 
essential part of the dynamic evolution of ideas in therapy. 
Therapists 
'-':ae-!.ection 
_....v.n.avoidable 
aspects of 
5? 
should become aware of the pervasive process of 
which occurs in therapeutic conversations. It is 
that the therapist will prefer to focus on certain 
the client's history to the exclusion of other 
aspects. This is a natural and unavoidable part of conversing in 
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daily life. But in the context of therapy where the official) ~­
meanings and expertise of the therapist already 
disproportionately favour the thE(rapl~t; ~----~nqs ___ ~QJrg!=:. the 
~~;;t;;-·m~~ngs, the therapist ~hou1d at 1east be aware of 
.whi~h :i.rrl-~:OOation s/he favours and which is left unattended to. 
In fact, Moscovici (1972, p.55) goes so far as to suggest that 
the "proper domain of our discipline is the study of cultural 
processes which are responsible for the organization of 
knowledge in society". Until this happens the best that 
therapists can do is to show respect and concern for how our 
~£a¥ourite theories predispose us to determine which statements 
are desirable/undesirable in the therapeutic context and how 
this process determines the content of the 'knowledge' which we 
work with in therapy. If, upon closer scrutiny, these preferred 
~anings of the therapist reflect ideological assumptions which 
are limiting to their clients, the therapist should take great 
care to restructure their selection of information in a manner 
which prevents this from happening. 
(/ / 
In P&_ychotherapy QUr theories are about the oJ:.:dinary practices 
·---·- ~- "-· 
of living. It is therefor e~. more essential tpat .. tne~·n(li_alogue 
~/ 
between th~~~!_ ___ p~r se and other _ PEact~s~~-~---··<>.~ life occur. 
l. Otherwi.se, one claims a position of privilege from which ~nly ~­~h~g~a judgements of revelation or concealment could be 
t-... 1anti9ipated" (Clegg, 1993, .-P---A2). Therapists should show great ~pe~t fq~;: ___ ~Qe!~~-~"o:t"ai..~ary s~~ies. However, this does not 
mean that we should elevate the significance of these ordinary 
stories to a new kind of grand narrative of the ordinary. Th~se 
mundane stories should also not be taken at face value, but 
should be examined to foreground the subtle covert manner in 
which language serves to "stabilize circuits of power", (Clegg, 
1993, p. 42). The practice of power in everyday life is also 
conducted through language as in power games in totalising 
theories. 
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~rapY,:p§J?:Q!!~?, be approache~d a~_1 an explQ!_ation and co-creation 
of alt'"~=~ative m=~~~ngs, 'ithout a.s.s.um;ip~=~i\~-~~~~-~-==~ 
correct meanl.ng~- or solution to the client Is problems. ·-The 
--Clients' view of the therapist as the oraqle'''i>"; expert who has 
access to the Truth, should be ~?~~~t~~~t~d. Therapists should 
guard against perpetuating this hi~rarchida·l relationship with 
-------·"/~,.. '"'""-
clients, since this establishes a power (}J,ff~~ntial in the 
therapeutic relationship which is limiting ''tp th.e· · .. process of 
therapy. The relationship should rather be mo\e eg~litarian. 
~e therapist has to stimulate and guide t~~~tion. in 
such a manner as to ensure that many ~rent m:~llf.rigs are __... ,. 
formulated for the client to select from. The --crt"'eiit can then 
\ 
select those meanings or solutions which suit h~~est. 
The therapeutic encounter should be regarded as ~-linear and 
relatively unstructured imaginative process. TheraP1sts should 
acknowledge that therapy proceeds in non-linear c~es and that 
..................... ,t·· 
·.change. often follows unpredic~able and :i(fi~gicai _,_:ircui ~s. The 
~er~p1st should help the cl1ent to e~e unsa1d, the -
- / u.pspoken, the undeveloped, underutilised', and ne9lect.~<l Selves . 
... ....;...B¥ bringing forth the marginalised and neglected meanings in the 
client's repertoire of meanings, truly new domains can be 
opened up. The therapist has to learn to conduct the therapeutic 
conversation in such a way that closure is postponed. 
~ermulations should be kept open-ended and tentative. 
~ients should be helped to become aware of the subtle culturai 
prescriptions for living and of the constraints of 
made personal ideologies that they and others 
~ld be able to deconstruct the discourses in 
these ready-
live by. They 
which they are 
embedded. A heightened awareness of these ideologies can 
minimise the impact which they have on their lives, even if they 
cannot be entirely eliminated. 
A Post-Modern consciousness requires a constant concern with 
~nguage, how it "frames the world, establishing the ontology 
' ) 
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and the array of values in which people invest their lives" 
(Gergen, in Friedman, 1992, p. x). Any formulation in language 
has certain specific possibilities and solutions. Each text or 
narrative, according to Gergen and Kaye (1992, p. 173) "invites 
certain actions and discourages others". What is meant here is 
not language a~ .. ,...an external expression of i:nne.:r, thoughts and{'·/""" 
~eli~~s, but :~~gua~e as that which sha~~ relationships and 
\;s~lves and is shaped by them in return. 
! ",.,, ------
r. Therapists should avoid using language which ~~:i_QJ;:_~·-- Self-
--descriptions as Rfxed and stable, and promote S~pescriptions 
which are depicted .... as ·bei~g i;;-·jrrocess and con~~tly changing. 
v'space> §:hO:ti.!g be 
--ai~logical self 
"'·~ 
~ -·-- ,..,..--- ~-· "'-"'~~-~---...-.. "'"""~---~,..~~------~---··'"'··~---
created in therapy for the notion of the 
,.-'_ ....... -· '\ 
of thel_multiple 
-""~""·· 
which is an expression 
relationships in which the client participates. Reductionistic 
ideas of Self as a kind of essence with fixed personality traits 
should be discarded in favour of the combined concept of 
Self/Other, while acknowledging that even this concept is merely 
an heuristic fiction which is shaped by our language structu~.r '' 
and culture. 
~Therapists should be sensitive to expressions of Self as a 
~e experience. The Self cannot be regarded as a kind of 
"\reservoir into which experiences accumulate over time. According 
tO"M"i"nsky (Rosenbaum & Dyckman, 1995, p. 27) "we are not only 
....,.,.'different in diff~~elit>-s.ocial contexts, but, at any instant, we 
are engaged in a process of. 'summation' of different selves-in-
-"-····"'-·•~-"· 
action that produce the working 'draft' of our consciousness". 
_,.~!Jlhus, as I gested in this study, the Self does not 
possess inhe ent continuity(.and coherence. It attains the 
illusion of coherence and st'abilil')'.. across time and across 
different contexts due to the narrative conventions which we 
superimpose on that interpersonal sp6" ~~~i~h.=~~--~~l _ _tl!_~ Self. 
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~ indicated in previous chapters the narrative metaphor is used 
as an overarching concept to describe the ~anizing and 
patterning of perceptual experiences. The narr~_~aphor 
de~qt::L9-~ariety of perceptual processes through whi-~~~ 
S~Q~Y' input is ordered into meaningful mental schemas which 
are stored in memory. 
~cording to Gergen (Friedman, 1992, p. x) the clients' accounts 
I 
of their dilemmas of living should not be seen as"';· 
~~epresentations of their true experiences, which are slightly 
biased by their needs or cognitive abilities, but rather as ~ 
·accounts which consist of narratives, family myths, metaphors,~ 
. folk psycholog!,!. ~~rth. Gergen regards thes~es as· ~ 
~re like mu~_sQm.Paniments th~n_-~_9..§_ "" m;irrors .. _<>.~- -~~!?~---- of . -r--~-~~~.-~~. Their value d@ lie in their refectio.n_Q.f..L~.ality, 
but in their social communication. 
-----·· 
There is a parallel between what Post-Modernist writers are 
doing (i.e. making readers aware of their need for narrative 
structures in various ways) and what occurs in therapy, in other (/' 
~rds, ~ client. s_;mn .... therapists should become aware of~. ow · ~ ~ /~ ~ ~WW' 
t they ~~s.truct and(,.!:_~:'?resen! . --~!lJ:m ..... ,~~.!yes through narrative forms. ~hrough this awareness or self-reflexivitJL_(or __ ~ta-naxxative) ~-· they can gain greater flexibility and creativity in how they 
live and story their lives. 
m:herapy therefore entails enabling the client to substitute the' 
previous types of narratives for 
more useful way 
(Friedman, 1992, 
of construing 
p. x) words 
alternative forms 'Which allow a 
life meanings, or in Gergen's 
"to shake loose the taken-for-
'r~ ~ 
l, /granted world and to open new l~~-Il:~~ist~9 __ ~_pac~s" which offer new 
foppor~uniti_~~---for l_...~In many cases it mea~~- liberating 
~ients from sel(-narratives that keep them(locked into 1 
""" ·~ ··~ "'-n...,._ ---"~- ~~' 
--Eiisempowering 
cultural story 
grand narratives. People who accei>£~-society' s 
of them often pay the price of oppression and 
... restraint. By acc~ting ~~~-~e~.l~~·-·-··.?.-~!i~~!=!:~~ of 
replace all the other descriptions of themselves 
them 
which 
they 
were 
possible. 
~- stated before, the life history of a person is not an / 
accumulation of all the different experiences he/she has lived 
· through. For every choice to be or to portray oneself as this or 
that kind of person, we exclude a large number of other 
possibilities which we could have lived or portrayed. Thus we 
~evelop into the Self which we portray by eliminating many 
potential Selves which are ~-Q!.uall¥ still .. _.available to. us. It 
can therefor~- b;-~-aid-U;~·-; Self incorporates al·~, the excluded 
' -~ Possible Selves. And it is this reservoir of 'alternative 
Possible Selves which the therapist can help to bring forth in 
the client. 
' ... \ 
c' ' fr~ychotherap!sts should abandon attempts to use a 
of. ffieory o;··---"g'l::and explanatory_. cerrce-pts· which 
u itary 
or 
s:::;;htdirectly dise_mpower -~l:i"'eaf~. By insisting on interpreting the 
clients' actions in terms of a centralised and normative body of 
theory we are 
acknowledged as 
-4,ppreciate the 
rather focus on 
insisting that the client's experience 
his/her experience. Therapists should 
singularity of personal narratives and 
is not 
rather 
should 
those forms of knowledge which do not fit into __ _..;::;......._ 
our scientific and theoretical discourses, forms of knowledge 
which are often denied and suppressed, rejected as inappropriate 
and naive, such as common sense formulations of experiences. 
This is one example of how power can be utilised to 'open up 
... ,.spaces' for being and of liberating the client from centripetal 
Self-descriptions. In this process the client may discover 
patterns of living which are resourceful and creative, rather 
than prescribed and entirely inscribed by the outdated Modernist 
notions of how to be a Self. 
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~.,,~syehotherapists should learn 
meanings of the Ordinary in 
to incorporate 
their work. 
the 
It requires that 
tperapists explore the reservoir of common sense theories, which 
already 
look for 
exist in the client's cultural niche, and attempt to 
alternative behaviours to problematic life situations 
in cultural and social narratives, rather than in prescriptive 
scientific, potentially oppressive grand narratives. The local 
theories of living belong to everyone; their narrative plots, 
metaphors, and characterisations are the common property of 
every member of a community. 
,,/'/-~-"'·.~·-'·----·-........ ,~ ................... ~ 
I , 
..-.lflfte ''M..Q<t~F:rtist assumption that kno~~_!-i~~rates people has / 
been turned on its head by Post~Modernism. Instead of liberating 
~·~/··-
people, it subjugates them This is, as stated before, because 
~wledge con~the po~~r to the expert to define others, to 
create linguistic and sociocultural 'spaces' in which the 
defined are obliged to live. These defined 'spaces' determine 
~ they experience themselves. Thus knowledge becomes a mode of 
surveillance, of regulation, and control. 
I It may be said that someone's standing and power (whether in a family or in an organisation) can be measured according to how much their stories are valued by others in that system (Madigan, 
~Pare, 1995). The subjugating power of scientific theories in 
psychotherapeutic practices become evident when one considers 
that clients willingly seek out the psychotherapist's so-called 
superior theory of who they ought to be, and thus devalue their 
own definition of Self. Parry (1991, in Pare, 1995~ p. 10) 
maintains that 
just as the modernist critic or scholar could claim a 
privileged position by virtue of an understanding of 
the underlying structure, myth, or subterranean force 
that the text expressed, the therapist has retained a 
~ivileged vantage point arising out of access to a 
221 
body of knowledge that explained the client on a 
different and superior level to her experience of 
herself. 
Regardless of how benevolent the intentions of psychotherapists 
~~, the clients' lives are inevitably described and interpreted 
in terms which are alien to them. 
Psychotherapists can no longer justify using normative theories 
to define their clients from an imaginary centre. Centripetal 
definitions of Self, or of anything else, for that matter, 
~evitably contain 'shoulds' and 'oughts' that align human 
behaviour with the normative prescriptions for behaviour which, 
inter alia, serve to perpetuate the dominant power structures in 
society. 
These suggestions do not entail explaining the Post-Modernist 
movement's philosophical background to the clients (they usually 
have enough complex issues to deal with as it is!}. At the level 
of remembering and recounting one's experiences we are obliged 
to rely on the everyday language and narrative conventions which 
depict Self as stable, coherent and continuous. However, at the 
next order of recursiveness, at the level of the therapist's 
self-reflexive descriptions, an awareness of these ideas is 
indispensable to a therapist. 
Conclusion 
The ideas in t~is study are not meant as a final set of answers 
to questions regarding the nature of meaning and Self. They are 
~tative formulations in a dialogue with the Reader. They are 
. -·•eant to be seen as part of an evolution of communally created 
ideas which will continue to change. Given that reflexivity is 
built into the process of perceiving and understanding, 
conceptualisations of human functioning and of Self will 
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.·' 
continue to become 8e~tabilised by 
,/'_:·: 
ne,:w paradf"9Q!~ shi·fts. However, 
Post-Modernism, it is 
and practices should 
at this juncture in the move towards 
--:i:mperative that psychotherapeutic concepts 
be examined in order to establish their relevance in this 
particular tide of change. 
study goes beyond that 
domain of psychology. I 
usuaalnldy /~_:_/_. 
included ideas if 
which is 
( 
The scope of the 
demarcated as the 
'/ A conceptualisations from a number of different but 
.. ~- .?-··· 
related 
/ h \ i fields, such as li t~~~-Ci,:r"Y th~():r~," .cultur.a~ ~ hist.Q;cy:_,__~Q£!Qlogy, 
~ and linguistics in this study. This is in keeping with the 
e-··-;~~t ~;;·t=:_;~d~r~ist trend to move beyond the atfifi~i~~Vly 
created boundaz:ies of specific fields of knowledge in order to 
/"\ '·· . ·····'""""'·'j 
1 enlarge and enrich the present discussion. In keeping with Post-
\
1_1 d . h t d . 
. ~~j_PD-t] c~borative, rather (~han obj·~~tive an~ . .; .... Mpoa __ d.~ et.rl'_ro __ --'_-.· nattlvtreendansd the ~_t~odology used -~9 .. __ _t_e s u Y lS 
<'feductionistic. '----- · ' 
v ~s study is an attempt to examine those processes through 
ich ~ea_~iilgs become~-fix~ in interpersonal contexts and during 
erapeutic ~;;~~d~~;;· -~··;~ particular. The relati~n between 
narrative codes and conventions and the communal con~truction of 
meaning was examined. The Post-Modernist notion of the reflexive 
relationship between the knower and the known was demonstrated 
by focussing 
was used as 
Self attains 
l 
'a number of 
in particular on the concept of the Self. Narrative 
a fr~~~,,to demonstrate that the notion of the 
its ~llusion or 'seaml~f')sness and stability through 
conve~_b-ions, ·-su"'ch- as using the' ·l>er:s.pecti ve of an 
i 
\omniscient narrator, the con~pity of characters' identities, 
\ coh~_;rence, prescri6ed and s~e~l-flmi pl~t-~--~tructure;:··"""-~nd so 
;;:-rerth. I attem~t~d to demonstrate how the··~elf can be viewed as 
a mutually agreed upon and heuristic convention in interpersonal 
contexts, which is negotiated with the Other in relationship and 
which is never quite at one with itself. 
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Following Derrida (1973; 1976; 1978; 1987, 1988), Foucault 
(1967; 1970; 1977; 1979), and Lacan (1977; 1986), the notion of 
~l}e Self is d€~s~ed to demonstrate its e~~ss in 
\1'\ language and current,~£!J),t:R:r:a.l .. :i~~q!o~t!~.~ which still contain 
; ~--------·-------,~--·'" 
aspects of Romanticism and Modernism, but which are also 
influenced by the forms of technologies which were produced in 
\,the Modernist era. __ !lhi.s suggests a Self which is presented as 
':~ €nomo~s and ~j,yiduaii·stic in some respects, but which is 
~rtually fully controlled and colonised by corporate commercial 
enterprises which offer prescriptions of how to be a Self. 
As moves into the Post-Modernist era, its 
found tiona! ass mptions and metaphors have to be examined to 
ascertain their coherence with these emerging reformulations of 
the Self. More specifically the psychotherapists need to 
~:flexively examine the assumptions on which they base their 
approaches and practices. While the idea of a centered and 
[
unified Self cannot be discarded in the context of 
psychotherapy, therapists should (at least at the second order 
!level of reflexivity) be aware of and examine the conventions through which the Self is negotiated and maintained in interpersonal domains. Therapists who are sensitive to the 
emerging Post-Modernist ideas should be able to discern how 
Modernist practices in psychotherapy which are based on the 
scientific assumptions of objectivity, neutrality and 
~·.·Fationali ty lead to power imbalances in the therapeutic 
relationship. Instead of using restrictive psychological 
~eories based on the Modernist grand narratives of 
'objectivity', 'truth' and 'rationality' which define clients 
. from an imaginary rt~ (centripetal theories) therapists C __-
~hould endeavour to~~struct the power dynamics inherent in 
-the· therapeutic relationship. While it is no,Jonger poss~J>le to 
return to the strictly Modernist definitio~f Self, it is also 
.-"PJK:)-1:-· ·possible "-to--iiberateourselves entirely from the impact of 
restrictive cultural ideologies. However if we can become 
224 
--~gilant and aware of these influences, we can at least become 
sceptical and resistant in relation to them and thereby become 
_pa.rtof the ongoing "struggle to assert our own meanings against 
the matrix of already codified meanings lying in wait for us" 
(Bakhtin, 1981, p. 272). 
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APPENDIX I 
TREVOR'S SELF-NARRATIVE 
An account of my life 
I have quite a few memories of when I was small, such as a very 
vague memory of seeing red light probably when I was born, of 
pushing my mother's nipple into her breast when I was feeding, 
and some of the toys I received when I was only 1 or 2 years 
old. Until I turned 7 or so, I was happy; life was sweet. I 
used to be fascinated by the fire we had in the fireplace. When 
I was about four years old, I remember having had all my teeth 
removed. My mother used to make me lick a handkerchief to clean 
my face with. I was quite cheeky towards my mother as a child. 
My first few months at school were the best in my whole school 
career. I befriended another chap, D ... W ... , and took care of 
him, consoling him on his first day at school. It seemed as if 
he was destined to be my boyhood friend. But throughout the 
rest of my school career, I would find it very difficult to make 
friends and gain their respect and love. 
During grade 1 my father took long leave and the family visited 
Britain. I have quite a few memories of this also. This 
affected my schooling somewhat. My performance was pretty 
average. 
Initially I struggled to learn to read and write, and only 
reached any kind of competence in standard four. Apart from 
D ... W ... I had no friends, except for some other kids who lived 
in the neighbourhood. They were all much younger than I was. I 
used to play a bit with P ... s ... who was two years younger than 
I. I remember Mrs S ... telling me to rather go and play with 
someone my own age. 
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In my early primary school years I used to ignore the gripes in 
my stomach and end up constipated. Physically I was quite 
strong but I used to be very happy to have some reason to rather 
stay at home. On occasion I was victimised by D ... M.... I 
tried to play cricket and soccer but never seemed to get going. 
My father and mother tried to get me interested in tennis. My 
mother had been a very good tennis player, winning many 
tournaments and also getting her Springbok colours for 
badminton. But I never fulfilled the expectations of my parents 
in any kind of sport. My father used to say I was a sissy if I 
complained that the water in the swimming pool was too cold. 
My father was very wrapped up in his own problems and used to 
ignore me completely. There was one exception to this general 
rule. With his interest in photography, he liked to take 
pictures of me but began to complain that I was no longer 
natural. I suppose I was pulling faces. 
Steadily my performance relative to the rest of the class 
improved until I was amongst the top three to five pupils. I 
was very artistic. 
My brothers disliked me, or at least wanted to establish their 
own ego on the basis of rivalling mine. In their presence I was 
usually unwelcome and ridiculed. All they needed was an excuse 
to condemn me. 
At high school I again became fairly obsessed with being 
popular. I used to like to hang out with the boarders, 
particularly a chap by the name of D ... B.... I think I had a 
bit of an obsession with him. Academically I did well, and 
raced ahead of the class particularly with Latin and Geometry. 
I befriended C ... D ... -s ... and used to spend almost every 
second weekend with her. We used to swim for hours on end and 
play card games and spill and spell. That was real fun, like 
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I've never experienced again. Thank God I had some contact with 
a girl at this stage of my development. 
It was at more or less this time, in standard 6, that the onset 
of puberty occurred. I didn't visit C ... very much after that. 
I became more and more introverted at school. Whereas 
previously I had actively sought popularity I now wanted only to 
survive, to escape. I used to fantasize about various things, 
for example a model jet engine, or novel model railway track 
layouts. My more practical ideas never came to any fruition 
because my parents always considered them too much trouble to do 
anything about. They labelled my ideas as impractical, and the 
more they did this, the more impractical did my ideas become. 
Later on in high school I tried again with various sports, rugby 
as well as hockey. I suffered from asthma. I just couldn't 
physically be anything. I used to get incredible hunger pains. 
It seemed I was strong, but vacant, and stupid, and even so with 
incredible intellectual potential. Always, potential. Nothing 
more. 
I stood up to my brothers with some success. At least I got 
that right. But I wonder if, in the end, I wasn't defeated 
after all; because in the process, I learned to conceal my own 
feelings, and to try to impress others for the sake of gaining 
their acceptance by being clever and intellectually superior. 
I was not totally without friends. I had one friend, C ... C ... 
who used to spend almost every lunch break with me. Towards the 
end of my high school career I met his cousin, M ... H ... , with 
whom I went steady. I went to boarding school during another of 
my parent's long-leave visits overseas. It was a good 
experience. I befriended one J ... s .... 
245 
M .... She was very religious and also very fond of me. We went 
to dancing lessons. I wonder if I might not have taken her to 
bed if I had only asked her. Perhaps a sexual encounter at that 
stage would have changed my life, in the sense that I would have 
valued myself as having a little substance. 
After school I went to the army. Initially I had wanted to go to 
Parabats to show everyone how tough I was. My brothers talked 
me out of it, and I went to Kroonstad Engineers instead. I 
resolved to switch off psychologically until it was over. M ... 
met somebody else at Pietermaritzburg. I became fairly 
religious, carrying on by myself the influence that M ... had had 
on me during our relationship. I became confirmed as a 
Methodist, and tried so hard to be genuine, by forcing myself to 
pray openly to be a witness. I felt very embarrassed about it 
all. God didn't answer my prayers, either. 
Towards the end of my one year, I shared a bungalow with some 
guys who were fairly antagonistic towards me. I tried to win 
popularity by doing favours, but this one chap, B ... , openly 
insulted me because he just didn't like me. These people used 
to confess their sexuality openly, while I shied away from such 
'indecent' openness. 
Based upon an aptitude test, it was decided that I should become 
a Civil Engineer. My first two years at university were really 
quite a bore. Initially my performance was only average, but it 
improved during the second year. 
step out a bit. I edited During the third year I determined to 
the student engineering journal and 
very well. I was also a member of 
I must admit, it came out 
Wits Choir during the last 
two of my four years at university. This was great fun, and I 
socialised much more than I had ever done before. I had several 
brief one-sided love affairs where I did the chasing and nothing 
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ever materialised. Sometimes, very occasionally, I felt like a 
king and felt that I impressed girls with my sheer brain-power 
and warrior-like attitude. At other times I simply felt alone 
and even stupid. 
It seemed as if I was still the victim of rejection by others, 
although when this occurred it was 90% because I expected it and 
only 10% attributable to things that other people really did or 
thought about me. I had learnt to perpetuate the pattern, all 
by myself. 
My ability to study varied. I tended to be a brilliant 
theoretician, sometimes the only one who could understand 
complex mathematics and whom the other students would ask for 
help. I was also unmotivated, often laughing off the tutorials, 
and going home instead. But I ended up being the best student 
in construction materials - and barely scraping through design. 
I attained the degree of civil engineering in the minimum period 
of four years. 
During my last 
wife-to-be by a 
introduction was 
year at university I was 
friend, M ... 
a trip down 
J.... The 
to Swaziland to 
introduced to my 
scenario for the 
the George Hotel. 
Mike had planned it with true naughtiness in mind. He nearly 
made love to my blind date G... and I nearly made love to 
Mike's wife-to-be, S.... Thank God I did not. And Gail and I 
did not make love but it was close. There were topless showers, 
etcetera. I think M ... really did make love to S... in any 
case he had to marry her shortly afterward. In future years 
M ... was to become a right royal pain in the proverbial. He and 
S ... used to visit us unpredictably, and given the incredibly 
egotistical way that .he used to flaunt his opinion on whatever 
subject, I came to dread the times he would come to visit. 
Powered along by a king-size inferiority complex he ultimately 
ended up in Tara having tried to kill himself. I discovered him 
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there quite by chance whilst visiting with a choir singing 
Christmas carols. It seems strange that I should come to hate 
this man, who introduced me to my wife, so much. 
I wonder why I fell in love with G .... I think it was not so 
much because of sexual attraction, but more simply because she 
was available. I just couldn't get close to anyone else - I was 
always rejected. Even though I have left her now, perhaps I owe 
at least this much that she was indeed available, and that 
buffered me from some of the problems that I had accumulated 
during my childhood years. 
My work as a civil engineer lasted for three years. I worked 
for the city council of Johannesburg. It was horrendously 
boring until the third year, when I worked for the construction 
division. I aimed for authority but was hopelessly immature 
which sometimes resulted in pure embarrassment, such as the time 
when I -- as an employee of the council -- advised a member of 
the public to consult his city councillor on a matter on which 
he was dissatisfied, which he did, and which backfired on me 
because in advising him to do so I had compromised the work the 
Council wanted to accomplish. 
During this 3-year period I did some astronomy and applied 
mathematics studies at UNISA and simultaneously registered at 
WITS for a Master of Science in optimisation of structures. The 
former studies went quite well, the latter disastrously -- I did 
nothing. How could I possibly have done all this -- whilst 
doing a full-time job at the same time? Not even an 
intellectual superman could do all this - not if he could not be 
stable and reasonably self-reassured emotionally. 
At the conclusion of this three-year period it is normal 
practice for the engineer to apply for registration as a 
professional engineer. I spurned this entirely and went back to 
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university, having found real-life civil'engineering to be an 
entirely boring exercise. No wonder. I wasn't all there. Some 
part of me only ever got a chance to dream, nothing more. 
At the conclusion of my Civil Engineering studies I was courting 
G.... I married her in July 1975. K ... , my brother, was my 
best man and D. . . W. . . and K. . . c. . . my two groomsmen. I 
considered it inevitable or necessary to have a stag party -- in 
retrospect, I just do not know why. So I organised it myself. 
If I had not done so, it would not have happened. I wanted to 
be a man, I suppose, even if it meant pretending that these guys 
were my hearty friends. I was duly sick. I had had my party. 
When I got married, I must admit I felt really happy on the day. 
I did not feel so very self-conscious, and I spoke easily when I 
addressed everyone. On our way to honeymoon in Durban, G ... and 
I stayed at the Jan Smuts holiday inn overnight, catching a 
plane in the morning. We made love 4 times in one night. What 
a breakthrough it seemed for me! 
The wedding day had been a peaceful and a happy one. During the 
honeymoon, however, there was a distinct cooling off. I think 
we were still very much in love, but there was just a touch of 
something missing. 
Since leaving the City Council I returned to university, to 
simultaneously 
to lecture to 
study towards a M.Sc in Applied Mathematics and 
first and second year students. The studying was 
disastrous, and I failed one critical subject that I could not 
repeat. I withdrew my registration and registered for an Honours 
B.Sc. at Unisa instead. Now this was plain sailing, and I 
passed all the required thirteen modules (ten postgraduate plus 
three undergraduate) in a single year. Not bad, quite an 
achievement, in fact. 
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During my lecturing years at Wits I sometimes lost students to 
other lecturers giving the same subject, at other times gaining 
confidence in material I was presenting for the second or third 
time. Perhaps I was learning some humility on the one hand, and 
a bit of courage coupled with dogged determination on the other. 
After three years of lecturing, however, I became a little bored 
with academic life. I wanted to get out into the real world, 
and earn some real money. I joined Anglo Alpha, which was a 
disastrous decision. They practiced a kind of intellectual 
dishonesty which they passed off as statistically derived 
information. 
I resigned and joined Dunswart Steel. There I worked for a chap 
by the name of B.... He was at least genuine, if a little 
misguided. We had some friction because he used to 
magnanimously pass off his foolish ideas as mine. 
I went to Olivetti. I had been recruited by a charismatic 
individual who believed me to also be charismatic. Great minds 
think alike. His first assignment was for me to spy on rival 
companies posing as a potential customer. I hated the job, but 
I did it all the same. He was fired about one month after I 
joined Olivetti. I was left as the product manager of a range 
of computers launched three months even before the official 
launch at Olivetti head office in Italy. But even so I did have 
a little success there. The product budget was adjusted 
downwards so we made a small profit. I transferred to a new 
subsidiary of Olivetti, namely Nikuv Computers. The work was 
technical. I did OK. The company went bust after nine months. 
I joined Isis. 
The MD of Isis wanted us all to be like a family. It was 
virtually compulsory to go to the tearoom at 10h00 and 15h00 
every day. I remember going in there, feeling incredibly shy, 
and also with the strange feeling that I had a peculiar kind of 
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myopia that made the people on the other side of the room appear 
to be a little blurred. Most often, I did not go at all. I have 
been working at Isis for eight years now. During that time I 
have become far more open with my ideas, and even able to 
control meetings with several people all wanting to go off at a 
tangent, but nevertheless I have been able to stay in control. 
The work has varied from technical to management (on a small 
scale), and has varied from being peaceful to quite traumatic. 
I have seldom been bored. The people are good technically and 
mostly very kind-hearted. I like them. 
So, married life proceeded. Initially I was still very much in 
the psychological grip of my parents, in the sense that I would 
tell them with great enthusiasm of my plans for the future. 
These plans were always intended to demonstrate my ability to 
inevitably forge ahead and rise above everyone else. Our 
daughter E... was born in 1984. G ... 's enthusiasm for 
love-making steadily diminished over the years. 
In trying to make progress in terms of house-building, I began a 
fairly ambitious plan to extend the house. Because it seemed 
that we didn't really have enough capital, initially I did all 
the skilled work myself. G ... provided only token help, not 
really getting going on Saturday and Sunday mornings so that I 
used to get the children and the workers fed before beginning 
what would often turn out to be a day's work in which 
frustratingly little progress would be made. All the same, I 
did quite a significant chunk of house - three rooms - all by 
myself. I think she didn't go along with the idea of building. 
I used to blame her for my plight because her income was so 
small, in the belief that it was our narrow income-to-expenses 
ratio that made it necessary for me to do the building work 
myself. It also seemed sometimes 
disregard for straight lines, and 
tried to help, often causing more 
that it was beyond womanly 
plain common sense, when she 
effort in the long run than 
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would have been the case if I had just done the job myself from 
the beginning. In situations where she would have to approve 
work or negotiate on the family's behalf, she would often 
under-represent our interests and make costly mistakes. So did 
I, of course, but she seemed to make more than I did; and I 
suffered the consequences not only of my own but always of her 
mistakes as well. It was beastly. 
Eventually, in about 1987, I relented and stopped my nagging and 
criticising. But it was too late. She had formed a hard and 
fast impression that I hated her working for enjoyment and 
convenience rather than for money, and no amount of reassuring 
could reverse that impression. I was only being tolerant of 
that anyway. Our love-making had become sterile, and only took 
place on a Sunday night if she wasn't too tired, after I'd been 
slaving like a dog all day anyway and she hadn't. A deadly 
loop. Work harder, play less ... and so work harder, and play 
even less. 
She did have some reasons for not feeling like making love, I 
suppose. Our second child, K ... , was born in 1987 and was an 
incredibly difficult child suffering from an allergy to milk. 
He used to keep G ... up most nights for several years. I didn't 
help much, since I used to sleep through his cries. 
Several times, I used to say to G ... that I thought something 
was wrong. I guess my attitude was very one-sided on my own 
behalf, but at least I was trying to say something. I used to 
get a stony look, with no questions or responses. Nothing, 
absolutely nothing, would happen from her side. I was unable to 
formulate my problems, but I tried; and she seemed unwilling to 
listen. 
What was even more significant, G ... and I began to lose touch 
generally; she was more interested in her science fiction, and I 
was more and more preoccupied 
was beginning to have. Only 
common interest for us both. 
enough. 
252 
with some meditative experiences I 
the Lodge (Rosicrucians) held a 
But in the long run, it was not 
Our marriage had taken place in the Methodist Church, and I 
think G ... and I were both very sincere about it all. We had 
one specific experience - a weekend in the Magaliesberg during 
which I felt very peaceful, very close to God. And I think she 
experienced it too. But although it seemed pleasant enough to 
go to the Sunday night church services, the minister and the 
congregation started bullying us to be more committed. 
It was during my three-year stint with the City Council, working 
as an engineer-in-training, that I encountered I ... G ... , who 
introduced me to the Rosicrucians. It was not so much that he 
offered to introduce us, but that I sensed a romantic attraction 
to a philosophy full of mystery, in which I would be free to 
pose whatever questions I might choose. It was very much due to 
this enthusiasm on my part that got G ... and me involved with 
the Rosicrucians. Intuitively, it just seemed to me to be the 
right thing to do. 
G ... attuned quite well with the Rosicrucians, although it was 
mostly for me. I held several offices: Guardian, Chaplain, 
Secretary, Master, and G ... several also, including Master. 
This mystical career has for each of us · so far lasted for 
sixteen years. It represents a significant force in my becoming 
what I have become. The heavy involvement at Lodge required me 
to overcome my inherent nervousness so many times. I used to 
enjoy the philosophical debates, in fact any opportunity to 
demonstrate my superior understanding. I even wrote, and read, 
several discourses. I liked to impress others in this way. For 
once I had some respect. During the ritual dramas, I would 
enjoy being impressive. 
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But this mystical career was by no means purely intellectual. I 
certainly did become psychologically stronger, and more able to 
deal with others. Not that I have no room for improvement, now; 
but my abilities in this regard improved by an order of 
magnitude compared with what they had been previously. I even 
presided as the Master at a funeral ceremony. Quite an 
experience. During the convocations, and the initiations, as 
well as during private meditations, I began to feel a current of 
energy, surging through me. 
This was exciting to me, since I believed that at last something 
was happening to me, that I was changing and therefore evolving. 
I used to push this experience to the limits, boosting it 
through intensive meditations, and feeling disappointed if I had 
a meditation during which I could not feel this energy. 
In August 1990, I had what I call the Kundalini experience. 
This term is derived from eastern mysticism, and to my knowledge 
the phenomenon is not recognized in western culture; I have only 
recently found vague references to it in the Rosicrucian 
doctrine. Even if I had read about it, however, I don't think I 
would have been prepared for what was to happen to me; suffice 
it to say for now that it resulted in the fundamental substance 
of my personality undergoing irreversible change. Whether this 
was a spiritual experience, or not, is very simply besides the 
point. As a result of it, I could no longer stand being with my 
wife, becoming attracted instead to L ... , and adventurous in the 
extreme ... a warrior who had suddenly come to life. 
From September 1990 onwards I experienced a severe inability to 
concentrate which lasted six months. During that time L ... 
gradually withdrew, and one time even deliberately sabotaged my 
first-ever job as a project manager. 
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Initially the Kundalini energy gave me such a sex drive that I 
made love to G ... frequently, far more frequently than before. 
But it was a purely sexual aspect of the relationship. I 
needed, and she was willing, only 
Gradually this new-found sex urge died 
could not even come to orgasm. 
too willing, to give. 
down to the point where I 
I wrote several discourses. I think that they are significant 
in that they highlight my preoccupation with the distant and 
ethereal. They covered topics such as the origin of the 
universe, including a refutation of the Big Bang theory, Love 
and Karma, the role of the ego in spiritual development, and 
true self-knowledge. Not that I truly knew myself. After an 
incredibly long period of time twenty months -- only one of 
these discourses has been approved by the Rosicrucians; possibly 
because, in the opinion of the higher officers of the Order, 
they represent heretical and egocentric (highly individualistic) 
views. I was deeply offended, as if my own identity was 
dependent upon getting recognition for having written something 
very clever. Which they probably are, anyway. 
I encountered severe problems at work, cornered between a stupid 
old hen and my boss, who was sympathetic towards her but even 
more stupid. My health declined and I developed an inner ear 
infection as well as Mennier's syndrome, which resulted in me 
experiencing motion sickness even whilst lying absolutely still 
on the bed. I became so weak and dehydrated I was taken to 
hospital by ambulance. The pain in my ears was incredible. 
This happened in July 1991. As a result of the long-term 
effects of this, as well as the other factors, I was asked to 
step down as project manager. 
It was when I was on my hospital bed that I made my decision to 
leave the marriage. Somehow I believed that my illness was 
purely psychosomatic, and that such a decision was what my 
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subconscious mind wanted. When G ... visited me in hospital, 
which she very dutifully and faithfully did, I couldn't stand 
her coming near me -- I became very sensitive to the smell of 
her breath. I think the ear infection I had probably 
accentuated my sensitivity towards her halitosis. But whatever 
the causes, I made a decision which in spite of the most severe 
self-condemnation and self-questioning I have never wanted to 
change. I advised G ... and the children on my return home from 
hospital, that I was going to leave her. I started looking for 
accommodation as soon as I was physically able. I moved into 
another house in November 1991. 
I swept into a vindication phase, trying to exploit fully my 
philosophical insights so that they might in some way show that 
I was becoming a great man, and that G ... had just been a 
nuisance all along. The Kundalini, though dormant, had given me 
tremendous resources with which I thought I might impress the 
world. 
I tried to move quickly away from G ... , and find the archetypal 
woman with whom I would live ecstatically ever after. It was as 
curious as it was desperate. I would go through depressive 
phases, almost once per week only managing to get in to work at 
around 10h00. Fortunately I had transferred to another 
department and was surrounded by caring people, who did not see 
my Mr. Hyde. 
I could not bring myself to actually divorce G.... I kept on 
threatening to mostly to myself -- until October 1992. I 
think the reason was that I was unable to find any philosophical 
justification for doing this and so I believed that I was the 
guilty party, and that I was unworthy to negotiate with G ... in 
a way that might at least protect my own chances of a full life 
in the future. But eventually I did do so, and currently am in 
a state where all has been verbally agreed in the presence of 
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attorneys, so that the emotional deadlock, I think, is over now. 
By March 1993 I should be divorced and free. 
A few months after the Kundalini experience, in November 1990, I 
sought psychological counselling for the first time. I saw a 
psychologist in Kempton Park about six times or so. I got 
irritated with him because he believed that the Kundalini 
experience was invalid, and he would argue philosophically with 
me. Whether 
really know. 
my complaints about him are rational, I don't 
I think I was extremely impatient to get on with 
living, now that I was appreciating the significance of life for 
the first time; I only wanted confirmation that I was truly 
divine, perhaps, and that my life's mission could best be 
accomplished without G .... 
A few months later, in May 1991, I consulted a psychiatrist. He 
said some interesting things, and reviewed some of my writings. 
Having diagnosed hypergraphia, the clever chap, he proceeded to 
prescribe anti-depressants which I took for four weeks before I 
became thoroughly fed up with side-effects. He treated me as an 
object of clinical curiosity but I believe that he had nothing 
of significance to offer. Again, perhaps I wanted recognition 
as the philosopher who had discovered all the secrets of God and 
life, time and space. 
In July 1991 I consulted a psychiatric nurse. She certainly 
attempted to talk to me in terms I could understand. We never 
talked about philosophy, but touched on how I felt about G ... , 
and how I could minimise the effect of the separation on the 
kids. She adopted a slightly confrontational approach, making 
me genuinely express how I felt. I think I came to understand 
in depth, the effect of my upbringing. She wanted me to be 
comfortable with untidiness, to be aware of my depressive 
phases. I saw her seven times, and G ... saw her also. The last 
time I saw her, I expressed the intention to see a clinical 
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psychologist. This psychiatric nurse said that I should watch 
out for 'mind-f ... ers'. [You know, that word actually passed the 
auto-spelling checker. I had to try it, just out of curiosity. 
We are enlightened, aren't we!] G ... has maintained contact 
with her. 
And lastly, I have been seeing S ... G ... from November 1991 
until now. As a result I have come to confront and to 
acknowledge myself. Of particular significance is Santjie's 
conviction that I use my philosophizing to distance myself from 
others in relationships. In terms of loving myself, I am still 
somewhat of a beginner. 
My relationships 
November 1991, 
became concerned 
with 
I had 
that I 
women have been quite problematic. In 
a brief relationship with someone who 
was in fact still married, and she quite 
rightly did not want to become a consideration in causing or 
accelerating my intended divorce. In February I had a more 
extended relationship with an older women of 54 years, a very 
caring person, J.... I made love to her many times, and we had 
a fairly good relationship. But I could never free myself from 
the idea that such a relationship should not be visible to the 
outside world. J ... was an outstanding lover but from my point 
of view, sometimes quite irritating to talk to over the 
telephone. She was highly dependent upon me psychologically, 
and that worried me. The relationship ended with me trying to 
make love when I realised I didn't want to. 
I have been through another two girlfriends. My values are 
changing quite rapidly, including a definition of what 
constitutes a good relationship. I do not intend to have sexual 
relations with anyone unless I believe that a 
relationship will develop. May God help me 
choice, and to live my life to the full. 
sound long-term 
to make a good 
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Description of transformations 
In this section I have identified several events in my life, 
that I believe have had transformational content. 
Choked off by my mother 
Until age 4 I was quite cheeky towards my mother. Once she 
exploded in anger, telling me that I should stop it. This 
happened in the presence of my brothers. It had a profound 
effect upon me, as if from that moment in time, I realised that 
I wasn't protected by her anymore. I had to please her rather 
than just expect unconditional love. 
Not invited to L ... B ... 's party 
I wanted to be popular and could not understand why I had not 
been invited to Lorry Bean's birthday party, to which almost 
half the class had been invited. I gate-crashed the party, and 
was allowed to stay although I was reminded that I had not been 
invited. I was puzzled at not having been chosen as a prefect 
in grade 2. These experiences set the scene for the rest of my 
life, in that I would forever be wanting recognition and not 
getting it. 
I put sugar in Mrs R ... 's bed 
When I was in standard five, my parents went on long leave 
overseas and we had a Mrs R ... stay with us as a kind of hired 
mother. A friend of mine inspired me to put sugar in her bed. 
My eldest brother choked me off, as if he were father. I came 
to respect him as a kind of father image, and he came to respect 
me a lot less. I was twelve years old, he was nineteen. 
I caused some damage to my Dad's car 
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Once I inadvertently left one of the rear doors slightly open 
whilst my Dad was reversing the car out of the garage, this door 
swung open and caused some damage. Actually the damage was 
incredibly minor; two square inches of car bodywork were 
affected. But my father was extremely angry. I cried and 
cried. I became aware of just how important material things 
were, to the detriment of my own personal values. I had 
acquired his materialism. To this day my relationship with my 
father is not great. In fact, even quite recently he indicated 
his reluctance to visit me at my home, even though he went to 
G's house quite frequently. I have often been quite prepared to 
say to him, "go and find another son". 
The family was involved in a car accident 
At the start of Standard 7 I had an extremely traumatic 
experience. The family was involved in a car accident in which 
my mother's face ended up being very badly scarred. My father 
had driven into a stationary car in front of him. K ... , the 
middle brother, told me that I had pushed the passenger seat 
that my mother was sitting in from behind, and that was why she 
had hit her head on the windshield. Of course it was the 
momentum that did it. I was guilty anyway. 
Onset of puberty 
Once visiting C ••• I think that after swimming with her in the 
pool she peeped on me and saw me masturbating, though I had no 
idea that these feelings were linked to being around her. I 
didn't see her very much after that. 
I became unable 
absent-minded. 
to concentrate at 
N... and K ••• , my 
school and extremely 
brothers, caught me 
masturbating and reported this to my mother. She said to me 
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that they had said I did dirty things. I denied that I did. 
She caught me once herself after that, and pretended not to see. 
In my guilt I unfortunately swore on the Bible that I would 
never do it again, in the belief that daring God would scare me 
into doing the right thing. It didn't work. Possibly this oath 
influenced me in later life, to become somewhat of an outcast, a 
rebel, and a heretic. 
My father made my career decision for me 
During my army year I had an aptitude test. The result 
indicated that I should do architecture, aeronautical 
engineering, agricultural engineering. The last choice was 
civil engineering. My father convinced my to do civil 
engineering because it was the safest, most secure way for me to 
go. How sorry I am I let him impose his value system upon me, 
since I started my career on the basis of having a safe, secure 
job rather than one that might be fulfilling. A life was 
unfolding, which had a cul-de-sac sign at the start. 
I was caught by some confidence tricksters 
When I was at university, I was taken in by some confidence 
tricksters. They took R100 off 
fool. I told my mother but asked 
me in 1971 money. I felt a 
her not to tell my father. I 
lost confidence. The world threatened. 
I had an open fight with my boss at Dunswart 
I remember one particular incident in which I felt peculiar, 
like I had screw loose in my head. In retrospect this was an 
early firing of the Kundalini which was to erupt a few years 
later. I left the meeting at which my boss, B ... , had made a 
faux pas on my behalf, early, and went home. The next day I 
returned to work with a vengeance, with the intention of wiping 
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B ... off the face of the earth. I incited two other of his 
subordinates to rebel and move to other departments. Bob wasn't 
terribly pleased. In fact he fired me on the spot. His boss 
rescued me, however, and we all lived uneasily ever after, until 
I became bored again with Dunswart, since none of our work and 
recommendations were being accepted by the rest of the company. 
I suppose I learnt that it was possible to work with someone 
that I'd had the most terrible argument with. 
Mother's death 
My mother died at age 75. This is an event that is remarkable 
in that it did not upset me, as far as I knew. For a long time, 
I never even thought about my mother, nor did I obtain any 
photographs of her. I can't say I know why. I've wondered if 
my mother's death precipitated my Kundalini experience, in some 
way. Now sometimes I do see her image inside my head, 
especially when I'm making love or in some other way being close 
to a woman. I think of her face, as she must have looked when 
she was anything between forty and seventy. 
Experiences of ecstacy 
At one point in time I experienced the most profound ecstasy. 
It lasted for twenty minutes. It seemed to come with an 
incredibly simple message: It does not matter what you have 
done, and what you have not done; you are worthy, and you are 
loved. Thank God for this experience. In all my life, I had 
been desperately waiting for some kind of miracle, and this 
seemed to be it. 
This ecstasy recurred at intervals of time anything between 3 
and 12 months. I sometimes received psychic impressions and 
phrases beyond explanation via fantasy or coincidence, and which 
seemed significant in terms of what was happening to me. The 
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scene was set for the most profound mystical experience in my 
life, which was to occur in August 1990. The scene was set, I 
think, for my subconscious mind to generate the most significant 
transformative experience in my life - the Kundalini experience, 
probably intended specifically to boost me out of the marriage, 
which my conscious mind had no apparent intention of doing. The 
balance of power between my subconscious and my conscious mind, 
had been fundamentally changed. And G ... , who had expressed her 
disapproval of what was going on, was to become a victim of this 
most powerful energy. So to speak. 
L ... and the Kundalini experience 
Regardless of my speculations as to what has caused this 
Kundalini experience, that it has occurred as a specific event 
is the surest thing in my whole life. Through it I became 
transformed in a short period of time from one state, to another 
state of being; virtually from one personality, to another. 
Even those who have viewed the resulting disruption in my life, 
are only to a very limited degree aware of the deep 
psychological changes that have taken place on the inside. 
The peculiar episode of events was heralded on August 19th by 
another waking dream, this time a vision of having a close 
relationship - at least telepathic, if not intimate - with a 
divorcee, named L ... , also employed at Isis. The same day I 
attended a seminar at which she was also present. Puzzled at my 
own attraction to this woman, and also by a feeling of alienness 
that I felt with respect to my very own self, I nevertheless 
enjoyed every moment of being with her. L ... and I never made 
love, but we often talked during the next few months. I think 
that after a while she withdrew from having any kind of 
relationship with me, in order not to be responsible for the 
breakup of my marriage. 
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Within a few days of the seminar, I began to say things to G ... 
that I would never have contemplated saying to her before. It 
seemed as if my subconscious mind was doing all the talking, and 
what it said wasn't nice. I tried to analyse the difference 
between G ... and L ... , and G ... caught me red-handed doing it on 
the computer. 
By September 9th, I began to wonder what this strange episode 
was all about. It was a Saturday afternoon, and I lay on the 
bed, looking out of the enormous windows at the beautiful blue 
sky, the bright white clouds, the patterns of sunlight, the 
green of the garden. I was happy to be there, and to receive 
all this visual beauty in all its intensity. I thought that 
this episode was over, interesting and enlivening as it had been 
up to then. I did not know how wrong I was. 
That night, I meditated from 23h00 to 24h00. It was a very 
powerful meditation, in which I managed to create and sustain a 
tingling sensation in all of my body. When I went to bed, the 
doorway started to move around - as if I was drunk. I stood up, 
went to the toilet just to do something, and came back to bed. 
Then these vibrations began similar to what I had created and 
sustained during meditation, but this time totally beyond my 
instigation and also my control. I said to G ... to pray for me. 
She said yes and rolled over and feel asleep, I think very much 
unaware of what my real needs were at the time. These vibrations 
covered my entire body, from head to toe. I was quite scared. 
I felt as if my soul would be carried away by some dark unseen 
force. I prayed to every living soul I knew. The vibrations 
were not unpleasant, in fact they were rather like an overall 
orgasm that lasted from three to four hours, non-stop. I did not 
sleep at all that night. I was not really tired in the morning. 
But I knew I had undergone a change to my psyche, and that I 
would never be the same person again. 
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As to L ... 's role in all this, I know she admired me and thought 
me intelligent. It seems amazing that someone else respecting 
me in this way could be sufficient cause for this transformative 
experience to have occurred. Perhaps there were other reasons, 
as well; I know that I admired and respected her very much, too. 
In retrospect, this experience, although it has so much in 
common with the experience of illumination in terms of eastern 
mysticism, can basically be thought of as the event of two 
different aspects of my personality that once were separated, 
becoming integrated. I forgave and welcomed my own demons back 
into myself if that makes any sense. It is as if I was 
integrated, and in a manner of speaking, came to life for the 
first time. The novelty of this experience made me unique; not 
only intrinsically, but also in my capitalising on it to try to 
achieve an even greater identity than the one I already had. 
Making love to a power-house 
I am a little embarrassed about this episode, but here it is. 
In December 1992 I went to the Buddhist Retreat in Ixopo. 
There, I had an entirely unintended sexual encounter with 
another older woman, very much like L ... , and also much older 
than myself. She was an incredible power-house, a person with 
multiple master's degrees in social psychology and management. 
At the time, I had been preoccupied with the fact that my sexual 
desire was steadily decreasing, and virtually non-existent; so 
when I was close to her, and realised that I actually had an 
erection, I was more than willing to go ahead with sexual 
intercourse. Unintended, whatever next? 
My experience of therapy 
By the time a friend of mine suggested that I seeS ... , I had 
already had a few attempts at getting help from other people. 
Firstly, I saw an analyst who gave every indication of getting 
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nowhere slowly. Secondly, I saw a psychiatrist who charged a 
fat fee for diagnosing depression and not much else. Thirdly, I 
saw a psychiatric nurse who really did help in the sense that I 
had someone who challenged me a little, and to whom I could turn 
for advice on how to approach certain problems, such as what to 
do about my children, but who could not get into the depth of my 
own personality. 
My expectations were that I could get an objective view as to 
what was happening to me, probably because I knew that something 
was very wrong in spite of my grandiose ideas of being divinely 
called, as it were. The therapist induced memories in me that 
were pretty uncomfortable, and in the early stages of therapy it 
often happened that when the session was over I would be driving 
my car with tears in my eyes, on my way home or returning to 
work. We dealt with several uncomfortable issues during the 
therapy. The therapist succeeded in clarifying a lot of my 
experiences so that I could understand them better. So I 
gradually acieved greater self-awareness. 
I need therapy for those 
what's happening, should 
cope. In my whole life I 
occasions when I feel overwhelmed 
I feel worthless again or unable 
really haven't had much by way 
by 
to 
of 
intimate and meaningful communication with other people. 
Therapy gives me a chance to get someone else's viewpoint 
regarding myself, to the point of confronting me where 
necessary. I hope to establish my own values. I need help in 
establishing criteria for what constitutes a good relationship 
and who would be a good choice for me to have a relationship 
with. 
I think that, in my case, therapy has come in the nick of time. 
In retrospect I realise that my life has been a progressive 
building-up of defence mechanisms, which might have become so 
strong that I might have successfully resisted as well as 
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rebuffed - any attempts from someone else to help me, and held 
myself safely within self-inposed isolation for who knows how 
long ... maybe even forever. 
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APPENDIX II 
FREDA'S SELF-NARRATIVE 
(This self-narrative was produced in Afrikaans, since this is 
Freda's medium of preference. After some deliberation I decided 
to present it in the original Afrikaans, since by translating it 
into English some of the intended meanings and nuances may 
inadvertently be altered.) 
MY LEWENSVERHAAL 
My Pa se agtergrond 
My Duitse Pa, F ... H ... , bet saam met sy twee broers en 'n 
suster na Suid-Afrika ge!mmigreer aan die einde van die vorige 
eeu. Hy simpatiseer met die Afrikaners en veg teen die Engelse 
in die Anglo-Boere-oorlog, word gevangene geneem en beland op 
Ceylon waar hy my oupa-grootjie, H ... N ... , bevriend en saam met 
hom terugkeer na die Vrystaat. Hy trou toe met my ouma -- 'mooi' 
A ... N ... en bulle bet vier kinders waarvan my pa die jongste 
was. 
My ouma se plasie is gedurende die Depressiejare onder bulle uit 
en my oupa gaan werk op die diamantmyne in Lichtenburg waar hy 
velkanker opdoen en hy sterf daaraan toe my pa-hulle nag redelik 
jonk was. Sy huwelik was klaarblyklik nie gelukkig nie my 
ouma was baie moeilik en hy meestal weg van die huis. My pa 
onthou hom as 'n soort skadufiguur. Vandag is daar net een 
familieportret en 'n ongemerkte graf in die begraafplaas op 
Frankfort van hom oar 
My pa-hulle bet ontsettend arm grootgeword en bulle is op skoal 
gespot oar bulle klere. Die oudste broer verlaat die skoal in 
standerd 7 en slaan pik om die gesin te help. In sy matriekjaar, 
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toe my pa 15 was, sluit hy aan by die Sewendedag Adventistekerk, 
na 'n reeks evangeliedienste op sy tuisdorp, Frankfort. Sy 
ontsteld en my ouma jaag hom uit die huis uit. 
in sy sak gaan hy na Helderberg Kollege (ons 
onderwysers is 
Met een pond 
kerkkollege in Somerset-Wes) om teologie te swot. Hy verkoop 
vakansies boeke en 
kafeteriakombuis om sy 
skaam en voel baie 
werk gedurende die jaar in die 
studies te betaal. Aanvanklik is hy baie 
uit tussen al die Engelse maar gaandeweg 
ontluik hy, word baie populer en klaspresident. Intussen word sy 
een broer, H ... , en sy rna ook Sewendedag Adventiste. Sy suster 
wat in Johannesburg verpleeg, verengels heeltemaal en verdwyn 
uit hulle lewens uit. 
My pa begin werk by die kerk se pers as vertaler en begin ook 
kortverhale skryf wat eerste pryse wen op Stellenbosch se 
Eisteddfods. Dan gaan boer hy saam met sy broer, H ... , en hulle 
skryf saam jeugverhale (gebaseer op hulle eie jeug), 
kortverhale, 'n novelle, 'n paar romans, ensovoorts, waarmee 
hulle die plaas afbetaal. Hulle het 'n baie hegte verhouding 
waarin my pa altyd my oom 'boost'. Hy doen dit die res van sy 
lewe as 'n soort kompensasie, dink ek. Blykbaar is hulle op 
skool saam in dieselfde klas gesit en my pa, wat die jongste 
was, het altyd beter presteer. 
My rna se agtergrond 
My oupa aan my rna se kant, J ... P ... , is 'n kleinkind van 
Andries Pretorius en Sarel Celliers. My rna het vandag die 
familiebybel. Hy is vroeg uit die skool om te boer, maar al sy 
ander broers en susters word dokters, predikante, onderwysers, 
ensovoorts. Sy familie is baie gekultiveerde en vroom mense. 
My ouma, 
gesiene 
jonger as 
F ... S ... , is die jongste en bedorwe dogter van 'n 
boer in die Tweeling distrik by sy tweede vrou wat baie 
hy is. My ouma verlaat die skool in st. 7 omdat sy nie 
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van die onderwyser hou nie en trou met my oupa op 
aandrang -- hy hou nie van haar Joodse kereltjie nie. 
twee dogters waarvan my rna, A ... J ... , die jongste 
vernoem na haar pa se rna en my ouma haal 
haar pa se 
Hulle het 
is. Sy is 
al haar 
minderwaardigheidsgevoelens jeens haar skoonfamilie op haar uit. 
(Sy het ryk grootgeword, maar haar familie is ruwe boere en nie 
gekultiveerde mense nie.) My rna haat vandag nog haar naam en ons 
noen haar G ... eerder as A .... 
My ouma het my rna ook gespot oor haar groot 'Petoorspote' (nr. 
7) en gedwing om te klein skoene te dra sodat haar 'pote' moes 
ophou groei. My ouma anders as haar man is baie 
onsimpatiek met die kinders se siektes en dissiplineer bulle op 
'n baie 'abusive' wyse. My oupa, egter, is baie sag, liefdevol, 
'caring', ensovoorts, en as hy tussenbeide tree wanneer sy vrou 
die kinders slaan, dan is daar eers drama! ('Sound familiar?') 
Die oudste dogter, E ... , is die appel van my ouma se oog en word 
tot vandag nog byna aanbid deur haar. 
Na matriek gaan my rna na Pretoria Universiteit toe om 
maatskaplike werk te swot maar sy skop op na 'n paar weke en 
gaan weer terug huis toe waar sy as 'n bankklerk werk vir vyf 
jaar. Sy gaan vyf jaar met my pa uit en trou op 23 met hom teen 
haar ouers se wense. 
Wat vir my interessant is, is dat albei my oumas oorheersend en 
'moeilik' was en dat hule albei bulle mans (vermoed ek) as 
swakkelinge beskou het. Albei oupas het uit gekultiveerde huise 
gekom en was sagte mense. My Duitse oupa vlug na die 'diggings' 
en my boere-oupa gaan werk in die handelshuis op die dorp en 
laat die boerdery grootliks aan my ouma oor. 
Albei oumas was kwaai en die dissiplineerders in die huis my 
rna se dissipline was net meer 'abusive', dink ek. My pa en rna 
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was albei die jongste kinders en albei neem besluite teen bulle 
ouers se wense; my pa was egter die 'favourite' en my ma nie. 
Daarin le nogal 'n groot verskil, dink ek. 
Karaktersketse van my ouers 
My pa is 'n warm, gemoedelike, sosiale mens wat baie 'caring' is 
en simpatiseer met die 'underdog'. Hy is ook 'n vurige vegter 
vir Afrikaans in sy kerk en is gevolglik as 'n boere-rebel 
beskou, maar is BAIE gewild onder sy studente en gemeentelede. 
Hy preek wonderlik, skryf interessant, is baie joviaal en 
grappig, en kan lag en huil. Hy is ook baie haastig, ongeduldig, 
onprakties, dominerend, veeleisend en geniet vroulike aandag! 
Hy is baie streng in sy godsdienstige opvattings maar is ook 
baie 'human' -- vertel stoute grappies, vat aan my ma se 'boobs' 
en is redelik 'tolerant' van 'weird' mense. Hy het seksuele 
dubbele standaarde wat my WOEDEND maak en waaroor ons baie 
baklei. Sy kombinasie van rigiditeit en 'humanness' verwar my 
redelik ek sukkel al my lewe lank om die 'physical' en 
'spiritual' bymekaar uit te bring en dis een van die redes 
waarom ek die kerk verwerp ek voel dat ek nie 'measure up to 
what is expected' nie. 
My ma is stiller, passiewer en laat my pa toe om haar te 
domineer en vir haar te dink. Sy bet geen lewe buiten hom nie en 
is totaal op sy behoeftes ingestem. Sy krop wel griewe op en 
ontplof dan op 'n dag --'in fact', sy raak heeltemaal beserk. 
Haar huishouding is baie ongeorganiseerd en my pa stel tot die 
'grocery'-lyste op. Sy brand gereeld die kos, lees tydskrifte, 
is dikwels in 'n dwaal, slaap sleg, bet baie kwale, maar kry 
weinig simpatie by my pa op die gebied. (As hy egter die dag 
siek is, kom die hele huishouding tot 'n 'standstill'.) Sy is 
baie stadig wat my pa en my erg frustreer. Sy leef heeltemaal in 
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sy skadu maar is ook die stille krag in sy lewe en bulle is lief 
vir mekaar vir 40 jaar van getroude lewe. 
Sy het weinig vriendinne of stokperdjies, het 'n lae selfbeeld, 
kan nooit 'n fout erken nie, is baie skaam en selfopofferend 
maar raak baie defensief en reaktief. Haar politieke idees dryf 
my tot raserny en sy veralgemeen verskriklik oor die 'Ingelse', 
die swartes, ensovoorts. Sy sukkel soms baie om haarself uit te 
druk en vra talle vrae as 'n vorm van gesprekvoering -- 'both of 
which drive me crazy'. Maar terselfdertyd voel ek 'n ontsettende 
deernis vir haar. 
My broer, F ... 
Op skool is hy 'n prefek, doen baie 
onderskeidings sonder om ooit te swot. 
sy fiets rond of is op die gholfbaan 
goed in sport en kry 4 
Hy is 'n dromer en ry op 
of tennisbaan. Na matriek 
loop hy 'n jaar medies op Stellenbosch maar doen baie swak 
die vryheid weg van die huis is een te veel vir hom. My pa is 
baie ontsteld en ek en my rna moet mooi praat om hom te kalmeer. 
My broer wou altyd 'n wildbewaarder word en het geleef vir 
vakansies wanneer ons na wildtuine gegaan het. My ouers wou niks 
weet hiervan nie. 
My broer besluit toe om ook Teologie op Helderberg Kollege te 
swot. Ongelukkig word hy altyd met my pa vergelyk, en omdat hy 
na my rna aard en stiller, sagter en minder dinamies as my pa is, 
kom hy die slegste daarvan af. Ek en hy en my neef, L ... , is 
baie 'close' tydens ons studentedae in die Kaap. Hy is 
aantreklik, goed versorg en gewild onder die meisies. Hy het 
twee vaste verhoudings voor hy verlief raak op 'n Engelse meisie 
van Zimbabwe -- wat baie na my lyk -- en trou met haar toe hy 22 
is en sy 19. Sy is fyn en tenger en nie baie gesond nie en het 
'n lisensiaat in klavier. Hulle woon in Oudtshoorn tydens sy 
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diensplig, trek later na Zimbabwe en weer terug Kaap toe. Hy 
behaal 'n MA-graad in Teologie deur ons kerk se universiteit in 
Amerika maar werk nou by die kerk se pers as redakteur en 
fotograaf (soos my pa ook vroeer). Sy vrou swot ook (deur Unisa) 
en maak twee seuntjies groot. Die gesin is 
net klassieke musiek, kyk nie TV nie en is 
Hulle bet ook weinig 
gehou nie en hou ook 
kontak met 
nie veel van 
ons sy 
ons nie. 
vegetaries, luister 
hipergodsdienstig. 
bet nie van my pa 
My broer bet baie 
'grievances' wat hy koester en verder is ons 'te materialisties, 
te werelds', ensovoorts. 
Hulle is baie lief vir mekaar maar wat my betref is dit 'n 
simbiotiese verhouding. Hulle versterk mekaar se 'insecurities' 
en 'hangups', laat min ander mense naby bulle toe, sy 'insist' 
om my broer se hare self te sny en dat by nie mag mooi aantrek 
of ' aftershave' gebruik nie. Hy lyk soos 'n sendeling deesdae. 
Sy dra mini-rokkies, lyk oulik en mooi. 
My suster, E ... 
Sy doseer fisioterapie aan die Universiteit van Stellenbosch en 
haar man is besig om te spesialiseer in Pediatrie. Sy is 
brandmaer, perfeksionisties, baie beheersd, rasioneel en 
'assertive' maar ook redelik 'introverted', nie baie spontaan 
nie, minder 'compassionate', redelik rigied, goed georganiseerd, 
trek elegant aan ('understated chic') en bet baie goeie smaak in 
haar huis en tuin en weet hoe om my swaer te hanteer -- na 'n 
aanvanklik ontstuimige en selfs gewelddadige aanpassingstydperk. 
Sy bet glo in 'n stadium bedreig gevoel deur my. Sy't gedink ek 
is slimmer (seker my pa se skuld want by bet so gedink) en meer 
spontaan en meer 'likeable'. Ek was ook baie maerder as sy en al 
was sy baie 'sexier', bet dit haar gepla. Ek bet haar ingelig 
oor die 'birds' en die 'bees' en haar gewaarsku oor wat om te 
verwag van mans sodat sy nie so na!ef soos ek die wereld sou 
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ingaan nie. Sy is baie deur my idees en smaak beinvloed. Ek bet 
haar ook fisies beskerm toe my rna 'n paar keer teenoor haar bbk 
in onbeheerste woedes uitgebars bet. Dit bet egter nie so 
dikwels gebeur nie want sy was minder 'cheeky' as ek en ook my 
rna se 'kleintjie'. 
Op skool bet sy baie goed presteer, was 'n prefek, bet 3 jaar na 
mekaar die redenaarsbeker gewen en was baie gewild onder die 
seuns. Toe sy Stellenbosch toe is en op Helderberg Kollege begin 
inwoon bet, bet sy egter baie verander. Die kollege mense bet 
gedink sy is baie wild omdat sy baie 'sexy' was, modern 
aangetrek bet, ensovoorts, en bet haar so behandel. Op 
universiteit is bulle ge-'pressurize' op akademiese gebied en sy 
bet chemie ge-'plug' en moes die hele jaar herhaal. Gevolgens 
bet sy begin glo dat sy dom is en bet onseker van haarself 
geraak, asook baie stil. 
Sy bet twee vaste verhoudings gehad met 'unsuitable' ouens tot 
sy besluit bet om met swaer te trou omdat by baie goeie 
troumateriaal is, eerder as wat sy so mal oor hom was. 
Sy wil glad nie graag kinders he nie maar haar man wil. Verder 
is sy baie geheg aan my en my rna en bel ons elke Sondag, maar 
huiwer ook nie om ons uit te skel nie! Sy is die middelpunt van 
haar eie wereldjie -- haar man en beste vriendin bet geen ander 
vriende nie en is byna volkome afhanklik van haar. Sy, egter, 
bet ander vriendinne en is redelik selfstandig. Haar finansies 
reguleer sy met 'n ysterhand en sy was nog nie naastenby in 
soveel moeilikheid soos ek nie -- nie finansieel of emosioneel 
nie! 
My verhaal 
My pa was 33 en my rna 23 toe bulle getroud is in 1952. Haar 
ouers was daarteen gekant omdat my pa 'n 'ouitser' was en 'n 
274 
Sewendedag Adventis -- bulle was 'klipdoppers' en trots op bulle 
Voortrekkerafkoms. My rna het na die troue 'n lidmaat van die 
SDA-kerk geword en is daarvoor onterf deur haar ouers. 
My ouers se eerste huweliksjaar was traumaties. Hulle het in een 
huis gewoon saam met my pa se broer, H ... , en sy nuwe vrou (hy 
is drie dae na my pa getroud, op 35, met 21-jarige meisie) en 
daar was baie jaloesie en onenigheid as gevolg van my pa en sy 
broer se te hegte verhouding en 'n wedywering tussen die 
vrouens. My pa los toe die plaas met al die implemente vir my 
oom en gaan terug Helderberg Kollege toe waar hy 'n BA-graad 
deur Unisa begin loop. Ek is daar 'conceive' en word die 
volgende jaar op Heidelberg, Transvaal, gebore waar my pa toe 
plaasvoorman by die kerk se hoerskool is en aangaan met sy 
studies. 
My pa was verskriklik in sy skik dat ek 'n dogtertjie was en het 
oorgeloop van trots op my. Hy het later in sy boeke selfs 
daaroor geskryf. 'I was his delight'. 
My eerste vyf jaar op Sedave onthou ek nie veel van nie -- net 
'n paar insidente en wat my rna my kon vertel. Ek het glo geweier 
om geborsvoed te word en my rna weggestoot as sy my ge-'hug' het 
(te styf, as ek reg onthou). Toe ek twee is, is my boetie, F ... , 
gebore en ek was baie jaloers. Hy was baie soet en 'beautiful' 
en my rna se 'delight'. Hy wou niks by ons vat nie, my rna moes 
alles vir hom doen. Ons het gestry oor na wie ons aard, met 
'obvious' voorkeure. 
Verder onthou ek ons huisbediende, T ... , my ouma, 'Gran' (aan my 
pa se kant) wat vir 'n paar weke per jaar vir ons kom kuier het, 
my nefies en van die skoolkinders. Ek het een maatjie gehad, 
M .... Ons het seksuele speletjies gespeel. 'Sabbatskool' was die 
hoogtepunt van die week. Ons was vegetaries en baie streng 
godsdienstig elke week in die kerk, geen radio/koop/werk, 
ensovoorts 
ensovoorts, 
op Saterdae 
ensovoorts. 'n 
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nie, elke 
Hoenderhaan 
a and 
bet 
'n 
my 
Bybelstorie, 
glo eenkeer 
onderstebo geskop en sy kop bet 'n paar minute later gewaai! (My 
pa.) My rna bet vir my mooi rokkies gemaak maar my gedwing om 
juis die een waarvan ek nie hou nie aan te trek! Nog 'n boetie 
is gebore toe ek 4 is, maar by is na 4 dae oorlede. My rna bet 
Duitse masels gedurende die swangerskap gekry by Oom H ... se 
kinders (nog 'n wrok teen bulle, vir haar) en die seuntjie se 
dunderm was iets mee fout sodat by niks kos kon inneem of 
verteer nie. Ons was baie hartseer en ek onthou hoe my boetie in 
sy kissie gelyk bet. My pa bet dit egter nie so erg soos my rna 
gevoel nie. Sy bet self sy grafsteentjie gemaak. 
Blykbaar was ek as kleinkind baie ekstroverties, spontaan, 
afwyserig en baasspelerig, asook selfsugtig met my speelgoed en 
MAL oor my pa. Ek onthou egter 'n minder aangename ervaring met 
hom -- ons was by die see en ek sien 'n stomp en dink dis 'n 
haai (seker my rna se vrese en waarskuwings wat dit veroorsaak 
bet) en skree blou moord en weier om in die water te gaan maar 
my pa forseer my. My rna en pa bet heelwat argumente oor sulke 
goed gehad sy is bang en versigtig en by wil dit weer uit ons 
kry met geweld. Verder bet bulle baklei oor familie, meesal oor 
sy broer. 
Verder onthou ek nie veel van hierdie tydperk nie. Ek onthou my 
pa se duiwe, veldblommetjies wat ons gepluk bet en 'n kwaai bul 
in 'n kamp agter ons huis. Dis omtrent al. 
Toe ek so 5 jaar was, verhuis ons na Helderberg Kollege, 
Somerset-wes, waar my pa Afrikaans doseer en besig is met 'n Ma-
verhandeling op Stellenbosch onder DJ Opperman. 
Die Kaap is vir my wonderlik mooi en die kollege kampus is teen 
die hange van die Helderberg, 'n paar kilometers van die strand, 
kyk oor Tafelberg en bet pragtige borne, al die bure is 
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Amerikaans of Engels. My pa stuur my op ses jaar na 'n 
Afrikaanse laerskool op Somerset-Wes maar haal my na 'n paar 
weke weer uit die skool en skryf my in by die laerskool op 
Helderberg waar ek 'n Amerikaanse onderwyseres bet wat nie 'n 
woord Afrikaans kan praat nie. Die kinders bet glo 'Afrikaner 
vrot banana' vir my gesing, my rna dwing my om langbroeke aan te 
trek as gevolg van chroniese mangelontsteking wat ek kry en die 
ander kinders se die heidens. Ek was dus redelik UIT! 
My laerskoolrapporte se ek is skaam, baasspelerig en bet 'n 
gebrek aan inisiatief (die Afrikaanse laerskool was BAlE streng 
en het glad nie inisiatief aangemoedig nie) maar ek doen baie 
goed en moet altyd die 'stadiger' kinders help. Die skoal bet 'n 
paar boelies wat ek haat en my broer en sy maatjies spot my oor 
my ontluikende borste in standerd 2 maar andersins gaan dit 
'okay'. Ek bet een goeie maatjie B ... en twee of drie 
'boyfriend'-jies wat vir my liefdesbriefies skryf, huisie-huisie 
saam met my speel en my soen. Die soene is opwindend en my hart 
bans en my wange brand maar ek voel ook skuldig -- hoekom weet 
ek nie. Ek lees ontsettend baie, tot 15 boeke per week, en vorm 
bendes met my broer se maatjies. Ons bet boomhuise, geheime 
plekke in die bos, ensovoorts, wat baie 'exciting' is. 
Die bure se kinders en ek speel etlike kere dokter-dokter. My rna 
vang ons uit een keer en bet ons seker uitgeskel want ek onthou 
ek bet gehuil en my neus is toegepoeier voor my pa sou huis toe 
kom sodat hy nie sou weet nie (miskien wou ek nie he hy moes 
weet nie). Maar ek was lank agterdogtig dat sy hom dalk wel 
vertel bet daarvan. Kinders by die skool bet my ook vertel van 
seks/voortplanting en ek was 'horrified' om te dink my ouers sou 
so iets doen. Ek bet ons huisbediende daarna uitgevra en sy het 
net gese ek sou anders daaroor voel as ek eendag groat is. Nie 
'n slegte antwoord nie! 
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In die stadium bet ek gedink my maatjies en juffrou is wonderlik 
en my pa en ma en ekself, dink ek --is minder 'nice'. Dit 
was ook nie vir my lekker dat my pa 'n annie was op die kampus 
nie want al die rebelse kinders was teen die onnies gekant. In 
standerd 2 bet ek die eerste keer liedjies van die Beatles 
gehoor by die ander kinders. 
In standerd 3 presteer ek so goed dat die prinsipale besluit ek 
moet standerd 4 'spring'. Gedurende die Desembervakansie moes my 
ouers my breuke (nagmerrie!) en Geskiedenis en Aardrykskunde 
leer, ek skryf 'n eksamen in Januarie, slaag dit met 90% en is 
dan skielik in standerd 5. Ek kry twee nuwe maatjies in hierdie 
jaar, menstrueer vir die eerste keer (baie erg vir my) en raak 
MAL oor perde. My pa koop vir my 'n perd en maak vir hom 'n 
stal, ek sluit aan by 'n ponieklub en ry saam met ander kinders. 
Ek verslind boeke oor perde en maak selfs plakboeke oor bulle. 
Ek maak ook self die perd en die stal skoon, voer die perd 
daagliks en dis heerlik. 
Ek swem baie en lees nog steeds 'voraciously'. My ouma 'Gran' 
aan my pa se kant is oorlede in my standerd 5 jaar en ek kry 
haar Bybel en haar horlosie. In hierdie jaar het ek die eerste 
'fight' met my vriendin, L ... , en haar ma -- ons onderwyseres --
roep ons saam in en bid vir ons oor die saak. Ek is 'moved' maar 
sy lag daaroor. Ek is hipergodsdienstig en baie ongemaklik met 
my eie lyf. Ek weier om 'n bra te dra tot in standerd 8. 
In standerd 6 luister ek skelm popmusiek en rook agapanthus-
stammetjies gestop met dennenaalde. Dis stout en 'fun'. Ek skeer 
my beenhare met my pa se skeermes en my ma spoeg op my toe sy 
dit uitvind. Ek koop 'n botteltjie ligpienk naellak maar my ma 
gooi dit in die vuur toe sy dit ontdek om te wys wat sy daarvan 
dink. Ek sny my lang blonde hare af in 'n kort 'Twiggy' styl en 
almal noem my Twiggy. 
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Ek besit net twee rokke en twee paar skoene. Vakansies werk ek 
in die kafeteria vir 'n bietjie sakgeld. Ander vakansies kuier 
ons by my ouma en oupa P ... op die plaas. Ek voel my ma is 
outyds en ek raak redelik modern en skoonheidsbewus, maar voel 
minderwaardig teenoor van die ander gewilder meisies in die 
skoal. My beste vriendin is w .•. en ek ken haar vandag nog. My 
Engelse onderwyseres maak 'n vreeslike 'fuss' oor my omdat ek as 
Afrikaanssprekende die beste presteer in 'n Engelse skoal. Sy 
toets my leesspoed en se ek lees teen die spoed van 'n volwasse 
tersiere student en gee my allerhande ekstra opdragte. Ek 
verslind al die Engelse boeke op die biblioteek se rakke -- Jane 
Austin, Charles 
Heights' lees ek 
Dickens, die Bronte's, 
seker ses keer en huil 
ensovoorts. 'Wuthering 
my elke keer katswink 
(obsessiewe liefde, intensiteit, ontoepaslike liefde, 
'heartache' ... ). Ek kry ook my laaste pak slae in standerd 6 
my ma takel my met 'n kasplankie en ek skop haar weg, sy se my 
pa aan om my met 'n belt te slaan en ek staan doodstil sander om 
'n traan te start. My pa besluit toe ek is te oud om nog pakke 
te kry. 
Ek kry dikwels sinusaanvalle tot die dokter bevind ek is 
allergies vir perdehare. Die perd moet toe verkoop word en ek 
praat in my slaap daaroor en kry nagmerries. Ek kry ook vir die 
eerste keer 'n migraine-hoofpyn die dag voor my graad 4 
musiekeksamen en dop die eksamen. My pa se ek hoef nie meer 
musiekeksamens af te le nie en daarna speel ek net vir my eie 
plesier op die Hofmeyer vleuelklavier wat my pa vir my gekoop 
bet in sy armoede. 
In standerd 7 verhuis ons na Benoni want my pa besluit 
uiteindelik om die bediening te betree en word soontoe beroep. 
Ek gaan na die Afrikaanse staatskool en moet skielik als in 
Afrikaans leer. Ek bet 'n 'nice' maatjie, C ... , maar voel ontuis 
in die groepie by wie sy pauses sit en raak baie stil en in 
myself gekeer. Tuis bet ek geen sosiale lewe nie. Ons woon die 
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kerk se sosiale funksies by maar ek voel baie lomp, selfbewus en 
skaam met die seuns. My pa !ewer gedurig kommentaar hieroor en 
dit maak my nog meer selfbewus. Niemand mag aan my raak nie 
1
nie eens my broer nie of ek kry die stuipe. 
'n Outjie stel wel in my belang en my pa is baie verlig want, se 
hy, hy het nie geweet of ek aantreklik vir mans sal wees nie. 
Die opmerking maak my geweldig seer. 
In standerd 8 verhuis ons weer eens na Randfontein op die Wes-
Rand. Daar maak ek drie goeie vriendinne. Ek begin weer 'relax' 
en geniet die skoollewe sowel as die kerk se sosiale funksies. 
Ek eksperimenteer met kleredrag en begin 'blue jeans' dra tot my 
ouers se ontsteltenis. Ek en my rna baklei soms verskriklik en ek 
sny een dag al haar belts stukkend met 'n sker. 
Standerd 9 was 'n jaar waarin ek meer aandag aan my skoolwerk 
begin gee het maar ek het nooit baie hard gewerk nie -- my pa 
het gese hy wil ons nie 'pressurize' om te presteer nie. 'n 
Outjie in ons kerk, D ... , begin by my kuier en leer my soen. Hy 
los my vir 'n ruk en kuier by 'n ander meisie in die kerk. Ek is 
nogal hartseer en my rna koop vir my 'n horlosie en troos my soos 
wat sy do en wanneer ek siek is. Ek is verstom deur haar 
'kindness'. Hy begin na 'n paar weke weer by my kuier as of niks 
ooit verkeerd was nie en gee my sy ring om te dra. 
In my matriekjaar is hy nie meer tevrede om my te soen nie, maar 
begin vry ook. Ten spyte van my fantasiee is ek totaal onkant 
gevang, fisies siek vir twee dae wat is verkeerd met ~ dat 
hy sulke dinge met my doen? Maar ek is nie in staat om myself 
hieroor te 'assert' nie. Seks is nooit met my bespreek nie en in 
'n huis wat deur wat totaal deur my pa gedomineer is ('Kinders 
het nie 'n wil van hulle eie nie', het hy altyd gese) en waar 
enige selfgeldendheid aan my kant as 'cheek' deur my rna beskou 
is ('Jy sal nog in die hel brand omdat jy nie jou moeder eer 
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nie', ensovoorts) was 'assertiveness' nie een van my sterk punte 
nie. Verder bet ek gedurig by die kerk gehoor -- 'Jesus first, 
others second, myself last'. 
My skuldgevoelens en tranedal het egter my kereltjie se beter 
kant na vore gebring en by bet belowe om dit 'nooit' weer te 
doen nie. Oor die volgende paar maande bet ons baie nader gekom 
aan mekaar en baie verlief geraak. Ek bet heeltemaal uit my 
'introverted' dop gekruip en ure met hom gesels, tot my pa se 
verbasing. Na 'n paar maande bet ons weer begin vry, maar 
hierdie keer wou ek dit doen, ten spyte van my skuldgevoelens. 
Ons bet baie baklei omdat by so besitlik was. Hy bet my oorlaai 
met geskenke, briewe, gedigte, boeke, plate, maar wou my nie die 
spasie gun om ander vriende ook te he nie. Hy was ook emosioneel 
manipulerend en bet later gedreig om sy studies op te skop of 
selfmoord te pleeg as ek hom sou los. 
My universiteitsjare op RAU was intellektueel baie opwindend --
ek bet gevoel daar is WeRELDE om te ontdek in boeke -- maar nie 
sosiaal opwindend nie. Ek was 'n dagstudent en bet by my ouers 
bly woon, en was dus ver van my ander vriende af. Ek bet my 
kamer begin mooi maak, altyd vars blomme uit die tuin gepluk, 
gegeurde kerse gebrand, gemediteer, baie musiek geluister en 
poesie gelees en soos 'n 'hippie' aangetrek. Ek bet swart 
lipstiffie en naellak gebruik, 'cheesecloth' rokke, John Lennon 
sonbrilletjies, maxi-rompe gedra en my bra weggegooi. Ek bet ook 
in my kamer gedans op die maat van 'rock'-musiek en Janis Joplin 
op top volume gesit as ek op my rebelste gevoel bet of woedend 
was vir my rna. (Ek en sy bet nog baie baklei.) 
In my finale jaar maak ek uiteindelik uit met D ... en voel baie 
verlig en vry. Ek gaan bly in Melville by 'n vriendin en haar 
ouers, want my ouers verhuis na Nelspruit. Ek en sy raak 
boesemvriendinne en doen alles saam -- rook, drink koffie en 
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wyn, luister 'rock'-musiek, swot saam, trek 'weird' aan, gaan 
saam op 'dates', lees poesie en het vet pret. 
Ek begin kaal slaap, begin lag met oorgawe, lees D.H. Lawrence 
(alles wat hy nog ooit geskryf het, selfs 'Lady Chatterley's 
Lover' wat toe nog verban is) en begin my eie filosofie oor seks 
en godsdiens ontwerp, naamlik dat as dit mooi en 'passionate' is 
en in liefde geskied, dit onmoontlik nie sonde kan wees nie maar 
selfs 'n vorm van 'spiritual experience' kan word ('the dark 
gods'). Ek voel bevry en juig in my nuutgevonde outonomie. My 
seksuele inisiatiewe voel skielik nie meer na sonde nie maar na 
bewyse van my 'aliveness', my 'vitality' en 'passion for life'. 
In 1975 vertrek ek Kaap toe om Engels honneurs te swot op 
Stellenbosch -- waar ek altyd wou swot -- en bly op my pa se 
aandrang in die koshuis op Helderberg Kollege. Voor ek arriveer 
het ek al 'n reputasie vir 'weird' en eksoties aantrek. My 
broer en neef laat my dadelik tuis voel. As my pa se dogter het 
ek 'n sekere status op die kampus. My skugterheid word as 
'unattainability' interpreteer. Ek word as die mooiste meisie op 
die kampus gekies een aand en is verstom. 'In fact', ek is 'n 
'hit'. Stellenbosch is wonderlik maar die rigiditeit en 
dissipline van Helderberg 'stifle' my. Etlike kere trek ek my 
bra en skoene uit, koop 'n bottel wyn en pak sigarette 
(Kollegemense sal flou val) en gaan le by die Bergrivier vir die 
hele dag in plaas van klasse bywoon. 
In die universiteitsvakansie gaan ek op 'n 'date' met 'n 
oenskynlik 'sweet' man wat verlangs familie is. Ek drink wyn en 
begin huil, hy sien 'n 'gap' en neem my 'virginity'. Ek haat 
dit, huil en soebat dat hy moet ophou maar hy weier. Ek gaan 
huis toe, neem 'n warm bad om my te reinig, huil 'n paar dae om 
en voel totaal 'depressed'. 
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Terug op Stellenbosch begin ek met C ... uitgaan. Ek het 'n klomp 
Portugese pelle ('underdog' sindroom) en 'n klomp bewonderaars. 
Ek lig C ... in oor my 'sexual views' en my duistere verlede. Hy 
wroeg maar aanvaar dit. In die vakansie wy ek die praktiese sy 
van my 'views' in met hom en geniet dit om die 'seducer' te 
wees. Ek kompliseer van tyd tot tyd als met my angste, trane, 
depressies, maagpyne en vrese dat ek ontrou aan hom sal wees oor 
ek nie seker is of ek so lief is vir hom as wat ek al vir ander 
ouens was nie. 
Gedurende 'n Julievakansie gaan ek per trein Kaap toe en bly by 
L ... (my neef). Daar sien ek vir D ... , 'n ou saam met wie ek 'n 
dinee op Helderberg bygewoon het. Ek en hy gesels ure, gaan 
fliek, loop op die strand, ry rond saam met L ... en raak 
verlief. Hy sien my af op die stasie, soen my totsiens en beloof 
om te skryf al weet hy van C .... By die huis gekom, vertel ek 
C ... daarvan. Aanvanklik gaan dinge maar voort maar D ... kom die 
Desembervakansie op en my broer nooi hom saam met ons Suidkus 
toe. C... wat intussen op Messina gestasioneer is kom 
kuier ook vir my by die see en ek voel verskeurd tussen die 
twee. 
Nadat D ... my amptelik gevra het om met hom uit te gaan, gee ek 
vir C ... die slegte nuus. Ons huil 'n nag saam om. Die volgende 
dag vertrek hy en los 'n brief op my kussing -- 'I love you 
madly and always will'. Dieselfde dag arriveer 'n telegram van 
D ... -- 'I love you and want to be yours forever'. Ek huil weer 
(my rna saam met my) en weet nie of ek die regte ding doen nie. 
Terwyl hy 'n kursus in Johannesburg loop, woon D ... 6 maande by 
ons. Ons is vreeslik verlief, hy vra my om te trou en ons raak 
amptelik verloof. My ouers is gelukkig -- hy is 'n goeie ou, kom 
uit 'n vooraanstaande en 'genteel' familie in ons kerk en is 'n 
regte 'gentleman'. Seksueel, egter, verloop dinge nie so vlot 
nie. Hy is vreeslik 'tender', soen my onophoudelik, bring elke 
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aand vir my 'n watersak en 'cuddle' my voor ons gaan slaap maar 
doen niks verder nie. Ons bespreek dit en hy se hy voel mense 
moet sulke goed 'negotiate' maar moet nooit 'all the way' gaan 
voor bulle getroud is nie. Vir my is 'negotiate' 'n vreemde, 
onromantiese idee en ek bet geen idee wat om te doen nie. Ek 
voel te bang om hom gewoonweg net te verlei uit vrees dat by sal 
dink ek is goedkoop. (Hy maak allerbande sulke geluide oor 
vrouens en seks.) 
Op 'n dag vertel by my dat sy broer vir 'n tyd lank in die tronk 
was en vra of ek dit kan aanvaar, ek se ja. Toe se by by wil met 
'n maagd trou want by is self een en ek gaan in 'n toestand in. 
Ek se vir hom ek is nie een nie en as hy dit nie kan aanvaar 
nie, dan is dit 'tough'. Hy wroeg vir dae maar besluit om my te 
'vergewe'. Hy kom egter daarna na my bed in die nag en 'insist' 
om seks te he ('proving he's as good as the previous man') maar 
dis aaklig elke keer. Ek kan nie glo dis dieselfde 'tender' man 
van vroeer nie. 
Ten spyte van tallose briewe, telegramme, geskenkies, uitneem na 
plekke en my verloofring, voel ek totaal 'insecure', 'unwanted' 
en 'unloved'. Hy weier om daaroor te praat, my troudag kom nader 
en ek weet GLAD nie hoe om te 'cope' met my vrese en onsekerbede 
of met die verbouding nie. Ons is albei dom en onervare en te 
bang om bulp te vra maar ek 'insist' dat ons vir berading moet 
gaan voor ons trou. Ons sien iemand by Lifeline 'n paar keer 
maar dit help weinig. 
Woede en konflik is ook 'n probleem. Ek krop op en ontplof en by 
onttrek sonder om iets te se. Ons besluit om die troue uit te 
stel. Hy gaan op 'n 'army'-kamp en se ons moet kontak verbreek 
in bierdie tyd, tog stuur hy poskaarte. Na die kamp skryf by vir 
my 'n afsebrief. Ek raak bisteries en moet 'n inspuiting by die 
dokter kry om my te kalmeer. Later skryf ek vir D ... en vra wat 
regtig verkeerd was by antwoord en se ek bet hom 'castrated' 
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laat voel. Ek voel morsdood en my selfbeeld stort heeltemaal in 
duie. 
Ek vra my dokter om my na 'n sielkundige te verwys en by stuur 
my na 'n psigiater wat toetse op my doen, my diagnoseer as 
obsessief-kompulsief en my ses keer vir 15 minute sien. Ons kom 
nooit eens uit by die seksuele nie en ek verstaan weinig van wat 
by se behalwe dat by se ek moet minder analities wees en ophou 
'worry' oor goed(!) Ek huil vir 6 maande en my pa huil soms saam 
met my en toe gaan die lewe maar weer aan. 
C ... , my 'ex', skryf nog altyd vir my en kuier by my en 
weer om uit te gaan maar ek kan nie, ek's te 'cut 
vra my 
up'. Ek 
besluit om my 'reg te ruk' en begin 'gym'. Ek neem ook 
bestuurlesse en op 25 kry ek my lisensie. Ek bedank my werk, vat 
my R600 pensioengeld en vertrek Kaap toe om daar werk te soek. 
Ek kry 'n woonstel in die Tuine en woon vir die eerste keer 
aileen. 
Ek begin by 'n Kleurling onderwyskollege in Roggebaai klas gee, 
maak twee kleurling vriendinne en sien al my ou vriende van die 
Helderberg Kollege weer op 'n gereelde basis. Ek begin 'social' 
soos nog nooit tevore nie 
kuier, pieknieks, uitry in 
strand. Dis vir my wonderlik. 
fliek, teater, uiteet, partytjies, 
die veld en berge en stap op die 
Intussen bet ek 'n Portugese ou van Helderberg se dae geken bet 
weer raakgeloop wat toe, in Windhoek woon. Ek sien hom een maal 
'n maand en by 'push' my om Namibie toe te trek en te trou. En 
'push' en 'push'. Hy bel tot my pa en by 'push' ook -- ek se net 
NEE, dis my lewe, ek weet waarvoor ek kans sien en wil nou eers 
in die Kaap bly en my eie ding doen. Maar intussen wil ek die 
man fisies met alle mag en geweld he en by soen my net op my 
voorkop en wil met my trou ... Weereens raak seks 'n 'issue'. Hy 
se by respekteer my en my pa en ek is so 'insecure' en woedend 
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oor sy dubbelstandaarde, ek sien net verwerping en chauvinisme 
in sy houding. 
Ons baklei en baklei. Nader hand word verwyte rondgeslinger, ek 
raak depressief en voel soos 'n 'freak'. My dokter sit my op 
anti-depressante en probeer my oortuig om die man te los. Na nog 
'n ruk van intense verwarring en teleurstelling is ons wel 
uitmekaar uit. 
Terug in die Kaap mis ek hom baie maar gaan redelik goed aan tot 
ek by my Portugese vriendinne hoor wat hy als te se het oor my: 
'Never an intellectual woman for me again; she's so analytical', 
ensovoorts). Aanhoudend moet ek sulke goed hoor tot ek eendag 
'crack' en soos 'n besetene by Gordonsbaai se berg opry en besef 
ek is uit beheer uit. My dokter hospitaliseer my vir 10 dae, 
besoek my elke dag en stuur my huis toe vir nog twee weke. 
Daarna trek ek na 'n woonstel in die Strand wat direk oorkant 
die see is en oor Tafelberg uitkyk. Dis pragtig. C ... bel en 
skryf nog steeds al die jare en vra my in die vakansie om hom in 
Johannesburg te ontmoet. Hy is baie goor met my en se hy sou my 
verkrag het as hy my nog wou gehad het, maar hy wil my nie meer 
he nie. 
In 1983 op 29-jarige leeftyd trek ek skielik terug Transvaal toe 
as gevolg van politieke redes. Blankes word gewoonlik net in 
tydelike poste aangestel in Kleurlingonderwys en dus moet my pos 
elke jaar hernu word. Die rektor van die kollege kom glad nie 
klaar met my Kleurling vriendin, F ... , nie en ek is bevrees hy 
gaan my die volgende jaar in haar pos aanstel, al belowe hy om 
dit nie te do en nie. Ek kry 'n pos by 'n technikon in die 
Transvaal en ek trek terug, hoewel ek nie eintlik in die 
Transvaal wil bly nie. 
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Hierbo ken ek niemand nie. Dis droog en warm. Ek haat die plek 
en is ontsettend eensaam. Ek woon weereens by my ouers omdat ek 
nie kans sien om in 'n klein woonstelletjie in Sunnyside te woon 
nie. Ek gaan elke vakansie Kaap toe en is baie 'depressed' bier 
bo. Om my 'sanity' te behou begin ek swot (Afrikaans honneurs 
deur Unisa) en beplan 'n oorsese toer in Juniemaand saam met 'n 
vriendin. Sy trek kop uit en ek besluit om aileen te gaan. Ek 
begin ook terapie by dr. K ... en is weer op anti-depressante. Ek 
voel dikwels aileen, soos 'n volslae mislukking, 'n oujongnooi, 
en 'suicidally depressed' maar sit ook tien voet 'mure' om my 
vir die volgende twee 
toe ek 30 is en almal 
'n 'freak' ' unable --
to other people'. 
jaar om mense 
vra my wanneer 
to move outside 
weg te hou. My 
trou ek dan. Ek 
of my fear and 
sussie trou 
voel soos 
reach out 
My terapie met dr. K ... verhoed dat ek wel selfmoord pleeg maar 
nie veel meer as dit nie. Met sy aanmoediging begin ek weer 
'date' maar omdat ek nie meer kerk toe gaan nie begin ek vir die 
eerste keer met ouens uitgaan wat 'daar buite in die wereld is'. 
Dis 'n nuwe wereld vir my. 
Intussen bet ek vriende gemaak en 'social' baie. Ek is minder by 
die huis by my ouers en bulle meng nie in my lewe in nie. My pa 
se net altyd, 'As jy gelukkig is, my kind, dan is ek ook 
gelukkig'. Dr K ... is baie ondersteunend en moedig my aan om net 
myself te wees en myself te aanvaar. 
Daarna bet ek 'n 6 maande verhouding met 'n Poolse plastiese 
chirurg wat 7 jaar ouer as ek is -- dis 'n baie goeie verhouding 
en by laat my 'wanted' voel en beskou nie my inisiatiewe as 
onvroulik nie. Ek is egter baie onseker want die verhouding is 
baie 'open ended' en by se nooit by is lief vir my nie al is by 
baie sjarmant en 'affirming'. Na 6 maande vind ek uit by is 
getroud en sy vrou kom Suid-Afrika toe uit Poland. Ek is 
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'shattered' en probeer aanvanklik nog die verhouding voortsit 
maar start in duie 2 maande later. 
Ek 'verloor' 2 dae erens (totale geheueverlies) en word 
gehospitaliseer in Denmar deur 'n psigiater. Hy 'push' my om 
alle bande met die man te verbreek wat ek toe doen, maar ek huil 
baie, wil net doodgaan, is so maer soos 'n plank en kan nie eet 
of slaap nie, ten spyte van sterk medikasie. Dr K ... is baie 
ondersteunend en geleidelik kom ek weer reg. 
Ek skryf in by Unisa vir Engels honneurs en lees ook omtrent al 
die Russiese en Franse 'classics' gedurende die volgende jaar. 
Verder besluit ek om my eie huis te kry, koop 'n erf, trek 
planne op en laat bou. Ek maak ook al my eie beddegoed, gordyne, 
ensovoorts. Daarna begin ek tuinmaak en 'settle' in in my 
huisie. Ek geniet dit ontsettend en onthaal baie dikwels mense 
al het ek min meubels. 
My rna kry in die stadium borskanker en dis baie ontstellend vir 
ons. Sy gaan Tygerberg toe vir behandeling eerder as om bier 'n 
onmiddellike en volledige mastektomie te ondergaan. 
Na nog 'n ongelukkige verhouding met my nuwe buurman beland ek 
weer in die hospitaal nadat ek 'n klomp pille gedrink bet. Die 
volgende week skryf ek 2 Engels honneurs-vraestelle en slaag dit 
met lof! Ek is so maer soos 'n kraai wanneer ek by die huis 
kom. Ek leen R300 en sit mure op tussen my en my buurman se 
huis. 
My pa kry 'n melanoom aan sy been en dit word uitgesny sander 
enige bestraling of chemoterapie of iets (ek weet nie hoekom 
nie). Die dokters lig ons ook nie in oor wat om verder te verwag 
nie. Hy bou intussen 'n huis vir my rna reg by die dam op 
Hartebeespoort en werk soos 'n besetene -- seker om te vergeet 
van die kanker. Na 'n paar maande raak hy verlam en 'n invalide 
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hy bet nou sekondere breinkanker. My ma is verpletterd en ek 
neem dadelik 'n beskermende rol in teenoor haar. 
Na nog 'n kortstondige en 'abusive' verhouding met 'n jong man 
oortuig 'n vriendin my om weereens terapie te probeer, die keer 
by jou. Dis vir my erg om my hele 'sorry' geskiedenis aan 'n 
vreemdeling op te dis maar ek besluit om tog te gaan en beland 
toe by jou. Kort daarna begin ek en A ... te 'date' vir 6 maande 
en die hele storie ken jy. My pa is ook oorlede 3 maande na my 
35ste verjaarsdag. Voor sy dood vra hy my om terug te kom kerk 
toe en om met so 'n oujongkerel vriend van my by die werk, te 
trou sodat hy gemoedsrus kan he. Ek wens ek kon se ja, ek sal, 
maar ek kan nie. Ek se net vir hom ek is BAlE lief vir hom en 
spandeer baie tyd by hom gedurende sy laaste weke -- ek is 
dankbaar dat ek my selfmoordpoging oorleef bet sodat hy minstens 
dit gespaar is so kort voor sy dood. 
Na A ... voel ek ek bet genoeg gehad van my destruktiewe 
lewenswyse en weet ek kan nie meer een so 'n verhouding oorleef 
nie. 
In die jaar na my pa se dood bly ek 8 maande by my ma en kry 
wonderbaarlike geduld om te 'cope' met haar hartseer, 
passiwiteit, afhanklikheid, ensovoorts. Ek raak ook stil en 
onttrek my van byna almal. Meestal doen ek introspeksie en werk 
aan my terapie met jou -- jy's die enigste mens wat glo dat wat 
met my aangaan goed kan wees. 
Ek neem waar as mede-direkteur vir 6 maande en vind dit baie 
stresvol al doen ek redelik goed. My vriendskappe gaan deur 
krisisse, ek bevraagteken alles wat ek doen en verloor my 
spontane!teit, voel soms soos 'n 'freak', en baie 'lonely'. 
Oorweeg dit om huis op te sit saam met my ma maar verander, 
goddank, van plan. Sy verkoop haar huis, koop 'n kleiner een en 
skryf haar kar af in 'n ongeluk. Vir 6 maande moet ek haar orals 
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rondneem en ek raak ontsettend 'resentful'. Moet ook 'cope' met 
verveeldheid soos nog nooit in my lewe nie. Ek en my rna doen 
baie dinge saam en raak 'closer' as voorheen al is ek baie 
ongeduldig met haar van tyd tot tyd. 
Sekere van my vriendskappe versuur heeltemaal, maar ander kom 
weer reg. Dan kom my absurde en misplaaste obsessie met J ... in 
1992, waarvan jy al die detail weet. Teen die einde van verlede 
jaar is ek 
seksueel met 
het en mal 
baie moeg vir my 'celibacy' en eksperimenteer weer 
my eerste kerel, D ... , wat nog altyd kontak behou 
is oor my, Met A ... , L ... se broer en G ... , 'n ou 
'varsity'-pel. Al drie is/was in my kerk! 
Aan die einde van verlede jaar ontdek ons ook dat my rna se 
kanker nou sekonder versprei het na haar longe toe en sy reageer 
glad nie op die terapie wat sy by Tygerberg ontvang nie. Sy boor 
sy het seker 6 maande oor om te lewe. Dis verskriklik vir haar 
en baie erg vir ons. Sy besluit teen chemoterapie en is nou op 
'n 'naturopath' se gesondheidsprogram en ons kan maar net wag en 
sien wat gebeur en bid vir krag om haar te ondersteun. Ek wil 
inskryf vir 'n MA op RAU maar weet nog nie of ek moet nie dis 
dalk net te veel stres. Ek voel ook my eie 'mortality' aan my 
lyf en dink -- ek weet nog skaars hbe om te lewe en ek kan more 
doodgaan ... Dis 'frightening'! Ook die gedagte om totaal alleen 
agter te bly met net my sus in die Kaap, my paar pelle en my 
bond en myself. 
Wat die volgende 2 jaar tot ek 40 is betref, wil ek my rna 
bystaan en haar dood verwerk as dit moet, en ook my vrede met 
haar probeer sluit oor die verlede. Verder wil ek werk aan my 
terapie, vriendskappe, verhoudings net kollegas, 'n MA-graad en 
'survival on my own' -- outonomie, seker. 
Daar is nog baie werk nodig in terapie en baie geduld en 
'perseverance' nodig aan my en jou kant. Goddank vir jou geduld 
en liefde, ook jou kreatiewe 
moontlikhede kan voorstel en 
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en praktiese denke, dat jy soveel 
by die 'skills' en 'nitty gritty' 
uitkom sander om in vae teoriee vas te haak. Ek is nog baie bang 
vir die uiteindelike losmaakproses van jou af, maar, nou ja. 
Verder is 'n mens onseker oor jou werk, huissubsidie, pensioen 
en selfs jou veiligheid in die 'nuwe' Suid-Afrika, 'but what to 
do'? 'But to carry on and hope for the best'. 
Ek het nou die aand afgekom op 'n paar goedjies wat ek geskry£ 
het 'n paar maande voor ek terapie by jou begin het. Hierdie 
gediggie wys duidelik hoe ek gevoel het. 
And what then? 
Hospitalized 
medicated and sedated 
freed from this obsession 
and recurring depression 
self seemingly in repossession 
And then what? 
A new lover? 
and a new hurt. 
a dying father 
absent and exhausted mother 
work, yes 
debts, yes 
an old car 
and rejected body 
over-used friends 
and a garden overgrown? 
That's what. 
